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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal  authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of  Rule  30(e)(3) of the  North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA11-496
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 December  2011
GINGER A. MCKINNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Guilford County
                                                                                                No.  02 CVD  8173
JOSEPH A. MCKINNEY,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  Defendant  from  orders  entered                                                    29  December                                    2009
and  3  November  2010  by  Judge  Susan  E.  Bray  in  the  District  Court
Division  of  the  General  Court  of  Justice  of  Guilford  County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  13 October  2011.
Wyatt  Early  Harris  Wheeler,  LLP,  by  A.  Doyle  Early,  Jr.  and
Lee C. Hawley, for Plaintiff-appellee.
Cranfill  Sumner  &  Hartzog,  LLP,  by  Michelle  D.  Connell,  for
Defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Joseph   A.   McKinney                                                                          (“Defendant”)   appeals   from   orders
awarding  attorney‖s  fees  to  Ginger  A.  McKinney                                            (“Plaintiff”)
(now  Ginger  A.  Sutphin).    Defendant  argues  the  trial  court  erred
by  (1)  admitting  an  affidavit  into  evidence  despite  Defendant‖s
hearsay  objection  and                                                                         (2)  awarding  attorney‖s  fees.     For  the




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following  reasons,  we  affirm  in  part,  vacate  in  part,  and  remand
to  the  trial  court  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this
opinion.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
Plaintiff  and  Defendant  married  on                                        23  May                          1998.    They  had
one  child,  born  6  April  1999.    The  couple  separated  24  May  2002
and  entered  into  a  Separation  Agreement  and  Property  Settlement
2   October                                                                   2002                             (the                 “2002   Separation   Agreement”   or   the
“Separation  Agreement”),  which  provided  that  Defendant  would  pay
child   support   in   the   amount   of                                      $2,250.00   per   month   plus
insurance  coverage,  prescription  drug  expenses,  private  school
tuition,  extracurricular  activities,  and                                   $300.00  per  month  for
clothing.     The  Separation  Agreement  further  provided  that  if
Plaintiff  sought  an  increase  in  child  support  payments,  the
child  support  portion  of  the  Separation  Agreement  would  become
void.
In  a  Consent  Order  for  Custody  dated                                    2   October                      2002,
Plaintiff  and  Defendant  agreed  to  share  joint  legal  and  physical
custody  of  their  minor  child  with  each  having  him  every  other
week  and  sharing  holiday  time  equally.                                   However,  Defendant
failed  to  exercise  equal  visitation  with  the  child,  spending
substantially  less  time  with  him  than  Plaintiff.    As  a  result,




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Plaintiff  incurred  additional  expenses  on  behalf  of  the  child,
and  the  trial  court  held  this  constituted  a  material  change  of
circumstances  regarding  the  issue  of  child  support.     Plaintiff
and Defendant divorced on  25 August  2003.
Beginning  in                                                                2006,  Defendant  offered  and  Plaintiff  agreed
that  Plaintiff  and  the  child  should  move  from  Plaintiff‖s  home
into  a  home  owned  but  not  occupied  by  Defendant.  Defendant  felt
this  home  was  in  a  safer  area.  By  verbal  agreement,  Defendant
voluntarily  allowed  Plaintiff  and  the  minor  child  to  live  in  the
residence  in  a  rent-free  arrangement.  In  addition  to  paying  the
mortgage  at  the  home,  Defendant  also  paid  a  majority  of  the
household  bills,  including  yard  maintenance  and  electricity.
Both  parties  believed  that  it  would  be  beneficial  for  the  child
for  Plaintiff  to  be  a  stay-at-home  mother  and  a  “classroom  mom”
at  the  child‖s  private  school.     This  enhanced  and  raised  both
Plaintiff‖s  and  the  child‖s  standard  of  living.    Plaintiff  was  a
“classroom  mom”  for  one  year.  Defendant  thereafter  continued  to
allow  Plaintiff  to  remain  at  the  residence  and  to  work  at  home
in  her  at-home  hair-salon,  which  Plaintiff  could  not  otherwise
afford   to   do.   In   effect,   Defendant   provided   support   for
Plaintiff  in  the  form  of  rent-free  housing  and  transportation
although he had no legal obligation to do so.




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From  April                                                                  2006   to  July                                                       2008,   Defendant  increased  his
direct  cash  payments  to  Plaintiff  from  $2,550.00  (which  included
the                                                                          $300.00  clothing  allowance  for  the  child)  to  an  average  of
$4,750.00   per   month.                                                     Plaintiff   claimed   this   increase   was
partially  to  account  for  her  loss  of  income  due  to  their  joint
decision  for  her  to  be  a  stay-at-home  mom.     The  trial  court
noted,                                                                       “Times  were  good  for  the  Defendant  and  he  generously
shared  his  good  fortune  with  Ms.  Sutphin  and  with                    [the  child],
sometimes   paying   more   than   twice   the   agreed-upon                 $2,550.”
Defendant  even  provided  private  air  travel  for  the  child  and  a
leased BMW for the benefit of both Plaintiff and the child.
In  the  spring  of                                                          2008,  Defendant  requested  Plaintiff  and
their  child  leave  his  provided  residence  due  to  a  downturn  in
business  and  a  need  to  reduce  his  overall  overhead.                  This
request  occurred  shortly  after  Defendant  learned  Plaintiff  had
started  dating  someone  and  after  he  texted  her  that,                 “I  am  not
going  to  pay  for  some  man  to  put  his  feet  up  on  my  coffee
table.”     Defendant  offered  to  let  Plaintiff  stay  in  the  home
until  it  was  sold  and  offered  to  co-sign  a  note  in  finding
another  home,  but  he  was  unwilling  to  continue  any  financial
assistance.    Plaintiff  asked  if  she  could  stay  in  the  house  for
two  more  years  or  until  she  remarried.     Defendant  denied  her




