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JOHN WILEY LASHLEE, III and REBECCA C. CLARK-LASHLEE, Plaintiff-
Appellants, V. WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC. and ELECTROLUX
MOTOR AB, Defendant-Appellees
No. COA00-490
(Filed  17 July  2001)
1.                                                                         Products Liability--contributory negligence--chainsaw
kickback--alleged negligent design and manufacture--failure
to tie into tree
The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for
defendants based upon plaintiff’s contributory negligence where
plaintiff became a paraplegic after falling from a tree while
using a chainsaw manufactured by defendants; plaintiff alleged
that the original non-kickback chain had been replaced with a
more dangerous chain; plaintiff had experienced kickback and was
aware of the danger; he had tied himself into the tree earlier in
the day because he had seen professionals do so and because it
was common sense, but did not do so when he decided to cut the
final limb; plaintiff had never seen anyone try to cut a tree
while standing on a ladder, but stood near the top of the ladder,
leaned his left side against the tree, and began to cut;
plaintiff was knocked from the tree, unconscious and with a
laceration along the center of his head; and plaintiff alleged
that defendants were negligent in designing, manufacturing, and
selling a chainsaw with inadequate safety devices.    Plaintiff’s
experts in chainsaw design were not competent to render an
opinion on the reasonable use of a chainsaw in a tree; plaintiff
knew that kickback could knock him off the ladder and out of the
tree and his failure to secure himself to the tree constituted
contributory negligence.
2.                                                                         Damages and Remedies--punitive damages--chainsaw replacement
chain
The trial court properly granted summary judgment for
defendants on the issue of punitive damages in a negligence
action arising from replacement of a low-kickback chainsaw chain
with a non-approved chain.    The characterization of defendants’
actions as conscious and reckless by a witness who was not
testifying as a legal expert did not create a genuine issue of
material fact.
Appeal by plaintiffs from order and judgment dated 15 December
1999  by  Judge  B.  Craig  Ellis  in  Superior  Court,  Bladen  County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  14 March  2001.
Jones Martin Parris & Tessener, PLLC, by John Alan Jones, for
plaintiff-appellants.




Ward & Smith, P.A., by Gary J. Rickner, and Dennis R. Bailey
for defendant-appellees.
McGEE, Judge.
Plaintiff  John  Wiley  Lashlee,  III  (Lashlee)  was  rendered  a
paraplegic  after  falling  from  a  tree  while  using  a  chainsaw
manufactured  by  defendants.    Plaintiffs  sued  defendants  seeking
recovery  on  multiple  grounds,  including  negligence,  and  seeking
punitive  damages.    Plaintiffs  allege  that  Lashlee  was  hit  in  the
head  and  knocked  to  the  ground  when  the  chainsaw  he  was  using
"kicked back" severely after the chainsaw's original low-kickback
chain  had  been  unintentionally  replaced  with  a  more  dangerous
chain.     In  their  complaint,  plaintiffs  allege  that  defendants
negligently  designed,  manufactured,  and  sold  a  chainsaw  with
inadequate  safety  devices,  and  they  seek  punitive  damages  on  the
grounds  that  defendants'  negligence  was  wanton,  gross,  reckless,
and in callous disregard for the rights and safety of others.
Defendants moved the trial court for summary judgment.   During
the summary judgment hearing, plaintiffs withdrew all claims except
those for negligence and punitive damages.   The trial court granted
defendants'  motion  for  summary  judgment  on  the  two  remaining
claims.    Plaintiffs appeal.
Lashlee  testified  during  his  deposition  that  the  chainsaw
involved in the accident had actually belonged to his neighbor, Rex
Tillotson,  although  Lashlee  had  been  using  the  saw  regularly  for
about three years prior to his injury.    Lashlee estimated that he
had used the saw some one hundred times a year during the two years
preceding his injury, primarily cutting firewood for a wood stove




