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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA07-1411
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  3 February  2009
DOUGLAS DALE JOHNS,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              New Hanover County
                                                                                                Nos.  06 CVD  597
JANICE MARIE JOHNS,                                                                             06 CVD  4299
Defendant,
___
JES
f,
v.
DOUGLAS DALE JOHNS,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  Douglas  Dale  Johns  from  orders  entered                                         20  April
2007,  30 April  2007, and  7 May  2007 by Judge Phyllis M. Gorham in
New Hanover County District Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals
11 June  2008.
Lisa Skinner Lefler for Douglas Dale Johns, appellant.
No brief filed on behalf of Janice Marie Johns, appellee.
GEER, Judge.
Douglas Dale Johns filed notices of appeal from  (1) an order
entered  20  April  2007  dismissing  motions  filed  by  Mr.  Johns  and
imposing Rule  11 sanctions on the law firm representing him, (2) a
second order entered on  20 April  2007 finding him in contempt and




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ordering him to pay attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,916.32, (3)
a  30  April  2007  order  for  arrest,  and  (4)  an  order  entered  7  May
2007  requiring  Mr.  Johns  to  pay  attorneys'  fees  in  the  amount  of
$3,600.00.    Because  the  record  on  appeal  does  not  include  either
the  20 April  2007 contempt/attorneys' fee order or the  7 May  2007
order, we dismiss the appeal as to those two orders.
With respect to the 20 April 2007 order relating to Mr. Johns'
motions, Mr. Johns primarily argues that the trial court erred in
failing  to  hold  an  evidentiary  hearing  prior  to  dismissing  his
motions.    Mr. Johns has not, however, on appeal, explained why an
evidentiary  hearing  was  necessary  to  decide  his  motions  or  what
evidence he would have presented at such a hearing.   Consequently,
we affirm the trial court's order as to those motions.
Mr. Johns' sole argument as to the order of arrest is that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because of his
appeal from the 20 April  2007 order regarding his motions.   Since,
however, Mr. Johns had not appealed from the order requiring him to
pay the attorneys' fees that led to the arrest and since Mr. Johns
did  not  seek  a  stay  of  enforcement  of  the  order  for  payment  of
attorneys' fees, we hold that the notice of appeal did not divest
the trial court of jurisdiction.
Facts
Mr.  Johns  and  Ms.  Johns  were  married  on                                  12  June                                                       1999,
separated on  5 November  2005, and ultimately divorced in February
2007.                                                                           They  have  one  child,  and  Ms.  Johns  also  has  another
daughter,  Jessica  Johns,  from  a  prior  marriage.     During  their




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separation, Ms. Johns filed a complaint and a motion for a domestic
violence protective order ("DVPO") against Mr. Johns on 8 February
2006.    Two  days  later,  on                                               10  February   2006,  Mr.  Johns  filed  an
action seeking custody of their child.    On  17 March  2006, Mr. and
Ms.  Johns  filed  a  stipulated  dismissal  of  the  DVPO  action  with
prejudice  and  a  consent  order  providing  for  temporary  custody  of
their child and restraining Mr. Johns from approaching Ms. Johns or
Jessica Johns.
On                                                                           30  March      2006,  Ms.  Johns  filed  an  answer  to  Mr.  Johns'
complaint for custody together with counterclaims seeking permanent
custody  of  their  child,  child  support,  post-separation  support,
alimony,  equitable  distribution,  sequestration,  and  attorneys'
fees.    Mr. Johns filed a reply on  6 June  2006.
On 6 October 2006, Jessica Johns filed a complaint and motion
for  a  DVPO  against  Mr.  Johns,  alleging  that  he  had  violated  the
agreed-upon restraining order.   Because Jessica Johns was 17 at the
time, her mother, Ms. Johns, was appointed as her guardian ad litem
("GAL") by the clerk of court.   On 12 October 2006, Mr. Johns filed
a motion to dismiss Jessica Johns' action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of  the  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  an  answer,  a  document  entitled
"Objection to Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem Janice Marie Johns
and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Motion for Domestic
Violence Protective Order" (referred to hereafter as "Objection to
GAL"), and a motion for Rule  11 sanctions.
The trial court conducted a hearing on 13 October 2006 on Mr.
Johns'  motion  to  dismiss.     The  court,  from  the  bench,  allowed