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request  and  told  her  she  and  their  child  could  stay  at  the  home
until  the  summer  of                                                        2009  at  which  time  he  would  sell  the
residence.                                                                    During   the   summer   of                    2008,   Defendant   informed
Plaintiff  he  would  no  longer  be  providing  her  with  use  of  the
BMW.    In  August  2008,  the  lease  on  the  BMW  terminated,  and  the
vehicle was turned in, leaving Plaintiff without a car.
Plaintiff  filed  a  Motion  in  the  Cause  to  Modify  Custody  and
Establish  Child  Support  on  29  August  2008.    Although  Plaintiff‖s
filing   the   motion   to   increase   child   support   nullified   the
provisions  of  the  2002  Separation  Agreement,  Defendant  continued
making   reduced   payments   of                                              $2,550.00   per   month   along   with
insurance,  educational,  extracurricular,  and  travel  expenses.
This   was   the   child   support   amount   agreed   to   in   the          2002
Separation  Agreement.    He  also  continued  to  pay  to  maintain  his
home in which Plaintiff and the child were living.
On                                                                            3   September                                 2008,   Plaintiff   filed   for   a   Temporary
Restraining   Order   and   Preliminary   Injunction,   seeking   to
maintain  possession  of  the  house  and  to  prevent  Defendant  from
selling  or  entering  that  property.    On  8  October  2008,  Defendant
sent  a  Notice  to  Vacate  to  Plaintiff,  notifying  Plaintiff  that
she  should  leave  the  residence  by                                        1  January                                    2009.    Plaintiff‖s
Motion  was  ultimately  denied  in  part  and  allowed  in  part,  and




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she  left  the  residence  in  late  January  2009  pursuant  to  a  court
order  and  moved  into  a  home  provided  by  her  current  husband,
John Sutphin.
In  response  to  Plaintiff‖s  Motion  for  Modification  for
Custody  and  Establishment  of  Support  filed                               29  August                                                          2008,  the
trial  court  entered  a  Consent  Order  for  Custody  and  Visitation
on                                                                            9  September                                                        2009,  ordering  continued  joint  custody  of  the
child  with  the  child  residing  primarily  with  Plaintiff  and
scheduling  specific  times  for  Defendant  to  see  the  child.    In  a
separate  child  support  order  entered  17  November  2009,  the  court
held  that  the  child  support  amount  agreed  upon  in  the                2002
Separation  Agreement  was  no  longer  reasonable.     After  careful
review  of  all  the  circumstances,  the  court  ordered  Defendant  to
pay                                                                           $3,796.10  per  month  in  child  support,  finding  this  amount
reasonable  with  regard  to  the  needs  and  actual  expenditures  for
the  child.    In  addition  to  this  amount,  Defendant  was  ordered  to
continue  to  pay  costs  for  the  child‖s  insurance,  medical  care,
private  school  tuition,  extracurricular  activities,  and  personal
trainer  and  nutritionist‖s  fees.     The  court  held  the  issue  of
attorney‖s fees open for hearing at a later date.
On                                                                            17  December                                                        2009,  Plaintiff  moved  for  attorney‖s  fees.
During   the   hearing,   the   court   admitted   into   evidence   an




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affidavit  signed  31  March  2009  by  Mike  and  Katherine  Weaver  (the
“Weaver  Affidavit”),  in  which  the  Weavers  stated  they  had  loaned
Plaintiff  $30,000.00  to  date  to  pay  for  this  litigation.    In  an
order  entered                                                               29  December                                       2009,  the  court  found  that  Plaintiff
had  insufficient  means  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  litigation
and  that  Defendant  refused  to  provide  support  that  was  adequate
under  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  of  the  institution
of   this   action.                                                          After   considering   the   experience,   skill,
expertise,  and  competence  of  Plaintiff‖s  attorneys,  paralegal,
and  expert  witness  as  well  as  the  scope  and  complexity  of  the
financing   issues   in   the   case,   the   court   awarded   Plaintiff
$60,000.00 in attorney‖s fees.
Plaintiff  then  filed  a  supplemental  motion  in  the  cause  for
additional  attorney‖s  fees,  and  the  court  heard  the  matter  on  11
October                                                                      2010.    In  its  order  entered                   3  November                                 2010,  the  court
took  judicial  notice  of  the  findings  of  fact  in  the  29  December
2009  order  supporting  the  previous  allowance  of  attorney‖s  fees.
For  work  performed  after                                                  28  September                                      2009,  the  court  awarded
Plaintiff  attorney‖s  fees  in  the  amount  of  $8,166.25.    Defendant
entered  timely  notice  of  appeal  to  this  Court  on                     22  November
2010.




