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NO. COA00-74
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                        19 June  2001
JOANNE KELLER
v.
WILLOW SPRINGS LONG TERM CARE FACILITY, INC.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 20 September 1999 by
Judge  J.B.  Allen,  Jr.  in  Orange  County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  14 February  2001.
Browne,  Flebotte,  Wilson  &  Horne  by  Linda  L.  Czyzyk  for
plaintiff-appellant.
McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe by Kurt E. Lindquist, II and
Arden Lynn Achenberg for defendant-appellee.
THOMAS, Judge.
Plaintiff Joanne Keller filed a complaint alleging defendant
Willow  Springs  Long  Term  Care  Facility,  Inc.  was  negligent  by
creating a hidden and dangerous condition which resulted in serious
injury  to  her  back.     From  the  grant  of  defendant’s  motion  for
summary judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff  was  employed  as  a  physical  therapy  assistant  for
Home Health Agency of Chapel Hill, Inc.   Her duties included caring
for several residents of a rest home in Carrboro being operated by
defendant.
On                                                                            21  December                                                 1993,  plaintiff  went  to  the  room  of  Peter
Koutouzakis                                                                   (Koutouzakis),  a  stroke  victim,  in  order  to  provide
physical  therapy.     She  had  previously  provided  care  for  him
including  exercise,  transfers  (moving  him  from  bed  to  wheelchair




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and   return)   and   gait   training.                                          According   to   plaintiff’s
allegations,  she  noticed  Koutouzakis  sitting  on  the  edge  of  his
bed,  agitated,  with  one  of  defendant’s  employees  attempting  to
assist him into a wheelchair.   The employee was not trained to care
for patients, had not locked the wheelchair and had failed to put
a  leg  brace  or  gait  belt  on  him.    As  plaintiff  entered  the  room,
the  employee  backed  away  and  Koutouzakis  began  to  slide  off  the
bed.    Plaintiff  rushed  to  his  aid,  putting  her  knees  in  front  of
him to prevent his fall.   Plaintiff then placed a gait belt around
Koutouzakis and transferred him to the wheelchair.   In catching him
and placing him in his wheelchair, however, she suffered injury to
her back resulting in permanent and total disability.
According  to  plaintiff,  “the  situation  which  existed  in  the
room” was the hidden and dangerous condition caused by the actions
and inactions of defendant.   According to the defendant, plaintiff
in  effect  is  arguing  that  Koutouzakis  himself  was  the  dangerous
condition.
The  trial  court  allowed  defendant’s  motion  for  summary
judgment on  20 September  1999, which plaintiff assigns as error.
The  standard  for  granting  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  is
well-established.   A party is entitled to summary judgment only “if
the   pleadings,   depositions,   answers   to   interrogatories   and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that any party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1
Rule  56.




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The party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of establishing the lack of any triable
issue.  Caldwell  v.  Deese,                                                288  N.C.      375,                                     218
S.E.2d  379  (1975).    The  movant  may  meet  this
burden by proving that an essential element of
the opposing party’s claim is non existent, or
by showing through discovery that the opposing
party  cannot  produce  evidence  to  support  an
essential  element  of  his  claim  or  cannot
surmount  an  affirmative  defense  which  would
                                                                                           bar  the  claim.  Bernick  v.  Jurden,   306  N.C.
435,                                                                        293   S.E.2d   405                                      (1982);   Dickens   v.
Puryear,  302 N.C.  437,  276 S.E.2d  325  (1981).
Mozingo v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 331 N.C. 182, 187, 415
S.E.2d 341, 344 (1992) (citing Collingwood v. General Electric Real
Estate  Equities,  Inc.,                                                    324  N.C.      63,                                      66,                      376  S.E.2d   425,   427
(1989)).
Here, plaintiff alleges defendant was negligent in that it: a)
failed to exercise ordinary care to keep and maintain the premises
in a reasonably safe condition; b) created a hidden and dangerous
condition by failing to properly medicate Koutouzakis; c) failed to
train its employees and agents and properly staff its facility; d)
failed  to  timely  toilet  him;  e)  failed  to  transfer  him  to  an
intermediate care facility to provide more extensive medical care
and supervision when his health condition deteriorated; f) failed
to warn plaintiff of hidden perils and unsafe conditions of which
defendant knew or, by reasonable inspection, could have discovered;
g)  failed  to  reasonably  inspect  him  and  to  correct   unsafe
conditions  which  such  an  examination  would  have  revealed;  and  h)
generally  failed  to  warn  plaintiff  of  these  hidden  and  dangerous
conditions.
In order to establish negligence, plaintiff must show that: 1)