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Jessica  Johns'  oral  motion  to  amend  her  complaint  and  denied  Mr.
Johns'  motion  to  dismiss  under  Rule  12(b)(6).    The  written  order
reflecting those rulings was not entered until 19 October 2006.   On
16  October  2006,  before  entry  of  the  order  and  prior  to  Jessica
Johns'  filing  her  amended  complaint,  Mr.  Johns  filed  a  motion  to
strike  any  amended  or  supplemental  complaint  as  being  "untimely"
filed.    The  next  day,                                                     17  October                                                    2006,  Jessica  Johns  filed  her
amended  complaint,  as  well  as  a  motion  for  Rule                       11  sanctions
against Mr. Johns and the law firm representing him.
On  2 November  2006, Mr. Johns filed an "Amended Objection to
Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem Janice Marie Johns and Motion to
Dismiss  Plaintiff's  Complaint  and  Motion  for  Domestic  Violence
Protective Order"  (hereafter "Amended Objection to GAL") together
with  a  memorandum  of  law.    In  addition,  on  8  November  2006,  Mr.
Johns moved to amend the trial court's 19 October 2006 order, again
arguing  that  the  amended  complaint  was  untimely  filed.     On          18
December                                                                      2006,  Mr.  Johns  also  filed  an  answer  to  the  amended
complaint.   The trial court entered an amended order consolidating
Mr. Johns' and Jessica Johns' actions on  8 February  2007.
On                                                                            16  March                                                      2007,  Mr.  Johns  filed  a  "Motion  to  Consider
Potential Conflicts of Interest Arising from Dual Representation of
Plaintiff  and  GAL  and  If  Found,  to  Remove  Counsel  of  Record,"
requesting the trial court to remove Linda B. Sayed as counsel for
both  Ms.  Johns  and  Jessica  Johns.     In  this  motion,  Mr.  Johns
repeated various allegations contained in the Objection to GAL and
Amended Objection to GAL, added some new allegations, and contended




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that if the GAL appointment was found improper, Linda B. Sayed, who
had  been  both  Ms.  Johns'  counsel  and  counsel  in  Jessica  Johns'
action, should be removed as counsel for both Jessica Johns and Ms.
Johns  "in  all  pending  matters  before  the  New  Hanover  County
District Court."   On 23 March 2007, Jessica Johns filed a motion to
strike,  dismiss,  or  deny  the  motion  to  remove  Ms.  Sayed  and  a
motion for Rule  11 sanctions on the ground that Mr. Johns' motion
was filed for an improper purpose.
On  26 March  2007, during a pre-trial conference, the parties
agreed to convert the terms of the temporary custody order into a
permanent custody order in exchange for Jessica Johns' dismissing
her action for a DVPO against Mr. Johns.   Despite the agreement to
dismiss  the  DVPO  action,  Jessica  Johns,  through  Ms.  Johns  as  her
GAL,  refused  to  withdraw  her  motion  for  sanctions  against  Mr.
Johns,  and  Mr.  Johns  refused  to  withdraw  his  pending  motions  and
objections to Ms. Johns' serving as Jessica Johns' GAL.
The  trial  court  held  a  hearing  the  next  day  to  rule  on  all
outstanding  issues,  including:                                             (1)  Mr.  Johns'  motion  to  modify
child and spousal support, (2) his motion to strike Jessica Johns'
DVPO amended complaint, (3) his motion to amend the 19 October 2006
order, (4) his Amended Objection to GAL, (5) his motion to consider
potential  conflicts  of  interest,                                          (6)  his  motion  for  Rule            11
sanctions,  and  (7)  Jessica  Johns'  motion  for  Rule  11  sanctions.
The trial court first heard the motion to modify child and spousal
support and related motions to hold Mr. Johns in contempt.   During
that  hearing,  both  Mr.  Johns  and  Ms.  Johns  called  witnesses  to




