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NO. COA09-433
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  2 November  2010
MLC AUTOMOTIVE, LLC; and
LEITH OF FAYETTEVILLE, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.                                                                         Moore County
No.  07 CVS  1635
TOWN OF SOUTHERN PINES; the
SOUTHERN PINES TOWN COUNCIL;
and FRANK QUIS, DAVID WOODRUFF,
FRED WALDEN, CHRISTOPHER
SMITHSON and MICHAEL HANEY,
Defendants.
Appeal  by  plaintiffs  and  defendants  from  order  entered              12
November                                                                   2008  by  Judge  James  M.  Webb  in  Moore  County  Superior
Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  28 October  2009.
Poyner  Spruill,  LLP,  by  Cecil  W.  Harrison,  Jr.  and  Chad  W.
Essick;  and  Currin  &  Currin,  by  Robin  Tatum  Currin,  for
plaintiffs.
Cranfill  Sumner  &  Hartzog  LLP,  by  Susan  K.  Burkhart,  for
defendants.
GEER, Judge.
This appeal arises out of a zoning dispute between plaintiffs,
Leith   of   Fayetteville,   Inc.   and   MLC   Automotive,   LLC,   and
defendants, the Town of Southern Pines  ("the Town"), the Southern
Pines  Town  Council,  and  individual  Council  members                   (Frank  Quis,
David  Woodruff,  Fred  Walden,  Christopher  Smithson,  and  Michael
Haney).   Plaintiffs purchased a parcel of land in the Town and made
initial preparations to develop it for use as an auto park, a use
permitted in the zoning classification that applied to the property




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at  the  time  of  plaintiffs'  purchase.    After  plaintiffs  began  the
process  to  obtain  the  required  permits,  the  Town  rezoned  the
property — the new classification no longer permitted motor vehicle
sales.
Plaintiffs  sued  defendants  for  tortious  interference  with
contract  and  tortious  interference  with  prospective  economic
advantage.   They also claimed to have a common law vested right to
develop  the  auto  park  on  the  property.    The  trial  court  granted
summary  judgment  to  defendants  on  plaintiffs'  tort  claims,  but
granted  summary  judgment  to  plaintiffs  on  the  common  law  vested
right claim.    Both sides appealed.
We  affirm  the  trial  court's  grant  of  summary  judgment  to
defendants  on  the  tort  claims.    Plaintiffs  failed  to  present  any
evidence  that  defendants  acted  without  justification  in  rezoning
the  property                                                                —  an  essential  element  of  both  tort  claims.    We,
however,  reverse  the  trial  court's  grant  of  summary  judgment  to
plaintiffs  on  their  claim  of  a  common  law  vested  right  since
plaintiffs  did  not  make  substantial  expenditures  in  good  faith
reliance  on  government  approval  of  their  proposed  automobile
dealership project.
Facts
In 2000, plaintiffs, who are in the business of developing and
operating automobile dealerships, became interested in purchasing
a 21-acre tract of land near the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and
N.C.  Highway                                                                2  in  the  Town  of  Southern  Pines,  North  Carolina.
Plaintiffs intended to develop an auto park consisting of several




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dealerships.   This property was zoned General Business ("GB"), and,
at  the  time,  the  Town's  Unified  Development  Ordinance                 ("UDO")
provided that property in districts zoned as GB could be used for
"Motor  Vehicle  and  Boat  Sales  or  Rental  or  Sales  and  Service"
without a special or conditional use permit.
On  28  June  2001,  the  Code  Enforcement  Officer  for  the  Town
sent  a  letter  to  Jim  Murray,  a  resident  of  Pinehurst,  explaining
that a car dealership can be located in the GB district so long as
all  zoning  requirements  are  met.    On  30  November  2001,  the  Code
Enforcement  Officer  responded  to  an  inquiry  by  Danny  Howell  of
Raleigh, acknowledging that the property at issue in this case was
located  in  the  GB  zoning  district,  and  automobile  sales  were  a
permitted use in the GB district.
Plaintiffs purchased the property for $1,553,904.00 in January
2002.                                                                        Between         2001  and   2005,  plaintiffs  spent  an  additional
$518,156.00  in  preparations  to  develop  the  property.    In  January
2005,  plaintiffs  entered  into  a  letter  of  intent                      ("LOI")  with
American Suzuki Motor Corporation ("Suzuki").   Pursuant to the LOI,
plaintiffs  agreed  to  construct  an  automobile  sales,  service,  and
parts facility on the property in accordance with the agreed upon
terms  and  conditions  set  out  in  the  LOI.     In  exchange,  upon
completion  of  the  facility,  Suzuki  agreed  to  issue  plaintiffs  a
Dealership Agreement for one year.
Plaintiffs  hired  William  G.  Daniel  &  Associates,  P.A.  to
perform  site  design  services  for  the  property,  which  included
investigating    the    regulatory    requirements    pertaining    to




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construction  of  the  auto  park.    In  January  2005,  Daniel  met  with
Bart Nuckols, the Town Planning Director, to discuss the plans for
the auto park.    At this meeting, Nuckols explained to Daniel that
under  the  UDO,  in  order  to  proceed  with  the  development  of  the
property, plaintiffs needed a zoning/building permit.   Nuckols told
Daniel that the Town's zoning permit and building permit procedure
was  a  unitary  procedure  and  that  there  was  a  checklist  of  items
that   had   to   be   completed   before   an   application   for   a
zoning/building permit could be submitted and reviewed.
In  support  of  their  motion  for  summary  judgment,  defendants
filed  an  affidavit  by  Nuckols  stating  that  since  at  least  1990,
"the Town has issued unitary zoning/building permits for proposed
construction in the Town."    According to Nuckols, the Town uses a
"unified" or "combined" zoning/building permit, which "has a blank
for indicating the appropriate zoning compliance and is signed by
the Zoning Officer when the zoning is determined to be appropriate.
The  Town  does  not  issue  a  separate  permit  to  indicate  zoning
compliance."
Daniel testified that Nuckols told him that plaintiffs had to
obtain  an  architectural  compliance  certificate  from  the  Town
Council  before   moving  forward  with  the  other  steps  on  the
checklist.   Nuckols, however, in his deposition, denied making that
statement.
On                                                                            17  March   2005,  plaintiffs  filed  their  architectural
compliance permit application and, on 6 April 2005, appeared at the
Town Council's agenda meeting to present the design.   After hearing




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the  presentation,  members  of  the  Town  Council  expressed  their
disapproval of the design, arguing that the modern design did not
fit  with  the  Town's  more  traditional  look.     The  Town  Council
indicated it would not approve an architectural compliance permit
for the project as presented and directed plaintiffs to revise the
design.
Plaintiffs modified the plans, and a new design was presented
at  the                                                                     8  June                    2005  meeting.    At  that  meeting,  the  Town  Council
acknowledged   that   plaintiffs   had   made   design   improvements.
According  to  plaintiffs,  they  expected  a  favorable  vote  on  the
plans at the next meeting.    At the  14 June  2005 meeting, one Town
Council member moved for architectural approval of the plans, and
another  member  seconded  the  motion.                                     The  Town  Council  then
discussed  concerns  over  proposed  building  materials  and  colors.
Many Town residents spoke in opposition to the plans.    At the end
of the discussion, the Town Council voted to delay the vote until
the next regular meeting.
Plaintiffs  decided  not  to  have  the  Town  Council  vote  on  the
plans at the next meeting, but rather chose to take additional time
to  facilitate  community  discussions  and  attend  a  meeting  with
neighbors who were strongly opposed to the proposed plans.    On  12
July  2005,  the  Town  Council  again  reviewed  the  plans,  which  had
been further revised.    Plaintiffs again declined to have the Town
Council vote on the plans, but stated they would come back to the
next meeting with answers to specific questions raised by the Town
Council.




