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RALPH LINDSEY, JR., Plaintiff v. BODDIE-NOELL ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a
HARDEE’S SKAT-THRU, Defendant
No. COA00-1420
(Filed  20 November  2001)
1.                                                                               Discovery-motion to compel-not timely
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence action
arising from defendant serving plaintiff a cup of water poured from a
pitcher which had contained a chlorine cleaning solution by denying
plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery one month before the trial..
Although the documents requested by plaintiff  (identifying similar claims)
were relevant to punitive damages  , plaintiff had not requested the
documents during the twenty months since the complaint was filed.
Plaintiff had had ample opportunity to obtain the documents.    N.C.G.S.  §
1A-1, Rule  26(b)(1).
2.                                                                               Jury--disregard of instructions-definition of willful and wanton
The trial court erred by denying plaintiff’s motion for JNOV in a
negligence action arising from a fast food restaurant serving water from a
container which had contained a chlorine cleaning solution where a juror
brought into the jury room definitions of  “willful” and  “wanton” he had
obtained from his computer during a lunch recess.    There was prejudice
because it would be more difficult to show willful and wanton conduct under
the computer definitions than the pattern jury instructions given by the
court  , the court was unaware of the use of the computer definitions until
after the trial and did not have an opportunity to instruct the jury to
disregard those definitions, and the jury did not award punitive damages
despite  25 similar incidents between  1994 and  1995.
3.                                                                               Negligence-definition of willful and wanton-applicable instruction
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence action by
not giving the jury instruction requested by plaintiff on the definition of
willful and wanton where the instruction requested by plaintiff was not
applicable and the court gave the jury the correct instruction.
4.                                                                               Evidence-polygraph-negligence action-not admissible
The trial court did not err in a negligence action by refusing to
admit evidence from a polygraph test tending to show that plaintiff had
lost his sense of taste as alleged.    It is well established that polygraph
evidence is not admissible in North Carolina trial courts.
5.                                                                               Appeal and Error-error in punitive phase only-remand of entire action
A negligence action was remanded for a new trial on all issues,
including liability for compensatory damages, where the jury considered an
outside definition of willful and wanton but plaintiff did not assign error
to the compensatory damages phase of the trial.    N.C.G.S.  §  1D-30 is clear
in its mandate that the same trier of fact try both the compensatory and
punitive phases of the trial and does not provide exceptions.    Moreover,
remand on the punitive damages issues only would deprive the jury of an
opportunity to consider all of the evidence presented during the
compensatory phase that bears upon the actual damages suffered by the
claimant.      N.C.G.S.  §  1D-35(2)(e).
Judge TYSON concurring in part and dissenting in part.




Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 21 July 1999 and order entered
22  February  2000  by  Judge  Mark  E.  Klass  in  Guilford  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  12 September  2001.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey, & Leonard, L.L.P., by L.P. McLendon,
Jr. and John W. Ormand III, for plaintiff-appellant.
Cranfill,  Sumner  &  Hartzog,  L.L.P.,  by  H.  Lee  Evans,  Jr.  and  Jaye  E.
Bingham, for defendant-appellee.
HUNTER, Judge.
Ralph  Lindsey,  Jr.                                                                     (“plaintiff”)  appeals  the  trial  court’s  entry  of
judgment  awarding  plaintiff  compensatory  damages  but  no  punitive  damages.
Plaintiff  also  appeals  the  trial  court’s  order  denying  his  motion  for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict  (“JNOV”) or, in the alternative, for a
new trial.    We remand for a new trial on all issues.
The  evidence  at  trial  tended  to  establish  the  following  facts.    On  13
December 1996, plaintiff entered the drive-thru window of the Skat-Thru owned
by   Boddie-Noell   Enterprises,   Inc.,   d/b/a   Hardee’s                              (“defendant”)   in
Reidsville, North Carolina.   Plaintiff ordered breakfast and a cup of water,
and observed the drive-thru employee, Frankie Settle  (“Settle”), pour water
into a cup from a pitcher.   Settle then handed plaintiff his food and water.
After plaintiff received his food, he pulled into the parking lot to eat his
breakfast.   Plaintiff ate all of his food before taking a drink of water.   As
plaintiff started to drive away, he removed the top to the cup of water and
took  a  large  drink.    Plaintiff  did  not  notice  anything out  of  the  ordinary
about the look or smell of the water, and he did not feel any burning to his
tongue as he drank the water.    After drinking the water, plaintiff’s throat
began  to  burn  and  he  vomited  several  times.     Plaintiff  returned  to  the
restaurant and informed the manager, Martha Settle, that something was wrong
with  the  water.     The  manager  drew  water  from  the  faucet  and  tasted  it,
informing plaintiff that nothing was wrong with the water.
Plaintiff  presented  evidence  showing  that  the  water  had  contained  a