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testify in support of their positions.   The trial court granted Mr.
Johns' motion to reduce child support, found that Mr. Johns was in
willful  contempt  for  failure  to  pay  post-separation  support  and
attorneys'  fees,  and  denied  Mr.  Johns'  motion  to  reduce  post-
separation support.
After the trial court ruled on the motions related to support,
the court indicated that it would consider the remaining motions.
Mr.  Johns'  counsel  objected  to  the  trial  court's  hearing  any  of
those motions that day since, according to Mr. Johns' counsel, the
motions  required  the  presentation  of  evidence  and  Mr.  Johns'
witnesses  had  been  released  from  their  subpoenas  the  day  before
based on the agreement to dismiss the DVPO action.   The trial court
overruled the objection and subsequently dismissed or denied all of
Mr. Johns' motions and objections.   With respect to Jessica Johns'
motion for Rule  11 sanctions, the trial court heard oral argument
and orally granted that motion and imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Mr.
Johns' counsel.
The trial court entered an order on 20 April 2007 setting out
its  rulings  on  Mr.  Johns'  motions  and  Jessica  Johns'  motion  for
Rule  11 sanctions.    With respect to the Rule  11 motion, the trial
court  concluded  that  "[t]he  Amended  Objection  to  GAL  is  not
warranted  by  existing  law  or  a  good  faith  argument  for  the
extension,  modification,  or  reversal  of  existing  law."    Further,
according  to  the  order,  "[t]he  Amended  Objection  to  GAL  and
supporting  Memorandum  of  Law  were  filed  for  an  improper  purpose,
that  is,  to  harass  and  humiliate  Janice  Marie  Johns,  to  cause




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unnecessary  delay  in  this  matter,  and  to  needlessly  increase  the
cost of litigation."   The trial court found that Jessica Johns and
her mother, as GAL, had jointly incurred $4,000.00 to $5,000.00 in
attorneys' fees.   The court then imposed a sanction of $1,000.00 on
Mr.  Johns'  counsel,  Rice  Law,  PLLC.    With  respect  to  the  other
pending motions, the trial court "summarily dismissed" Mr. Johns'
Motion  for  Sanctions,  his  Motion  to  Amend  Order,  his  Motion  to
Strike   Amended   Complaint   and   Motion   for   Domestic   Violence
Protective Order, and his Motion to Consider Conflicts of Interest.
The  court  "denied"  Mr.  Johns'  Amended  Objection  to  GAL  and
accompanying motion to dismiss.
On 26 April 2007, a notice of appeal was filed from this order
on behalf of both Rice Law, PLLC and Mr. Johns.  1 On 30 April 2007,
the  trial  court  entered  an  order  for  Mr.  Johns'  arrest,  finding
that Mr. Johns had previously been determined to be in contempt for
failure   to   pay   child   support,   post-separation   support,   and
attorneys'  fees  and  that  Mr.  Johns  had  "not  complied  with  the
condition  set  for                                                            [him]  to  purge  his  contempt,  that  is,  to  pay
attorneys'  fees  of                                                           $4,916.32  to  Block,  Crouch,  Keeter,  Behm  &
Sayed, LLP, by April 26, 2007, as set forth in the Order entered on
April  20,  2007."    On  18 May  2007, Mr. Johns filed a second notice
of  appeal  from  a  20  April  2007  order  finding  him  in  contempt  and
ordering the payment of $4,916.32 in attorneys' fees, the 30 April
1
Rice Law, PLLC has proceeded with a separate appeal  (COA07-
1259).    This opinion addresses only Mr. Johns' appeal.