he owned.    Prior to his injury, Lashlee never received any formal
training  in  chainsaw  use  and  never  read  the  operating  manual  or
other   written   material   concerning   the   use,   operation   and
maintenance of the chainsaw.    Instead, Lashlee learned how to use
the chainsaw by watching professionals work, watching television,
and talking with knowledgeable individuals like Isaac Simmons, Jr.
(Simmons) and Layton Priest.
From  watching  professionals,  Lashlee  learned  always  to  stay
balanced with the chainsaw, not to cut above shoulder level, and to
wear  protective  equipment  such  as  plastic  glasses,  gloves,  and
boots.   Lashlee had observed that professionals did not always wear
hardhats, so Lashlee never acquired one for himself.    Lashlee had
observed  professionals  cutting  in  trees,  both  from  an  hydraulic
bucket and by tying into the tree, although Lashlee had never seen
anyone  use  a  chainsaw  from  a  ladder.    Lashlee  was  familiar  with
kickback,  having  experienced  it  some  four  or  five  times  prior  to
the  time  of  his  injury,  but  he  had  never  observed  anyone  else
experience kickback and was not clear on its mechanics other than
that it happened when the tip of the chainsaw blade came in contact
with some object.    Lashlee had never cut in a tree before the day
of his injury and never spoke with either Simmons or Layton Priest
about cutting in a tree.   Lashlee did talk with James Alton Boswell
(Boswell), the town maintenance supervisor, about whether he should
cut down the tree limb he was cutting when his injury occurred, but
they did not talk about how to cut it.
Lashlee  sought  to  bring  down  a  tree  that  was  close  to  his
house  on  28  October  1992.    Lashlee  began  working  about  noon,  and




the day was warm and sunny.   The tree, a thirty-foot bay tree, had
a  diameter  of  about  a  foot  and  a  half  and  split  into  a  "V"  about
ten  feet  above  the  ground.    To  control  the  tree's  fall,  Lashlee
decided  to  remove  several  limbs  from  the  house  side  of  the  tree.
Because the limbs were about twenty feet above the ground, Lashlee
used a neighbor's ten-foot ladder to climb into the "V," then tied
himself into the tree for safety.   Lashlee tied himself in because
he had watched professionals do so, and because it was common sense
to him to do it.
After  cutting  the  limbs,  Lashlee  untied  himself  from  the
tree, climbed down, and returned the ladder to his neighbor.   Using
the rope with which he had tied himself into the tree, as well as
the rope he had used to raise the chainsaw into the tree, Lashlee
tied  the  tree  to  the  back  of  his  truck.    Boswell  arrived,  and
Lashlee  cut  a  preparatory  notch  into  the  tree.    Boswell  started
Lashlee's  truck  and  stressed  the  rope  attached  to  the  tree  as
Lashlee  began  the  final  cut  to  bring  down  the  tree.     However,
Lashlee became concerned that the remaining limb on the house side
of the tree could cause the tree to twist as it fell, damaging the
house.     Lashlee  and  Boswell  discussed  the  possibility  of  such
twisting, and Lashlee decided to cut off the remaining limb.
Lashlee  retrieved  the  ladder  from  his  neighbor,  an  aluminum
ladder that was the lower half of a twenty-foot extension ladder.
The  rungs  were  round,  ridged,  and  about  two  inches  in  diameter.
Lashlee  asked  Boswell  to  hold  the  ladder  and  then  climbed  the
ladder carrying the chainsaw.   The limb he sought to cut exited the
tree about a foot below the "V" in the tree, so Lashlee positioned




himself about three or four rungs from the top of the ladder.   The
limb  was  to  his  right,  so  Lashlee  placed  his  left  foot  a  rung
higher on the ladder than his right foot and leaned the left side
of  his  body  against  the  tree.    Lashlee  had  his  left  leg  bent  and
the  fatty  part  of  his  underarm  against  the  tree,  with  his  weight
against  the  tree.    Lashlee  felt  balanced  and  secure  and  did  not
have to reach to cut the limb, which was about at the height of his
diaphragm.    Lashlee  testified  that  he  remembered  starting  to  cut
the  limb,  and  that  the  next  thing  he  remembered  was  lying  on  the
ground  and  asking  someone  to  help  him  up.    In  addition  to  a  neck
injury, Lashlee received a laceration along the center of his head
some  two  inches  long,  although  the  baseball-style  cap  he  was
wearing while cutting had only a scratch or a grease mark on it.
Boswell  testified  that,  at  the  time  of  Lashlee's  accident,
Boswell  was  holding  the  ladder  for  Lashlee.     Boswell  was  not
watching  Lashlee  cut  because  sawdust  was  falling  down.    At  some
point,  Boswell  heard  the  chain  on  the  chainsaw  stop  abruptly,  a
sound  Boswell  believed  to  be  due  to  kickback.    Boswell  looked  up
and saw Lashlee falling straight back from the ladder, the chainsaw
falling separately.    Lashlee's eyes were wide open and he made no
movement or sound as he fell, knocked out.
Boswell  was  maintenance  superintendent  for  the  town  of
Clarkton in  1992.    The town maintenance staff used chainsaws when
needed, though they would always hire contractors when a chainsaw
had  to  be  used  in  a  tree.    Most  contractors  used  bucket  trucks,
except  one,  an  individual  who  would  sometimes  tie  himself  into  a
tree  and  sometimes  would  not.     Boswell  never  spoke  with  that




