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EDDIE G. JONES, Employee-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, SELF-
INSURED, Employer-Defendant-Appellant.
No. COA99-742
(Filed 29 December 2000)
1.                                                                                                    Constitutional Law--standing--equal protection--workers’ compensation defendant
The argument of a workers’ compensation defendant that it had standing to raise an equal
protection argument against a special compensation scheme for workers suffering from
asbestosis or silicosis was tenuous at best.  The class discriminated against, if any, would be the
larger class of employees who have contracted other occupational diseases.
2.                                                                                                    Constitutional Law--equal protection--asbestosis and silicosis compensation
Defendant-employer’s  equal protection rights were not violated by N.C.G.S. § 97-61.5, a
workers’ compensation statute providing special compensation for workers suffering from
asbestosis or silicosis.  Defendant conceded that there was no suspect class or fundamental right
affected by the statute and the classification made by the legislature was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest, to account for the incurable, latent and unique nature of these
diseases, factors not apparent in other occupational diseases.
Judge GREENE concurring.
Appeal by defendant from opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission
entered 25 February 1999.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 March 2000.
Hilliard & Jones, by Maola Jones, and The Law Offices of Robin E. Hudson, by Samuel A.
Scudder, for plaintiff-appellee.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Robert C. Kerner, Jr. and Tracey L. Jones,
for defendant-appellant.
McGEE, Judge.
Weyerhaeuser Company (defendant) appeals an opinion and award
of  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission                                                      (the  Commission)
entered                                                                                               25  February                                                                      1999  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §   97-86
(1999).    A  deputy  commissioner  filed  an  opinion  and  award  on  30
July                                                                                                  1998  awarding  workers'  compensation  benefits  to  plaintiff
Eddie  G.  Jones.     The  Commission  entered  an  opinion  and  award
affirming and modifying the deputy commissioner's award.




The Commission found that plaintiff was employed by defendant
for  more  than  thirty-one  years  as  a  pipe  fitter,  maintenance
mechanic,   and   millwright,   beginning   in                             1966.                                                               The   parties
stipulated that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos fibers during his
employment with defendant.   Defendant transferred plaintiff to the
finishing  department  in                                                  1989  because  he  was  diagnosed  with  a
"probable" asbestos-related lung condition.
The Commission's findings of fact included: (1) plaintiff had
proven by the greater weight of the evidence that he had developed
asbestosis;                                                                (2)   plaintiff's   employment   was   a   significant
contributing   factor   in   the   development   of   his   asbestosis;
(3)  plaintiff's  employment  placed  him  at  an  increased  risk  of
developing  asbestosis  compared  to  members  of  the  general  public;
and                                                                        (4)  plaintiff's  last  injurious  exposure  to  asbestos  fibers
ended in 1989 when he was transferred to the finishing department.
Based  upon  its  findings  of  fact,  the  Commission  concluded  that
plaintiff developed asbestosis as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-
53(24)  (1999) and  97-62  (1999).    The Commission awarded plaintiff
benefits of  $376.00 per week for  104 weeks, pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  97-61.5(b)  (1999),  and  concluded  that  the  provisions  of
N.C.G.S.  §  97-61.5 were not unconstitutional.    Defendant appeals.
[1] Defendant argues that the Commission erred in its finding
of fact and conclusion of law that the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 97-
61.5 are not unconstitutional.   Defendant contends that the statute
denies it equal protection of the law under both the North Carolina
Constitution and the United States Constitution because the statute
treats  employers  with  employees  who  are  exposed  to  asbestos  and