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On  22 and  29 July  2005, Robert Thompson, a local real estate
attorney,  submitted  to  the  Town  two  different  zoning  amendment
petitions  supported  by  citizen  signatures.     The  first  petition
sought to amend the UDO by reducing allowable impervious surfaces
for development.   The second petition sought to rezone plaintiffs'
property so that it was no longer in a GB district, but rather was
located  in  an  Office  Services  ("OS")  district.    Thompson  did  not
communicate with any Town staff or Town Council members regarding
the  petitions.     The  Town  noticed  the  petitions  for  hearing  in
accordance with the UDO.
On  9 August  2005, at the next Town Council meeting, the Town
Council received a letter from plaintiffs' attorney advising that
if  the  Town  Council  did  not  approve  the  architectural  plans,
plaintiffs would file a lawsuit.   At the meeting that evening, the
Town Council postponed the scheduled vote on the plans because it
said it needed time to review the letter threatening legal action
sent by plaintiffs' attorney.
On                                                                           24  August                                   2005,  the  Town  Planning  Board  heard  public
comments  and  recommended  that  the  Town  Council  approve  both
rezoning  amendments.                                                        The  Planning  Board  concluded  that  the
existing  GB  zoning  for  plaintiffs'  property  was  an  "anomaly"
because  the  tract  was  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  residential
neighborhoods,  with  forested  conservation  areas  across  the  road
from  the  tract,  and  that  OS  zoning  would  serve  as  a  buffer  or
transition to the adjacent neighborhoods.




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On 9 September 2005, Daniel submitted plaintiffs' application
and  plans  for  an  erosion  control  permit.    Daniel  and  plaintiffs'
counsel also each sent a letter on that date to Nuckols, requesting
that the Town treat the letters and accompanying site plans as an
application  for  a  "zoning  permit."     Daniel  made  this  request
because he believed that plaintiffs could not satisfy the checklist
requirements  for  applying  for  a  zoning/building  permit,  so  he
sought  to  make  a  distinction  between  a  "zoning"  permit  and  the
zoning/building  permit  recognized  by  the  Town.     In  response,
Nuckols  sent  a  letter  stating:  "We  have  received  the  materials
developed  by  William  G.  Daniel  &  Associates,  and  will  proceed  in
our  normal  manner.    Attached  are  the  instructions  we  provide  to
persons seeking building/zoning permits."   The letter attached the
checklist Nuckols had discussed with Daniel earlier.
On  13  September  2005,  the  Town  Council  approved  plaintiffs'
architectural  plans  for  the  Suzuki  dealership.    At  that  meeting,
the  Town  Council  also  considered  the  proposed  zoning  amendments.
The  Council  deferred  voting  on  the  proposed  amendments  until  the
next meeting on  11 October  2005.
On 4 October 2005, the Town denied plaintiffs' erosion control
application.     On                                                          11  October   2005,  at  approximately   4:30  p.m.,
Daniel went to the Town's Public Works Department and attempted to
submit  an  application  for  a  water  and  sewer  permit,  a  driveway
permit, an encroachment agreement and various plans, including an
erosion control plan identical to the one that had previously been




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denied.    The  plans  were  accepted,  but  the  other  documents  were
rejected pending review of the plans.
On  the  evening  of                                                         11  October                                              2005,  the  Town  Council  voted
unanimously to rezone the property so that it was located in an OS
district.    The  Public  Works  Department  took  no  further  action  on
the  submitted  plans  because  the  rezoning  prohibited  the  proposed
use.     The  Suzuki  LOI  subsequently  expired,  and  plaintiffs  are
unable to operate a Suzuki dealership on the property.
On 9 December 2005, plaintiffs brought suit against defendants
in  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the  Middle  District  of
North  Carolina.    Plaintiffs  asserted  claims  for                        (1)  common  law
vested  rights,                                                              (2)  violation  of  federal  substantive  due  process
rights, (3) violation of state substantive due process rights, (4)
tortious interference with contract, and (5) tortious interference
with  prospective  economic  advantage.     The  parties  filed  cross-
motions for summary judgment.   The district court entered an order
abstaining  from  deciding  the  state  law  claims  and  staying  the
federal claims pending resolution of the land use and zoning issues
in state court.   Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and on  3 July  2008, the Court affirmed.    MLC Automotive,
LLC v. Town of Southern Pines,  532 F.3d  269  (4th Cir.  2008).
On                                                                           18  October                                              2007,  plaintiffs  filed  this  action  in  Moore
County  Superior  Court.     Both  parties  again  filed  motions  for
summary  judgment.    On  12  November  2008,  the  trial  court  granted
plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on their claim for
a  common  law  vested  right  and  granted  defendants'  motion  for




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partial  summary  judgment  on  plaintiffs'  claims  for  tortious
interference  with  contract  and  prospective  economic  advantage.
Both sides timely appealed to this Court.
Defendants' Appeal
Defendants appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment
to  plaintiffs  on  their  claim  that  they  had  a  vested  right  to
develop the property as an auto park notwithstanding the rezoning
of the property.    "The standard of review for summary judgment is
de novo."    Forbis v. Neal,  361 N.C.  519,  524,  649 S.E.2d  382,  385
(2007).     "'[O]ur  standard  of  review  is                                 (1)  whether  there  is  a
genuine  issue  of  material  fact  and                                       (2)  whether  the  movant  is
entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.'"    McCoy  v.  Coker,  174
N.C. App. 311, 313, 620 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2005) (quoting NationsBank
v. Parker, 140 N.C. App. 106, 109, 535 S.E.2d 597, 599 (2000)).   We
view  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  non-movant.
Id.
"As  a  general  proposition  '[t]he  adoption  of  a  zoning
ordinance does not confer upon citizens .  . . any vested rights to
have   the   ordinance   remain   forever   in   force,   inviolate   and
unchanged.'"    Browning-Ferris  Indus.  of  South  Atlantic,  Inc.  v.
Guilford  County  Bd.  of  Adjustment,                                        126  N.C.  App.                 168,   171,   484
S.E.2d 411, 414 (1997) (quoting McKinney v. City of High Point, 239
N.C.  232,  237,  79 S.E.2d  730,  734  (1954)).    "North Carolina does,
however,  recognize  two  methods  for  a  landowner  to  establish  a
vested  right  in  a  zoning  ordinance:                                      (1)  qualify  with  relevant
statutes  .  .  .; or  (2) qualify under the common law[.]"    Id.