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II. Jurisdiction
As  Defendant  appeals  from  the  final  judgments  of  a  district
court,  an  appeal  lies  of  right  with  this  court  pursuant  to  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §7A-27(c)  (2009).
III. Analysis
Defendant  contends  the  trial  court  committed  reversible
error  by                                                                    (1)  allowing  the  Weaver  Affidavit  into  evidence  over
Defendant‖s  objection;                                                      (2)  awarding  attorney‖s  fees  pursuant  to
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-13.6  where  the  child  support  order  did  not
find  nor  conclude  that  Defendant  refused  to  provide  adequate
child  support  or  that  the  child  support  was  inadequate;              (3)
ordering  supplemental  attorney‖s  fees  after  entering  a  final
attorney‖s  fees  order;  and                                                (4)  awarding  expert  witness  fees
pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                              §                                                             50-13.6  under  the  guise  of
attorney‖s   fees.                                                           We   affirm   in   part   and   vacate   in   part,
remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A.     The Weaver Affidavit
Defendant   argues   the   trial   court   committed   prejudicial
error  by  allowing  the  Weaver  Affidavit  into  evidence  over  his
hearsay   objection.                                                         Assuming   without   deciding   the   Weaver
Affidavit   constituted   inadmissible   hearsay,   Defendant   falls
short  of  demonstrating  the  kind  of  prejudice  necessary  for  this




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Court  to  reverse  the  trial  court‖s  order.    See  In  re  M.G.T.-B.,
177  N.C.  App.  771,  775,  629  S.E.2d  916,  919  (2006)  (“[E]ven  when
the  trial  court  commits  error  in  allowing  the  admission  of
hearsay   statements,   one   must   show   that   such   error   was
prejudicial in order to warrant reversal.”).
Defendant  contends  the  error  was  prejudicial  error  because
the  Weaver  Affidavit  was  the  only  evidence  at  the  attorney‖s
fees hearing to support finding of fact  29, which states:
The  Plaintiff  was  fortunately  able  to  obtain
a  loan  from  Mike  and  Catherine  Weaver  to  pay
her  retainer  and  to  advance  her  attorney‖s
fees  and  expenses  throughout  this  litigation
and  that  without  their  financial  assistance,
the  Plaintiff  would  not  have  been  able  to
meet   the   Defendant   on   equal   grounds   and
litigate                                                                      this              matter   properly   and
effectively.
Defendant  argues  that,  without  finding  of  fact                          29,  the  trial
court  did  not  make  adequate  findings  of  fact  to  support  its
conclusion  of  law  two  that  Plaintiff  had  “insufficient  means  to
defray  the  expenses  of  this  litigation.”    We  disagree.                “Where
there  is  competent  evidence  to  support  the  court‖s  findings,  the
admission  of  incompetent  evidence  is  not  prejudicial.”     In  re
McMillon,                                                                     143  N.C.  App.   402,     411,       546  S.E.2d   169,   175   (2001).
In  a  bench  trial,  the  judge‖s  findings  “are  conclusive  on  appeal
if  supported  by  any  competent  evidence,  notwithstanding  the  fact




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                                                                              that  evidence  to  the  contrary  may  have  been  offered.”     Huski-
Bilt,  Inc.  v.  First-Citizens  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,                                                                                                                                          271  N.C.                   662,
668,  157 S.E.2d  352,  356-57  (1967).
                                                                              Here,  even  after  excluding  the  Weaver  affidavit  signed                                                                                31
March                                                                         2009,  there  is  competent  evidence  supporting  finding  of
fact                                                                          29  that  Plaintiff  obtained  a  loan  from  the  Weavers  to  pay
her  litigation  expenses.     On                                                                                                                        10  September                         2009  at  the  child
                                                                              support  hearing,  Plaintiff  testified  that  she  borrowed  all  the
funds  for  attorney‖s  fees  to  date.                                                                                                                                                        Defense  counsel  cross-
                                                                              examined   Plaintiff   about   the   Weaver   loan   extensively,   and
                                                                              Plaintiff  consistently  testified  that  she  had  a  verbal  agreement
with  the  Weavers  to  pay  back                                                                                                                        $50,000.00  she  had  borrowed  to
cover   litigation   expenses.                                                                                                                           Additionally,   Plaintiff‖s   child
support  exhibit                                                              17  specifically  noted  a                                                                                       $50,000.00  debt  to  the
Weavers.
Defendant  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  using  prior
testimony  from  the  child  support  hearing  to  support  findings  of
fact  in  its  attorney‖s  fee  order.    This  Court  has  held,  however,
that  it  is  not  improper  for  a  trial  court  to  take  judicial
notice  of  earlier  proceedings  in  the  same  cause.     Raynor  v.
Odom,                                                                         124  N.C.  App.                                                            724,                                  728,                        478  S.E.2d   655,   657   (1996).     We
acknowledge  that  Hensey  v.  Hennessy  prohibits  a  trial  court  from




