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NO. COA02-1733
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  4 November  2003
GARLAND JOYNER,
Employee-Plaintiff
v.
MABREY SMITH MOTOR COMPANY,
Employer-Defendant
and
NON-INSURED,
Carrier-Defendant
Appeal  by  defendant  from  an  opinion  and  award  entered                16
August 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  9 October  2003.
Brumbaugh,  Mu  &  King,  P.A.,  by  Kenneth  W.  King,  Jr.,  for
plaintiff-appellee.
Bailey & Way, by John E. Way, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Mabrey  Smith  Motor  Company  (“defendant”)  appeals  an  opinion
and  award  issued  by  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission
(“Commission”)   awarding   Garland   Joyner                                 (“plaintiff”)   total
disability  benefits,  medical  expenses,  and  attorneys’  fees  for
plaintiff’s  work-related  injuries  resulting  from  a  motor  vehicle
accident.    We affirm.
On                                                                           6  July                 1998,  plaintiff  was  employed  as  a  mechanic  for
defendant.   While plaintiff was test-driving a vehicle he repaired,
he  was  struck  from  behind  by  another  vehicle.    Plaintiff  sought
medical treatment from Carteret General Hospital and was diagnosed
with  cervical  strain.    Plaintiff’s  condition  grew  worse.    He  was




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placed on medical restrictions by his treating physician and missed
work periodically due to dizziness, blurred vision, and headaches
associated  with  the  accident.    On  18  September  2000,  plaintiff’s
wife  called  defendant  and  reported  plaintiff’s  inability  to  work
that  day  because  of  a  headache.     The  following  day,  defendant
informed  plaintiff  he  was  terminated  for  failing  to  follow
personnel policy by having his wife call, rather than himself, to
report that he was ill and unable to work.
On                                                                           9   May                                                        2000,   plaintiff   filed   a   claim   for   workers’
                                                                             compensation  benefits  for  injuries                          “caused                                                  [on   6  July   1998]  by
being rear ended  .  .  .                                                    .”    On  12 July  2000, plaintiff reported to
the  Commission  that  the  parties  failed  to  reach  an  agreement
regarding  compensation  because  plaintiff  was                             “unable  to  locate
workers’ compensation insurance, and employer has neither accepted
or  denied                                                                   [the]  claim.”    Plaintiff  requested  that  his  claim  be
assigned for hearing.
On                                                                           18   July                                                      2000,   plaintiff   sent   defendant   a   set   of
interrogatories.     Two  months  later,  after  defendant  failed  to
timely respond to the interrogatories, plaintiff wrote to defendant
and  requested  that  defendant  forward  the  answers                       “as  soon  as
possible.”    Defendant  again  failed  to  respond,  and  the  hearing
scheduled  for                                                               3  October                                                     2000  was  converted  into  a  pretrial
conference.   At the pretrial conference, the parties stipulated to
the  following:                                                              (1)  an  employer-employee  relationship  existed
between defendant and plaintiff; (2) defendant was non-insured; (3)
plaintiff’s  average  weekly  wage  was  $410.00;  and  (4)  the  date  of




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injury was 6 July 1998.   An order of continuance, granted by Deputy
Commissioner Morgan S. Chapman, mandated that defendant respond to
plaintiff’s  interrogatories                                                “within  two  weeks  or  be  subject  to
sanctions.”
On  1  November  2000,  plaintiff  wrote  to  defendant  requesting
answers to plaintiff’s interrogatories “as soon as possible.”   When
defendant   failed   to   respond   to   the   sought   interrogatories,
plaintiff wrote defendant again on  12 December  2000 to remind him
that  the  order  of  continuance  required  defendant  to  answer  the
interrogatories within two weeks.   Plaintiff warned defendant that,
if  his  answers  were  not  received  by  19  December  2000,  plaintiff
would request sanctions.    Defendant never responded.
At a hearing held 6 February 2001, Deputy Commissioner George
T. Glenn, II, imposed sanctions against defendant “for defendant’s
failure to comply with Deputy Commissioner Morgan Chapman’s Order
of October  11,  2000” by  “striking any defenses that the defendant
may  have  to   the   claim  of  plaintiff.”                                Accordingly,  Deputy
Commissioner  Glenn  entered  an  opinion  and  award  in  favor  of
plaintiff for a work-related injury sustained by plaintiff while in
the course and scope of his employment.   The hearing was limited to
the issue of the workers’ compensation benefits to which plaintiff
was entitled as a result of his injuries.   The deputy commissioner
awarded plaintiff total disability benefits at the rate of $532.00
per week beginning 19 September 2000 and continuing until plaintiff
returned  to  work                                                          “earning  the  same  or  greater  wages  as  he  was
earning  at  the  time  of  his  injury”  or  the  Commission  ordered