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In  this  case,  plaintiffs  have  claimed  only  a  vested  right
arising  under  the  common  law.    "A  party  claiming  a  common  law
vested  right  in  a  nonconforming  use  of  land  must  show:             (1)
substantial expenditures; (2) in good faith reliance; (3) on valid
governmental  approval;                                                     (4)  resulting  in  the  party's  detriment."
Kirkpatrick  v.  Village  Council  for  the  Village  of  Pinehurst,  138
N.C.  App.                                                                  79,                                             87,   530  S.E.2d   338,  343   (2000).    The  disputes  on
appeal  are  whether  plaintiffs  acted  in  reliance  on  the  required
"valid   governmental   approval"   and   whether   plaintiffs   made
substantial expenditures in reliance on that approval.
Plaintiffs  first  contend  that  existing  zoning  is  sufficient
governmental  approval  to  give  rise  to  a  vested  right  when  a
landowner  makes  substantial  expenditures  based  on  that  existing
zoning.   Under their view, because the property was zoned GB and an
automobile dealership was a permitted use, they acquired a common
law vested right to develop their automobile dealership when they
expended sums in reliance on that zoning.
Plaintiffs, in support of their motion for summary judgment,
submitted an affidavit from Linda J. Leith, the Manager of MLC and
Vice  President  of  Leith.     She  stated  multiple  times  in  that
affidavit  that  Leith  acquired  the  property  "[i]n  good  faith
reliance  upon  the  fact  that  the  Property  was  zoned  GB  and  that
automobile  dealerships  were  a  permitted  use  of  the  Property,  as
confirmed  repeatedly  by  the  Town  .  .  .                               ."    She  represented  that
"Leith would never have purchased the Property, nor incurred any of
the other expenses described in this Affidavit, if the Property had




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not  been  zoned  GB  where  automobile  dealerships  were  a  permitted
use."
Our  Supreme  Court  has,  however,  expressly  rejected  this
contention:  "[O]ne  does  not  acquire  a  vested  right  to  build,
contrary  to  the  provisions  of  a  subsequently  enacted  zoning
ordinance,  by  the  mere  purchase  of  land  in  good  faith  with  the
intent  of  so  building  thereon  .  .  .                                  ."    Town  of  Hillsborough  v.
Smith,                                                                      276  N.C.                          48,           55,   170  S.E.2d   904,                                   909   (1969).    In  other
words,  the  fact  that  plaintiffs  purchased  the  property  in  good
faith reliance on the GB zoning is not sufficient to give rise to
a vested right.
Instead, Town of Hillsborough set forth the following test for
the existence of a common law vested right:
We, therefore, hold that one who, in good
faith  and  in  reliance  upon  a  permit  lawfully
issued  to  him,  makes  expenditures  or  incurs
contractual    obligations,    substantial    in
amount,  incidental  to  or  as  part  of  the
acquisition   of   the   building   site   or   the
construction  or  equipment  of  the  proposed
building  for  the  proposed  use  authorized  by
the  permit,  may  not  be  deprived  of  his  right
to  continue  such  construction  and  use  by  the
revocation   of   such   permit,   whether   the
revocation be by the enactment of an otherwise
valid zoning ordinance or by other means, and
this  is  true  irrespective  of  the  fact  that
such expenditures and actions by the holder of
the permit do not result in any visible change
in the condition of the land.
Id.  (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs,   however,   counter   that   the   Supreme   Court's
subsequent  decision  in  In  re  Campsites  Unlimited  Inc.,  287  N.C.
493,                                                                        501,                               215  S.E.2d   73,   78            (1975),  altered  that  rule.     In




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Campsites,   the   landowner,   Campsites,   purchased   and   began
constructing a campsite development at a time when the county had
no zoning ordinance at all applicable to rural areas.   Id. at  495,
215  S.E.2d  at                                                              74.    Subsequently,  the  county  adopted  a  zoning
ordinance that placed the area including Campsites' property in a
zone that prohibited campsite developments.   Id. at 496, 215 S.E.2d
at                                                                           75.    The  Court  applied  Town  of  Hillsborough  even  though
Campsites had not relied upon a building permit because:
The  only  significance  of  the  building  permit
in  those  cases  was  that  such  permit  was
required, under the ordinance in effect at the
time  of  its  issuance,  in  order  to  make  the
proposed  use  of  the  property  lawful.    In  the
present   instance,   there   was   no   county
ordinance  or  other  law  in  effect  at  the  time
Campsites   began   its   development   of   its
property which required Campsites to obtain a
permit  therefor.     It  was  then  lawful  for
Campsites to proceed as it did.
Id.  at                                                                      501,   215  S.E.2d  at                                             77-78.     The  Court  concluded  that
"[s]ubstantial expenditures and obligations were made and incurred"
and  that  if  done  so  in  good  faith,  "the  adoption  of  the  county
zoning ordinance . . . did not deprive Campsites of its preexisting
right to so develop and use its land."    Id. at  502,  215 S.E.2d at
78.
Defendants   contend   that   Campsites   only   applies   when   a
landowner  makes  expenditures  in  reliance  on  a  complete  lack  of
zoning,  while  plaintiffs  contend  that  Campsites  stands  for  the
proposition  that  "reliance  upon  existing  zoning  is  sufficient  to
create  vested  rights."     In  other  words,  plaintiffs  ask  us  to
conclude that Campsites overruled sub silentio the language in Town




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of Hillsborough holding that the purchase of property in reliance
on existing zoning is insufficient to give rise to a vested right.
We  first  note  that  Justice  Lake  authored  both  Town  of
Hillsborough  and  Campsites,  and  nothing  in  Campsites,  which
discusses  the  prior  decision  extensively,  suggests  any  intent  to
limit the precedential effect of the Town of Hillsborough decision.
Moreover, in Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 366, 384 S.E.2d
8, 16 (1989), the Supreme Court described the holding in Campsites
as  follows:  "We  have  held  that  when  a  property  owner  makes
expenditures in the absence of zoning or under the authority of a
building permit, subsequent changes in the zoning of the property
may not prohibit the resulting nonconforming use."
Here,  there  was  no  absence  of  zoning,  and,  therefore,
Campsites  does  not  apply.    Plaintiffs,  however,  also  argue  that
their position is supported by this Court's decisions in Russell v.
Guilford County Bd. of Comm'rs,  100 N.C. App.  541,  397 S.E.2d  335
(1990),  and  Sunderhaus  v.  Bd.  of  Adjustment  of  Town  of  Biltmore
Forest,  94 N.C. App.  324,  380 S.E.2d  132  (1989).
In Russell, this Court wrote:
The obtaining of a building permit is not the
crucial  factual  issue  to  be  resolved  when
determining  whether  a  party  has  acquired  a
vested  right  to  continue  development  of  land
as   a   nonconforming   use   after   rezoning.
[Campsites,                                                                 287  N.C.  at   501,                                     215  S.E.2d  at
78].    To  acquire  a  vested  right  under  North
Carolina law, "it is sufficient that, prior to
.  enactment  of  the  zoning  ordinance  and
with   requisite   good   faith,   he   make   a
substantial   beginning   of   construction   and
incur                                                                       therein         substantial                              expense."
Hillsborough,                                                               276  N.C.  at   54,                                      170  S.E.2d  at
909.                                                                                        At  issue  in  this  case  is  whether




