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NO. COA12-533
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  18 December  2013
DONALD KING,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                          Buncombe County
No.  09 CVS  1627
JIMMY LEE BROOKS, TOMMY LEE
BROOKS, a/k/a TOMMIE LEE BROOKS,
FRANKIE LEE SOUTHERLAND, a/k/a
FRANKIE LEE SOUTHLAND, JESSICA
FAWN CHAVEZ, a/k/a JESSICA FREE,
HENDERSON RACHMAN, NICHOLAS JONES,
WILLIAM WRIGHT, AND WILLIAM WRIGHT
d/b/a WRIGHT’S COIN SHOP
Defendants.
Appeal  by  William  Wright  from  judgment  entered  15  September
2011  by  Judge  James  U.  Downs  in  Buncombe  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  10 October  2012.
William E. Loose for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Patla,  Straus,  Robinson  &  Moore,  P.A.,  by  Brian  D.  Gulden,
for Defendant-Appellant.
BEASLEY, Judge.
William  Wright                                                             (Appellant)  appeals  from  the  jury’s  verdict
finding  him  liable  to  Donald  King                                      (Appellee)  for  conversion.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
Appellee  is  a  collector  of  many  things,  including  coins,
stamps,  antiques,  and  sports  memorabilia.     Between  April            2007




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and  June  2007,  thieves  broke  into  Appellee’s  house  at  least  once
and   stole   a   number   of   collectible   items   from   his   home.
Appellant  is  one  of  several  defendants  in  this  case  and  is  a
coin shop owner.
Detective  Ron  Heacock  of  the  Buncombe  County  Sheriff’s
Department  spoke  with  Appellant  in  the  course  of  investigating
the  break-in(s)  at  Appellee’s  home.     Appellant  had  purchased
coins  from  several  of  his  co-defendants.     Detective  Heacock
informed  Appellant  that  individuals  matching  the  descriptions  of
Jimmy  Brooks  and  Nicholas  Jones  had  attempted  to  sell  some
stolen  coins  at  a  shop  in  Black  Mountain.    The  coin  dealer  in
Black  Mountain  questioned  the  individuals  at  length  about  their
title  to  the  coins  but  turned  them  away  when  it  was  evident  that
they  did  not  understand  the  nature  of  the  coins  and  refused  to
show  identification.    Detective  Heacock  told  Appellant  that  his
co-defendants  were  suspects  in  the  theft(s)  and  were  suspected
of  selling  the  coins  they  had  stolen,  which  made  Appellant
“visibly  upset.”    The  stories  provided  to  Appellant  by  his  co-
defendants  regarding  their  title  to  the  coins  varied.    Appellant
was  told  that  some  of  the  coins  were  acquired  through  various
trades  with  a  drug  addict  who  had  inherited  the  coins;  that  some
of  the  coins  were  being  sold  to  pay  for  the  care  of  a  disabled




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child,  who  was  present  at  the  store;  and  that  some  of  the  coins
were  acquired  in  exchange  for  caring  for  an  elderly  woman.    By
Appellant’s  testimony,  nothing  about  these  stories  made  him
think  that  the  coins  might  be  stolen.     Appellant  paid  Jimmy
Brooks  approximately  $19,207;  Tommy  Brooks  about  $1,507;  Frankie
Southerland  around  $56,800;  Jessica  Chavez  approximately  $6,648;
and  Nick  Jones  about                                                       $3,300.                                                     Appellant  cooperated  with  the
Sheriff’s  Department  and  was  able  to  recover  some  of  Appellee’s
property.    Some  items  had  Appellee’s  name  on  them.    Appellant’s
co-defendants  were  later  charged  criminally  in  conjunction  with
the  break-in(s)  at  Appellee’s  home.     Appellant’s  co-defendants
pled guilty to a variety of charges.
Appellee  filed  a  complaint  for  conversion,  among  other
claims,  on                                                                   18  March                                                                                      2009  in  Buncombe  County  Superior  Court.
                                                                              Appellant   filed   an   answer   and   crossclaim   on                                                                                       26   May   2009.
Appellant                                                                     crossclaimed                                                against                            co-defendants                                             Frankie
Southerland,  Jessica  Chavez,  and  Jimmy  Brooks  for  fraud  and
civil  conspiracy.    Mr.  Wright  filed  an  amended  crossclaim  on         4
February                                                                      2011   to  add  claims  of  fraud  and  civil  conspiracy
against Tommy Brooks.
At  the  close  of  Appellee’s  evidence  and  the  close  of  all
evidence,  Appellant  moved  for  directed  verdict.     Those  motions