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otherwise.    Medical expenses, attorneys’ fees and costs were also
awarded.   The Full Commission affirmed the opinion and award of the
deputy commissioner, and defendant appeals.    On appeal, defendant
contends (I) the Commission should not have sanctioned defendant by
striking his defenses;  (II) the Commission’s findings of fact and
conclusions  of  law  concerning  plaintiff’s  entitlement  to  total
disability  benefits  from  19  September  2000  are  not  supported  by
competent evidence; and (III) there was insufficient evidence that
plaintiff is entitled to the payment of medical expenses.
I.    Sanctions
North  Carolina  General  Statute  §  97-80(a)  (2001)  “gives  the
Commission  the  power  to  make  rules  consistent  with  the  Workers'
Compensation  Act  for  carrying  out  its  provisions.”    Matthews  v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg  Hosp.  Auth.,  132  N.C.  App.                       11,                                15-16,           510
S.E.2d  388,  392  (1999).    Rule  605(1) of the Workers’ Compensation
Rules  of  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission  provides  that
parties  may  obtain  discovery  by  the  use  of  interrogatories,  and
where  there  is  a  “failure  to  answer  an  interrogatory,  the  party
submitting the interrogatories may move the Industrial Commission
for an order compelling answer.”   Workers’ Comp. R. of N.C. Indus.
Comm’n                                                                      605(1),                            2002  Ann.  R.   (N.C.)   765.   The  rule  goes  on  to
expressly  provide  for  sanctions  for                                     “failure  to  comply  with  a
Commission order compelling discovery.”   Workers’ Comp. R. of N.C.
Indus. Comm’n  605(5),  2002 Ann. R.  (N.C.)  766.
Rule 802 of the Workers' Compensation Rules of
the   North   Carolina   Industrial   Commission
provides  that                                                              “failure  to  comply”  with  the
Workers'  Compensation  Rules  “may  subject  the




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violator  to  any  of  the  sanctions  outlined  in
Rule  37  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Civil
Procedure                                                                     .  against  the  party  or  his
counsel whose conduct necessitates the order.”
Hauser  v.  Advanced  Plastiform,  Inc.,  133  N.C.  App.  378,  387,  514
S.E.2d                                                                        545,                                       551   (1999).   Rule   37  expressly  allows  a  court  to
sanction  a  party  failing  to  comply  with  an  order  by  “refusing  to
allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims
or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters
in  evidence[.]”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  37(b)(2)b  (2001).
“The  administration  of                                                      [discovery]  rules,  in  particular  the
imposition  of  sanctions,  is  within  the  broad  discretion  of  the
trial court.    The trial court's decision regarding sanctions will
only  be  overturned  on  appeal  upon  showing  an  abuse  of  that
discretion.”    Williams v. N.C. Dep't of Correction,  120 N.C. App.
356,  359,  462 S.E.2d  545,  547  (1995)  (citations omitted).
In  the  instant  case,  defendant  asserts  the  hearing  officer
should not have stricken his defenses.   Defendant failed to answer
plaintiff’s interrogatories sent to him on 18 July 2000 within the
appropriate  time  period  and  failed  to  request  any  extension  of
time.   After defendant was ordered by the Commission to respond to
plaintiff’s  interrogatories  within  two  weeks  of  the  pretrial
conference order filed  11 October  2000, defendant again failed to
answer  plaintiff’s  interrogatories  or  request  any  extension  of
time.     Defendant  further  chose  to  ignore  plaintiff’s  letters
reminding defendant of his obligation to comply with the order by
answering the interrogatories and ultimately warning defendant of
plaintiff’s impending intent to seek sanctions.    Over three and a