-14-
plaintiff  made  "substantial  expenditures"  in
reasonable  reliance  on  the  current  zoning  of
the  property  before  the  County  Commission
rezoned three acres of his property.
100 N.C. App. at  543,  397 S.E.2d at 336  (emphasis added).   Russell
does not, however, discuss or even cite the test set out in Finch,
a decision recently cited favorably by the Supreme Court as setting
out the law on vested rights.   See Robins v. Town of Hillsborough,
361  N.C.  193,  197,  639  S.E.2d  421,  423  (2007).    A  panel  of  this
Court cannot, of course, adopt an interpretation of a Supreme Court
decision that is contrary to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
its own precedent.
Moreover,  the  language  in  Russell  is  dicta.     The  Court
ultimately  held  that  "the  trial  court's  findings  of  fact  support
its  conclusion  that  the  plaintiff  had  not  incurred  substantial
expenditures  for  the  commercial  development  of  this  property."
Russell,  100 N.C. App. at  545,  397 S.E.2d at  337.    The Court then
added: "Since we find that the plaintiff did not make substantial
expenditures, we need not address whether plaintiff's reliance on
the [county Planning Staff's] conditional approval of the plan was
reasonable."                                                                   Id.   Thus,  the  Court  itself   recognized  that
resolution  of  the  reliance  issue  was  not  necessary  given  its
holding regarding substantial expenditures. 1
1
We   note   that   this   portion   of   the   Russell   opinion   is
inconsistent with the suggestion that expenditures in reliance on
current zoning is sufficient to give rise to a vested interest.   If
that was in fact the Court's intended holding, then there would be
no   need   to   leave   open   the   question   of   reliance   on   other
governmental  approval,  such  as  a  conditional  approval  by  the
planning department staff.




-15-
"Language  in  an  opinion  not  necessary  to  the  decision  is
obiter dictum and later decisions are not bound thereby."   Trustees
of Rowan Technical Coll. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230,
242,  328 S.E.2d  274,  281  (1985).    Our Supreme Court has stressed:
"'[I]t is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions
in  every  opinion  are  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  the  case  in
which those expressions are used.   If they go beyond the case, they
may  be  respected,  but  ought  not  to  control  the  judgment  in  a
subsequent suit where the very point is presented for decision.'"
State  v.  Jackson,  353  N.C.  495,  500,  546  S.E.2d  570,  573  (2001)
(quoting Moose v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Alexander County, 172 N.C. 419,
433,  90 S.E.  441,  448-49  (1916)).
The pertinent language in Sunderhaus, decided before Finch, is
likewise dicta.   The landowners in Sunderhaus had already begun to
install  a  satellite  dish  when  the  town  adopted  an  ordinance
requiring   that   landowners   obtain   a   permit   before   starting
installation.    This  Court  first  noted  that  "[i]n  Campsites,  our
Supreme  Court  held  that  a  party  may  acquire  a  right  to  build
without a permit if the good faith expenditures are made at a time
when no permit is required."   Sunderhaus,  94 N.C. App. at 326,  380
S.E.2d  at                                                                    134.    Since  the  landowners  made  their  satellite  dish
expenditures at a time when the ordinance did not require a permit,
the  case  fell  squarely  within  the  Campsites  rule.    Nevertheless,
the Court went on to say, without citing any authority: "Likewise,
a substantial expenditure or the commencement of building at a time
when  one  zoning  ordinance  is  in  effect  will  serve  to  make  the




-16-
provisions   of   that   ordinance   applicable   to   the   builder,
notwithstanding  the  enactment  of  new  regulations  prior  to  the
completion  of  the  project."    Id.    This  latter  statement  was  not
necessary for the decision and, therefore, is non-binding dicta.
Therefore,  we  hold  that  the  controlling  law  remains,  as  set
out in Town of Hillsborough, that a property owner does not acquire
a  vested  right  to  develop  land  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  a
subsequently enacted zoning ordinance simply based on the purchase
of the land in reliance on existing zoning.   Town of Hillsborough,
276  N.C.  at                                                                55,                                                           170  S.E.2d  at   909.    A  vested  right  can  arise,
however, if "a property owner makes expenditures in the absence of
zoning,"  Finch,                                                             325  N.C.  at                                                 366,              384  S.E.2d  at                         16,  or  without
governmental  approval  when,  at  the  time  of  the  expenditures,  no
prior approval was required.   Sunderhaus, 94 N.C. App. at 326, 380
S.E.2d  at                                                                   133-34.     This  holding  is  consistent  with  the  well-
established principle that "no property owner has a per se vested
right in a particular land-use regulation such that the regulation
could remain 'forever in force, inviolate and unchanged.'"   Michael
Weinman Assocs. Gen. P'ship v. Town of Huntersville, 147 N.C. App.
231, 233, 555 S.E.2d 342, 345 (2001) (quoting McKinney, 239 N.C. at
237,  79 S.E.2d at  734).
Turning  to  the  form  of  government  approval  required  by  the
common   law   vested   right   analysis,   this   Court   held   in
Browning-Ferris,                                                             126  N.C.  App.  at                                           172,              484  S.E.2d  at                         414,  that
"[i]n   those   situations   where   multiple   permits   are   required
preliminary to the issuance of the building permit, and substantial




-17-
obligations and/or expenditures are incurred in good faith reliance
on the issuance of those permits, the party does acquire a vested
right in those provision(s) of the ordinance or regulation pursuant
to  which  the  preliminary  permit(s)  was  issued."    Thus,  Browning-
Ferris establishes that permits other than a building permit may,
when  combined  with  substantial  expenditures  in  reliance  on  the
permit, give rise to a common law vested right.
Here, the Town's UDO, which was adopted in 1989, provided that
"the use made of property may not be substantially changed .  .  .  ,
substantial  clearing,  grading  or  excavation  may  not  be  commenced
and   buildings   or   other   substantial   structures   may   not   be
constructed,  erected,  moved  or  substantially  altered  except  in
accordance with and pursuant to one of the following permits  .  .  .
."   The listed permits included a zoning permit, a grading permit,
a special use permit, a conditional use permit, an erosion control
permit, and, if applicable, an architectural compliance permit.
Plaintiffs  do  not  dispute  (1)  that  they  were  required  under
the  UDO  to  obtain  a  zoning  permit,  a  grading  permit,  an  erosion
permit, and an architectural compliance permit; and  (2) that they
did  not  obtain  any  of  those  permits  prior  to  making  their
expenditures.   Since plaintiffs' expenditures were not in reliance
on  any  permits  and  permits  were  required  to  proceed  with  the
automobile dealership project, Town of Hillsborough and Browning-
Ferris  establish  that  no  common  law  vested  right  to  complete  the
automobile  dealership  arose.    See  also  PNE  AOA  Media,  L.L.C.  v.
Jackson County, 146 N.C. App. 470, 480, 554 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2001)