chlorine concentration of more than two-hundred parts per million.   Plaintiff
asserted at trial that the cup of water which he drank contained a sanitizing
solution  known  as  Q-25  Alkaline  Sanitizer  (“sanitizer”).    The  evidence  at
trial showed that the sanitizer was usually mixed at the restaurant in water
to  clean  and  sanitize  the  dishes  and  counters.    The  water  pitchers  were
cleaned  with  the  sanitizer  each  night  and  air  dried.    The  morning  shift
employees would fill the pitchers with water from the faucet in the morning.
After  drinking  the  water  and  confronting  the  manager,  plaintiff  drove
himself  to  Annie  Penn  Hospital,  taking  the  partially  filled  cup  with  him.
Plaintiff left the hospital but returned later that day complaining of throat
pain,  stomach  pain,  and  shortness  of  breath.     Three  days  later,  on            16
December 1996, plaintiff reported to Urgent Medical Center where it was noted
that  plaintiff  had  no  sense  of  taste,  was  dehydrated,  disoriented  and  that
his  veins  were  collapsed.    In  June  of  1997,  plaintiff  was  examined  by  Dr.
Susan  Schiffman,  a  professor  at  Duke  University  Medical  School.     Dr.
Schiffman testified that plaintiff suffered a total and permanent loss of his
sense of taste.    In October of  1998, plaintiff submitted to a taste test by
Dr. Beverly Cowart, a research psychologist at Monell Chemical Senses Center
in  Philadelphia.    Dr.  Cowart  testified  by  video  deposition  at  trial  that
plaintiff  did  not  have  a  complete  loss  of  taste  and  that  her  testing  could
not confirm that plaintiff had a partial loss of taste.
Plaintiff  filed  suit  against  defendant  on                                            28  August   1997.   The
compensatory  and  punitive  damages  phases  were  bifurcated  upon  defendant’s
motion.    The  jury  found  that  defendant  was  negligent  and  awarded  plaintiff
$32,500.00 in compensatory damages.   Evidence was then heard in the punitive
damages  phase  of  the  trial  by  the  same  jury.     The  trial  court’s  charge
included the definitions of “willful” and “wanton” as set forth in N.C.P.I.,
Civ.  810.05,  and  each  juror  was  provided  a  copy  of  the  jury  instructions.
During  the  jury’s  deliberations,  a  note  from  a  juror  was  delivered  to  the
trial court.    The note stated:




Your Honor:
I’m  writing  this  note  because  as  of  now  I’m  one  of  the
[ones] having difficulty coming to some conclusion.   The
reason for this is because of the way the wording in your
charge is written.
As  I  understand,  according  to  your  charge  we  must  rule
based    on    the    understanding    that    Boddie-Noell
intentionally wronged Mr. Lindsey.   This to me says that
the  only  way  we  can  rule  is  for  the  defense,  because
there is no way we can rule for the plaintiff because we
can’t  really  prove  that  the  incident  was  willing  and
wanton  (intentionally).
I said all that to say this.   Is it possible to allow us
another option?
In  response  to  the  note,  the  trial  court  stated  to  the  jury,  “[y]’all  have
the charge, and the definition is in that charge of what willful and wanton
means,  so,  that’s  all  I  can  tell  you  on  that,  and  there’s  no  other  option
that I can  - you know, that’s what the law is, so, you have to go by what’s
in that charge.”   At that time, plaintiff’s counsel requested that the court
instruct the jurors on the definitions of “willful” and “wanton” as set forth
in  N.C.P.I.,  Civ.  102.86.    The  trial  court  denied  the  request.    The  jury
returned and awarded no punitive damages to plaintiff.
After  the  trial,  plaintiff  filed  a  motion  for  JNOV  or,  in  the
alternative,  a  new  trial,  accompanied  by  affidavits  from  four  jurors.    The
affidavits   indicated   that   during   deliberations,   Juror   Couch   brought
definitions of the words  “willful” and  “wanton” into the jury room which he
had obtained from a dictionary through a computer.   The trial court received
the  affidavits  and  considered  them,  and  subsequently  denied  plaintiff’s
motion.    Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff has entered eight assignments of error in the record, but has
abandoned two of these by failing to raise them in his appellate brief.   See
N.C.R.  App.  P.                                                                          28(b)(5).     The  remaining  assignments  of  error  have  been
condensed into four arguments for our review:                                             (1) that the trial court erred
in denying plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery;  (2) that the trial court
erred  in  denying  plaintiff’s  motion  for  JNOV  or,  in  the  alternative,  a  new