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issuing  an  order  based  solely  upon  the  court‖s  own  personal
memory  of  another  proceeding  and  requires  the  evidence  to              “be
taken  in  the  case  which  is  at  bar,  not  in  a  separate  case  which
                                                                                                     was  tried  before  the  same  judge.”            201  N.C.  App.                              56,   68,   685
S.E.2d                                                                         541,                  549                                      (2009)   (emphasis  in  original).     However,  in
Hensey,  the  judge  granted  a  domestic  violence  protective  order
after  hearing  no evidence  at  all.    Id.  at  67,  685  S.E.2d  at  549.
He  based  his  decision  on  his  knowledge  of  a  completely  separate
criminal  case  he  presided  over  in  which  charges  stemming  from
the  domestic  violence  incident  were  brought.     Id.     We  find
Hensey  distinguishable  from  the  case  sub  judice  because  the
child  support  hearing  Judge  Bray  took  notice  of  was  in  the  same
cause as the attorney fee hearing she also presided over.
Moreover,  we  hold  that  finding  of  fact                                   23  also  supported
the  trial  court‖s  conclusion  that  Plaintiff  had  insufficient
means  to  defray the  expenses  of the  suit.    Finding  of  fact  23  is
supported by the evidence and states:
Plaintiff‖s  personal  estate  is  minimal  and
she  does  not  own  any  real  estate,  does  not
own  an  automobile,  and  had  a  few  hundred
dollars  in  a  bank  account.     She  used  an
inheritance  of  approximately                                                 $10,000.00  to
pay   off   a   credit   account   and   has   some
minimal   jewelry   and   her   clothing.                                      The
Plaintiff  has  earned  income  and  she  had  been
earning   approximately   between                                              $400.00   and
$800.00  per  month  as  a  hair  stylist  and  has




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often   bartered   for   women‖s   apparel   in
exchange for her services.
In   fact,   at   the   attorney‖s   fee   hearing,   defense   counsel
testified  Plaintiff  had  no  income  at  trial.    Therefore,  we  find
the  trial  court‖s  conclusion  that  Plaintiff  had  insufficient
means  to  defray  the  expenses  of  this  litigation  is  supported  by
the  evidence.    Thus,  admission  of  the  Weaver  Affidavit  was  not
prejudicial error.
B.    Attorney’s Fees
Defendant  next  makes  several  arguments  regarding  the  trial
court‖s decision to award Plaintiff attorney‖s fees.
1. Provision of Adequate Support
Defendant   argues   the   trial   court   erred   by   awarding
attorney‖s   fees   and   supplemental   attorney‖s   fees   because
Defendant  never  refused  to  provide,  and  in  fact  did  provide,
adequate  support  under  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  of
the institution of the child support proceeding.
In  an  action  or  proceeding  for  the  custody
or   support,   or   both,   of   a   minor   child,
including  a  motion  in  the  cause  for  the
modification  or  revocation  of  an  existing
order  for  custody  or  support,  or  both,  the
court  may  in  its  discretion  order  payment  of
reasonable  attorney‖s  fees  to  an  interested
party    acting    in    good    faith    who    has
insufficient  means  to  defray  the  expenses  of
the  suit.    Before  ordering  payment  of  a  fee
in  a  support  action,  the  court  must  find  as




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a  fact  that  the  party  ordered  to  furnish
support  has  refused  to  provide  support  which
is  adequate  under  the  circumstances  existing
at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the  action
or proceeding.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §                                                                         50-13.6                                           (2009)           (emphasis  added).   “A  finding
of  fact  supported  by  competent  evidence  must  be  made  on              [the
issue  of  refusing  to  provide  adequate  support]  in  addition  to
meeting   the   requirements   of                                             ―good   faith‖   and                                                      ―insufficient
means‖  before  attorney‖s  fees  may  be  awarded  in  a  support  suit.”
Hudson  v.  Hudson,  299  N.C.  465,  473,  263  S.E.2d  719,  724  (1980).
Here,  the  trial  court  made  the  required  findings  of  fact
based  on  competent  evidence  to  support  the  award  of  attorney‖s
fees  to  Plaintiff.    Specifically,  there  is  competent  evidence  to
support  the  trial  court‖s  finding  of  fact  that  Defendant  refused
to  provide  adequate  child  support  at  the  commencement  of  this
action.     The  evidence  shows  that  both  parties  and  their  child
enjoyed  a  high  standard  of  living.    From  2002  until  April  2006,
in  accord  with  the                                                         2002  Separation  Agreement,  Defendant  paid
Plaintiff                                                                     $2,250.00   per  month                                                    (in  cash  or  check)  in  child
                                                                              support  plus  payments  for  medical,  dental  and  hospitalization
                                                                              coverage  (both  insured  and  uninsured),  expenses  for  attending  a
private  school,  and                                                                                                                                   $300.00  for  the  child‖s  clothing  purchases
(the                                                                          “additional  payments”).     From  April                                                                                    2006  to  July   2008,




