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NO. COA12-959
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  21 May  2013
COREY BRETT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                          Wake County
No.  10 CVS  9956
MIKE ROBERTSON, COMMISSIONER OF
THE N.C. DIVISION OF MOTOR
VEHICLES and THE N.C. DIVISION OF
MOTOR VEHICLES,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  petitioner  from  order  entered  20  December  2011  by
Judge  Shannon  R.  Joseph  in  Wake  County  Superior  Court.  Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  27 February  2013.
Currin   &   Currin   by   George   B.   Currin   for   petitioner-
appellant
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorneys  General
Christopher  W.  Brooks  and  Carrie  D.  Randa,  for  the  State,
respondent-appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The  Rules  of  Evidence  do  not  apply  to  Division  of  Motor
Vehicle  license  revocation  hearings  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§  20-16.2,  and  the  hearing  officer  properly  admitted  the  police
reports   of   the   arresting   officer.   Where   the   trial   court




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                                                                              exercised   and   applied   the   appropriate   standard   of   review
pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                        §     20-16.2(e),  the  revocation  of
petitioner’s license is affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural History
During  a  traffic  stop  of  a  motor  vehicle  on                           3  December
2009,  Officer  R.T.  Pereira  of  the  Raleigh  Police  Department
(Officer  Pereira)  noticed  a  strong  odor  of  alcohol  coming  from
Corey  Brett  Johnson                                                         (petitioner).  He  observed  that  petitioner
had   red,   glassy   eyes   and   was   very   unsteady   on   his   feet.
Petitioner  admitted  that  he  had  consumed  eight  or  nine  beers.
Sergeant  W.  Vaughn                                                          (Sergeant  Vaughn),  the  officer  who  had  made
the  traffic  stop,  informed  Officer  Pereira  that  petitioner  was
the  driver  of  the  vehicle.  Officer  Pereira  placed  petitioner
under  arrest  for  driving  while  impaired  and  transported  him  to
the  Wake  County  Jail.  Petitioner  refused  to  submit  to  a  chemical
analysis  of  his  breath.  Pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                   §                                                                        20-
16.2(d),   the   Division   of   Motor   Vehicles                             (DMV)   notified
petitioner  that  his  license  would  be  revoked  for  one  year  for
refusal   to   submit   to   a   chemical   analysis   of   his   breath.
Petitioner was charged with driving while impaired.
Petitioner  requested  an  administrative  hearing  before  the
DMV  contesting  the  revocation  of  his  license  for  refusal  to




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submit  to  a  chemical  analysis.  Officer  Pereira  and  the  chemical
analyst  testified  at  the  hearing  and  were  subject  to  cross-
examination  by  petitioner.  On                                              26  May                                2010,  the  hearing  officer
upheld  the  revocation  of  petitioner’s  driver’s  license.  On             11
June  2010,  petitioner  filed  a  petition  for  review  of  the  hearing
officer’s decision in Wake County Superior Court.
In  the  criminal  proceeding,  petitioner  filed  a  motion  to
suppress  all  evidence  resulting  from  Sergeant  Vaughn’s  stop  of
his  vehicle  and  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  driving  while  impaired.
On                                                                            22  September                          2010,  the  Wake  County  District  Court  granted
petitioner’s  motion  to  suppress  all  evidence  resulting  from
Sergeant  Vaughn’s  stop  and  dismissed  the  charge  of  driving  while
impaired.
On                                                                            20  December                           2011,  the  trial  court  affirmed  the  hearing
                                                                                                                     officer’s  revocation  of  petitioner’s  driver’s  license.  On   18
January                                                                                                              2012,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order  staying  the        20
                                                                              December  2011 order pending appeal.
Petitioner appeals.
II. Collateral Estoppel
“Issues  not  presented  in  a  party’s  brief,  or  in  support  of
which   no   reason   or   argument   is   stated,   will   be   taken   as
abandoned.” N.C.R. App. P.  28(b)(6).