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2007 order for arrest, and a  7 May  2007 order requiring Mr. Johns
to pay  $3,600.00 in attorneys' fees.
I
We  first  address  Mr.  Johns'                                               18  May                                                        2007  notice  of  appeal.
That notice of appeal states that he is appealing from:
[T]he  Honorable  Phyllis  M.  Gorham's:  Order
finding Douglas Johns in contempt of court and
ordering  him  to  pay  attorney  fees  in  the
amount of  $4,916.32 to Block, Crouch, Keeter,
                                                                              Behm  &  Sayed,  LLP,  entered  on  20  April                                              2007
(signed                                                                       18  April  but  filed                                          20  April                   2007,
entitled   "Modification   of   PSS   and   Child
Support  And  Contempt  in                                                    06  CVD                                                        597");  the
Order that Douglas Johns pay attorney fees to
Block,  Crouch,  Keeter,  Behm  &  Sayed,  LLP,  in
the  amount  of  $3600.00  entered  on  7  May  2007
(signed  3  May  but  filed  7  May  2007,  entitled
"Attorneys'  Fees                                                             —                                                              06  CVD                     597");  and  the
Honorable Phyllis M. Gorham's Order for Arrest
for contempt against Douglas Johns entered  30
April  2007.
Neither the  20 April  2007 nor the  7 May  2007 orders identified in
this notice of appeal are included in the record on appeal.
Rule                                                                          9  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure
provides  that  the  record  on  appeal  shall  contain  "a  copy  of  the
judgment,  order,  or  other  determination  from  which  appeal  is
taken."    N.C.R.  App.  P.  9(a)(1)(h).    It  is  well  established  that
"failure to include [the judgment] in the record on appeal subjects
the appeal to dismissal."    Searles v. Searles,  100 N.C. App.  723,
724, 398 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1990).   See also Abels v. Renfro Corp., 126
N.C.  App.  800,  804,  486  S.E.2d  735,  738  (recognizing  that  "this
Court  will  dismiss  an  appeal  if  the  judgment  or  order  does  not




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appear  in  the  record  on  appeal"),  disc.  review  denied,  347  N.C.
263,  493 S.E.2d  450  (1997).
It  is  not  entirely  clear  from  Mr.  Johns'  brief  on  appeal
whether  he  intended  to  pursue  his  appeal  of  these  two  attorneys'
fees  orders.     Nevertheless,  to  the  extent  his  first  question
presented                                                                    —  "Whether  the  trial  court  committed  reversible  error
when it sanctioned Douglas and ordered him to pay attorney's fees
for Janice"  — can be viewed as challenging those two orders, that
part of his appeal is dismissed.
We  next  note  that  13  pages  of  Mr.  Johns'  brief,  addressing
that first question presented, argue that the trial court erred in
imposing sanctions on him under Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure.   In the 20 April 2007 order addressing Jessica
Johns' motion for Rule  11 sanctions, the trial court found:
[Mr. Johns'] law firm, Rice Law, PLLC, should
be  sanctioned  for  its  attorney  signing  the
Amended Objection to GAL and the Memorandum of
Law when the members of the law firm knew, or
should have known, that it is not warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension,   modification,   or   reversal   of
existing  law;  and  that  on  its  face,  these
documents were filed for an improper purpose,
that is, to harass and humiliate Janice Marie
Johns,  to  cause  unnecessary  delay  in  this
matter, and to needlessly increase the cost of
litigation.
The  trial  court  concluded  that  "[Jessica  Johns']  Motion  for
Sanctions  should  be  allowed  against                                      [Mr.  Johns']  attorneys"  and
ordered  that  "Rice  Law,  PLLC,  shall  pay  $1,000.00  to  Plaintiff's
attorneys, Block, Crouch, Keeter, Behm & Sayed, LLP, within 30 days
of  today,  that  is  March                                                  27,                                                            2007."     The  order  contains  no