-18-
(holding  that  no  vested  right  arose  because  "[w]hile  it  is  true
that no county permit was required, a permit from DOT was, and it
is  clear  that  PNE  had  not  secured  that  permit  before  it  began  to
erect the sign along State Highway  441").
Plaintiffs  argue,  however,  that  governmental  approval  other
than a permit can give rise to a vested interest and point to two
letters sent by the Town's Planning Department.    On  28 June  2001,
three months after Leith contracted to purchase the property, the
Code  Enforcement  Officer  sent  "Mr.  Jim  Murray"  a  letter  stating
only:  "This  letter  is  to  advise  that  a  car  dealership  can  be
located in the General Business District as long as it can meet all
zoning  requirements,  such  as  the  setbacks,  landscaping,  parking,
etc.    Should  you  need  further  information,  please  advise."    The
letter did not reference any specific property.
On  30  November  2001,  the  Code  Enforcement  Officer  sent  "Mr.
Danny  Howell"  a  letter  referencing  the  property  at  issue  in  this
case.    She  wrote:  "The  above  reference[d]  property  is  located  in
the General Business Zoning District and is in the Highway Corridor
District.    Automobile  Sales  are  a  permitted  use  in  the  General
Business  District.    However,  all  zoning  requirements  must  be  met
per  the  Southern  Pines  Unified  Development  Ordinance.     If  you
should  have  further  questions,  please  advise."     Although  Leith
closed  on  the  property  in  January  2002,  plaintiffs  did  not  begin
work on the site until December  2004, more than three years after
the sending of these letters.




-19-
We  need  not  specifically  address  what  types  of  government
approval,  short  of  a  permit,  are  sufficient  for  the  common  law
vested  right  analysis  because  Browning-Ferris  establishes  that
expenditures  in  reliance  on  letters  such  as  these  are  not
sufficient to give rise to a vested right.   In Browning-Ferris, the
plaintiff intended to construct and operate a transfer station.   On
13 June  1994, the Director of the county Planning Department sent
a letter to the plaintiff informing the plaintiff that the land on
which  it  intended  to  build  the  transfer  station  was  zoned  Heavy
Industrial  ("HI") and that a transfer station was a permitted use
in  the  HI  zone.    He  explained  further  that  the  plaintiff  would
still have to meet watershed, driveway, parking, landscaping, and
other  requirements  set  out  in  the  county  zoning  ordinance.          126
N.C. App. at  169,  484 S.E.2d at  413.    In reliance on this letter,
the plaintiff purchased the property.   Id.   Three months later, the
technical  review  committee  for  the  county  conditionally  approved
the   site   development   plan   subject   to                              12   conditions.   Id.
Subsequently,   the   county   board   of   commissioners   adopted   an
amendment to the zoning ordinance providing that construction and
operation of a transfer station would require a special use permit.
Id.
The plaintiff argued that it had a common law vested right to
proceed with the transfer station without a special use permit, as
the  ordinance  had  allowed  prior  to  the  amendment.     This  Court
concluded that the plaintiff did not have a vested right to proceed
with   the   transfer   station   consistent   with   the   pre-amended




-20-
ordinance,  explaining:  "In  so  holding  we  reject  the  arguments  of
[the  plaintiff]  that  substantial  expenditures  in  reliance  on  the
pre-amended Ordinance, the  13 June  1994 letter from  [the planning
director] or the conditional approval of the site development plan
gives  rise  to  a  vested  right  to  construct  and  operate  a  transfer
station."    Id. at  172,  484 S.E.2d at  415  (emphasis added).
We see no meaningful basis for distinguishing Browning-Ferris
from  this  case.     The  letter  from  the  Browning-Ferris  planning
director  is  virtually  identical  with  the  30  November  2001  letter
from  the  Code  Enforcement  Officer  in  this  case                         —  it  merely
confirmed  that  a  particular  use  was  a  permitted  use  in  the
applicable zone, but also stressed that the project would have to
meet other requirements set out in the zoning ordinance.  2 We are
bound by this Court's holding in Browning-Ferris that substantial
expenditures in reliance on the prior version of the ordinance and
a letter of this nature are not sufficient to give rise to a vested
right.
Plaintiffs argue that Browning-Ferris does not apply because
the zoning classification in that case never changed, while it did
change in this case.   That argument mistakes the nature of a common
law  vested  right.     The  question  presented  by  the  vested  right
analysis  is  whether  an  amendment  to  an  ordinance  applies  to
development of the property that was started prior to the date of
the amendment.   Plaintiffs have cited no authority suggesting that
2
The                                                                           28   June       2001   letter   in   this   case   did   not   even
specifically  address  this  property.     It  did  nothing  more  than
reiterate the pertinent portion of the zoning ordinance.




-21-
the  vested  rights  analysis  varies  if  the  amendment  involves  a
change in the zoning classification rather than an increase in the
requirements  necessary  for  completion  of  a  project.     To  the
contrary,  in  Sunderhaus,  94  N.C.  App.  at  327,  380  S.E.2d  at  134,
one of the cases upon which plaintiffs rely, this Court applied the
same  vested  rights  analysis  used  in  cases  involving  zoning
classification changes to an appeal in which the zoning amendment
did not change the permissible uses, but rather only added a permit
requirement.
Plaintiffs  further  argue  that  Huntington  Props.,  LLC  v.
Currituck County, 153 N.C. App. 218, 569 S.E.2d 695 (2002), should
control the decision in this case rather than Browning-Ferris.   To
the extent that plaintiffs contend that Huntington should be more
persuasive  because  it  is  a  more  recent  decision,  plaintiffs  have
mistaken the law.    Since one panel of this Court may not overrule
a  second  panel,  when  two  decisions  are  inconsistent,  we  are
required  to  follow  the  earlier  decision.    See  In  re  R.T.W.,  359
N.C.  539,  542 n.3,  614 S.E.2d  489,  491 n.3  (2005)  (in considering
two  lines  of  cases  that  developed  in  Court  of  Appeals  —  Stratton
line and Hopkins line  — Court held, under In re Civil Penalty,  324
N.C.  373,  384,  379  S.E.2d  30,  36-37  (1989),  that  "[t]he  Hopkins
panel should have followed Stratton, which is the older of the two
cases").   Accordingly, if Huntington is inconsistent with Browning-
Ferris, we are required to follow Browning-Ferris.
We  do  not  believe  that  we  need  to  reach  that  question,
however, since Huntington, even in the absence of Browning-Ferris,




-22-
would not require a different result.   In Huntington, Orchard Park,
a mobile home park, was constructed in 1972 and initially approved
to accommodate  440 mobile homes.                                              153 N.C. App. at  220, 569 S.E.2d
at  698.   During the  1970s and 1980s, Orchard Park operated at near
capacity,  but  in  1987,  the  State  limited  the  park  to  140  mobile
homes  because  of  new  restrictions  on  private  wastewater  systems.
Id.    In  1992,  the  county  amended  its  UDO  to  prohibit  mobile  home
parks  altogether  except  for  lawful  nonconforming  uses  such  as
Orchard  Park.    Id.    The  plaintiff  purchased  Orchard  Park  in  1995
and subsequently sought to upgrade the wastewater treatment system
and  operate  the  mobile  home  park  at  the  original  capacity  of  440
mobile  homes.    Id.  at                                                      220-21,                             569  S.E.2d  at                                 698-99.    In   1996,
however,   the  county  amended  its  UDO  again  to  provide  that
improvements to water and sewage treatment systems to accommodate
more  mobile  homes  in  a  mobile  home  park  would  be  considered  an
impermissible enlargement of a nonconforming use.    Id. at  221-22,
569  S.E.2d  at                                                                669.                                The  plaintiff  sued  seeking  an  injunction
prohibiting the county from enforcing the amendment against it.
This  Court,  after  first  concluding  that,  even  before  the
amendment, the county's UDO prohibited more than 140 mobile homes,
then  addressed  the  plaintiff's  argument  that  it  had  a  common  law
vested right to operate  440 mobile homes.    In the language relied
upon  by  plaintiffs  in  this  case,  the  Court  stated:  "Plaintiffs
could  have  established  vested  rights  in  Orchard  Park  by                (1)
obtaining  zoning  and  building  permits  from  the  State  which  would
have  allowed  them  the  right  to  expand  Orchard  Park,  or                (2)