                                                                                          trial;  (3)  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  refusing  to  charge  the  jury  using
N.C.P.I.,  Civ.                                                                           102.86;  and                                                                              (4)  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  refusing  to
admit polygraph evidence.
I.
[1]  Plaintiff  first  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his
motion to compel discovery.   Plaintiff filed his complaint on 28 August 1997.
Between  that  time  and  the  commencement  of  trial  on  7  June  1999,  plaintiff
apparently filed four separate requests for production of documents, although
only  two  have  been  included  in  the  record.     In  his  fourth  request  for
production of documents, filed 5 May 1999 (approximately twenty months after
the complaint was filed and one month before trial), plaintiff requested that
defendant produce all documents generated between  1 January  1986 and May of
1999 relating to any incident in which a customer or employee of any Hardee’s
restaurant  owned  or  operated  by  defendant  claimed  to  have  been  served  a
beverage  containing  sanitizer.    As  far  as  we  are  able  to  discern  from  the
record,  this  fourth  request  for  production  was  the  first  time  plaintiff
specifically  requested  the  production  of  such  documents  from  this  time
period.
At the time of this fourth request for production, defendant had already
produced   documents   identifying   claims   involving   beverages   containing
sanitizer  between  1992  and  1997.    By  response  filed  4  June  1999,  defendant
objected  to  the  request  for  documents  from  1986  through  1999.    Three  days
later,  on  the  day  trial  was  scheduled  to  commence,  7  June  1999,  plaintiff
filed a motion to compel defendant to produce additional documents generated
from  1990 to  1992, and from  1997 through  1999.    The motion was heard by the
trial court on  7 June  1999, immediately prior to trial, and the trial court
denied  the  motion.    Having  reviewed  the  record  on  appeal,  we  are  unable  to
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in this matter.
“Under  the  rules  governing  discovery,  a  party  may  obtain  discovery
concerning any unprivileged matter as long as relevant to the pending action




and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools’ Bd. of Education,  113 N.C. App.  579,  585,  440
S.E.2d  119,  123  (citing N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  26(b)(1)  (1999)  (“Rule
26(b)(1)”)),  disc.  review  denied,                                                     336  N.C.                         615,           447  S.E.2d   414   (1994).
“Whether or not  [a] party’s motion to compel discovery should be granted or
denied is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion.”    Id.
Plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his  motion  to
compel  discovery  because  the  documents  which  he  sought  to  have  defendant
produce  were  relevant  to  establishing  that  defendant’s  conduct  was  willful
and  wanton  and  warranted  an  award  of  punitive  damages.     We  agree  with
plaintiff  that  the  documents  sought  were  relevant  to  the  punitive  damages
issue.    Our  General  Statutes  provide  that,  in  determining  the  amount  of
punitive damages, the jury may consider evidence that relates to:
c.    The  degree  of  the  defendant’s  awareness  of  the
probable consequences of its conduct.
d.    The duration of the defendant’s conduct.
g.    The  existence  and  frequency  of  any  similar  past
conduct by the defendant.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                        §                                 1D-35(2)(c),   (d),          (g)   (1999).    The  evidence  sought  by
plaintiff  in  his  motion  to  compel  was  relevant  to  these  issues  and,
therefore,  relevant  to  the  issue  of  punitive   damages  and  reasonably
calculated  to  lead  to  the  discovery  of  evidence  that  would  have  been
admissible during the punitive damages phase of the trial.
Nevertheless, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to compel given the timing of plaintiff’s fourth request
for  production  of  documents  and  the  timing  of  the  motion  to  compel.    Rule
26(b)(1) provides that the court may limit the use of discovery methods,
if  it  determines  that:                                                                (i)  the  discovery  sought  is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from  some  other  source  that  is  more  convenient,  less
burdensome,  or  less  expensive;                                                        (ii)  the  party  seeking




discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the
action  to  obtain  the  information  sought;    or  (iii)  the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation.
Rule                                                                                     26(b)(1).    Although  the  record  does  not  indicate  that  the  evidence
sought  by  plaintiff  would  have  been  unreasonably  cumulative  or  unduly
burdensome for defendant to produce, the record does indicate that plaintiff
had  “ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought.”    Id.
As noted, plaintiff filed its fourth request for production of documents
approximately  twenty  months  after  the  complaint  was  filed,  and  one  month
before trial was scheduled.   In this document, plaintiff requested defendant
to  produce  all  documents  generated  between  1  January  1986  and  May  of  1999
relating to any incident involving beverages containing sanitizer.   Plaintiff
failed  to  request  production  of  such  documents  in  its  second  request  for
production,  which  appears  in  the  record,  and  we  are  unable  to  determine
whether  plaintiff  requested  such  documents  in  the  first  or  third  requests
because these documents have not been included in the record.   Presuming, as
we  must,  that  plaintiff  first  requested  production  of  these  documents  one
month prior to trial, and failed to make such a request during the previous
twenty  months,  we  cannot  say  that  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion  in
denying the motion to compel.
II.
[2]  In  his  second  argument,  plaintiff  contends  that  the  trial  court
erred  in  denying  his  motion  for  JNOV  or,  in  the  alternative,  a  new  trial.
Plaintiff contends that the jury’s use of dictionary definitions of the words
“willful”  and                                                                           “wanton”  was  improper,  and  that  this  conduct  resulted  in
prejudice to plaintiff.    We agree.
As   noted   above,   plaintiff   filed   a   motion   for   JNOV   or,   in   the
alternative,  a  new  trial,  accompanied  by  affidavits  from  four  jurors.    The
affidavits   indicate   that   during   deliberations,   Juror   Couch   brought