individual about when it was appropriate to tie into a tree.
Lashlee testified that, sometime before the accident, he had
damaged the chain on the chainsaw and had brought the chainsaw to
Simmons to have the chain replaced.    Simmons, a professional tree
cutter,  owned  and  ran  a  chainsaw  shop.    Lashlee  had  never  before
had  the  chain  replaced  and  did  not  ask  Simmons  to  put  any
particular  kind  of  chain  on  the  chainsaw.    Ten  days  before  the
accident,  Lashlee  took  the  chainsaw  to  a  different  chainsaw  shop
and  had  the  chain  sharpened.    At  the  time  of  his  injury,  Lashlee
did  not  know  what  a  low-kickback  chain  was,  would  not  have
recognized one if he saw it, and had no idea whether the chain on
the chainsaw was a low-kickback chain.
Simmons testified that he had been a professional tree cutter
for  more  than  thirty  years  at  the  time  of  Lashlee's  injury.    In
addition, Simmons had opened a chainsaw and small engine store in
the early 1980's and had become a dealer for defendants' chainsaws
after  calling  defendant's  office  in  Charlotte  a  few  times  and
receiving  a  couple  of  visits  from  a  salesman  for  defendants.
Simmons did not recall having to sign an agreement or contract to
become a dealer, and Simmons was not required to attend, nor did he
attend, any of the various training programs that were offered by
defendants.   In 1987, Simmons sold Rex Tillotson the chainsaw that
was ultimately involved in Lashlee's injury.
Simmons  closed  his  shop  sometime  around                                   1990  for  health
reasons,  although  he  continued  to  do  some  repair  work  out  of  his
home.    Simmons testified that he remembered Lashlee coming to his
home for a new chain, but did not actually remember putting a chain




on  the  chainsaw.    Simmons  identified  the  chain  on  the  chainsaw
during the deposition as a chisel chain, as opposed to one designed
for softer woods, and testified that the saw would have been sold
with  such  a  chisel  chain.     Simmons  had  never  heard  of  a  low-
kickback chain and did not recall ever being told by defendants to
put  only  low-kickback  chains  on  the  chainsaw.    Simmons  did  not
consider the suggested chains listed on the label on the chainsaw
to be the only ones he should install.
Simmons testified that he had experienced kickback thousands
of  times  and  had  been  bruised  badly,  but  never  cut.     Simmons
explained  that  only  a  bar  tip  guard  can  prevent  kickback,  but  he
had never actually used one, and in fact most people just take it
off at the time they buy a chainsaw.    Thus, Simmons never ordered
the  bar  tip  guards  for  his  shop,  though  defendants'  salesman  did
teach him how to install them.
Charles  Suggs                                                                (Suggs)  testified  that  he  had  a  Ph.D.  in
agricultural  and  biological  engineering  and  that  his  research
focused  on  man-machine  systems.     His  publications  include  the
development,   testing   and   evaluation   of   a   chainsaw   kickback
simulator.   Suggs concluded that the chain on the chainsaw used by
Lashlee was not a low-kickback chain, and that excessive kickback
knocked  Lashlee  out  of  the  tree  on  the  day  of  the  accident.
Moreover, Suggs testified that he had visited nine chainsaw dealers
with a chainsaw like the one involved in Lashlee's injury, and had
asked to have a new chain installed.    Of the nine, one dealer did
not  have  a  chain  that  would  fit,  three  dealers  installed  low-
kickback chains, one dealer installed a chain that may or may not