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determination that Mr. Johns violated Rule  11 and imposes no Rule
11  sanctions  on  him.    We,  therefore,  need  not  address  Mr.  Johns'
arguments regarding Rule  11.
II
Mr.  Johns  next  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
dismissing five of his motions without first conducting evidentiary
hearings  on  those  motions.    Mr.  Johns'  brief  on  appeal  does  not
include  any  argument  addressing  the  merits  of  his  motions.    We,
therefore,  limit  our  review  solely  to  the  question  whether  the
trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing.
When the trial court indicated that it would hear Mr. Johns'
pending  motions  and  Jessica  Johns'  Rule                                  11  motion,  Mr.  Johns
objected  to  the  court's  proceeding  when  the  motions  required  the
presentation of evidence, and Mr. Johns had released his witnesses
for  the  DVPO  action  from  their  subpoenas  the  day  before  based  on
his understanding that Jessica Johns would be dismissing the DVPO
action.   Mr. Johns' counsel did not, at the hearing, identify which
of  the  motions                                                              —  other  than  Jessica  Johns'  Rule   11  motion   —
required evidence, made no showing as to what evidence the released
witnesses would present that was relevant to the pending motions,
and did not explain how an evidentiary hearing would aid the trial
court in its resolution of his motions.   Mr. Johns has not provided
any  further  explanation  on  appeal.    We  nonetheless  specifically
address each motion.




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Motion to Strike Amended Complaint: In this motion, Mr. Johns
argued  that  the  trial  court  should  have  struck  the  amended  DVPO
complaint  as  untimely  because  it  was  not  filed  within  the  time
frame orally specified by Judge Criner when granting the motion to
amend.    Since Jessica Johns had agreed to voluntarily dismiss the
amended complaint and that dismissal occurred prior to the entry of
the                                                                           20   April   2007   order,   this   motion   was   rendered   moot.
Accordingly,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  summarily  dismissing
the  motion  without  holding  an  evidentiary  hearing.     See  In  re
Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978) ("Whenever,
during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought
has  been  granted  or  that  the  questions  originally  in  controversy
between  the  parties  are  no  longer  at  issue,  the  case  should  be
dismissed,  for  courts  will  not  entertain  or  proceed  with  a  cause
merely to determine abstract propositions of law."), cert. denied,
442 U.S.  929,  61 L. Ed.  2d  297,  99 S. Ct.  2859  (1979).
Amended Objection to GAL and Motion to Dismiss: In Mr. Johns'
Amended  Objection  to  GAL,  he  objected  to  the  appointment  of  Ms.
Johns  as  Jessica  Johns'  GAL  pursuant  to  Rule  17  of  the  Rules  of
Civil  Procedure.    He  also  moved  the  court  to  dismiss  Jessica's
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) "for lack of jurisdiction as a
result of the improvident appointment of the guardian ad litem who
is neither fit nor proper to appear before the Court.  .  .                   ."    The
trial court denied the Amended Objection to GAL and dismissed the
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Johns lacked standing to
challenge  the  appointment  of  a  GAL  for  Jessica.    Mr.  Johns  has




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offered no explanation why this objection and motion still needed
to  be  heard  in  light  of  the  voluntary  dismissal  of  the  amended
complaint.     Further,  "[w]hether                                          [a  party]  has  standing  is  a
question of law.  .  .                                                       ."    Indian Rock Ass'n v. Ball,  167 N.C. App.
648,  650,  606 S.E.2d  179,  180  (2004).    Mr. Johns has presented no
reason                                                                       —  and  we  know  of  none                                      —  why  evidence  was  necessary  to
determine this question of law.
Motion  to  Consider  Potential  Conflict  of  Interests:  This
motion was, by its terms, contingent on the trial court's allowing
his Amended Objection to GAL.   Again, Mr. Johns suggests no reason
why  he  needed  to  present  evidence  on  this  motion  once  the  trial
court concluded that his Amended Objection to GAL should be denied
based on standing and after Jessica Johns voluntarily dismissed her
DVPO action and Mr. and Ms. Johns resolved their custody dispute.
Mr. Johns' Motion for Rule  11 Sanctions: Mr. Johns contends,
citing Brown v. Hurley,  124 N.C. App.  377,  477 S.E.2d  234  (1996),
that  every  motion  for  Rule  11  sanctions  requires  an  evidentiary
hearing.   Nothing in Brown supports this proposition.   Indeed, the
opinion suggests that the "evidence" considered in connection with
the  Rule                                                                    11  motion  in  that  case  was  the  evidence  developed  in
discovery  conducted  in  order  to  litigate  the  underlying  action.
Id. at  382,  477 S.E.2d at  239.
As we have pointed out in the appeal by Rice Law, PLLC, Johns
v. Johns, COA07-1259,  __ N.C. App.  __,  __,  __ S.E.2d  __,  __  (Feb.
3, 2009), filed this same date, this Court held in Taylor v. Taylor
Prods., Inc.,  105 N.C. App.  620,  629,  414 S.E.2d  568,  575  (1992),