definitions of the words  “willful” and  “wanton” into the jury room which he
had obtained from a dictionary through a computer.   The trial court properly
received the affidavits and considered them, pursuant to Rule  606(b) of the
North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence,  which  provides  that  the  trial  court  may
receive juror testimony as to “whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule
606(b)                                                                                     (1999).    After  considering  the  affidavits,  the  trial  court  denied
plaintiff’s motion.   We believe that the trial court erred because the jury’s
consideration  of  the  dictionary  definitions  was  improper,  and  because
plaintiff was    prejudiced by the jury’s improper conduct.
In North Carolina, as well as in every jurisdiction that has considered
the  issue,  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  improper  for  a  jury  to  consider  or
rely upon extraneous information, such as definitions found in a dictionary,
during deliberations.   See In re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 87, 113 S.E.2d 1,
13 (1960) (“‘[i]t generally is ground for reversal that the jury obtained and
took  into  the  jury  room  a  dictionary  which  they  consulted  to  determine  the
meaning  of  legal  or  other  terms,  which  they  do  not  understand’”  (citation
omitted));  State  v.  Barnes,                                                             345  N.C.                                                                    184,   226,   481  S.E.2d   44,   67   (1997)
(“[c]ourts  throughout  the  United  States  have  generally  concluded  that  a
jury’s reliance on extraneous sources during deliberations is error”), cert.
denied,  523  U.S.  1024,  140  L.  Ed.  2d  473  (1998);    State v.  McLain,  10  N.C.
App. 146, 148, 177 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1970) (“[i]t was improper for the jury to
obtain and read a dictionary definition of one of the offenses charged in the
bill of indictment”); see also Jean E. Maess, Annotation, Prejudicial Effect
of Jury’s Procurement or Use of Book During Deliberations in Civil Cases,  31
A.L.R.4th  623  (1984).    However, even where it is shown that a jury has been
improperly  influenced  by  extraneous  information,  a  party  challenging  the
verdict  must  further  show  that  the  jury  was  prejudiced  against  him  as  a
result  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  relief.    See  Pinckney  v.  Van  Damme,  116




N.C. App.  139,  149,  447 S.E.2d  825,  831  (1994).
Here,  the  dictionary  definitions  used  by  the  jury  clearly  had  the
potential to prejudice plaintiff.   Plaintiff sought punitive damages based on
the contention that defendant’s conduct was willful and wanton.   According to
N.C.P.I.,  Civ.  810.05,  willful  and  wanton  conduct  “means  the  conscious  and
intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others,
which  the  defendant  knows  or  should  know  is  reasonably  likely  to  result  in
injury,  damage  or  other  harm.”     According  to  the  dictionary  definitions
considered  by  the  jury,  however,  “willful”  means  “deliberate”  or  “done  on
purpose,”  and                                                                           “wanton”  means   “gratuitously  cruel;  merciless;   [m]arked  by
unprovoked, gratuitous maliciousness.”   The potential prejudice to plaintiff
is clear:    it is more difficult to show that a defendant harmed a plaintiff
deliberately and “on purpose,” and that the defendant acted in a gratuitously
cruel  and  malicious  way,  than  it  is  to  show  that  a  defendant  merely  acted
with an intentional disregard of, or indifference to, a plaintiff’s safety.
Moreover,  we  believe  the  following  factors  establish  that  the  use  of
these  definitions  did,  in  fact,  prejudice  plaintiff  in  this  case.    First,
during deliberations, Juror Jackson submitted a note to the trial court judge
which stated, in part:
As  I  understand,  according  to  your  charge  we  must  rule
based on the understanding that [defendant] intentionally
wronged  [plaintiff].    This to me says that the only way
we can rule is for the defense, because there is no way
we  can  rule  for  the  plaintiff  because  we  can’t  really
prove   that   the   incident   was   willing   and   wanton
(intentionally).
(Emphasis added.)    Second, according to the juror affidavits, this note was
precipitated by the fact that Juror Couch provided to all of the jurors the
dictionary  definitions  at  issue,  which  he  had  obtained  from  his  computer
during  a  lunch  recess.     Third,  the  trial  court  here  did  not  have  an
opportunity  to  instruct  the  jury  to  disregard  the  dictionary  definitions
because the trial court was unaware until after the trial that the jury had
considered these definitions.   See Pinckney, 116 N.C. App. at 152, 447 S.E.2d