silica  differently  than  employers  with  employees  who  are  not
exposed  to  asbestos  and  silica.    In  response,  plaintiff  contends
that   defendant   does   not   have   standing   to   challenge   the
constitutionality of N.C.G.S.  §  97-61.5. 1
"The  general  rule  is  that  'a  person  who  is  seeking  to  raise
the question as to the validity of a discriminatory statute has no
standing for that purpose unless he belongs to the class which is
prejudiced by the statute.'"   In re Appeal of Martin,  286 N.C.  66,
75, 209 S.E.2d 766, 773 (1974) (citation omitted); see also Roberts
v. Durham County Hospital Corp.,  56 N.C. App.  533,  289 S.E.2d  875
(1982),  aff'd  per  curiam,                                                   307  N.C.   465,             298  S.E.2d   384           (1983);
Apartments,  Inc.  v.  Landrum,                                                            45  N.C.  App.   490,          263  S.E.2d   323
(1980); State v. Vehaun,  34 N.C. App.  700,  239 S.E.2d  705  (1977).
The  statute  presently  challenged  is  N.C.G.S.  §  97-61.5(b),  which
states:
If  the  Industrial  Commission  finds  at  the
first  hearing  that  the  employee  has  either
asbestosis  or  silicosis  or  if  the  parties
enter into an agreement to the effect that the
employee has silicosis or asbestosis, it shall
by   order   remove   the   employee   from   any
occupation which exposes him to the hazards of
asbestosis  or  silicosis,  and  if  the  employee
1
Although plaintiff failed to cross-assign error to this issue
in  violation  of  N.C.R.  App.  P.  10(d),  we  believe  that  we  may  not
reach the merits of a constitutional challenge if the challenging
party  lacks  standing.    See,  e.g.,  State  v.  Waters,  308  N.C.  348,
355, 302 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1983) (stating that the constitutionality
of a statute may only be contested by a litigant who has standing
to  challenge  the  statute);  Apartments,  Inc.  v.  Landrum,  45  N.C.
App.  490,  494-95,  263 S.E.2d  323,  326  (1980)  (refusing to address
defendant's  constitutional  challenge  because  defendant  "ha[d]  no
standing to attack the statutes"); see also Safeco Co. v. City of
White House, Tenn., 191 F.3d 675, 689 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Although no
party  mentions  whether  Appellants  have  standing  to  challenge  the
constitutionality of the statute, this court must assure itself of
jurisdiction.").




thereafter  engages  in  any  occupation  which
exposes  him  to  the  hazards  of  asbestosis  or
silicosis without having obtained the written
approval   of   the   Industrial   Commission   as
provided  in  G.S.                                                           97-61.7,  neither  he,  his
dependents,  personal  representative  nor  any
other   person   shall   be   entitled   to   any
compensation    for    disablement    or    death
resulting   from   asbestosis   or   silicosis;
provided, that if the employee is removed from
the  industry  the  employer  shall  pay  or  cause
to  be  paid  as  in  this  subsection  provided  to
the  employee  affected  by  such  asbestosis  or
silicosis   a   weekly   compensation   equal   to
sixty-six  and  two-thirds  percent  (66  b  %)  of
his  average  weekly  wages  before  removal  from
the  industry,  but  not  more  than  the  amount
established annually to be effective October 1
as provided in G.S.  97-29 or less than thirty
dollars                                                                      ($30.00)  a  week,  which  compensation
shall continue for a period of  104 weeks.
The statute thus provides a special compensation scheme for workers
suffering  from  asbestosis  or  silicosis                                   --  a  narrow  class  of
occupational disease-suffering employees.    Accordingly, the class
discriminated  against,  if  any,  would  be  the  larger  class  of
employees  who  have  contracted  occupational  diseases  other  than
asbestosis  or  silicosis.    Defendant's  argument,  however,  is  that
because its business exposed its workers to asbestos, defendant is
"burdened  with  additional  liability  for  workers  compensation
benefits,   with   which   similarly   situated   employers"                 (whose
businesses did not expose their workers to asbestos or silica) are
not so burdened.    Defendant's    argument is at best tenuous.
[2]  Nonetheless,  even  assuming  arguendo  that  defendant  does
have  standing  to  assert  a  constitutional  challenge  to  N.C.G.S.
§  97-61.5,  we  agree  with  the  Commission  that  the  statute  is  not
unconstitutional.   See Roberts, 56 N.C. App. at 539, 289 S.E.2d at
878-79 ("Assuming that plaintiffs had standing to attack N.C. Gen.