-23-
obtaining  a  final  interpretation  of  the  UDO  from  the  County's
Planning  Staff  stating  that  they  were  allowed  to  operate  Orchard
Park at a capacity over 140 units."   Id. at 226, 569 S.E.2d at 701.
The description of the second prong was, however, dicta.    As this
Court noted, "it would have been impossible for plaintiffs to have
obtained  permission  to  expand  Orchard  Park  because  a                   440-unit
mobile home park was not otherwise lawful at the time Orchard Park
became  nonconforming  in                                                     1992,  much  less  when  the  Amendment  was
passed  in                                                                    1996."     Id.  at                             227,              569  S.E.2d  at   702.                 Thus,  the
language set out in the second prong of the Huntington test was not
necessary to the decision.
In  any  event,  we  are  not  persuaded  that  the  two  letters  in
this case would, even under the Huntington test, be sufficient to
3
give  rise  to  a  vested  right.                                             Huntington  required  "a  final
interpretation of the UDO from the County's Planning Staff stating
that they were allowed to operate Orchard Park at a capacity over
140  units."     Id.  at                                                      226,                                           569  S.E.2d  at   701               (emphasis  added).
Consistent  with  prior  vested  rights  precedent,  we  read  this
language as requiring approval of the specific project and not just
3
While plaintiffs describe the generic letters in this case as
"certificates of zoning compliance," they cite no authority of any
type defining what constitutes a "certificate of zoning compliance"
or  whether  a  generic  letter  of  the  type  here  —  not  addressing  a
specific  project  —  is  a  "certificate  of  zoning  compliance."    We
further note that plaintiffs rely on treatises and not case law to
support the proposition that a certificate of zoning compliance is
valid  governmental  approval  for  purposes  of  a  vested  right.    We
express no opinion on whether a certificate of zoning compliance is
sufficient because Browning-Ferris establishes that, in any event,
a  letter  of  the  type  relied  upon  in  this  case  is  not  adequate
government approval.




-24-
a reiteration of the UDO.   See Robins,  361 N.C. at  197,  639 S.E.2d
at 423 (observing that "our vested rights decisions have considered
whether  a  plaintiff  has  a  right  to  complete  his  project  despite
changes in the applicable zoning ordinances"  (emphasis added)).
Here, the June 2001 letter did not address the specific parcel
of land at all and, therefore, could not be a final interpretation
approving the project sought to be developed by plaintiffs.    With
respect to the November  2001 letter, we do not view this letter as
an "interpretation" of the UDO.   The letter merely stated what was
apparent  on  the  face  of  the  UDO  and  the  zoning  maps:  that  a
particular  piece  of  property  was  zoned  as  GB  and  that  automobile
sales were a permissible use in the GB district.    If the Planning
Staff had simply photocopied the pertinent schedule of the UDO and
the  zoning  map,  precisely  the  same  information  would  have  been
conveyed.    Nothing  was  interpreted.    In  addition,  the  letter           —
which was sent three years before Leith approached the Town about
its actual intended auto park — did not address a specific project.
The letter did not state that plaintiffs' proposed auto park could
in  fact  be  built  on  that  parcel  of  land.     Indeed,  the  letter
stressed  that,  for  any  motor  vehicle  sales  project,  all  zoning
requirements would still have to be met.4
4
This Court in Browning-Ferris cited Avco Com. Developers v.
South Coast Reg. Comm'n,  17 Cal.  3d  785,  132 Cal. Rptr.  386,  390-
91,  553  P.2d  546,  551  (1976),  appeal  dismissed  and  cert.  denied,
429  U.S.  1083,  51  L.  Ed.  2d  529,  97  S.  Ct.  1089  (1977),  for  the
proposition  that  "preliminary  governmental  approval                         [is]  not
sufficient  to  support  [a]  vested  right[.]"    Browning-Ferris,  126
N.C.  App.  at  171-72,  484  S.E.2d  at  414.    In  Avco,  the  court  held
that  government  approval  issued  prior  to  any  submission  of  the
details  of  the  project  was  not  sufficient  for  purposes  of  vested




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Plaintiffs argue that these letters are no different than the
quarry permit found to be sufficient governmental approval to raise
the  issue  of  a  common  law  vested  right  in  Simpson  v.  City  of
Charlotte, 115 N.C. App. 51, 57-58, 443 S.E.2d 772, 776-77 (1994).
In Simpson, however, the property owner applied for and received a
permit allowing it to construct and operate a specific quarry on a
parcel  of  land  adjoining  an  existing  quarry.     In  other  words,
because a permit was issued, there was a final approval by a zoning
administrator  of  the  construction  and  operation  of  a  particular,
described  project.    The  same  is  not  true  of  the  letters  in  this
case.  5
If we were to accept plaintiffs' argument that a vested right
could  be  based  on  letters,  sent  three  years  before  a  project
materialized and confirming only that a use was expressly permitted
within  a  particular  zoning  classification,  we  would  in  effect  be
allowing a property owner to obtain a vested right solely by making
expenditures  in  reliance  on  existing  zoning.    Since,  as  we  have
explained, Town of Hillsborough does not permit such a result, we
hold  that  plaintiffs'  expenditures  in  reliance  on  the  June  and
November 2001 letters did not result in a common law vested right.
Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to demonstrate that their
expenditures  were  in  reliance  upon  government  approval  of  their
right analysis.                                                               17 Cal.  3d at  794,  132 Cal. Rptr. at  391-92,  553
P.2d at  551-52.
5
Plaintiffs also cite City of Winston-Salem v. Hoots Concrete
Co.,  37  N.C.  App.  186,  245  S.E.2d  536,  disc.  review  denied,  295
N.C.                                                                          645,                                                    248  S.E.2d   249   (1978),  but  that  case  involved  no
discussion of vested rights.