at 833 (holding that one factor in determining prejudice resulting from jury
consideration  of  extraneous  information  is  whether  trial  court  instructed
jury to consider only matters introduced at trial).    Finally, the jury here
did  not  award  any  punitive  damages  to  plaintiff,  despite  evidence  that
similar   incidents   had   occurred   on   approximately   twenty-five   separate
occasions  between                                                                        1994  and            1997.    We  believe  these  factors  indicate  that
plaintiff  was  prejudiced  in  this  case  and,  thus,  we  hold  that  the  trial
court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion was clearly erroneous and constituted an
abuse of discretion.    See id. at  148,  447 S.E.2d at  831.
In concluding that defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced,
the dissent relies upon Hall,  252 N.C.  70,  113 S.E.2d  1, and McLain,  10 N.C.
App.  146,  177 S.E.2d  742.    These cases are distinguishable from the present
case.    In  Hall,  the  Court  held  that  the  definition  of                           “undue  influence”
provided by an encyclopedia and considered by the jury during deliberations
was  actually  more  favorable  to  appellants  than  the  definition  applied  by
North  Carolina  courts.    See  Hall,  252  N.C.  at  88,  113  S.E.2d  at  13.    The
Court  concluded  that,  because  the  definition  could  not  have  prejudiced  the
appellants, it was not error to deny the appellants’ motion to set aside the
verdict.   See id. at  88,  113 S.E.2d at  14.   In McLain, defendant moved for a
new trial on the grounds that the jury considered a dictionary definition of
the offense of  “uttering” during deliberations.   See McLain,  10 N.C. App. at
148,  177 S.E.2d at  743.   This Court held that the trial court did not err in
denying  the  motion  because  (1)  the  trial  court  specifically  instructed  the
jury before it reached a verdict to disregard the definition taken from the
dictionary,  and  (2)  the  defendant  failed  to  show  that  he  was  prejudiced  in
any way by the jury’s conduct.    Id.
III.
[3]  Plaintiff  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  refusing  to
instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  definitions  of                                         “willful”  and       “wanton”  as
contained  in  N.C.P.I.,  Civ.  102.86.    We  disagree.    It  is  within  the  trial




court’s discretion to determine whether additional instructions are needed to
dispel jury confusion.   State v. Prevette, 317 N.C. 148, 164, 345 S.E.2d 159,
169                                                                                      (1986).                                                               We  review  the  trial  court’s  decision  under  an  abuse  of
discretion standard in determining whether the trial court erred in refusing
to give plaintiff’s requested instruction.    Id.                                        “It is well settled  ‘[t]he
trial court must give the instructions requested, at least in substance, if
they  are  proper  and  supported  by  evidence.  .  .                                   .’”    Roberts  v.  Young,  120
N.C.  App.                                                                               720,                                                                  726,                                                              464  S.E.2d   78,   83   (1995)   (citation  omitted).   “A
requested instruction which is not, in its entirety, a correct statement of
the law applicable to the evidence may be refused, the court being under no
duty  to  modify  or  qualify  it  so  as  to  remedy the  defect therein.”    King v.
Higgins,  272 N.C.  267,  270,  158 S.E.2d  67, 70  (1967)  (holding that the trial
court  did  not  err  by  refusing  to  give  a  requested  definition  that  did  not
apply to the evidence).
Here,  the  trial  court  properly  refused  to  instruct  the  jury  using  the
pattern jury instruction requested by plaintiff.   The note which accompanies
N.C.P.I., Civ.  102.86 states:                                                           “Use this instruction only where an issue as
to  plaintiff’s  contributory  negligence  will  be  submitted  and  where  the
plaintiff  seeks  to  overcome  a  prospective  adverse  finding  on  the  issue  of
contributory  negligence  by  proving  defendant’s  conduct  was  willful  or
wanton.”                                                                                 (Footnote omitted.)    The issue of contributory negligence was not
submitted to the jury.    Therefore, this jury instruction was not applicable
to this case.    Moreover, the trial court properly instructed the jury using
the definitions of “willful” and “wanton” set forth in N.C.P.I., Civ. 810.05,
which  is  intended  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  determining  liability  for
punitive damages.   We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in  refusing  to  instruct  the  jury  using  the  jury  instruction  requested  by
plaintiff.
IV.
[4] In his final argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred




in  refusing  to  admit  evidence  from  a  polygraph  test  tending  to  show  that
plaintiff had lost his sense of taste.    Although we are remanding for a new
trial  on  all  issues                                                                    (as  discussed  below),  we  briefly  address  this  issue
because we believe it is likely to arise again during the new trial.    It is
well-established that polygraph evidence is not admissible in North Carolina
trial  courts.    See  State  v.  Grier,  307  N.C.  628,  645,  300  S.E.2d  351,  361
(1983)  (Court  found  polygraph  evidence  inherently  unreliable  and  held  that
polygraph  evidence  is  no  longer  admissible  in  either  civil  or  criminal
trials).     Thus,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  refusing  to  admit  the
polygraph evidence.
V.
[5] Finally, we hold that this case must be remanded for a new trial on
all issues.    Defendant  argues  that  if  a  new  trial  is  ordered,  it  should be
limited  to  the  issue  of  punitive  damages  only,  because  plaintiff  has  not
assigned error to the compensatory damages phase of the trial.    In general,
appellate courts in North Carolina have discretionary authority to determine
whether  a  case  should  be  remanded  for  a  partial  new  trial.     See,  e.g.,
Robertson  v.  Stanley,                                                                   285  N.C.                                                    561,   568,   206  S.E.2d   190,   195   (1974).
However,  in  this  case  the  compensatory  and  punitive  damages  phases  of  the
trial  were  bifurcated  pursuant  to  section                                            1D-30  of  our  General  Statutes,
which states:
Upon  the  motion  of  a  defendant,  the  issues  of
liability  for  compensatory  damages  and  the  amount  of
compensatory damages, if any, shall be tried separately
from the issues of liability for punitive damages and the
amount  of  punitive  damages,  if  any.    Evidence  relating
solely to punitive damages shall not be admissible until
the  trier  of  fact  has  determined  that  the  defendant  is
liable  for  compensatory  damages  and  has  determined  the
amount of compensatory damages.    The same trier of fact
that  tried  the  issues  relating  to  compensatory  damages
shall try the issues relating to punitive damages.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-30 (1999) (emphasis added).   Defendant contends that the
final  sentence  of  the  statute  should  not  apply,  and  was  not  intended  to
apply,  where  an  appellate  court  remands  a  case  to  the  trial  court  after