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Defendant  continued  making  the  additional  payments  and  also
increased  his  cash/check  payments  to  an  average  of  $4,750.00  per
month.    He  further  allowed  Plaintiff  and  his  child  to  live  in
one  of  his  homes  and  use  a  vehicle  he  was  leasing.     However,
Defendant  then  experienced  a  downturn  in  business  and  also
learned  Plaintiff  was  in  another  relationship.     Defendant  told
Plaintiff  that  she  and  the  child  must  find  a  new  residence,  that
she  and  the  child  would  not  have  use  of  the  car  after  August
2008,   and   that   he   was   reducing   his   monthly   child   support
payments  back  to                                                            $2,550.00.     Defendant  provided  Plaintiff  and
their  child  with  an  average  of                                           $4,750.00  in  child  support  for
over  two  years,  and  then  unilaterally  reduced  his  payments  to
$2,550.00.  Such  an  abrupt  reduction  in  support  left  Plaintiff
unable  to  maintain  the  minor  child‖s  standard  of  living,  and
Defendant  refused  to  increase  support  even  upon  Plaintiff‖s
requests.    The trial court found that
Plaintiff,  individually,  and  by  and  through
her    attorney,    had    requested    upon    the
Defendant  for  an  increase  in  child  support
on  several  occasions  prior  to  and  during
this   litigation.                                                            On   at   least   three
occasions    after    receiving    offers    from
Plaintiff  attempting  to  settle  this  matter,
the  Defendant  responded  that  he  would  only
pay                                                                           $2,500.00  per  month.    The  Defendant,  in
fact,  refused  to  mediate  the  issue  of  child
support.




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Defendant  argues  that  because  he  never  refused  to  pay
anything  less  than                                                           $2,550.00  per  month  per  the                               2002  Separation
Agreement,  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  refused  to  provide
adequate  child  support.    However,  paying  the  amount  listed  under
a  prior  agreement  is  not  necessarily                                      “adequate.”    See  Sikes  v.
Sikes,  330  N.C.  595,  600,  411  S.E.2d  588,  591  (1992)  (Though  the
defendant  paid  child  support  in  the  amount  consented  to  by  the
parties  in  a  prior  order,  the  Court  found  the  defendant  refused
to  provide  adequate  support  because  he  refused  to  pay  the  new
increased  support  amount  set  forth  by  the  trial  court  until  he
was ordered to do so.).1    Here, Defendant was paying  $2,550.00 in
child  support  from  July                                                     2008  until  the  trial  court  ordered  him
to  pay                                                                        $3,796.10  because  it  found  the  initially  agreed  upon
child  support  amount  of  $2,550.00  unreasonable.    Like  in  Sikes,
Defendant‖s  refusal  to  increase  his  child  support  payments  until
ordered  to  do  so  also  supports  the  trial  court‖s  finding  that
Defendant refused to provide adequate child support.
We  note  that  a  payment  of  $2,550.00  per  month  may  seem  more
than   adequate   to   support   a   young   child,   however,   the
1  We  recognize  the  Sikes  opinion  regards  the  application  of
retroactive  increased  child  support  payments,  which  is  not  the
issue  in  the  case  at  bar.    However,  the  portion of  Sikes  we  rely
upon  concerns  the  adequacy  of  the  defendant‖s  child  support
payments in determining whether to award attorney‖s fees.




-16-
determination  of  “adequacy”  of  child  support  is  a  subjective  one
based   on   the   particular   child   and   parents‖   circumstances,
including  the  parties‖  “accustomed  standard[s]  of  living.”    N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  50-13.4(c1)  (2009).    Here,  with  Defendant  having  a
very  high  income,  the  minor  child  was  accustomed  to  a  high
standard  of  living.     Defendant‖s  abrupt  reduction  in  support
payments  in  July                                                          2008                                                       (from                    $4,750.00  to            $2,550.00  per  month)
left  Plaintiff  unable  to  sufficiently  provide  for  the  child
under  the  standard  of  living  he  was  accustomed  to.    Therefore,
we  hold  there  is  competent  evidence  supporting  the  trial  court‖s
finding  that  Defendant  refused  to  provide  adequate  child  support
before this action was commenced.
Further,  we  note  that  Defendant  was  properly  denied  credit
for  the  increased  monthly  child  support  payments  he  made  from
April                                                                       2006  to  July                                             2008,  which  averaged   $4,750.00  per  month—
approximately                                                               $2,200.00  more  than  he  was  required  to  pay  under
the  Separation  Agreement.    We  hold  such  payments  were  gratuitous
ones  made  from  one  family  member  to  another.     See  Francis  v.
Francis,  223  N.C.  401,  402,  26  S.E.2d  907,  908  (1943)  (“[W]here
certain  family  relationships  exist,  services  performed  by  one
member  of  the  family  for  another,  within  the  unity  of  the