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overruled on other grounds by Brooks v. Giesey,  334 N.C.  303,  432
S.E.2d  339  (1993),  that  an  evidentiary  hearing  is  required  on  a
Rule  11  motion  only  when  necessary  to  resolve  issues  of  fact  or
issues  of  credibility.    In  any  event,  such  a  hearing  does  not
necessarily require the presentation of live witnesses, but may be
conducted based on affidavits and other documentary evidence.   Id.;
see also N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e) ("When a motion is based on facts not
appearing  of  record  the  court  may  hear  the  matter  on  affidavits
presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the  matter  be  heard  wholly  or  partly  on  oral  testimony  or
depositions.").   Thus, "a trial court is required to give the non-
moving party an opportunity to present evidence, but whether that
evidence   includes   oral   testimony   or   depositions   is   in   the
discretion of the court."    Johns,__ N.C. App. at  __,  __ S.E.2d at
__                                                                           (emphasis  added)                     (internal  citations  and  quotation  marks
omitted).    See  also  McClerin  v.  R-M  Indus.,  Inc.,  118  N.C.  App.
640,                                                                         643,                                  456  S.E.2d                                   352,   355      (1995)                              (affirming  trial  court's
denial of motion for Rule 11 sanctions after considering "verified
complaint, the contract incorporated therein, and the depositions
and affidavits submitted by the parties").
Although  Mr.  Johns  makes  no  specific  argument  as  to  why  an
evidentiary  hearing  was  required  in  this  case,  we  also  note  that
Mr.  Johns'  Motion  for  Rule                                               11   Sanctions  was  verified  and,
therefore, constituted an affidavit to the extent the verification
was based on personal knowledge.   See Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C.  697,
705,                                                                         190  S.E.2d                           189,                                          194    (1972)   ("A  verified  complaint  may  be




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treated  as  an  affidavit  if  it  (1)  is  made  on  personal  knowledge,
(2) sets forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
(3) shows affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein.").    Mr. Johns chose not to submit any
other  affidavits  or  documentary  material  to  support  his  Rule  11
motion.   The trial court's order, however, reflects that the court
reviewed the court file, which included many verified filings.   Mr.
Johns offers no reason why oral testimony was needed in addition to
this  evidence.    Accordingly,  the  trial  court  also  did  not  err  in
deciding  Mr.  Johns'  Rule  11  motion  without  allowing  Mr.  Johns  to
call witnesses.
III
Finally, Mr. Johns contends that, after he filed his notice of
appeal, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue an order for
his arrest.   On 26 April 2007, Mr. Johns appealed from the 20 April
2007 order imposing Rule  11 sanctions and dismissing his motions.
Mr.  Johns  contends  that  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                  §   1-294   (2007)  then
divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter its 30 April 2007
order  for  his  arrest  based  on  his  failure  to  comply  with  a  prior
order requiring him to pay attorneys' fees within  30 days from  27
March  2007.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1-294 provides:
When  an  appeal  is  perfected  as  provided
by   this   Article   it   stays   all   further
proceedings   in   the   court   below   upon   the
judgment  appealed  from,  or  upon  the  matter
embraced  therein;  but  the  court  below  may
proceed upon any other matter included in the
action   and   not   affected   by   the   judgment
appealed from.