concluding  that  there  was  error  in  the  punitive  damages  phase  of  the  trial
but  not  in  the  compensatory  damages  phase.    In  support  of  this  argument
defendant  relies  upon  an  opinion  from  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Minnesota,
Nugent  v.  Kerr,                                                                          543  N.W.2d                                                      688,   691   (Minn.  App.   1996).     In  Nugent,  the
plaintiff  argued  that  a  retrial  after  remand  could  not  be  limited  to  the
issue  of  punitive  damages  only  because  the  pertinent  statute  authorizing
separate  proceedings  for  the  issues  of  compensatory  and  punitive  damages
required the same trier of fact to determine both compensatory and punitive
damages.     The  court  rejected  this  argument  and  ordered  a  new  trial  on
punitive damages only because it concluded that “the issues of liability are
uncomplicated and neither party has demonstrated that it would be prejudiced
by  a  retrial  on  punitive  damages  alone.”    Id.  at  691.    However,  we  believe
Nugent is unpersuasive because the pertinent statute in that case did not, as
our statute does, expressly mandate that the same trier of fact  “shall” try
both  phases  of  the  trial.    See  Minn.Stat.  §  549.20,  subd.  4  (2000).    Our
statute is clear in its mandate, and does not provide any exceptions.
Further,  we  believe  that  we  are  required  to  remand  for  a  new  trial  on
all issues, including liability for compensatory damages.   This conclusion is
based upon the language of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1D-30, which contemplates four
issues   at   trial                                                                        (liability   for   compensatory   damages,   the   amount   of
compensatory  damages,  liability  for  punitive  damages,  and  the  amount  of
punitive  damages)  grouped  into  two  categories                                         (“the  issues  relating  to
compensatory  damages”  and  “the  issues  relating  to  punitive  damages”),  and
which  contemplates  that  the  same  trier  of  fact  must  try  both  categories
(i.e., all four issues).   Therefore, where an appellate court concludes that
a case that was bifurcated at trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1D-30 must
be  remanded  for  a  new  trial  on  the  issues  relating  to  punitive  damages,  we
believe  the  statute  requires  that  the  case  must  also  be  remanded  for  a  new
trial on the issues of liability for compensatory damages and the amount of
compensatory damages, so that the same jury may try all of these issues.




Our  interpretation  is  buttressed  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                §                                                                  1D-35,  which
provides  that  the  jury,  in  determining  the  amount  of  punitive  damages,  may
consider  evidence  that  relates  to  a  variety  of  factors,  including                “[t]he
actual  damages  suffered  by  the  claimant.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1D-35(2)(e).
Were  we  to  remand  for  a  new  trial  only  on  the  issues  relating  to  punitive
damages, the jury would be deprived of an opportunity to consider all of the
evidence  presented  during  the  compensatory  damages  phase  of  the  trial  that
bears upon the actual damages suffered by the claimant.
We  remand  for  a  new  trial  on  all  issues.    We  also  affirm  the  trial
court’s  denial  of  plaintiff’s  pretrial  motion  to  compel  production  of
documents.
New trial.
Judge WYNN concurs.
Judge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.
TYSON, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I  concur  in  parts  I,  III,  IV  and  V  of  the  majority’s  opinion.     I
respectfully dissent from part II of the majority’s opinion.   Plaintiff fails
to show that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a new trial.
II. Extraneous prejudicial information
Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to G.S.  §  1A-1, Rule  59(a)(2)
on  the  grounds  of  jury  misconduct.    In  support  of  the  motion,  plaintiff
tendered  four  affidavits  from  jurors  concerning  dictionary  definitions  of
“willful”  and                                                                            “wanton”  brought  into  the  jury  room  during  deliberations.
Plaintiff  demands  a  new  trial  and  argues  that  these  definitions  constitute
extraneous information which was prejudicial to him.
Appellate review of an order of a trial court granting or denying a new
trial pursuant to G.S.  §  1A-1, Rule  59 is limited to the question of whether
the  record  discloses  a  manifest  abuse  of  discretion  or  that  the  ruling  was