-26-
project, a critical element of their claim of a common law vested
right.    Accordingly,  the  trial  court  erred  in  granting  summary
judgment to plaintiffs and denying summary judgment to defendants
on this claim.
Plaintiffs' Appeal
Plaintiffs,  in  their  appeal,  contend  that  the  trial  court
erred  in  granting  summary  judgment  to  defendants  on  plaintiffs'
claims  for  tortious  interference  with  contract  and  tortious
interference  with  prospective  economic  advantage  based  on  their
loss of a Suzuki dealership.  6 To establish tortious interference
with contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) a valid contract between
the plaintiff and a third person, (2) the defendant knew about that
contract, (3) the defendant intentionally induced the third person
not  to  perform  the  contract,                                              (4)  the  defendant  acted  without
justification,  and                                                           (5)  the  plaintiff  suffered  actual  damages.
Bloch  v.  Paul  Revere  Life  Ins.  Co.,  143  N.C.  App.  228,  239,  547
S.E.2d                                                                        51,                                               59,  disc.  review  denied,   354  N.C.                                                  67,   553  S.E.2d   35
(2001).                                                                                                                                                       To  establish  tortious  interference  with  prospective
economic  advantage,  a  plaintiff  must  show  that  the  defendant,
without  justification,  induced  a  third  party  to  refrain  from
entering into a contract with the plaintiff, which would have been
made absent the defendant's interference.   Dalton v. Camp, 138 N.C.
6
The  parties  agree  that  the  Town  Council  members,  in  their
individual capacities, are entitled to legislative immunity as to
these claims.   The parties dispute, however, whether the doctrines
of  legislative  and  sovereign  immunity  protect  the  Town,  the  Town
Council, and the Town Council members in their official capacities.
As  we  conclude  that  summary  judgment  was  properly  granted  to
defendants on the merits, we do not address the immunity issues.




-27-
App. 201, 211, 531 S.E.2d 258, 265 (2000), rev'd on other grounds,
353 N.C.  647,  548 S.E.2d  704  (2001).
Because,  based  on  our  review  of  the  record,  we  believe  that
plaintiffs  failed  to  present  sufficient  evidence  that  defendants
acted  without  legal  justification  in  rezoning  the  property,  we
address  only  that  element  of  the  tort  claims.    A  person  "acts
without justification in inducing the breach of contract  .  .  . if
he has no sufficient lawful reason for his conduct."   Childress v.
Abeles,  240 N.C.  667,  675, 84 S.E.2d  176,  182 (1954).   A plaintiff
must  show  that  the  defendant  was  acting  not  "in  the  legitimate
exercise  of                                                                   [his]  own  right,  'but  with  a  design  to  injure  the
plaintiff  or  gain  some  advantage  at  his  expense.'"    Dalton,  138
N.C.  App.  at  211,  531  S.E.2d  at  265  (quoting  Owens  v.  Pepsi  Cola
Bottling Co. of Hickory, N.C., Inc., 330 N.C. 666, 680, 412 S.E.2d
636,  644  (1992)).
In  arguing  that  defendants  acted  without  justification,
plaintiffs first point to the Fourth Circuit's decision upholding
the  district  court's  order  abstaining  from  ruling  on  plaintiffs'
state law claims, including the tortious interference claims, and
staying  decision  on  the  federal  constitutional  claims  pending
decision  of  the  land  use  and  zoning  issues  in  state  court.    MLC,
532  F.3d  at                                                                  284.                                                         Pointing  to  the  court's  discussion  whether
summary    judgment    was    warranted    on    the    federal    claims
notwithstanding state law, plaintiffs argue that the Fourth Circuit
effectively concluded that issues of fact exist regarding whether
defendants acted with justification in rezoning the property.   See




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id.  at  281-82  (addressing  Town's  argument  "that  summary  judgment
was  appropriate  regardless  of  the  resolution  of  Leith's  vested
rights claim").    Since the district court declined to rule on the
state  law  issues,  and  the  Fourth  Circuit  concluded  that  the
district court properly did so, we cannot conclude that we are in
any way bound by the Fourth Circuit's determination that issues of
fact exist on the federal constitutional claims.
Plaintiffs also argue that this case is analogous to Browning-
Ferris Indus. of South Atlantic, Inc. v. Wake County, 905 F. Supp.
312 (E.D.N.C. 1995).   In Browning-Ferris, the individual plaintiff,
Jonathan  Garrity,  had  contracted  to  lease  property  he  owned  near
Lake Crabtree to the second plaintiff, Browning-Ferris ("BFI"), for
use  as  a  solid  waste  facility.    The  Town  of  Morrisville  approved
the plaintiffs' site plan and that approval was upheld by the state
courts despite challenges by nearby property owners.    Id. at  315.
Wake County also issued a land disturbing permit.    Id.    After the
Town of Cary approved BFI's connecting to the Cary sanitary sewer
system, the Town of Morrisville then issued a building permit for
the facility.    Id.    The plaintiffs then obtained an easement from
an adjacent property owner allowing a sewer line to run across his
land  to  connect  with  the  sewer  line  owned  by  Wake  County  that  in
turn connected with the Cary wastewater treatment plant.    Id.
Subsequently, the Wake County Board of Commissioners discussed
the  suitability  of  locating  a  solid  waste  facility  near  Lake
Crabtree.    Id.    Ultimately, the Board voted to adopt a resolution
urging  the  State  not  to  issue  a  pollutant  discharge  elimination




-29-
system  permit.     Id.  at                                                  316.     The  Board  also  voted  to  adopt  a
resolution  informing  the  Town  of  Cary  that  the  county  took  the
position  that  a  prior  agreement  between  Cary  and  the  county  gave
the  county  the  right  to  approve  sewage  flowing  through  its  sewer
line to Cary's treatment plant.   Id.   The Board then voted to deny
BFI access to its sewer line and adopted a resolution notifying the
Town  of  Cary  of  its  denial.     Id.     BFI  then  terminated  its
contractual relationship with Garrity.    Id.
Both BFI and Garrity brought suit against the county asserting
violations  of  the  state  and  federal  constitutions.    Garrity  also
asserted  a  cause  of  action  for  tortious  interference  with  a
contractual  relation.    On  the  latter  claim,  the  court  ultimately
held that summary judgment should be denied due to the existence of
genuine  issues  of  material  fact  regarding  the  issue  of  legal
justification.    Id. at  324.
Prior to addressing this cause of action, however, the court
had already concluded that plaintiffs had acquired both statutory
vested  rights  (by  virtue  of  the  issuance  of  the  building  permit)
and  common  law  vested  rights                                             (based  on  the  plaintiffs'  making
substantial expenditures in reliance on the site plan approval and
the issuance of the building permit).   Id. at 318-19.   In addition,
the court concluded that the county did not act with a legitimate
objective   because   its   actions   were   outside   the   county's
jurisdiction.    Id. at  320.
The court found that the location of the facility — which was
the basis for the county's and the public's objections  — "was not




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a  matter  rightfully  within  the  Board's  purview  and  that  its
concerns about the facility's storm water runoff was an issue best
left to the responsible state regulatory agency.   The County had no
authority to regulate land use within the geographical confines of
the Town of Morrisville."   Id. at  320.   The court added that "[i]n
addition to having no jurisdiction over the tract of land" on which
the  facility  was  being  built,  the  county's  concern  regarding  the
storm  water  runoff  was  a  "matter                                         .  which  falls  under  the
jurisdiction of the [Department of Environment, Health and Natural
Resources],"  even  if  it  "might  have  been  a  legitimate  concern."
Id.    Further,  the  court  concluded  that  the  county's  motives  in
acting were improper because the county's concern — the storm water
runoff  into  Lake  Crabtree  —  was  unrelated  to  the  action  it  took:
barring  the  passage  of  effluent  through  its  sewer  line.    Id.  at
321.
The court ultimately held:
A  thorough  review  of  the  evidence  of  record
leads the court to the inescapable conclusion
that defendant denied BFI access to the [sewer
line]  for  the  sole  reason  that  defendant  did
not  want  plaintiffs  to  proceed  with  their
plans  to  construct  the                                                     [facility]  on  the
Garrity  tract.    The  reason  for  the  denial  of
access  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  effluent
from  the  BFI  facility  that  was  to  be  sent
through  the                                                                  [sewer  line].     The  County  had
already  issued  the  one  permit  over  which  it
had  issuing  authority,  the  land  disturbing
permit.
Id.    In  sum,  the  county  in  Browning-Ferris  blocked  a  project  in
which  the  plaintiffs  had  a  vested  right  for  reasons  outside  the
county's jurisdiction.