have been a low-kickback chain, and four dealers installed chains
not classified as low-kickback.
Suggs   opined   that   defendants   were   negligent   in   not
manufacturing a chainsaw bar that could only be fitted with a low-
kickback chain, not color-coding low-kickback chains to make them
easily identifiable, and not strengthening the warning language on
the  label  that  recommended  which  chains  should  be  used  with  the
chainsaw.    Suggs acknowledged that most chainsaw manufacturers do
not meet those standards but concluded therefore that those other
manufacturers  were  negligent  as  well.     Suggs  had  no  reason  to
believe that the chain saws manufactured by defendants did not meet
all voluntary safety standards adopted by the industry.
It was also Suggs' opinion that, although it would certainly
be  a  good  idea  to  tie  oneself  into  a  tree  if  there  were  any
question  about  the  stability  of  one's  footing,  given  Lashlee's
chainsaw experience, it was safe for Lashlee to use a chainsaw on
a  ladder  as  he  did.    However,  Suggs  acknowledged  that  he  had  no
professional training in the use of chainsaws and had never tried
to use a chainsaw in a tree.
William  F.  Kitzes                                                           (Kitzes)  testified  that  he  was  a  safety
analyst  and  product  safety  manager,  and  that  he  had  given  two  to
three  hundred  depositions  on  product  safety  issues  over  the
previous  fifteen  years.     In  his  opinion,  the  warnings  used  by
defendants  informing  users  about  the  importance  of  low-kickback
replacement chains, and defendants' training of dealers to insure
that users were aware of the importance of low-kickback replacement
chains, were inadequate.    Kitzes had no information about whether




other  chainsaw  manufacturers  required  their  dealers  to  attend
training  or  what  warning  language  other  chainsaw  manufacturers
used,  but  considered  that  issue  irrelevant.     In  his  opinion,
defendants  had  consciously  and  recklessly  failed  to  provide
consumers with the information they needed, although Kitzes did not
allege that defendants had acted deliberately.
Kitzes testified that he had used a chainsaw no more than once
or twice, and only in a laboratory setting.   He acknowledged that,
when  cutting  a  tree,  it  would  be  prudent  to  tie  in  and  he  would
recommend it, when it could be done.   However, Kitzes believed that
there might be situations in which tying into a tree might not be
appropriate or feasible.
I.
[1] Plaintiffs first assign error to the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendants because of plaintiffs'
alleged contributory negligence.    Summary judgment is appropriate
under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  56
if  the  pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to
interrogatories,   and   admissions   on   file,
together  with  the  affidavits,  if  any,  show
that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  as  to  any
material  fact  and  that  any  party  is  entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  56(c)  (1999).    The  trial  court  held
that  the  undisputed  facts  before  it  established  Lashlee  to  be
contributorily  negligent  as  a  matter  of  law,  and  accordingly
granted summary judgment to defendants on the claim of negligence
(R  80).
"Issues  of  contributory  negligence,  like  those  of  ordinary
negligence are rarely appropriate for summary judgment.   Only where




plaintiff's  own  negligence  discloses  contributory  negligence  so
clearly  that  no  other  reasonable  conclusion  may  be  reached  is
summary  judgment  to  be  granted."    Jenkins  v.  Lake  Montonia  Club,
125  N.C.  App.                                                                102,   104,   479  S.E.2d   259,   261   (1997)   (citations
omitted).
"Contributory  negligence  per  se  may  arise
where a plaintiff knowingly exposes himself to
a known danger when he had a reasonable choice
or  option  to  avoid  that  danger,  or  when  a
plaintiff  heedlessly  or  carelessly  exposes
himself  to  a  danger  or  risk  of  which  he  knew
or should have known."
Davies v. Lewis, 133 N.C. App. 167, 171, 514 S.E.2d 742, 744, disc.
review denied, 350 N.C. 827, 537 S.E.2d 819 (1999) (quoting Lenz v.
Ridgewood Associates, 55 N.C. App. 115, 122-23, 284 S.E.2d 702, 707
(1981), disc. review denied,  305 N.C.  300,  290 S.E.2d  702  (1982))
(emphasis in original).   We therefore consider whether Lashlee was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
In Jenkins, the plaintiff was partially paralyzed after making
a  shallow  dive  from  his  knees  from  the  end  of  a  lakeside  sliding
board.   The plaintiff acknowledged that he and others had gone down
the slide board on their knees many times before; that he knew the
water  under  the  board  was  shallow,  although  he  did  not  know  how
shallow; and that he knew it would hurt if he hit his head on the
bottom  of  the  lake.    This  Court,  in  affirming  the  trial  court's
finding  of  contributory  negligence  as  a  matter  of  law,  held  that
"plaintiff was aware of the potential danger and knew the risk of
the  activity  in  which  he  engaged.    The  danger  of  striking  the
bottom  of  the  swimming  area  when  diving  head  first  into  shallow
water was obvious to plaintiff."   Jenkins, 125 N.C. App. at 107-08,