clearly erroneous.   Pinckney v. Van Damme,  116 N.C. App.  139,  447 S.E.2d  825
(1994).
The general rule is that, once rendered, a verdict may not be impeached
by the jurors.   See In Re Will of Hall,  252 N.C.  70,  87-88,  113 S.E.2d  1,  13
(1960)                                                                                    (“It  is  firmly  established  in  this  State  that  jurors  will  not  be
allowed to attack or overthrow their verdicts, nor will evidence from them be
received for such purpose.”)  (citations omitted); Carolina-Virginia Fashion
Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 291 N.C. 208,  222,  230 S.E.2d 380, 389-90  (1976)
(jurors will not be allowed by testimony or affidavit to impeach, to attack,
or  to  overthrow  their  verdicts)  (quoting  State  v.  Hollingsworth,  263  N.C.
158,  139 S.E.2d  235  (1964))  (citations omitted).
Rule 606(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence creates an exception
to the general rule.    Berrier v. Thrift,  107 N.C. App.  356,  364,  420 S.E.2d
206,  210-11  (1992).    Rule  606(b) permits testimony by a juror as to whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly before the jury.   N.C. Gen.
Stat.                                                                                     §                                                                             8C-1,  Rule    606(b)        (1999).     A  juror  may  not  testify  as  to  the
subjective  effect  of  the  extraneous  information  upon  the  jury’s  decision.
State  v.  Lyles,  94  N.C.  App.  240,  245,  380  S.E.2d  390,  394  (1989)  (citing
N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                                       §                                                                             8C-1,   Rule   606(b)).      Extraneous   information   is
“information  dealing  with  the  defendant  or  the  case  being  tried,  which
information  reaches  a  juror  without  being  introduced  in  evidence.    It  does
not include information which a juror has gained in his experience which does
not deal with the defendant or the case being tried.”    State v. Rosier,  322
N.C.                                                                                      826,                                                                          832,           370  S.E.2d   359,                                                   363   (1988).    No  presumption  of  prejudice
arises  in  a  civil  action  from  a  showing  that  extraneous  information  or
perceived  extraneous  information  was  improperly  brought  to  the  jury’s
attention.   Pinckney, 116 N.C. App. at 148, 447 S.E.2d at 831.   Plaintiff, as
the moving party, must demonstrate  “actual” prejudice.    Id.
The trial court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law stated:
“[t]he  jury  did  not  ignore  the  instructions  of  the  Court,  nor  did  it  apply




extraneous definitions or information in reaching its verdict.   Furthermore,
while  the  jury  was  exposed  to  the  above  definitions,  the  Court  finds  that
this  was  not  ‘extraneous  information’  pursuant  to  Rule  606,  and  the  Court
finds no prejudice to the movant.”
I agree with the trial court that the contents of the affidavits in this
case do not fall within the exception as extraneous prejudicial information.
The  definitions  do  not  specifically  concern  the  defendant  or  the  evidence
presented in this case.    Rosier,  322 N.C. at  832,  370 S.E.2d at  363.
The majority opinion states that it is  “apparent” that the definitions
of  “willful”  and  “wanton”  in  a  case  involving  a  claim  for  punitive  damages
constitutes “extraneous information”   because they pertain to the case being
tried  and  the  governing  law  at  issue.     I  find  that  the  reading  of  the
dictionary definitions by Juror Couch is analogous to a situation where one
of the jurors informs the jury what “willful” and “wanton” mean, according to
his  knowledge  of  the  English  language.     The  definition  of  words  in  our
standard dictionaries has been considered a matter of common knowledge which
the jury is supposed to possess.   State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227, 252 (Conn.
1984); Dulaney v. Burns,  119 So. 21, 25 (Ala.  1928), rev’d on other grounds,
Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co.,  447 So.2d  655  (Ala.  1984).
The  information  received  in  this  case  does  not  fall  within  the
definition of extraneous information contemplated by our Supreme Court.   See
generally Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 370 S.E.2d 359 (1988) (juror affidavit showed
that  juror  watched  prohibited  program  on  child  abuse,  held  not  extraneous
information  because  the  matters  reported  to  the  jury  did  not  deal  with  the
defendant  or  the  evidence  introduced);  State  v.  Robinson,  336  N.C.  78,  443
S.E.2d 306 (1994) (affidavits from jurors that they were mistakenly informed
about defendant’s eligibility for parole, found to be internal influences and
not  extraneous  information);  Berrier,                                                 107  N.C.  App.   356,   420  S.E.2d   206
(1992) (juror affidavits that foreman misinformed them that punitive damages
were only a statement of what decedent’s life was worth rather than a money




