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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA03-193
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 December  2003
IN THE MATTER OF
TRE’ZHA COLLETTE YANCEY,
DOB  11/8/2001
Forsyth County
No.  01 J  464
Appeal  by  respondent  mother  from  order  entered  11  September
2002  by  Judge  William  Graham  in  Forsyth  County  District  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  17 November  2003.
Forsyth  County  Department  of  Social  Services,  by  Assistant
County Attorney Theresa A. Boucher, for petitioner-appellee.
Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant.
Womble,  Carlyle,  Sandridge  &  Rice,  P.L.L.C.,  by  Joann  A.
Waters, for the Guardian ad Litem.
MARTIN, Judge.
Respondent,  Rima  Yancey,  is  the  mother  of  Tre’Zha  Collette
Yancey, born on 8 November 2001.   Due to respondent’s incarceration
at the time of the minor child’s birth, Tre’Zha was placed in the
custody of the Forsyth County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
on                                                                                              9  November   2001.    On   13  November   2001,  DSS  filed  a  petition
alleging that Tre’Zha did not receive proper care, supervision or
discipline, and had been abandoned by respondent, and thus, was a
neglected  and  dependent  juvenile.     The  petition  alleged  that
respondent  had  lost  custody  of  another  child  due  to  neglect,  and




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her parental rights had been terminated as to three other children.
On  15  May  2002,  nunc  pro  tunc  13  February  2002,  Tre’Zha  was
adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile pursuant to G.S. §§
7B-101(9) and (15).   The trial court determined that “reunification
[with respondent] is not appropriate at this time,” approved DSS’s
plan  for  adoption,  and  relieved  DSS  of  any  further  reunification
efforts.    However, the trial court determined that respondent was
entitled  to  three  hours  per  week  of  supervised  visitation  with
Tre’Zha, and that respondent may be reunified with her daughter if
she:                                                                             (1)  undergoes  a  full  psychological  evaluation  and  follows
through with any recommendations;  (2) undergoes a substance abuse
assessment  and  follows  all  recommendations;  and                             (3)  submits  to
random drug testing.
On                                                                               13   March                                                             2002,   DSS   filed   a   petition   to   terminate
respondent’s parental rights to Tre’Zha.   The petition alleged that
one or more grounds existed to support the termination pursuant to
G.S.  §  7B-1111.    On  19  and  23  August  2002,  a  hearing  was  held  to
determine  the  merits  of  the  petition  to  terminate  respondent’s
parental rights.   In an order entered 11 September 2002, the trial
court found that respondent neglected the juvenile pursuant to G.S.
§                                                                                7B-1111(a)(1).    Specifically,  the  trial  court  found  that  the
juvenile had previously been adjudicated neglected on  13 February
2002,  that  although  respondent  was  released  from  prison  on               10
December 2001 and re-incarcerated on 21 February 2002, she had not
visited  Tre’Zha  while  she  was  able  to  do  so,  that  respondent  has




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failed  to  provide  any  support  for  Tre’Zha  during  the  lifetime  of
the  child,  that  respondent  failed  to  complete  previously  ordered
substance  abuse  treatment,  failed  to  attend  a  previously  ordered
psychological  evaluation,  failed  to  attend  previously  ordered
parenting classes, failed to establish steady employment during the
time  she  was  not  incarcerated,  and  that  respondent’s  parental
rights to three other children had been involuntarily terminated by
the Juvenile Court of Forsyth County.    The trial court also found
that  respondent  lacked  the  ability  to  establish  a  safe  home
pursuant  to  G.S.  §  7B-1111(a)(9).    Specifically,  the  trial  court
found  that  respondent                                                      “continues  to  maintain  a  lifestyle  which
includes multiple incarcerations, illegal drug use and instability
in  maintaining  a  safe  home  for  herself  and  her  children.”
Accordingly,  the  trial  court  concluded  that  it  was  in  the  best
interest of the minor child that the parental rights of respondent
be terminated.    Respondent appeals.
Respondent first argues that the trial court’s conclusion that
Tre’Zha is a neglected juvenile pursuant to G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is
not  supported  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence.    After  careful
review, we disagree.
An order terminating one’s parental rights is not authorized
unless  the  trial  court  determines  that                                  “any  one  or  more  of  the
conditions  authorizing  a  termination  of  the  parental  rights  of  a
parent  exist  .  .  .                                                       .”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1110(a)  (2001).    A
finding  of  neglect  is  sufficient  to  authorize  a  termination  of




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parental  rights.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                             §                  7B-1111(a)(1)   (2001).    The
                                                                             standard  of  review  for  neglect  determinations  under  G.S.                                                           §   7B-
1111(a)(1) is whether there is clear and convincing evidence that:
(1)  the  juvenile  is  neglected  pursuant  to  G.S.  §  7B-101(15),  and
(2)                                                                          “the  juvenile  has  sustained  'some  physical,  mental,  or
emotional impairment . . . or [there is] a substantial risk of such
impairment' as a consequence of the neglect.”    In re Beasley,  147
N.C. App. 399, 403, 555 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2001)(citations omitted).
A  neglected  juvenile  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                      §                                                                     7B-101(15)
(2001) is a juvenile:
who does not receive proper care, supervision,
or  discipline  from  the  juvenile's  parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has
been   abandoned;   or   who   is   not   provided
necessary medical care; or who is not provided
necessary  remedial  care;  or  who  lives  in  an
environment   injurious   to   the   juvenile's
welfare;  or  who  has  been  placed  for  care  or
adoption in violation of law.
Since  respondent  did  not  challenge  the  sufficiency  of  the
evidence supporting the findings of fact, we treat such findings as
conclusive.   In re Caldwell, 75 N.C. App. 299, 301, 330 S.E.2d 513,
515                                                                          (1985).    The  trial  court  found  that  Tre’Zha  was  previously
adjudicated neglected on  13 February  2002, that respondent failed
to  attend  court  ordered  substance  abuse  treatment  or  parenting
classes in January and February of 2002, that respondent failed to
visit with Tre’Zha while she was able to do so, attending only two
out  of  sixteen  visitation  opportunities,  that  respondent  has
provided no support for Tre’Zha, that she failed to attend a court
ordered  psychological  evaluation  on                                       12  February                                                          2002,  that  she