Stat.                                                                         §                 1-15(c),   the   statute   is   not   unconstitutionally
discriminatory.").    Equal protection, as guaranteed by the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section  19 of the Constitution
of North Carolina, "requires that all persons similarly situated be
treated  alike."    Walters  v.  Blair,                                       120  N.C.  App.   398,                                                       400,   462
S.E.2d  232,  233  (1995)  (citation  omitted),  aff'd  per  curiam,  344
N.C.                                                                          628,              476   S.E.2d                                               105    (1996).                           In   evaluating   the
constitutionality of a statute, the Walters Court stated,
If the statute impacts upon a suspect class or
a   fundamental   right,   the   government   must
"demonstrate   that   the   classification   is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest"  (strict  scrutiny).    If  the  statute
does  not  impact  upon  a  suspect  class  or  a
fundamental  right,  it  is  only  necessary  to
show  that  the  classification  created  by  the
statute  bears  a  rational  relationship  to  or
furthers   some   legitimate   state   interest
(minimum scrutiny).
Id.  at                                                                       400,              462  S.E.2d  at                                            234    (internal  citations  omitted).
Defendant  concedes,  and  we  agree,  that  no  suspect  class  or
fundamental  right  is  affected  by  the  statute;  however,  defendant
contends  that  the  statute  cannot  survive  even  minimum  scrutiny.
Our Court has discussed the rational basis test:
"The   constitutional   safeguard                                             (of   equal
protection)    is    offended    only    if    the
classification    rests    on    grounds    wholly
irrelevant  to  the  achievement  of  the  State's
objective.   State legislatures are presumed to
have  acted  within  their  constitutional  power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result   in   some   inequality.                                              A   statutory
discrimination  will  not  be  set  aside  if  any
statement of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."
Roberts,  56  N.C.  App.  at  539,  289  S.E.2d  at  879  (emphasis  added)
(quoting  McGowan  v.  Maryland,  366  U.S.  420,  425-26,  6  L.  Ed.  2d




393,                                                                 399       (1961)).   Defendant  cannot  overcome  the  high  hurdle
established by application of the rational basis test.
Our Supreme Court has set out the importance of the asbestosis
and silicosis statutes and the necessary distinction between those
diseases and other occupational diseases:
[P]roper    consideration    of    the    special
provisions   of   the   statutes   relating   to
asbestosis  and  silicosis  must  rest  upon  a
conviction  that  in  passing  these  laws  the
Legislature  gave  due  heed  to  the  nature  of
these diseases.
The definition of silicosis itself makes
it  plain  that  the  legislators  approved  the
amendment covering occupational diseases with
full knowledge that silicosis is a disease of
the   lungs   contracted   by   breathing   air
containing silica dust.    Besides, an analysis
of the pertinent sections as a whole indicates
that the lawmakers acted with an awareness of
the discoveries of medicine and industry that
silicosis  is  characterized  by  shortness  of
breath,  decreased  chest  expansion,  lessened
capacity  for  work,  reduced  vitality,  and  a
marked  susceptibility  to  tuberculosis;  that
the   average   time   before   symptoms   of   the
disease develop is from ten to fifteen years;
that  silicosis  is  incurable;  that  whether
silicosis  will  result  in  death  or  disability
to  a  particular  worker  is  dependent  on  his
susceptibility   to   the   affliction   and   the
duration  and  intensity  of  his  exposure  to
silica   dust;   and   that   silicosis   is   a
progressive    disease,    the    lung    changes
continuing  to  develop  for  one  or  two  years
after  complete  removal  of  the  worker  from
silica hazard.
When   the   special   provisions   of   the
occupational  disease  amendment  relating  to
asbestosis  and  silicosis  are  read  in  their
entirety,   it   is   apparent   that   they   are
designed  to  effect  these  objects:                                (1)  To
prevent  the  employment  of  unaffected  persons
peculiarly   susceptible   to   asbestosis   or
silicosis  in  industries  with  dust  hazards;
(2)  to  secure  compensation  to  those  workers