judgment, did not fall within the exception as extraneous information).   But
See  Lyles,  94  N.C.  App.  240,  380  S.E.2d  390  (1989)  (writing  at  bottom  of
photograph  uncovered  by  juror  indicating  that  defendant  was  in  the  area  on
the date of the crime, held inadmissible evidence which affected defendant’s
alibi and was extraneous information).
Even  if  the  “willful”  and  “wanton”  definitions  were  determined  to  be
extraneous information, courts cannot presume prejudice.   Plaintiff must also
demonstrate that he suffered “actual” prejudice.   Pinckney, 116 N.C. App. at
148,  447  S.E.2d  at  831.    The  majority’s  opinion  states  that  the  dictionary
definitions  had  the                                                                     “potential  to  prejudice  the  plaintiff.”     Potential
prejudice is not actual prejudice.
Our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue where a juror brought into
deliberations   an   encyclopedia   containing   the   definition   for                   “undue
influence.”   In Re Will of Hall, supra.   The court stated that “it generally
is ground for reversal that the jury obtained and took into the jury room a
dictionary  which  they  consulted  to  determine  the  meaning  of  legal  or  other
terms,  which  they  do  not  understand.”    Id.  at  87,  113  S.E.2d  at  13.    The
court  held,  however,  that  the  definition  of                                         “undue  influence”  did  not
prejudice  the  caveators  and  was  more  favorable  to  them.    Id.  at                88,                                                                            113
S.E.2d at  13.
This Court addressed a similar issue where a juror brought a definition
of  “uttering” from a dictionary into the jury room during deliberations in a
criminal trial.   State v. McLain,  10 N.C. App.  146,  148,  177 S.E.2d  742,  743
(1970).                                                                                   Although  it  was  improper  for  the  jury  to  obtain  and  read  the
definition,  we  held  that  no  reversible  error  had  occurred.    Id.    The  trial
court instructed the jury to disregard the definition and defendant had not
shown any prejudice by the jury conduct.    Id.
Other states have addressed the issue of dictionary definitions brought
before  the  jury  and  found  no  prejudice.    In  State  v.  Klafta,  831  P.2d  512
(Haw.                                                                                     1992),  the  Supreme  Court  of  Hawaii  held  that  the  conduct  of  three




jurors  in  looking  up  terms  in  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  was  harmless  beyond  a
reasonable  doubt  where  the  verdict  was  not  shown  to  be  influenced  by  the
misconduct.    The  Supreme  Court  of  Alabama  stated  that  actual  prejudice  may
not  be  inferred  merely  from  exposure,  and  found  no  prejudice  where  jurors
obtained  a  dictionary  definition  of                                                  “standard.”    Pearson  v.  Fomby  By  and
Through Embry, 688 So.2d 239, 242-43 (Ala. 1997).   The court noted that there
was  no  evidence  that  any  juror  stated  that  the  collective  decision  of  the
jury had been influenced.   Id.   The Iowa courts have also addressed the issue
of  jurors  looking  up  dictionary  definitions  and  found  no  prejudice.    See
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch,  497 N.W.2d  821  (Iowa  1993)
(no competent evidence that the misconduct improperly influenced the jury);
In the Matter of Estate of Cory,  169 N.W.2d  837 (Iowa  1969)  (juror looked up
and shared the definitions of “undue” and “undue influence” in a will contest
case,  held  the  dictionary  definitions  were  no  different  than  the  jurors’
common knowledge of the terms); Harris v. Deere & Co.,  263 N.W.2d  727  (Iowa
1978)(juror  looked  up  “control”  and  “lever”  in  a  products  liability  case,
held no error in denial of a new trial), overruled on other grounds, Ryan v.
Arneson,  422 N.W.2d  491  (Iowa  1988).
At  bar,  it  was  unknown  to  the  trial  court,  during  deliberations,  that
the jury had obtained the dictionary definitions.   After receiving a question
regarding the definitions of “willful” and “wanton,” the trial court further
instructed the jury  “the definition is in that  [jury] charge of what willful
and wanton means  .  .  . there’s no other option  .  .  . that’s what the law is,
so, you  have  to  go  by  what’s  in  that  charge.”    The  trial  court essentially
gave the same instruction as given in McLain, which this Court held cured any
potential   prejudice,   and   that   defendant   failed   to   show   that   he   was
prejudiced.    McLain,  10 N.C. App. at  148,  177 S.E.2d at  743.    Additionally,
the  affidavit  of  Juror  Couch,  offered  by  plaintiff,  states  that  upon
returning to deliberations, the law contained in the court’s instructions was
applied.




The majority’s opinion lists several factors which it contends establish
prejudice to plaintiff.   First, the fact that Juror Jackson submitted a note
after receipt of the dictionary definitions.   This merely indicates that the
jury was grappling with the issue of whether defendant’s conduct was willful
or wanton.    Second, the fact that the trial court did not instruct the jury
to disregard the definitions.   The trial court instructed the jury that they
must apply the law and definitions of the jury charge which they had in their
possession.     Finally,  the  failure  to  award  any  punitive  damages  despite
evidence of twenty-five similar incidents does not establish prejudice.   The
jury heard evidence of the prior incidents and also testimony from plaintiff
that he did not notice that the water looked or smelled any different and did
not feel any burning to his tongue as he drank the water.      Punitive damages
require an element of aggravation which plaintiff has not conclusively shown
here.     See  Lashlee,                                                              ___  N.C.  App.   ___,   ___,   548  S.E.2d   821,   827   (2001)
(citation omitted).
The  record  supports  the  trial  court’s  finding  and  conclusion  that  the
jury applied the law and definitions given in the court’s instructions, and
that plaintiff was not prejudiced.    I would affirm the trial court’s denial
of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.    I respectfully dissent from part II
of the majority’s opinion.

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