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family,  are  presumed  to  have  been  rendered  in  obedience  to  a
moral obligation and without expectation of compensation.”).
Defendant  next  argues  that  even  if  there  is  evidence  from
the  attorney‖s  fees  hearing  to  show  he  refused  to  provide
adequate  support,  the  trial  court  was  collaterally  estopped  from
relitigating  the  child  support  order.    We  disagree.    Collateral
estoppel  precludes  a  court  from  relitigating  issues  in  a  later
suit  that  were  actually  litigated  and  necessary  to  the  outcome
of  a  prior  action  involving  a  different  cause  of  action  between
the  parties  or  their  privies.     Simms  v.  Simms,                     195  N.C.  App.
780,                                                                        781-82,                                                     673  S.E.2d         753,   755                            (2009).   The  doctrine  only
applies when the following circumstances are present:
(1)  The  issues  to  be  concluded  must  be  the
same  as  those  involved  in  the  prior  action;
(2)  in  the  prior  action,  the  issues  must
have  been  raised  and  actually  litigated;  (3)
the   issues   must   have   been   material   and
relevant  to  the  disposition  of  the  prior
action;  and                                                                (4)  the  determination  made  of
those  issues  in  the  prior  action  must  have
been    necessary    and    essential    to    the
resulting judgment.
Id.   at                                                                    782,                                                        673   S.E.2d   at   755.   “Where   the   doctrine   is
applicable,  a  court  will  be  precluded  from  issuing  findings  of
fact   and   conclusions   of   law   contrary   to   the   previous
disposition.”  Id.     Here,  however,  collateral  estoppel  does  not
apply  because                                                              (1)  the  issues  to  be  concluded  were  not  the  same




-18-
in  the  child  support  and  attorney‖s  fees  orders  and                   (2)  the
findings in both orders do not contradict one another.
For  collateral  estoppel  to  apply,  the  underlying  issues  of
the  matters  actually  litigated  must  be  identical.    Beckwith  v.
Llewellyn,  326  N.C.  569,  574,  391  S.E.2d  189,  191  (1990).    In  a
child   support   hearing,   the   court   must   determine   if   the
separation  agreement  is  reasonable,  presuming  it  to  be  so  unless
rebutted.    Pataky  v.  Pataky,  160  N.C.  App.  289,  297,  585  S.E.2d
404,  410  (2003).    In  an  attorney‖s  fees  hearing,  the  court  must
find  (1)  the  interested  party  is  acting  in  good  faith,  (2)  that
she  has  insufficient  means  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  suit,
and                                                                           (3)  that  the  party  ordered  to  pay  attorney‖s  fees  was  not
providing  adequate  child  support  at  the  time  of  the  commencement
of  the  proceeding.     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                    §                                                                     50-13.6   (2009).   While
there  is  factual  overlap  in  the  determination  of  these  issues,
the  elements  Plaintiff  was  required  to  allege  and  prove  to
prevail in each hearing were significantly different.
Moreover,  the  findings  in  the  child  support  and  attorney‖s
fees  orders  are  not  contradictory.     The  child  support  order
finds  Defendant  often  paid  more  than  was  required  of  him  in
child  support,  and  the  attorney‖s  fees  order  repeatedly  noted
the  additional  child  support  Defendant  paid  Plaintiff  before  she




-19-
filed  her  motion  for  child  support.     Finding                         10  of  the  child
support  order  clearly  states  that                                        “[f]rom  the  months  of  August
2008  through  January  30,  2009,  the  Defendant  paid  $2,550.00  per
month in cash payments.”    Finding  11 states that
In  the  spring  of                                                          2008,  Defendant  requested
that   Plaintiff   and   the   child   leave   the
Meadowbrook  residence  due  to  a  downturn  in
business  and  a  need  to  reduce  his  overall
overhead.                                                                    However,   this   also   occurred
shortly   after   the   Defendant   learned   the
Plaintiff  had  begun  dating  someone  and  he
texted  the  Plaintiff  that  “I  am  not  going  to
pay  for  some  man  to  put  his  feet  up  on  my
coffee table.”
Finding  24  of  the  attorney‖s  fees  order  is  consistent  with  these
findings and states:
Prior  to  the  filing                                                       [sic]  the  action  for
custody   and   child   support   on   August                                29,
2008,  the  Defendant  was  paying  an  inadequate
amount   of   child   support   in   that   the
Defendant  had  reduced  his  monthly  cash  child
support  to  $2,250.00  cash  plus  approximately
$300.00   in   clothing   allowance   from   the
Trust.  Additionally,  Defendant  had  told  the
Plaintiff  that  she  was  going  to  have  to  move
out   of   the   Defendant‖s   Meadowbrook   home
where   she   and   the   minor   child   had   been
living   rent   free   and   the   Defendant   had
advised  the  Plaintiff  that  he  was  not  going
to  renew  the  lease  of  her  automobile  which
expired  in  August,                                                         2008,  which  would  leave
the  Plaintiff  without  a  home  or  a  vehicle  of
her  own.  In  anticipation  of  losing  these
gratuitous  benefits  for  herself  individually
and  for  the  minor  child,  the  reduction  in
cash  child  support  and  the  increased  expense
resulting                                                                    from                                the   changed   custody