-31-
None of the factors pertinent in Browning-Ferris exist in this
case.    First,  we  have  already  concluded  that  plaintiffs  did  not
have  a  vested  right  in  their  auto  park  project.    In  addition,
defendants' actions fell squarely within the Town's jurisdiction to
regulate land use within the Town.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  160A-382(a)
(2009)  ("For  any  or  all  these  purposes,  the  city  may  divide  its
territorial jurisdiction into districts of any number, shape, and
area  that  may  be  deemed  best  suited  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of
this Part; and within those districts it may regulate and restrict
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or
use of buildings, structures, or land.").
Although plaintiffs argue that the evidence is undisputed that
defendants' purpose was to "unlawfully stop Leith," plaintiffs do
not address the motive behind the desire to prevent the auto park.
Defendants  had  the  authority  to  amend  the  zoning  ordinance.    See
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §   160A-385(a)(1)   (2009)  ("Zoning  ordinances  may
from  time  to  time  be  amended,  supplemented,  changed,  modified  or
repealed.").   This authority includes amendments to the zoning map.
Id. ("In case, however, of a qualified protest against a zoning map
amendment,  that  amendment  shall  not  become  effective  except  by
favorable  vote  of  three-fourths  of  all  the  members  of  the  city
council.").    Because  of  this  authority,  it  is  not  enough  to  show
that  defendants  voted  to  rezone  in  order  to  bar  plaintiffs'
project; plaintiffs must show that defendants' reason for barring
that project through rezoning was not a legitimate justification.




-32-
Plaintiffs  argue  that,  just  like  Wake  County  in  Browning-
Ferris, defendants were acting "under the guise of protecting the
public's  interest."     Plaintiffs  have  overlooked  the  critical
distinction: Wake County, in Browning-Ferris, was acting in an area
outside  of  its  jurisdiction  regarding  an  interest  outside  its
authority,  while  the  public  interest  in  this  case  falls  squarely
within the authority and jurisdiction of defendants.
The   evidence   in   the   record   indicates   that   the   public
objections and defendants' motive in stopping the auto park was a
concern  that  such  a  project  was  not  an  appropriate  use  for  that
location  since  it  was  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  residential
districts and, on the fourth side, had a conservation area across
the  highway.    The  General  Assembly  has  placed  responsibility  for
addressing  such  a  concern  on  defendants.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
160A-383                                                                       (2009)   ("The   [zoning]  regulations  shall  be  made  with
reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character
of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses,
and   with   a   view   to   conserving   the   value   of   buildings   and
encouraging  the  most  appropriate  use  of  land  throughout  such
city.").   Finally, the action taken by defendants directly related
to  the  concern  —  they  concluded  that  the  use  was  not  appropriate
for  the  location  and  rezoned  the  location  to  make  it  a  district
more  in  character  with  the  surrounding  property.     Thus,  the
rationale  behind  Browning-Ferris  supports  the  grant  of  summary
judgment in this case.




-33-
In  Carolina  Water  Serv.,  Inc.  of  N.C.  v.  Town  of  Atlantic
Beach,                                                                          121  N.C.  App.   23,   464  S.E.2d   317   (1995),  disc.  review
denied,  342 N.C.  894,  467 S.E.2d  901  (1996), this Court similarly
concluded that summary judgment was appropriately granted to a town
on a claim of tortious interference with contract.    The plaintiff
contended  that  the  town  had  maliciously,  intentionally,  and
unlawfully  interfered  with  the  plaintiff's  contracts  to  furnish
water  service  to  various  homeowners  in  an  annexed  area  when  the
town  offered  the  residents  a  discount  to  connect  to  newly-
constructed  town  water  lines.    Id.  at  27,  464  S.E.2d  at  320.    In
concluding  that  the  plaintiff  had  failed  to  present  evidence
showing  that  the  defendants  had  acted  without  justification,  the
Court  pointed  out  that  the  General  Assembly  had  authorized
municipalities to provide water to residents, that the setting of
water rates and fees is a matter for the judgment and discretion of
municipal  authorities,  and  that  a  municipality  has  authority  to
extend its water lines to an annexed area when it is concerned that
the  residents  in  the  annexed  area  are  no  longer  receiving  water
service  equal  to  that  provided  by  the  town  to  other  areas  within
the municipal boundaries.    Id. at  28-29,  464 S.E.2d at  321.
Thus, in Carolina Water Service, the town did not act without
justification  when  it  acted  pursuant  to  legislatively-granted
authority in order to address a public concern that the legislature
had  determined  to  be  within  the  town's  jurisdiction.     Here,
defendants  acted  pursuant  to  their  legislatively-granted  zoning
authority to remedy a public concern  — that the current zoning of




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the  property  was  not  consistent  with  the  character  of   the
neighborhood                                                                 —  that  was  a  concern  the  legislature  has  stressed
should  be  considered  by  municipalities.    Accordingly,  the  trial
court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as
to plaintiffs' claims for tortious interference with contract and
prospective economic advantage.
We note that plaintiffs are, in effect, seeking to obtain the
equivalent of a vested right without meeting the requirements for
either a common law or statutory vested right.   If we were to hold,
as plaintiffs urge, that defendants were not legally justified in
changing the zoning for plaintiffs' property after they knew about
plaintiffs' plans for an auto park, that precedent would mean that
even  if  a  municipality  lawfully  rezoned  property  —  prior  to  any
right  vesting                                                               —  it  could  still  be  held  liable  for  substantial
damages.     We  do  not  believe  that  a  municipality  acts  without
justification if it exercises its zoning authority, in accordance
with statutory authority, to amend the zoning map in a manner that
does not violate any vested rights.   See Varner v. Bryan, 113 N.C.
App. 697, 702, 440 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1994) (holding that person acts
with legal justification if he "does a wrongful act or exceeds his
legal  right  or  authority  in  order  to  prevent  the  continuation  of
the contract between the parties").
Conclusion
In  sum,  we  reverse  the  trial  court's  order  granting  summary
judgment to plaintiffs on their claim of a common law vested right
and remand for entry of summary judgment in defendants' favor.   We




-35-
affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in defendants'
favor  on  the  claims  for  tortious  interference  with  contract  and
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.

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