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As  a  result  of  this  statute,  "an  appeal  removes  a  case  from  the
jurisdiction of the trial court and, pending the appeal, the trial
judge is functus officio."   Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633,
635,  234 S.E.2d  748,  749  (1977).
We note first that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294 stays only "further
proceedings  in  the  court  below  upon  the  judgment  appealed  from."
The statute expressly allows the trial court to proceed "upon any
other  matter  included  in  the  action  and  not  affected  by  the
judgment  appealed  from."    Id.    Here,  on  26  April  2007,  Mr.  Johns
only  appealed  the                                                            20  April        2007  order  on  Rule   11  sanctions  and
dismissal of his motions.    Until  18 May  2007, he had not appealed
the  20 April  2007 order that found him in contempt and ordered him
to pay the attorneys' fees to purge the contempt.   As a result, as
of 30 April 2007, when the order of arrest was entered, no stay had
occurred under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294 with respect to the 20 April
2007 order that Mr. Johns pay attorneys' fees.    Compare Joyner v.
Joyner,  256 N.C.  588,  591,  124 S.E.2d  724,  726-27  (1962)  (holding
that  trial  court  could  not  punish  husband  for  violating  order  to
pay  alimony  while  husband's  appeal  of  that  order  was  pending);
Lawrence v. Lawrence,  226 N.C.  221,  222, 37 S.E.2d 496, 497 (1946)
(holding that court could not hold party in contempt for failure to
comply with order while appeal of the order was pending); Upton v.
Upton,                                                                         14  N.C.  App.   107,                    108-09,              187  S.E.2d   387,   388-89   (1972)
(holding that trial court could not hold plaintiff in contempt for
failure  to  pay  child  support  while  appeal  of  that  order  was
pending).




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Moreover, Mr. Johns has overlooked   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-289(a)
(2007), which provides:
If the appeal is from a judgment directing the
payment   of   money,   it   does   not   stay   the
execution  of  the  judgment  unless  a  written
undertaking  is  executed  on  the  part  of  the
appellant,  by  one  or  more  sureties,  to  the
effect that if the judgment appealed from, or
any  part  thereof,  is  affirmed,  or  the  appeal
is  dismissed,  the  appellant  will  pay  the
amount directed to be paid by the judgment, or
the  part  of  such  amount  as  to  which  the
judgment  shall  be  affirmed,  if  affirmed  only
in  part,  and  all  damages  which  shall  be
awarded against the appellant upon the appeal,
except  as  provided  in  subsection  (b)  of  this
section.
In  Cox  v.  Cox,  133  N.C.  App.  221,  233,  515  S.E.2d  61,  69  (1999),
this Court specifically held that "G.S. 1-289 applies to awards of
attorneys'  fees."    This  Court,  in  Cox,  held  that  an  appeal  of  an
order directing a party to pay attorneys' fees did not preclude a
trial  court  from  holding  that  party  in  contempt  for  not  paying
those   fees   because   the   party   had   not   obtained   "a   written
undertaking executed by a surety" as required by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
1-289(a).    Cox,  133 N.C. App. at  233,  515 S.E.2d at  69.
We find no meaningful basis on which to distinguish Cox.   The
record  in  this  case  contains  a  Motion  to  Stay  the  20  April  2007
order imposing Rule  11 sanctions filed on behalf of both Rice Law,
PLLC  and  Mr.  Johns  on                                                       26  April                                                                  2007.                                           Nothing  in  that  motion
                                                                                purports to seek a stay of the separate order directing Mr. Johns
                                                                                to   pay   attorneys'   fees   in   order   to   purge   his   contempt.
Subsequently,  on                                                               30  May                                                                    2007,  Mr.  Johns  filed  a  motion  to  stay
enforcement  of  the                                                            7  May                                                                     2007  order  that  he  pay                                                  $3,600.00  in




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attorneys' fees.   The record, however, contains no indication that
Mr. Johns ever sought to stay, in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-289(a), enforcement of the 20 April 2007 order requiring him to
pay attorneys' fees.   We, therefore, affirm the trial court's order
of arrest.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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