affected  with  asbestosis  or  silicosis,  whose
principal  need  is  compensation;  and                                       (3)  to
provide compulsory changes of occupations for
those   workmen   affected   by   asbestosis   or
silicosis,  whose  primary  need  is  removal  to
employments without dust hazards.
Obviously,    the    Legislature    enacted
[N.C.G.S. § 97-61.5] for the paramount purpose
of securing to an affected worker undergoing a
compulsory change of occupation an independent
position  as  a  wage  earner  in  some  work  free
from  dust  hazards.    When  the  language  of  the
statute  is  considered  in  the  light  of  the
mischief sought to be avoided and the remedies
intended  to  be  applied,  it  becomes  manifest
that   the   Legislature   has   authorized   the
Industrial Commission to order a forced change
of  occupation  for  an  employee  affected  by
asbestosis   or   silicosis   only   in   case   it
appears  to  the  Commission  that  there  is  a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that such
employee  possesses  the  actual  or  potential
capacity   of   body   and   mind   to   work   with
substantial regularity during the foreseeable
future  in  some  gainful  occupation  free  from
the hazards of asbestosis and silicosis. . .
[A]  contrary  interpretation  must  necessarily
be  based  upon  the  absurd  premise  that  the
lawmakers legislated in ignorance of, or with
indifference  to,  the  self-evident  facts  that
the   incapacity   of   a   workman   affected   by
asbestosis  or  silicosis  to  adapt  himself  to
new  employment  or  the  progression  of  his
disease  may  render  it  impossible  for  him  to
obtain or follow a gainful occupation in a new
sphere of activity.
Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 365-68, 49 S.E.2d 797, 800-03
(1948)  (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, our Supreme Court found significant "the distinction
made by the Legislature between asbestosis and silicosis, and other
occupational diseases[.]"   Honeycutt v. Asbestos Co., 235 N.C. 471,
476,  70 S.E.2d  426,  430  (1952).   "An employee does not contract or
develop  asbestosis  or  silicosis  in  a  few  weeks  or  months.    These
diseases  develop  as  the  result  of  exposure  for  many  years  to




asbestos dust or dust of silica.    Both diseases, according to the
textbook  writers,  are  incurable  and  usually  result  in  total
permanent disability."    Id. at  476-77,  70 S.E.2d at  430.
Thus,  under  Roberts,  the  classification  made  by  the  General
Assembly  is,  at  a  minimum,  rationally  related  to  a  legitimate
governmental  interest.                                                      56  N.C.  App.  at  539,  289  S.E.2d  at  879.
Although  defendant  cites  Walters,  120  N.C.  App.  398,  462  S.E.2d
232,  in  support  of  its  contention  that  N.C.G.S.                       §                                                                97-61.5  is
unconstitutional,  we  find  that  case  readily  distinguishable.    In
Walters, the plaintiff-employee challenged the constitutionality of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-63 (1991), which required claimants suffering
from  asbestosis  or  silicosis  to  have  been  employed  in  North
Carolina  for  two  years.    The  purposes  of  that  statute  were  to
"prevent[] [] forum shopping and [to] protect[] against claims for
which the employer is not responsible."   Id. at  401, 462 S.E.2d at
234.                                                                         Our  Court  held  that,  while  those  were  legitimate  state
interests, "the statute is grossly underinclusive in that it does
not  include  all  who  are  similarly  situated."     Id.                   (citations
omitted).
The  statute  at  issue  in  Walters  imposed  upon  claimants
suffering  from  asbestosis  or  silicosis  an  additional  burden  for
recovery  not  so  imposed  on  claimants  with  other  occupational
diseases.    The  purposes  for  which  the  statute  was  enacted  were
equally  applicable  to  all  claimants  suffering  from  occupational
diseases.    Conversely, N.C.G.S.  §  97-61.5 was enacted as an added
benefit  to  employees  suffering  from  asbestosis  or  silicosis,  and
its  purpose  was  to  account  for  the  incurable,  latent,  and  unique




nature of asbestosis and silicosis, factors not apparent in other
occupational diseases.   Accordingly, Walters is inapplicable to the
case before us, and defendant's argument is without merit.
The opinion and award of the Commission is affirmed.
Judge EDMUNDS  concurs.
Judge GREENE concurs with a separate opinion.




NO. COA99-742
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                                   29 December 2000
EDDIE G. JONES,
Employee,
Plaintiff;
From the North Carolina
v.                                                                                                       Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 177613
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY,
Employer;
SELF-INSURED,
Defendant.
GREENE, Judge, concurring.
I write separately because I believe defendant has standing to raise a constitutional challenge
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5.
Any  party  who  “alleges  some  direct  injury  in  fact”  has  standing  to  challenge  the
constitutionality of a statute.  See Greene v. Town of Valdese, 306 N.C. 79, 88, 291 S.E.2d 630, 636
(1982).   Defendant argues in its brief to this Court that employers such as itself “whose workers
have had occupational exposure to asbestos and silica are burdened with additional liability for
workers[’] compensation benefits, with which similarly situated employers are not so burdened.”
This alleged additional liability, which is not imposed on similarly situated employers, would cause
a direct injury to defendant.  Accordingly, defendant has standing to bring its claim that section 97-
61.5 is unconstitutional.  Otherwise, I fully concur in the majority’s opinion.

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