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On   appeal,   petitioner   does   not   discuss   the   issue   of
collateral   estoppel   in   his   brief   even   though   it   was   the
principal  issue  before  the  trial  court  and  was  the  primary  focus
of  the  trial  court’s  order.  This  issue  is  deemed  abandoned,  and
we do not address it.
III. Applicability of Rules of Evidence
In  his  first  argument,  petitioner  contends  that  the  hearing
officer  committed  an  error  of  law  in  allowing  the  reports  of
Officer   Pereira   and   Sergeant   Vaughn,   and   the   affidavit   of
Officer  Pereira  to  be  admitted  as  substantive  evidence.  We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“Questions  of  statutory  interpretation  of  a  provision  of
the  Motor  Vehicle  Laws  of  North  Carolina  are  questions  of  law
and  are  reviewed  de  novo  by  this  Court.” Hoots  v.  Robertson,  __
N.C. App.  __,  __,  715 S.E.2d  199,  200  (2011).
B. Analysis
In  support  of  his  contention  that  the  North  Carolina  Rules
of  Evidence  apply  to  proceedings  before  the  DMV  pursuant  to         §
20-16.2,  petitioner  cites  the  1971  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court
case  of  Joyner  v.  Garrett,  279  N.C.  226,  182  S.E.2d  553  (1971),
as  authority.  Petitioner’s  reliance  on  Joyner  is  misplaced.  The




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issue  in  Joyner  was  whether  or  not  the  sworn  report  could  be
prima  facie  evidence  that  the  arrested  person  willfully  refused
to  submit  to  the  Breathalyzer  test  when  the  petitioner  did  not
have  the  opportunity  to  cross-examine  the  arresting  officer  at
the administrative hearing. Id. at  234,  182 S.E.2d at  559.
Of  more  significance  is  the  fact  that  the  North  Carolina
Rules  of  Evidence  had  not  been  enacted  at  the  time  Joyner  was
decided  and  did  not  become  effective  until  1  July  1984,  thirteen
years  after  the  decision.                                                   1983  N.C.  Sess.  Laws,  ch.                                      701,          §      3.
Under  Rule  1101,  the  Rules  of  Evidence  apply  “to  all  actions  and
proceedings  in  the  courts  of  this  State”  and  if  otherwise
provided  by  statute.  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                      §                                                                  8C-1,  Rule   1101   (2011).
Rule                                                                           1101  further  provides  that  the  Rules  of  Evidence  do  not
apply  in  certain  proceedings,  including  preliminary  questions  of
fact,  grand  jury  proceedings,  sentencing  hearings,  probation
revocation  hearings,  and  probable  cause  hearings.  Id.  Petitioner
has  cited  no  other  statute  that  otherwise  provides  for  the
application  of  the  Rules  of  Evidence  to  hearings  pursuant  to
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  20-16.2.  See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  8C-1,  Rule  1101
(2011)                                                                         (“Except  as  otherwise  provided  in  subdivision                 (b)  or  by
statute,  these  rules  apply  to  all  actions  and  proceedings  in  the
courts  of  this  State.”).  After  reviewing  applicable  statutes,  we




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are  not  persuaded  that  the  Rules  of  Evidence  apply  to  these
types  of  hearings.  See  generally  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                       §                                              8C-1,  Rule
1101  (2011);  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  20-16.2  (2011);  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
150B-1(e)(8)                                                                  (2011)                                         (exempting  the  Department  of  Transportation
from   the   contested   case   provisions   of   the   Administrative
Procedure   Act);                                                                                                            19A   N.C.A.C.                                                                                                                        3A.0100   to                                                                                          3J.0907                  (2012)
                                                                                                                             (outlining  regulations  concerning  the  DMV).  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                            §
                                                                                                                             16.2(d)   only   requires   that   the   hearing   officer   subpoena
witnesses   or   documents                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         “that   the   hearing   officer   deems
                                                                              necessary.”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                         §                                                             20-16.2(d)                                                                   (2011).  We  hold  the
Rules  of  Evidence  do  not  apply  to  DMV  hearings  held  pursuant  to
§  20-16.2. Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
Even  assuming  arguendo  that  the  Rules  of  Evidence  did
apply,  the  hearing  officer  did  not  commit  an  error  in  admitting
the  police  report  and  the  affidavit  and  revocation  report  of
Officer  Pereira  as  substantive  evidence.  Petitioner  contends
these   documents   were                                                      “incompetent   hearsay   statements.”   Rule
803(6)  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence  provides  an
exception  to  the  hearsay  rule,  allowing                                  “records  of  regularly
                                                                                                                                                                                                     conducted  activity”  to  be  admissible.  N.C.  Gen  Stat.                                                                                                         §                        8C-1,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Rule  803(6)  (2011).  See  also  Wentz  v.  Unifi,  Inc.,  89  N.C.  App.
33,                                                                           39-40,                                         365  S.E.2d                                                             198,                                                          201                                                                          (1988)                   (holding  a  trooper’s




