Preview:

TONY  E.  LAMBETH  and  BONNIE  G.  LAMBETH,  Plaintiffs,  v.  MEDIA
GENERAL,  INC.  d/b/a  WINSTON-SALEM  JOURNAL  and  JOHN  O.  BROWN  and
JASON T. CRAVER and MICHAEL S. BARBER, Defendants
NO. COA04-401
Filed:  7 December  2004
Negligence-newspaper stop-delivery notice  not secured-home broken into--no duty or
causation
The trial court properly dismissed a complaint against a newspaper owner  for failure to state
a claim where plaintiffs alleged that their home was broken into while they were away because
defendant left the stop delivery notice with the newspapers at the drop-off, available to any passerby.
Plaintiffs did not allege a legal duty owed by defendant or a causal connection between breach of
such a duty and their injury.
Appeal  by  plaintiffs  from  order  of  dismissal  entered                                               10
December  2003  by  Judge  William  Graham  in  Forsyth  County  District
Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  22 October  2004.
Douglas K. Meyers, for plaintiff-appellant.
Enns  &  Archer,  LLP,  by  Roderick  J.  Enns,  for  defendant-
appellee.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs,  Tony  and  Bonnie  Lambeth,  brought  this  action
asserting a claim for conversion against defendants Brown, Craver
and  Barber  and  a  claim  of  negligence  against  defendant  Media
General, Inc.  (Media General).    Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of a
break-in  of  their  home  on                                                                             16  September   2002  by  the  individual
defendants,  who  stole  guns,  currency,  coins,  and  electronic
devices,  and  converted  this  property  for  their  own  use.     With
respect to defendant Media General, plaintiffs alleged that they




were  subscribers  to  one  of  its  newspapers,  The  Winston  Salem
Journal, and contacted the newspaper in September  2002 to request
that their home delivery be stopped while they were away from home
in  order  to  reduce  the  appearance  that  their  home  was  vacant.
Plaintiffs alleged that an employee of Media General conveyed the
notice  to  stop  delivery  to  its  newspaper  carrier  by  leaving  it
“with  the  newspaper  carrier’s  daily  newspapers  at  the  carrier’s
drop  off  location                                                           .;”   “that  the  stop  notice   .  was  not
secured  and  that  a  passerby  could  obtain  and  read  the  notice  and
thereby  obtain  knowledge  of  the  plaintiffs’  request  to  stop
newspaper  delivery  and  their  absence  from  home;”  and  that  Brown,
Craver, and Barber chose plaintiffs’ residence as a target of their
criminal activity after learning of plaintiffs’ absence therefrom
“by reading the stop notice issued to the newspaper carrier.”
The complaint further alleged:
22.    Employees and agents of defendant, Media
General,   knew   or   should   have   known   that
plaintiffs’ disclosure . . . of their imminent
absence  from  their  home  for  a  period  of  time
could   aid   a   third-party   obtaining   such
information  in  committing  a  crime  against
plaintiffs’   home   by   revealing   plaintiffs’
absence  .  .  .
and alleged that defendant Medial General had breached its duty to
plaintiffs  by  failing  to  protect  the  dissemination  of  the  stop
notice,  carelessly  disregarding  the  risks  this  failure  posed  to
plaintiffs’ property.    The complaint alleged:
25.    The acquisition and use of the sensitive
information regarding plaintiffs’ absence by a
third    party    to    exploit    the    disclosed
vulnerability  of  plaintiffs’  home  and  reduce
the   risk   of   entering   their   home   without
detection  was  a  foreseeable  consequence  of
defendant Media General’s negligent treatment




of that specific information . . . through the
acts   and   omissions   of   its   agents   and
employees.
and that defendant’s lack of reasonable care “was a proximate cause
of  [plaintiffs’] home’s selection for the break-in carried out by
defendants  Brown,  Craver  and  Barber  and  plaintiffs’  losses  which
derived from that break in.”
Defendant Media General moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint
against it pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6).   The
trial court granted Media General’s motion, dismissing plaintiffs’
claim against it with prejudice.    Plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs’ sole argument on appeal is that the allegations in
the complaint were sufficient to state a claim for negligence.   We
disagree.
“A motion to dismiss made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”   Harris v. NCNB, 85
N.C.  App.                                                                 669,   670,   355  S.E.2d   838,   840   (1987).    If  no  law  to
support the claim exists or if supporting facts are inadequate, a
complaint  may  be  dismissed.     Shell  Island  Homeowners  Ass'n  v.
Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 225, 517 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1999).             “To
withstand  a  motion  to  dismiss,  plaintiff’s  negligence  complaint
must allege the existence of a legal duty or standard of care owed
to  the  plaintiff  by  the  defendant,  breach  of  that  duty,  and  a
causal relationship between the breach of duty and certain actual
injury or loss sustained by the plaintiff.”    Sterner v. Penn,  159
N.C. App.  626,  629,  583 S.E.2d  670,  673  (2003)  (internal citation
omitted).