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half  months  after  defendant  was  warned  he  would  be  subject  to
sanctions,  the  deputy  commissioner  imposed  sanctions  expressly
approved  under  Rule  37  as  authorized  by  Rules  605  and  802  of  the
Workers’  Compensation  Rules.    Defendant  cannot  complain  when  the
Commission   fulfills   its   warning   and   imposes   sanctions   for
continuing  noncompliance  with  the  deputy  commissioner’s  order
spanning  a  period  of  almost  three  and  a  half  months.    We  find  no
abuse of discretion.
Moreover, we note defendant’s arguments to this Court fail to
assert the Commission abused its discretion in imposing sanctions.
Rather, defendant merely presents on appeal the defenses expressly
barred  by  the  Commission  as  a  result  of  the  sanctions.    These
defenses include that the work on the vehicle cannot be considered
part  of  the  scope  of  his  work,  that  plaintiff’s  testimony  was
contradictory, and that plaintiff had not provided medical records
to  defendant.    Having  concluded  the  Commission  did  not  abuse  its
discretion by striking these defenses, we do not entertain them on
appeal.
II.    Onset of Disability
Defendant  next  asserts  the  conclusions  of  law  made  by  the
Commission  regarding  the  onset  of  plaintiff’s  disability  are  not
supported by the findings of fact, and the findings of fact are not
supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.   Specifically,
defendant  argues  the  Commission’s  conclusion,  that  plaintiff  was
entitled to total disability benefits from the date plaintiff was
terminated,  was  not  supported  by  findings  of  fact  or  competent




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evidence because plaintiff came to work the day he was terminated;
therefore, defendant argues, plaintiff could not have been unable
to work.    Defendant additionally argues, in the alternative, that
plaintiff  was  fired  only  because  he  violated  personnel  policy  by
failing to personally call in sick.    We examine these contentions
together.
The  Commission  found  as  fact  that  plaintiff  had  not  worked
since  the  date  of  his  termination                                      “as  a  result  of  problems
associated with his injury by  [the] accident on July  6,  1998” and
concluded plaintiff was entitled to total disability benefits from
that  date.    We  are  not  persuaded  that  plaintiff  is  barred  from
benefits because defendant alleges plaintiff reported to work the
day he was fired, that he disregarded the existing policy requiring
employees to personally call in sick, and that such misconduct or
fault could have been a constructive refusal to work.   To determine
entitlement  to  benefits  following  an  employee’s  termination  in
situations analogous to the facts presented by the case at bar, we
examine the evidence of the cause of the employee’s diminution or
loss of wages.
[T]he test is whether the employee's loss
of, or diminution in, wages is attributable to
the   wrongful   act   resulting   in   loss   of
employment,  in  which  case  benefits  will  be
barred, or whether such loss or diminution in
earning  capacity  is  due  to  the  employee's
work-related  disability,  in  which  case  the
employee will be entitled to benefits for such
disability.
Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 228, 234, 472
S.E.2d  397,  401  (1996).    In the instant case, plaintiff expressly




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testified  that  his  efforts  to  obtain  subsequent  employment  were
thwarted  by  his  medical  restrictions  resulting  from  the  accident
and  no  one  would  consider  him  because  of  those  restrictions.
Although further competent evidence is not required, Adams v. AVX
Corp.,                                                                      349  N.C.   676,                                          681,   509  S.E.2d   411,   414   (1998),  we  note
plaintiff’s  testimony  is  fully  supported  by  the  medical  records
submitted  to  the  Commission.     Whether  we  would  have  reached  a
different   result   on   the   evidence   is   irrelevant,   and   more
importantly,  beyond  the  scope  of  our  review.     Id.     Under  our
holding  in  Seagraves,  we  find  there  was  competent  evidence  to
support the findings and conclusions of the Commission.
III.    Medical Expenses
Finally, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to
find  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  payment  of  medical  expenses
incurred  for  the  treatment  of  the  injuries  sustained  or  further
treatment  necessary  to  cure,  give  relief,  or  lessen  plaintiff’s
period  of  disability.    This  argument  fails  for  multiple  reasons.
First,  defendant  violated  our  rules  of  appellate  procedure  by
failing to include any citations of authority upon which he relies.
N.C.  R.  App.  P.                                                          28(b)(6)    (2003).     Second,  we  need  not  revisit
defendant’s  recapitulation  of  defenses  previously  considered  and
found unavailable.   Third, both the medical records and plaintiff’s
testimony are fully competent to support the Commission’s findings
that  plaintiff  suffered  a  compensable  work-related  injury  by
accident,  and  that  finding  supports  the  conclusion  of  law  that
plaintiff is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.




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Defendant has brought forward no argument for his assignments
of  error  concerning  the  Commission’s  findings  of  fact  that  he
“engaged in stubborn and unfounded litigiousness during the course
of  defending  this  claim”  or  the  Commission’s  conclusions  of  law
requiring  defendant  to  pay  plaintiff’s  attorneys’  fees  and  the
costs of the action.   We deem these assignments of error abandoned.
N.C.  R.  App.  P.                                                         28(b)(6)   (2003).    The  opinion  and  award  of  the
Commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur.

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