-20-
arrangement,  the  Plaintiff  filed  her  Motion
in  the  Cause  to  Modify  Custody  and  Establish
Child   Support   on   August                                                  29,     2008.   The
Plaintiff   and   the   minor   child   were   not
forced    to    move    out    of    Defendant‖s
Meadowbrook   residence   until   the   end   of
January,                                                                       2009.   However,  the  Defendant  had
made  clear  to  the  Plaintiff  that  she  was  not
going  to  be  able  to  continue  to  have  the
gratuitous  use  and  benefit  of  his  residence
for  an  extended  period  of  time.  The  amount
of   child   support   being   provided   by   the
Defendant  as  of  August                                                      29,     2008,  was  found
by  the  trial  court  to  be  inadequate  and  the
Court  found  that  the  Defendant  had  refused
to  provide  child  support  which  was  adequate
under  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time
of the institution of this action.
Therefore,    Defendant‖s    collateral    estoppel    argument                is
misplaced.
Defendant   also   argues   the   court   erred   by   awarding
attorney‖s  fees  where  the  child  support  order  did  not  find  nor
conclude   that   Defendant   refused   to   provide   adequate   child
support  or  that  the  child  support  provided  was  inadequate  under
the   circumstances   existing   at   the   filing   of   the   action.
However,  there  is  no  requirement  that  a  child  support  order  make
such  a  finding.     Instead,  as  discussed  supra,  a  child  support
order  must  find  whether  the  separation  agreement  is  reasonable
with  regards  to  child  support,  Pataky,  160  N.C.  App.  at  297,  585
S.E.2d  at  410,  not  whether  child  support  is  adequate.    It  is  the
attorney‖s  fees  order  that  must  find,  inter  alia,  that  the  party




-21-
ordered  to  pay  attorney‖s  fees  was  not  providing  adequate  child
support  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding.    N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                   §                                                          50-13.6   (2009).    Here,  finding  of  fact   24  of  the
attorney‖s  fees  order  clearly  states,  “Prior  to  the  filing  [of]
the  action  for  custody  and  child  support  on  August  29,  2008,  the
Defendant  was  paying  an  inadequate  amount  of  child  support  in
that  the  Defendant  had  reduced  his  monthly  cash  child  support  to
$2,250.00  cash  plus  approximately                                          $300.00  in  clothing  allowance
from  the  Trust.”                                                            (Emphasis  added).    Therefore,  the  trial  court
did  not  err  by  finding  in  its  attorney‖s  fees  order  and  not  its
child  support  order  that  that  Defendant  refused  to  provide
adequate support.2
2. Supplemental Fee Order
Defendant  next  contends  the  trial  court  erred  in  ordering
supplemental  attorney‖s  fees  after  entering  a  final  attorney‖s
fees  order,  claiming  the  supplemental  order  was  precluded  by  res
judicata.                                                                     “We  review  a  trial  court‖s  determination  regarding
entitlement  to  attorney‖s  fees  de  novo.”  Rhew  v.  Felton,              178
N.C. App.  475,  485,  631 S.E.2d  859,  866  (2006).
2  Defendant also argues that because the trial court did not
find  in  its  child  support  order  that  Defendant  failed  to  provide
adequate  child  support,  it  could  not,  under  collateral  estoppel,
subsequently  find  Defendant  failed  to  provide  adequate  child
support  in  its  attorney‖s  fees  order.    We  discard  this  argument
per our discussion supra of collateral estoppel.




-22-
Under  the  doctrine  of  res  judicata,                                      “a  final  judgment  on
the   merits   in   a   prior   action   by   a   court   of   competent
jurisdiction  operates  as  ―an  absolute  bar  to  a  subsequent  action
involving  the  same  claim,  demand,  and  cause  of  action‖  between
―the  parties  and  their  privies.‖”    Edwards  v.  Edwards,  118  N.C.
App.  464,  469,  456  S.E.2d  126,  129  (1995)  (quoting  Gaither  Corp.
v.  Skinner,  241  N.C.  532,  535,  85  S.E.2d  909,  911  (1955)).    Res
judicata  applies  “to  every  point  which  properly  belonged  to  the
subject   in   litigation   and   which   the   parties   exercising
reasonable  diligence,  might  have  brought  forward  at  the  time.”
Painter  v.  Bd.  of  Ed.,                                                    288  N.C.                                                  165,   173,   217  S.E.2d   650,   655
(1975)  (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here,    the    trial    court    properly    refused    to    award
supplemental  attorney‖s  fees  to  Plaintiff  for  work  performed
before  the  initial  attorney‖s  fees  hearing  was  completed  on           28
September                                                                     2009  because  such  fees  should  have  been  litigated
during  the  initial  hearing  and  were  precluded  by  res  judicata.
However,   supplemental   fees   incurred   by   Plaintiff   after   the
initial   attorney‖s   fees   hearing   were   not   precluded   by   res
judicata  because  Plaintiff  could  not  have  known  of  or  litigated
these  fees  at  that  time.3     Thus,  the  trial  court‖s  award  of
3  We note that Plaintiff exercised  “reasonable diligence” by