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were  denied.    Appellant  also  requested  a  jury  instruction  on  an
affirmative  defense.    Appellant  argued  that  he  was  a  bona  fide
purchaser   for   value   without   knowledge   that   the   coins   were
stolen,  and  as  such  the  jury  should  be  instructed  on  this
defense.    The  trial  court  denied  Appellant’s  request  for  a  jury
instruction.
On                                                                            9  September                                             2011,  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  finding
Appellant    and    his    co-defendants    liable    to    Appellee.
Specifically,   the   jury   found   Appellant,   Tommy   Brooks,   and
Frankie  Southerland  liable  for  conversion.    The  jury  found  that
Appellant  owed                                                               $84,000  in  damages  to  Appellee.     Only  nominal
damages   were   awarded   against   Tommy   Brooks   and   Frankie
Southerland.     The  jury  found  Tommy  Brooks  liable  to  Appellant
for  fraud  in  the  amount  of                                               $1,507.                                                  The  jury  found  Frankie
Southerland  liable  to  Appellant  for  fraud  in  the  amount  of
$56,800.                                                                      Appellee   obtained   a   judgment   by   default   on   15
September  2011  against  Jimmy  Brooks,  Nicholas  Jones,  and  Jessica
Chavez.
Appellant  filed  a  motion  for  judgment  notwithstanding  the
verdict  (JNOV)  or  in  the  alternative  a  new  trial  on  22  September
2011.    The  same  was  denied  on  11  October  2011.    Appellant  filed
his timely notice of appeal to this Court on  26 October  2011.




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Appellant  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his
motions  for  directed  verdict  and  JNOV  because  he  presented
sufficient  evidence  that  he  was  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value.
If  such  a  defense  exists  in  North  Carolina,  we  nonetheless
affirm the trial court’s denial of both motions.
“The  standard  of  review  of  directed  verdict  is  whether  the
evidence,  taken  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  non-moving
party,  is  sufficient  as  a  matter  of  law  to  be  submitted  to  the
jury.”    Davis  v.  Dennis  Lilly  Co.,  330  N.C.  314,  322,  411  S.E.2d
133,                                                                           138                                (1991)(citing  Kelly  v.  Int’l  Harvester  Co.,   278  N.C.
                                                                               153,  179  S.E.2d  396  (1971)).   “On  appeal  the  standard  of  review
for  a  JNOV  is  the  same  as  that  for  a  directed  verdict,  that  is
whether  the  evidence  was  sufficient  to  go  to  the  jury.”    Tomika
Invs.,  Inc.  v.  Macedonia  True  Vine  Pentecostal  Holiness  Church
of  God,  Inc.,                                                                136  N.C.  App.                    493,                                               498-99,     524  S.E.2d   591,   595
(2000).    A  motion  for  directed  verdict  or  JNOV  should  be  denied
“unless  the  evidence,  taken  as  true  and  viewed  in  the  light  most
favorable  to  the  plaintiff,  establishes  an  affirmative  defense
as  a  matter  of  law.”    Radford  v.  Keith,                                160  N.C.  App.                    41,                                                43,
584  S.E.2d  815,  817  (2003).    Our  review  is  de  novo.    Austin  v.
Bald II, L.L.C.,  189 N.C. App.  338,  342,  658 S.E.2d  1,  4  (2008).




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“In  this  state,  conversion  is  defined  as                                ‘an  unauthorized
assumption  and  exercise  of  the  right  of  ownership  over  goods  or
personal  chattels  belonging  to  another,  to  the  alteration  of
their  condition  or  the  exclusion  of  an  owner’s  rights.’”    Spinks
v.   Taylor,                                                                  303   N.C.                                     256,                                                                       264-65,                                                       278   S.E.2d   501,                 506
                                                                              (1981)(quoting  Peed  v.  Burleson’s,  Inc.,                                                                                                                                            244  N.C.      437,          439,   94
                                                                                                                             S.E.2d  351,  353  (1956)),  superseded  by  statute  on  other  grounds
                                                                              as  stated  in  Stanley  v.  Moore,                                                                                       339  N.C.                                                     717,           454  S.E.2d          225
(1995).                                                                                                                                                                                                 There  is  some  authority  in  North  Carolina  indicating
that  the  status  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  is  a  defense
to  the  tort  of  conversion.     In  Singer  Manufacturing  Co.  v.
Summers,                                                                      143  N.C.                                      102,                                                                       105-06,                                                       55  S.E.       522,          523    (1906),  the
Supreme Court stated,
It  is  well  established  that  when  a  man’s
property   has   been   obtained   from   him   by
actionable  fraud  or  covin,  the  owner  can
follow  and  recover  it  from  the  wrongdoer  as
long  as  he  can  identify  or  trace  it;  and  the
right  attaches,  not  only  as  to  the  wrongdoer
himself,  but  to  any  one  to  whom  the  property
has  been  transferred  otherwise  than  in  good
faith  and  for  valuable  consideration.
The  principle  applies,  not  only  to  specific
property, but to money and choses in action.
Singer  appears  to  open  the  door  for  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for
value  defense,  given  the  language  allowing  the  rightful  owner  to
trace  his  property  into  the  hands  of  those  who  have  acquired  the