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caused herself to be re-incarcerated on  21 February  2002, with an
anticipated  release  date  of  December  2003,  and  that  respondent’s
parental  rights  to  three  other  children  had  been  involuntarily
terminated.    Respondent argues that these findings of fact do not
support  a  conclusion  that                                                   “the  juvenile  has  sustained  'some
physical,  mental,  or  emotional  impairment  .  .  .  or  [there  is]  a
substantial  risk  of  such  impairment'  as  a  consequence  of  the
neglect,”  In  re  Beasley,  147  N.C.  App.  at  403,  555  S.E.2d  at  646
(citations  omitted),  because  none  of  the  findings  point  to  any
evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.
However,“[i]f there is no evidence of neglect at the time of
the termination proceeding . . . parental rights may nonetheless be
terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of neglect
and  the  trial  court  finds  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence  a
probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned
to her parents.”    In re Reyes,  136 N.C. App.  812,  815,  526 S.E.2d
499,  501  (2000).    In  this  case,  there  is  a  past  adjudication  of
neglect,  but  respondent  argues  that  the  findings  of  fact  are  not
sufficient  to  support  a  conclusion  that  the  neglect  would  be
repeated if the juvenile were returned to the care of respondent.
We disagree.
In  the  case  of  In  re  Davis,  116  N.C.  App.  409,  413-414,  448
S.E.2d 303, 306, disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 516, 452 S.E.2d 808
(1994),  the  Court  held  that  the  parents’  failure  to                    “obtain[]
continued  counseling,  a  stable  home,  stable  employment,  and
[attend]  parenting  classes”  was  sufficient  to  show  a  probability




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that neglect would be repeated if the juvenile were returned to the
care of the parents.   In the case of In re Bradshaw,  ___ N.C. App.
____, ___, 587 S.E.2d 83, ___ (2003), the Court held that a failure
to  provide  any  financial  support  for  a  child,  no  matter  how
trivial, and the failure to seek personal contact with or attempt
to convey love and affection to a child were sufficient to support
a  conclusion  of  neglect.    Likewise,  the  findings  of  fact  in  this
case are more than sufficient to support the conclusion that there
was a probability that the neglect would be repeated if Tre’Zha was
returned  to  the  custody  of  respondent,  and  thus,  Tre’Zha  was
neglected pursuant to G.S.  §  7B-1111(a)(1).
Since the trial court’s findings are sufficient to support the
termination  of  respondent’s  parental  rights  under  G.S.                  §   7B-
1111(a)(1),  we  need  not  address  the  issue  of  whether  the  trial
court’s findings are also sufficient to support the termination of
respondent’s parental rights under G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(9).   N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2001); see also In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404,
293  S.E.2d  127,  133  (1982)(if  any  of  the  grounds  for  termination
listed by the trial court is  “supported by findings of fact based
on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the order appealed from
should be affirmed”).
Respondent  lastly  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  when  it
concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in
the best interest of the child.   Once a trial court determines that
“any one or more of the conditions authorizing a termination of the
parental rights of a parent exist, the court shall issue an order




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terminating the parental rights of such parent with respect to the
juvenile  unless  the  court  shall  further  determine  that  the  best
interests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the
parent  not  be  terminated.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1110(a)  (2001).
Whether  termination  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the  child  is
discretionary.   In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 543 S.E.2d
906,                                                                         910                                                                (2001).    Thus,  we  review  such  a  finding  for  abuse  of
discretion only.
A  trial  court  may  decline  to  terminate  parental  rights  only
where                                                                        “there  is  reasonable  hope  that  the  family  unit  within  a
reasonable period of time can reunite and provide for the emotional
and physical welfare of the child.”    Id.    There is no requirement
that the trial court make findings of fact when entering an order
terminating  parental  rights;  only  when  the  court  determines  that
termination  is  not  in  the  best  interests  of  the  child  are  such
findings required. Id.
In this case, respondent argues that the numerous demands made
of  respondent  in  the  two  and  half  months  that  she  was  not
incarcerated   were   unrealistic   and   unmanageable,   and   that   a
termination of parental rights only nine months after the birth of
the  child  was  an  abuse  of  discretion.                                  “One  of  the  underlying
principles  guiding  the  trial  court  in  the  dispositional  stage  is
the recognition of the necessity for any child to have a permanent
plan of care at the earliest possible age, while at the same time
recognizing the need to protect all children from the unnecessary
severance  of  a  relationship  with  biological  parents  or  legal




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guardians.”    In re Blackburn,  142 N.C. App. at  612,  543 S.E.2d at
910.   Here, respondent caused herself to be re-incarcerated and is
not scheduled to be released from prison until December 2003, over
a year after the termination proceedings were held.    Coupled with
the  extensive  findings  of  fact  supporting  the  conclusion  that
Tre’Zha  was  neglected  pursuant  to  G.S.  §  7B-1111(a)(1),  we  agree
with the trial court that there was not a reasonable hope that the
family  unit  could  be  reunited  successfully  within  a  reasonable
period of time.   Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s  conclusion  that  it  was  in  the  best  interest  of  the  child
that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge LEVINSON concur.
Report per rule  30(e).

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