479 S.E.2d at  263  (citation omitted).
In Davies, the plaintiff broke her neck after making a shallow
dive off of a floating dock.   The plaintiff had made dives off the
dock before, but never in the direction of the dive that broke her
neck.    The  water  around  the  dock  had  a  visibility  of  only  one  to
two inches; the plaintiff had been taught not to dive into water of
an  unknown  depth;  and  the  plaintiff  was  aware  that  water  depth
changed with the tide, although she assumed that tidal conditions
at  the  floating  dock  would  remain  constant.    This  Court  affirmed
the trial court's finding of contributory negligence as a matter of
law, holding that the plaintiff
failed to use ordinary care before diving into
the  water  on  the  date  in  question.    She  knew
from  her  experience  as  a  trained  diver  that
diving  into  water  of  an  unknown  depth  was
dangerous, but did so by her own choosing and
at  her  own  risk.     There  was  a  reasonable
opportunity  for  her  to  avoid  this  danger  by
jumping instead of diving into the water, and
her  decision  to  dive  without  attempting  to
measure    the    water's    depth    constitutes
contributory negligence.
Davies,  133 N.C. App. at  170-71,  514 S.E.2d at  744.
In  the  case  before  us,  Lashlee  had  experienced  kickback  and
was  aware  of  the  danger  it  posed.    He  had  tied  himself  into  the
tree  earlier  on  the  day  of  his  injury  to  prevent  himself  from
falling, both because he had seen professionals do so and because
it was "common sense."   Lashlee had never seen anyone try to cut a
tree while standing on a ladder.    Yet, when he decided to cut the
final  limb,  Lashlee  chose  not  to  retrieve  the  rope  he  had
previously used to tie himself in.   Instead, Lashlee stood near the
top of the ladder, leaned his left side against the tree, and began




to  cut.    We  conclude  that  Lashlee  was  aware  of  the  danger  that
kickback  could  potentially  knock  him  backward  off  the  ladder  and
out  of  the  tree,  and  that  Lashlee's  failure  to  secure  himself  to
the tree constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs  contend  that,  under  Nicholson  v.  American  Safety
Utility Corp., 346 N.C. 767, 488 S.E.2d 240 (1997), plaintiffs are
entitled  to  have  the  issue  of  Lashlee's  contributory  negligence
heard  by  a  jury.    In  Nicholson,  the  plaintiff  was  an  experienced
electrical lineman working in an insulated hydraulic bucket beneath
energized electrical lines.   To protect himself, the plaintiff wore
a  helmet  and  insulated  gloves.    Twice  prior  to  the  accident,  the
plaintiff's   helmet   blew   off   and,   each   time,   the   plaintiff
immediately lowered the bucket and retrieved the helmet.   The third
time his helmet blew off, however, the plaintiff was in the midst
of tightening a bolt and chose to continue tightening.   One of the
overhead  electrical  lines  then  somehow  came  in  contact  with  the
plaintiff's head, and current ran through the plaintiff's body and
out through his gloved hands, severely injuring the plaintiff.
The  trial  court  in  Nicholson  held  that  the  plaintiff  was
contributorily  negligent  as  a  matter  of  law.    Our  Supreme  Court
reversed, noting that one of the plaintiff's experts had stated by
affidavit  that  the  plaintiff,  although  failing  to  comply  with
safety  standards,  had  acted  as  other  similarly  trained  linemen
would  act  in  similar  circumstances.    The  Court  concluded  that  an
issue of fact existed as to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
conduct  under  the  circumstances,  and  therefore  that  summary
judgment was improper.