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defendant  owed  a  legal  duty  to  the  plaintiff;                          2)  the  defendant
breached  the  duty;                                                          3)  plaintiff  sustained  injuries;  and   4)  the
plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by defendant’s breach.
Pulley v. Rex Hospital,  326 N.C.  701,  392 S.E.2d  380  (1990).
In the instant case, plaintiff bases her negligence claim on
a  premises  liability  theory.    She  contends  a  lack  of  proper  care
for Koutouzakis caused an unsafe condition which breached a duty to
plaintiff as a business invitee.
Our  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  landowners  owe  a  duty  to
exercise  reasonable  care  in  the  maintenance  of  their  premises  to
all lawful visitors.   Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d
882 (1998), reh’g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 533 S.E.2d 467 (1999).   The
Court in Nelson also eliminated the distinction between licensees
and  business  invitees  for  the  purposes  of  premises  liability  and
instead imposed a duty on landowners to exercise reasonable care to
all  lawful  visitors.    Landowners  have  a  duty  to  maintain  their
premises  in  a  reasonably  safe  condition  for  their  intended  use.
Pulley v. Rex Hospital,  326 N.C.  701,  392 S.E.2d  380  (1990).
To  withstand  summary  judgment  under  a  premises  liability
theory,  plaintiff  must  demonstrate  substantial  evidence  showing
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of
its premises.    Nelson,  349 N.C. at  633,  507 S.E.2d at  893.
Plaintiff argues that a staff shortage resulted in Koutouzakis
not being toiletted and properly medicated prior to his 10:00 a.m.
appointment with plaintiff.   She says this failure created a hidden
and dangerous condition which resulted in her injury. In essence,




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plaintiff  advances  the  novel  theory  that  the  rest  home  resident
himself  became  a  dangerous  condition.     Some  of  the  dangerous
conditions recognized by North Carolina Courts have included uneven
and/or  broken  sidewalks,  indentures  in  walkways,  a  dirt  filled
ditch, uneven stairs and/or the absence of handrails, wet floors,
and  unlighted  parking  lots.    See  Newsom  v.  Byrnes,  114  N.C.  App.
787,                                                                          443  S.E.2d                                  365                                                                                                                            (1994);    Rappaport  v.  Days  Inn  of  America,
Inc.,                                                                         296  N.C.                                    382,                               250  S.E.2d   245                                                                                                                               (1979).    Additionally,  this
                                                                                                                                                                            Court  has  held  that  a  hospital  owes  a  duty  to  protect  a  patient
                                                                                                                                                                            against foreseeable assaults by another patient.   Burns v. Forsyth
                                                                                                                           County  Hosp.  Authority,  Inc.,                 81  N.C.  App.                                                                556,                                                344  S.E.2d                      839
                                                                                                                                                                            (1986).   There is no reasonable analogy from any of these holdings
                                                                              to the present case.
Our  review  of  the  record  shows  no  evidence  that  defendant
failed  to  act  outside  the  standard  of  care  in  the  maintenance  of
its  premises,  that  the  premises  were  improperly  maintained  or  of
any  other  breach  of  duty  owed  to  plaintiff.    Plaintiff  has  not
indicated  any  evidence  of  a  defective,  dangerous  or  unsafe
condition on the property of defendant.
Even if it were determined that the resident was a dangerous
condition, or as plaintiff argues, the “situation” in the room was
the dangerous condition with defendant not properly caring for its
residents,  plaintiff’s  contention  would  still  fail.    Our  Supreme
Court,  in  Branks,  held  that  dismissal  of  plaintiff’s  complaint
alleging  premises  liability  was  appropriate  where  the  alleged
hazard  was  obvious  to  her.                                                320  N.C.  621,  359  S.E.2d  780  (1987).




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Similarly  in  Newsom,  this  Court  held  that  “even  if  the  condition
.  .  . had been rendered unsafe under the circumstances, plaintiff
knew  of  the  unsafe  condition.”     Therefore,  defendant  was  not
liable.    Newsom,  114 N.C. App. at  790,  443 S.E.2d at  368.
In  the  case  at  bar,  plaintiff  claims  the  condition  was  both
dangerous and hidden.   Even while arguably dangerous, however, the
condition was in no way hidden from plaintiff.    Her argument goes
to Koutouzakis’ condition at the moment she entered the room being
unexpected, not hidden.   Plaintiff also claims defendant had a last
clear chance to avoid injury to plaintiff, but fails to adequately
analyze the theory or cite appropriate authority.
The ultimate facts are straightforward.   Plaintiff voluntarily
went to the aid of a resident with the admitted knowledge that he
was agitated, needed to use the restroom and was not utilizing his
leg brace.    She also was aware the wheelchair was not in a locked
position.    Plaintiff  is  a  physical  therapy  assistant  capable  of
making proper bed to wheelchair transfers.   The only danger alleged
by plaintiff was a human condition of which plaintiff was apprised
and well-trained to address.    Plaintiff may not recover where the
allegedly  dangerous  condition  would  be  obvious  to  an  ordinary
person  or  where  plaintiff  had  equal  or  superior  knowledge  of  the
allegedly  dangerous  condition.    See  Pulley  v.  Rex  Hospital,  326
N.C.  701,  392  S.E.2d  380  (1990);    Branks  v.  Kerns,  320  N.C.  621,
359  S.E.2d  780  (1987).    Accordingly,  this  assignment  of  error  is
rejected and the decision of the trial court affirmed.
AFFIRMED.




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Judges WYNN and MCGEE concur.

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