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accident  reports  were  admissible  in  a  civil  case  as  either
business  or  public  records);  Keith  v.  Polier,  109  N.C.  App.  94,
97,  425  S.E.2d  723,  725  (1993)  (holding  a  police  accident  report
admissible   under   either   Rule                                             803(6)   or   Rule   803(8)   as   an
exception to the hearsay rule).
To   be   admissible   such   reports   must   be
authenticated  by  their  writer,  prepared  at
or  near  the  time  of  the  act(s)  reported,  by
or  from  information  transmitted  by  a  person
with  knowledge  of  the  act(s),  kept  in  the
course   of   a   regularly   conducted   business
activity,  with  such  being  a  regular  practice
of    that    business    activity    unless    the
circumstances                                                                  surrounding          the                report
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Wentz,  89 N.C. App. at  39,  365 S.E.2d at  201.
In  the  instant  case,  petitioner  contends  that  there  is
“nothing  in  the   Record  which  indicates  there  was  a  proper
foundation  laid  for  the  admission  of  these  hearsay  statements  .
.  .  .”  The  record  before  us  is  incomplete  since  it  only  contains
the  exhibits  admitted  at  the  hearing  and  the  testimony  of  the
chemical  analyst.  The  transcript  of  Officer  Pereira’s  testimony,
which   would   have   presumably   laid   the   foundation   for   the
admission  of  his  reports,  was  inadvertently  deleted  and  is  not
in  the  record.  Petitioner  noted  in  his  closing  statement  to  the
hearing  officer  that  he  “previously  objected  to  the  introduction
of  the  notes  of  the  officers  for  several  reasons[,]  [i]ncluding




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that   there   was                                                           .   not   a   proper   foundation   for   the
introduction  of  the  officer’s  notes.”  However,  before  the  trial
court   petitioner   did   not   allege   any   specific   errors   that
occurred  in  Officer  Pereira’s  testimony,  instead  stating  only
that  the  reports  could  not  have  been  past  recollection  recorded
because  no  foundation  had  been  laid.  His  contentions  that  the
exhibits  could  not  be  admitted  under  any  Rule                         803  exception
because  the  hearing  officer  did  not  make  a  finding  that  they
possessed  sufficient  guarantees  of  trustworthiness,  or  that  the
documents  were  authenticated  in  any  way  were  raised  for  the
first  time  on  appeal  in  his  reply  brief.  A  party  “may  not  swap
horses  after  trial  in  order  to  obtain  a  thoroughbred  upon
appeal.”  State  v.  Hester,                                                 343  N.C.                                       266,   271,   470  S.E.2d   25,   28
(1996)  (quotation  omitted).  Accordingly,  we  follow  a  presumption
in  favor  of  the  regularity  and  correctness  of  the  hearing  in
front  of  the  DMV,  with  the  burden  resting  upon  the  appellant  to
show  error.  C.f.  L.  Harvey  &  Son  Co.  v.  Jarman,                     76  N.C.  App.
191,  195-96,  333  S.E.2d  47,  50  (1985)  (“The  longstanding  rule  is
that   there   is   a   presumption   in   favor   of   regularity   and
correctness  in  proceedings  in  the  trial  court,  with  the  burden
on  the  appellant  to  show  error.”).  In  the  absence  of  a  complete
record  and  petitioner’s  failure  to  assert  specific  errors  that




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were  committed  during  the  DMV  hearing  before  the  trial  court,  we
presume  a  proper  foundation  was  laid  with  respect  to  Officer
Pereira’s  police  report  and  revocation  report.  We  do  not  address
petitioner’s  arguments  with  respect  to  Sergeant  Vaughn’s  police
report  because  Officer  Pereira’s  police  report  and  revocation
report   provide   sufficient   factual   basis   for   the   challenged
conclusion  of  law.  The  exhibits  were  properly  admitted  into
evidence.
This argument is without merit.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In  his  second  and  third  arguments,  petitioner  contends  that
the  hearing  officer’s  findings  of  fact  were  not  supported  by
competent  evidence,  and  the  findings  of  fact  do  not  support  the
conclusion  of  law  that  Officer  Pereira  had  reasonable  grounds  to
believe  petitioner  had  committed  an  impaired  driving  offense.  We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Several  cases  from  this  Court  have  cited  to  Gibson  v.
Faulkner,  132  N.C.  App.  728,  732-33,  515  S.E.2d  452,  455  (1999),
for  support  of  the  following  standard  of  review:  on  appeal  to
this  Court,  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  are  conclusive  if
supported   by   competent   evidence,   even   though   there   may   be