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property  in  a  manner  other  than  for  value  and  in  good  faith.
Id.     A  more  recent  case  from  our  Supreme  Court  also  seems  to
recognize   the   bona   fide   purchaser   for   value   defense   to
conversion.    The  Supreme  Court  held  that  if  the  defendant  proved
that  it  did  not  have  notice,  constructive  or  actual,  that  the
funds   it   acquired   were   the   plaintiff’s   property,   then   the
defendant   could   not   be   liable   for   conversion.                    Variety
Wholesalers,  Inc.  v.  Salem  Logistics  Traffic  Servs.,  LLC,             ___
N.C.  ___,  ____,  723 S.E.2d  744,  749  (2012).
Taking   the   evidence   in   the   light   most   favorable   to
Appellee,  Appellant  did  not  establish  the  affirmative  defense  of
a bona fide purchase for value  as a matter of law.    We find  that
the  stories  that  Appellant’s  co-defendants  fed  him  regarding
their  titles  to  the  coins  are  weak  in  establishing  his  good
faith  in  purchasing  the  coins.    Appellant  did  not  establish  his
affirmative  defense  as  a  matter  of  law,  and  the  trial  court
properly  denied  both  the  motion  for  directed  verdict  and  the
motion for JNOV.
Further,  Appellant  did  not  submit  a  correct  statement  of
law  to  the  trial  court.    Thus,  the  trial  court  properly  refused
to  give  the  jury  an  instruction  on  the  bona  fide  purchase  for
value.




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“[R]equests for special instructions  i.e., non-pattern jury
instructions  must  be  submitted  to  the  trial  court  in  writing
prior   to   the   charge   conference.                                       Requests   for   special
instructions  not  made  in  compliance  with  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1-181
and  Rule                                                                     51(b)  may  be  denied  at  the  trial  court’s  discretion.”
Swink  v.  Weintraub,  195  N.C.  App.  133,  155,  672  S.E.2d  53,  67-68
(2009)(citations  omitted),  review  denied,                                  363   N.C.                                                      812,                        693
S.E.2d  352  (2010).
When  reviewing  the  refusal  of  a  trial  court
to  give  certain  instructions  requested  by  a
party  to  the  jury,  this  Court  must  decide
whether  the  evidence  presented  at  trial  was
sufficient  to  support  a  reasonable  inference
by  the  jury  of  the  elements  of  the  claim.  If
the    instruction    is    supported    by    such
evidence,  the  trial  court’s  failure  to  give
the instruction is reversible error.
Ellison  v.  Gambill  Oil  Co.,                                               186  N.C.  App.                                                 167,                        169,                                   650  S.E.2d
819,  821  (2007)(citations  omitted),  aff’d  per  curiam  and  review
improvidently  allowed,  363  N.C.  364,  677  S.E.2d  452  (2009).    The
Court  has  reviewed  an  appeal  regarding  jury  instructions  under
the  above  standard  of  review,  rather  than  abuse  of  discretion,
even  when  counsel  did  not  sign  the  instructions  as  required  by
Rule                                                                                                                                          51.    Kinsey  v.  Spann,   139  N.C.  App.                        370,          373,   533  S.E.2d
487,                                                                          490-91                                                          (2000).                     Based  on  Kinsey,  this  Court  can                        “decide
whether   the   evidence   presented   at   trial   was   sufficient   to




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support  a  reasonable  inference  by  the  jury  of  the  elements  of
the  claim,”  even  though  Appellant’s  counsel  did  not  sign  the
written  proposed  jury  instructions.    Ellison,                             186  N.C.  App.  at
169,  650 S.E.2d at  821.
A  specific  jury  instruction  should  be  given
                                                                               when                                                                                                                            “(1)  the  requested  instruction  was  a
                                                                                                                                                                    correct   statement   of   law   and                                                                                                    (2)   was
                                                                                                                                                                    supported  by  the  evidence,  and  that                                                                                                (3)  the
                                                                                                                                                                                                               instruction    given,    considered    in    its
                                                                                                                                                                                                               entirety,  failed  to  encompass  the  substance
                                                                                                                                                                    of  the  law  requested  and                                                                  (4)  such  failure
                                                                                                                                                                    likely misled the jury.”
                                                                               Outlaw  v.  Johnson,                                                                 190  N.C.  App.                            233,                                               243,                                      660  S.E.2d   550,   559
                                                                                                      (2008)(quoting  Liborio  v.  King,                                                                                                                          150  N.C.  App.                           531,          534,   564
S.E.2d                                                                         272,                   274                                                           (2002)).                                                                                      This  Court  has  previously  upheld  a
refusal  to  give  an  instruction  to  the  jury  where  the  instruction
misstated  the  applicable  law  for  the  jury.    Cobb  ex  rel.  Knight
v.  Town  of  Blowing  Rock,  ___  N.C.  App.  ___,  ___,  713  S.E.2d  732,
736,                                                                           740                    (2011)(affirming,  in  both  the  majority  and  dissenting
opinion,  the  trial  court’s  refusal  to  instruct  the  jury  on  a
landowner’s  purported  higher  duty  of  care  owed  to  a  child
because  it  was  an  incorrect  statement  of  law),  rev’d  on  other
grounds,  __ N.C.  __,  722 S.E.2d  479  (2012).
The  applicable  portion  of  the  written  instructions  proposed
by Appellant’s counsel read as follows:
Was  the  Defendant  a  purchaser  of  currency