In the case before us, plaintiffs' experts, Suggs and Kitzes,
each suggested that Lashlee's failure to tie himself into the tree
at  the  time  of  the  accident  may  have  been  reasonable  under  the
circumstances.                                                                However,  Suggs  acknowledged  that  he  had  no
professional  chainsaw  training,  and  that  he  had  never  used  a
chainsaw  in  a  tree.    Kitzes  acknowledged  that  he  had  hardly  ever
used  a  chainsaw  at  all,  and  never  outside  of  a  laboratory.
Although Suggs and Kitzes may have been qualified to testify about
chainsaw design, neither was competent to render an expert opinion
on the reasonable use of a chainsaw in a tree.
We  conclude  that,  at  the  time  defendants  moved  for  summary
judgment on the issue of defendants' negligence, no genuine issue
of  fact  existed  as  to  the  negligence  of  Lashlee's  conduct.    The
trial court did not err in finding Lashlee contributorily negligent
as a matter of law.
II.
[2] Plaintiffs also assign error to the trial court's grant of
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendants  on  the  issue  of  punitive
damages.
As  a  general  rule,  punitive  damages  may
be   recovered   where   tortious   conduct   is
accompanied  by  an  element  of  aggravation,  as
when  the  wrong  is  done  willfully  or  under
circumstances   of   rudeness,   oppression,   or
express  malice,  or  in  a  manner  evincing  a
wanton    and    reckless    disregard    of    the
plaintiffs' rights.
                                                                                                                                         Connelly v. Family Inns of Am., Inc.,  141 N.C. App.  583,  593,  540
S.E.2d                                                                        38,                                                44-45   (2000)                                                                   (citation  omitted).    We  note  also  that
                                                                                                                                         "contributory negligence will not bar recovery where the defendant
                                                                                                                                         is  guilty  of  willful  or  wanton  negligence."     Collins  v.  CSX




Transportation,  114  N.C.  App.  14,  21,  441  S.E.2d  150,  154,  disc.
review  denied,                                                                336  N.C.              603,   447  S.E.2d   388   (1994)   (citation
omitted).
Plaintiffs  assert  that  defendants  demonstrated  willful  or
wanton  negligence  by  making  it  possible  for  users  of  defendants'
chainsaws  to  unknowingly  replace  a  factory-approved  low-kickback
chain with a non-approved chain.    Plaintiffs point to the limited
warnings on the chainsaw itself, the fact that most chainsaw users
cannot tell a low-kickback chain from other chains, and defendants'
failure  to  require  their  dealers  to  attend  safety  training  as
evidence of defendants' negligence.   Plaintiffs argue that, because
it  is  foreseeable  that  a  chainsaw  user  will  need  a  replacement
chain at some point, defendants' failure to take additional steps
to assure that the replacement chain will be a low-kickback chain
demonstrates a wanton and reckless disregard for the safety of the
users of its chainsaws.
In  order  to  warrant  punitive  damages,  an  act  of  negligence
must be willful or wanton.
A  wanton  act  is  an  act  done  with  a
"wicked  purpose  or                                                           .  done  needlessly,
manifesting  a  reckless  indifference  to  the
rights  of  others."     An  act  is  willful  when
there is a deliberate purpose not to discharge
a duty, assumed by contract or imposed by law,
necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  person  or
property of another.
Benton v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc.,  136 N.C. App.  42,  51,  524 S.E.2d
53, 60 (1999) (citations omitted).   In Benton, our Court held that
evidence of a restaurant's failure to provide adequate security for
its  diners,  despite  a  duty  to  do  so  and  its  location  in  a  high-
crime  area,  was  insufficient  as  a  matter  of  law  to  justify  a




punitive  damages  verdict.     See  id.     Similarly,  we  hold  that
plaintiffs  in  the  present  case  have  failed  to  present  sufficient
evidence  to  support  a  finding  that  defendants  were  willfully  or
wantonly negligent.
Plaintiffs  contend  that  the  expert  opinion  of  Kitzes  that
defendants consciously and recklessly failed to provide consumers
with needed information is sufficient to take the issue of punitive
damages to a jury.   Defendants counter that, because Kitzes was not
testifying  as  a  legal  expert,  his  legal  characterization  of
defendants'  acts  carries  no  independent  weight.    See  Howard  v.
Jackson,  120  N.C.  App.  243,  249,  461  S.E.2d  793,  798  (1995).    We
agree  with  defendants  and  hold  that  the  mere  characterization  by
Kitzes of defendants' negligence as conscious and reckless did not
create a genuine issue of material fact.
We  therefore  affirm  the  trial  court's  grant  of  summary
judgment  in  favor  of  defendants.     Defendants  have  adequately
demonstrated Lashlee's contributory negligence as a matter of law,
and  plaintiffs  have  failed  to  present  competent  evidence  that
defendants were willfully or wantonly negligent.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and THOMAS concur.

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