Plaintiffs  argue  their  complaint  sufficiently  alleges  that
Media General had a duty of reasonable care regarding information
about  their  absence  from  home.    Plaintiffs  maintain  that  Media
General had a legal duty to guard their stop order to prevent the
harm  of  a  break-in  because  Media  General  rendered  a  service  to
them.   Plaintiffs contend that when an active course of conduct is
undertaken,  it  is  negligent  to  violate  the                               “positive  duty  to
exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm.”   Davidson and
Jones,  Inc.  v.  County  of  New  Hanover,  41  N.C.  App.  661,  666,  255
S.E.2d 580, 584, disc. review denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911
(1979).    We disagree.
The  duty  of  ordinary  care  “arises  whenever  one  person  is  by
circumstances placed in such a position towards another that anyone
of  ordinary  sense”  recognizes  the  need  to  use  ordinary  care  to
prevent “injury to the person or property of the other.”   Davidson,
41 N.C. App. at 666, 255 S.E.2d at 584.   Under this standard, we do
not believe the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show
that  Media  General  breached  any  duty  of  ordinary  care  owed
plaintiffs  under  the  circumstances.                                         The  course  of  conduct
undertaken  by  Media  General  was  newspaper  delivery  and  stopping
that  delivery  while  plaintiffs  were  on  vacation.    The  complaint
alleges no breach by Media General of its duty to use ordinary care
in performing that course of conduct.   Plaintiffs cite no authority
for the proposition that Media General owed a further legal duty to
plaintiffs to treat the “stop delivery” request in confidence, and
we decline to invent one.   Moreover, even if we were to decide that
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Media General had a legal




duty  to  maintain  the  “stop  delivery”  request  as  confidential  and
breached   that   duty,   plaintiffs’   complaint   is   nevertheless
insufficient  to  allege  a  causal  relationship  between  any  such
breach and plaintiffs’ loss.
Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that the stop order was left in
the open for anyone to read and that the individual defendants read
it  and  thereby  selected  plaintiffs’  house  as  their  target.    They
contend this adequately alleges a causal connection between Media
General’s negligent act and plaintiffs’ loss.   We cannot agree.   To
withstand   a   motion   to   dismiss,   a   plaintiff’s   complaint   in
negligence  must  allege  facts  demonstrating  “that  the  defendants’
negligence  was  a  proximate  cause  of  their  injuries.”     Ford  v.
Peaches Entertainment Corp., 83 N.C. App. 155, 156, 349 S.E.2d 82,
83                                                                           (1986),  disc.  review  denied,                             318  N.C.   694,          351  S.E.2d   746
(1987).                                                                      “Foreseeability of some injury from an act or omission is
a  prerequisite  to  its  being  a  proximate  cause  of  the  injury  for
which  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  damages.”    Ratliff  v.  Power
Co.,  268 N.C.  605,  614,  151 S.E.2d  641,  648  (1966).    The break-in
was  not  a  foreseeable  consequence  of  defendant’s  system  of
communicating   the   stop  notices  to  its  carrier.                       Here,  the
intervening acts of the other defendants caused the harm from which
the plaintiffs seek recovery.    See Meyer v. McCarley and Co.,  288
N.C.                                                                         62,                                                         68,         215  S.E.2d   583,          587   (1975)   (holding  there  is  no
liability for the loss where an unforeseeable intervening act was
the cause of the harm).    Because the plaintiffs alleged neither a
legal  duty  owed  them  by  Media  General  nor  a  causal  connection




between any breach of such duty and their injury, the trial court
properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur.

Download 04-401-5.pdf

South Carolina Law