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                                                                                                                                           evidence  to  the   contrary,  and  we  review  whether  the  trial
                                                                                                                                           court’s  findings  of  fact  support  its  conclusions  of  law  de  novo.
                                                                              See,  e.g.,  Hartman  v.  Robertson,                                                                                                      208  N.C.  App.               692,   694,        703
                                                                                                                                           S.E.2d  811,  813  (2010);  Steinkrause  v.  Tatum,  201  N.C.  App.  289,
291-92,                                                                       689  S.E.2d                                           379,   381                                                                          (2009),  aff’d  per  curiam          364  N.C.
419,  700  S.E.2d  222  (2010)  (per  curiam).  This  standard  of  review
was  appropriate                                                              “where  the  trial  judge  sits  as  the  trier  of
fact.” Gibson,  132 N.C. App. at  732,  515 S.E.2d at  455.
However,  effective  1  December  2006,  the  legislature  amended
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  20-16.2(e)  deleting  the  provision  allowing  for
de  novo  review  in  the  superior  court.  2006  N.C.  Sess.  Laws,  ch.
253,  §  15. Section  16.2(e) now provides that:
The  superior  court  review  shall  be  limited
to  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  in
the   record   to   support   the   Commissioner's
findings  of  fact  and  whether  the  conclusions
of  law  are  supported  by  the  findings  of  fact
and  whether  the  Commissioner  committed  an
error of law in revoking the license.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  20-16.2(e)  (2011).  Thus,  on  appeal  from  a  DMV
hearing,  the  superior  court  sits  as  an  appellate  court,  and  no
longer  sits  as  the  trier  of  fact.  Accordingly,  our  review  of  the
decision  of  the  superior  court  is  to  be  conducted  as  in  other
cases  where  the  superior  court  sits  as  an  appellate  court.  Under
this  standard  we  conduct  the  following  inquiry:  “(1)  determining




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whether  the  trial  court  exercised  the  appropriate  scope  of
review  and,  if  appropriate,                                                (2)  deciding  whether  the  court  did
so  properly.”  ACT-UP  Triangle  v.  Comm'n  for  Health  Servs.,            345
N.C.                                                                          699,                                      706,                                                         483   S.E.2d   388,   392           (1997).   We   previously
rejected  a  standard  of  review  that  was  the  same  standard  as  that
the  superior  court  employed,  stating                                      “the  statutory  provisions
for  judicial  review  of  agency  action  at  the  trial  court  level
would  appear  to  lack  purpose  if  that  court's  determination  is  to
be  given  no  consideration  at  the  appellate  level.”  Amanini  v.
                                                                              N.C.  Dep't  of  Human  Res.,             114  N.C.  App.                                              668,           676,   443  S.E.2d
114,                                                                          119                                       (1994).   We   hold   that   these   cases   provide   the
appropriate  standard  of  review  for  this  Court  under  the  amended
provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  20-16.2.
B. Analysis
In  the  instant  case,  the  record  indicates  that  the  superior
court  employed  the  correct  standard  of  review  since  the  order
affirming  the  decision  of  the  hearing  officer  cites  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  20-16.2(e)  and  states  the  proper  standard:  “[t]his  Court
does  not  conduct  a  de  novo  review  of  the  facts  and  instead
reviews  the  record  to  determine  whether  there  is  sufficient
evidence  in  the  record  to  support  the  Commissioner’s  findings  of




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fact.                                                                      .”  We  must  now  determine  whether  the  trial  court
properly conducted this review.
After  reviewing  the  record,  we  conclude  that  the  trial
court  correctly  determined  that  there  was  sufficient  evidence  in
the  record  to  support  the  Commissioner's  findings  of  fact  and
that  its  conclusions  of  law  are  supported  by  the  findings  of
fact. We affirm the revocation of petitioner’s driver’s license.
This argument is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
Judges GEER and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur.

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