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                                                                                                                           supplemental   attorney‖s   fees   for   work   performed   after                                                28
                                                                                                                           September  2009  was  not  error.    We  also  note  that  multiple  awards
                                                                                                                           of  counsel  fees  in  the  same  domestic  action  are,  in  the  proper
                                                                                                                           circumstances,  within  the  court‖s  discretion  to  allow.  Patton  v.
Patton,                                                                      78  N.C.  App.                         247,   258,                                                                          337  S.E.2d   607,   613-14        (1985),
                                                                             rev’d  in  part  on  other  grounds,                                                                                        318  N.C.     404,   348  S.E.2d   593
(1986).    Accordingly,  we  hold  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its
discretion in allowing supplemental attorney‖s fees.
3. Expert’s Fees as Attorney’s Fees
Defendant  finally  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  awarding
attorney‖s   fees   for   the   time   Plaintiff‖s   expert   took   in
preparation  for  trial.     We  agree.                                      “Whether  a  trial  court  has
properly  interpreted  the  statutory  framework  applicable  to  costs
is  a  question  of  law  reviewed  de  novo  on  appeal.”  Peters  v.
Pennington,                                                                  __  N.C.  App.                         __,    __,                                                                           707  S.E.2d   724,   741           (2011).
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7A-305 provides:
(d)  The  following  expenses,  when  incurred,
are  assessable  or  recoverable,  as  the  case
may   be.   The   expenses   set   forth   in   this
subsection  are  complete  and  exclusive  and
constitute   a   limit   on   the   trial   court‖s
discretion  to  tax  costs  pursuant  to  G.S.                               6-
20:
filing  for  supplemental  fees  twenty  days  before  the  order  for
attorney‖s fees was entered on  29 December  2009.




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(11)  Reasonable  and  necessary  fees  of  expert
witnesses   solely   for   actual   time   spent
providing  testimony  at  trial,  deposition,  or
other proceedings.
                                                                            N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                          §                                                  7A-305(d)   (2009)                                                                         (emphasis  added).                              “If  a
                                                                                                                                       category  of  costs  is  set  forth  in  section                                                                                              7A-305(d),  the  trial
                                                                                                                                                                                                      court  is  required  to  assess  the  item  as  costs.”    Peters,  __  N.C.
App.  at                                                                    __,                                                        707  S.E.2d  at                                                741                                                                            (citations  and  quotation  marks
omitted).                                                                                                                              “Subsection                                                                                                                                   (d)(11)  therefore  requires  a  trial  court
to  assess  as  costs  expert  fees  for  time  spent  testifying  at
trial.”  Id.                                                                “A  trial  court  may  not,  however,  assess  as  costs
expert witness fees for preparation time.” Id.
Here,   Plaintiff   needed   assistance   in   understanding   and
determining   Defendant‖s   income   in                                     2008   and                                                 2009,   as   his
financial  data  was  complicated  and  complex,  with  Defendant‖s
2008  income  related  documents  totaling  10,957  pages.    Plaintiff
hired  Mike  Boger,  a  certified  public  accountant  with  expertise
in  the  area  of  construction  accounting,  to  testify  as  an  expert
witness  under  subpoena  at  trial  regarding  Defendant‖s  income  and
to  assist  in  the  review  and  preparation  of  Defendant‖s  financial
data.    The trial court found that:
[Mr.]  Boger  charges                                                       $260.00  per  hour  which
is   reasonable   in   consideration   of   his
background  experience,  expertise  and  skill
in  that  he  spent  approximately                                          11.75  hours




-25-
reviewing                                                                    documents,                                                                            assisting         the
                                                                             Plaintiff‖s   counsel   in   the   review   and
preparation                                                                  of                                                exhibits,                                       and   spent
approximately                                                                                                                  24   hours   in   preparing   for
trial,   testifying   in   court   as   an   expert
witness,   and   in   assisting   the   Plaintiff
during  the  two  day  trial  in  anticipation  of
possibly  being  called  as  a  rebuttal  witness
to    financial    information    and    documents
presented  by  the  Defendant.                                               [Mr.]  Boger‖s
charges   in   the   amount   of                                             $9,295.00   are
reasonable expert and witness fees.
Thus,  our  review  of  the  record  indicates  at  least                    $3,055.00  of
the  total  costs  the  trial  court  ordered  Defendant  to  pay  to
Plaintiff‖s  counsel  is  attributed  to                                     “reviewing  documents[  and]
assisting  the  Plaintiff‖s  counsel  in  the  review  and  preparation
of  exhibits”—for  which  granting  attorney‖s  fees  is  expressly
prohibited   under   Peters.                                                 With   regard   to   the   remaining
$6,240.00,  the  trial  court  does  not  indicate  exactly  how  much  of
this  amount  covers  time  Mr.  Boger  actually  spent  testifying
versus  time  he  spent  preparing  for  trial.    Therefore,  we  vacate
the  portion  of  the  attorney‖s  fees  order  insofar  as  it  awards
$3,055.00  for  Mr.  Boger‖s  preparation  time.     We  remand  for  a
hearing  to  determine  exactly  how  much  of  the  remaining  $6,240.00
included  time  Mr.  Boger  spent  testifying  and  direct  the  trial
court   to   deduct   the   appropriate   resulting   amount   from   the
revised attorney‖s fees award.




-26-
IV. Conclusion
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  find  no  prejudicial  error  in
the  trial  court‖s  decision  to  admit  the  Weaver  Affidavit.     We
hold  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  choosing  to  award  attorney‖s
fees  and  supplemental  attorney‖s  fees.    We  vacate,  however,  the
portion  of  the  attorney‖s  fees  order  that  awards  Plaintiff
$3,055.00  for  time  Mr.  Boger  spent  preparing  for  trial.     We
remand  to  the  trial  court  to  determine  how  much  of  the  remaining
$6,240.00  attorney‖s  fees  award  was  awarded  for  time  Mr.  Boger
spent  preparing  for  trial.     Any  such  amount  shall  be  deducted
from the new order.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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