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for  value  without  knowledge  of  any  defect  of
title and in good faith?
On  this  issue,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the
Defendant.     This  means  that  the  Defendant
must  prove,  by  the  greater  weight  of  the
evidence, these things:
First,  that  what  the  Defendant  purchased  was
currency.  .  .
A  diligent  investigation  in  North  Carolina’s  statutory  and
case   law   reveals   no   requirement   that   a   defendant   purchase
currency.     If  the  defense  exists,  it  seemingly  requires  only
that  a  defendant  purchase  the  converted  property  for  value,  in
good  faith,  without  notice,  constructive  or  actual,  that  the
property  has  been  converted.    See  Variety  Wholesalers,  ___  N.C.
at  ____,  723  S.E.2d  at  749;  Singer,  143  N.C.  at  105-06,  55  S.E.
at  523.    As  such,  Appellant’s  requested  instruction  to  the  jury
is  an  incorrect  statement  of  law  in  that  it  requires  the  jury  to
make  an  irrelevant  finding.    The  trial  court  properly  denied  the
request for this instruction.
Appellant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his
motion  for  a  new  trial  because  the  jury  returned  a  “compromise”
verdict.    We disagree.
“[A]n   appellate   court’s   review   of   a   trial   judge’s
discretionary  ruling  either  granting  or  denying  a  motion  to  set
aside  a  verdict  and  order  a  new  trial  is  strictly  limited  to  the
determination  of  whether  the  record  affirmatively  demonstrates  a




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manifest  abuse  of  discretion  by  the  judge.”     Worthington  v.
Bynum,  305 N.C.  478,  482,  290 S.E.2d  599,  602  (1982).
                                                                                                              Appellant  cites  Roberston  v.  Stanley,                                    285  N.C.   561,             206
S.E.2d                                                                         190                            (1974),  for  the  proposition  that  a  new  trial  should
                                                                                                              be   granted   when   the   jury   renders   a   compromise   verdict   or
                                                                                                              demonstrates   a   misunderstanding   of   the   law.                                    Roberston   is
                                                                               inapposite.                    This   Court   has   stated   that   Roberston                                                            “dealt
exclusively  with  the  issue  of  damages  for  pain  and  suffering.”
McFarland  v.  Cromer,  117  N.C.  App.  678,  682,  453  S.E.2d  527,  529
(1995).     This  Court  has  also  stated  that  Robertson                    “held  that
uncontroverted  damages  cannot  be  arbitrarily  ignored  by  the
jury.”    Warren  v.  Gen.  Motors  Corp.,  142  N.C.  App.  316,  320,  542
S.E.2d  317,  319  (2001).
Here,  the  damages  are  not  for  pain  and  suffering.    The  jury
also  did  not  ignore  the  law;  they  simply  awarded  Appellee  his
full  recovery  from  Appellant  and  then  allowed  Appellant  to
recover  from  his  co-defendants.    Appellant  could  have  sought  a
judgment  by  default  against  Jimmy  Brooks  and  Jessica  Chavez  to,
in  essence,  indemnify  his  loss.                                            Appellant  also  could  have
pursued  claims  against  Nicholas  Jones,  another  co-defendant  whom
he  paid  for  property  stolen  from  Appellee’s  home.    There  is  no
evidence   that   the   jury   returned   a   compromise   verdict   or




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blatantly  ignored  the  judge’s  instructions.    As  such,  we  find  no
abuse  of  discretion  and  affirm  the  denial  of  the  motion  for  a
new trial.
For  the  reasons  stated  above,  we  affirm  the  trial  court’s
denial  of  the  motion  for  directed  verdict,  motion  for  JNOV,
request for jury instructions, and motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.
Judge ELMORE concurs.
Judge STROUD concurs in result only.

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South Carolina Law