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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
COA03-1601
COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
FILED:                                                                                          7 December  2004
MICHAEL MOSS,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              New Hanover County
                                                                                                No.  03 CVD  2360
SCOTT D. MINTER,
Defendant
Appeal by defendant from an order entered  12 August  2003 by
Judge James H. Faison, III in New Hanover County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  14 September  2004.
Fletcher, Ray & Satterfield, L.L.P., by Kimberly L. Moore,
for plaintiff-appellee.
Andrew W. Olsen for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
By this appeal, Scott D. Minter (“defendant”) presents several
procedural issues arising from the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of Michael Moss (“plaintiff”).   Defendant argues
the  trial  court  erroneously                                                                  (I)  granted  plaintiff’s  motion  for
summary judgment where plaintiff failed to give defendant notice of
the summary judgment hearing;  (II) excluded defendant’s testimony
contesting plaintiff’s summary judgment motion; and (III) failed to
exercise  its  jurisdiction  to  consider  setting  the  appeal  bond  at
less   than                                                                                     $250.00.                                 Defendant   also   argues   the   magistrate




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erroneously denied defendant’s motion for a continuance.   We affirm
the judgment below.
Defendant  agreed  to  lease  one  of  plaintiff’s  beach  rental
properties in Wilmington, North Carolina, beginning in January 2003
and ending on 30 May 2003.   Defendant agreed to pay $500.00 monthly
rent  from  January  through  March  and                                      $600.00  for  April  and  May.
Defendant also agreed to leave the premises during May if plaintiff
had a weekly rental for the property and plaintiff would reimburse
defendant  $150.00.    The  lease  was  silent  as  to  whether  pets  were
allowed.
Plaintiff contends defendant breached the lease agreement by
failing  to  vacate  the  premises  during  one  week  in  May,  for
remaining  in  the  property  one  day  beyond  the  expiration  of  the
lease  term  and  for  having  a  pet  on  the  premises.    Defendant  was
also charged a pet fumigation and clean-up fee.    The total amount
of damages demanded was  $3,633.11.
Plaintiff initiated a small claims action against defendant to
be heard on  23 June  2003.   Defendant moved for a continuance as he
had a nonrefundable vacation to Spain scheduled for the same date.
The magistrate denied the motion and defendant did not appear.    A
judgment was entered in plaintiff’s favor and defendant appealed by
requesting a trial de novo in district court.    In district court,
plaintiff  moved  for  summary  judgment.    At  the  summary  judgment
hearing, the trial court would not allow defendant to present oral
testimony  opposing  plaintiff’s  motion.    As  defendant  had  neither
answered   plaintiff’s   complaint   nor   filed   any   affidavits   in




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opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, summary judgment
was entered in favor of plaintiff.    Defendant appeals.
Defendant first contends the trial court lacked authority to
consider plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because defendant
received  inadequate  notice  of  the  hearing.    A  summary  judgment
“motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for
the  hearing”  to  provide  notice  to  the  opposing  party.    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                          §                                                              1A-1,  Rule   56(c)   (2003).     Failure  to  comply  with  this
mandatory  ten-day  notice  requirement  deprives  the  trial  court  of
authority  to  grant  summary  judgment  unless  the  opposing  party
waives  notice.    Calhoun  v.  Wayne  Dennis  Heating  &  Air  Cond.,  129
N.C. App.  794,  800,  501 S.E.2d  346,  350  (1998), review dismissed,
350 N.C.  92,  532 S.E.2d  524  (1999); see also Barnett v. King,  134
N.C.  App.  348,  517  S.E.2d  397  (1999);  Trust  Co.  v.  Rush,  17  N.C.
App.  564,  195 S.E.2d  96  (1973).
In  this  case,  the  summary  judgment  hearing  was  held  on                11
August  2003; however, the notice sent to defendant on  29 July  2003
indicated  the  summary  judgment  hearing  would  be  held  on  4  August
2003.    Therefore,  defendant  contends  he  did  not  receive  proper
notice.                                                                        Plaintiff   contends  the  date   in   the   notice  was   a
typographical error, as the calendar request that was sent with the
notice  indicated  the  summary  judgment  hearing  would  occur  on  11
August  2003.
Notwithstanding  the  parties’  arguments  as  to  whether  the
notice  was  proper,  defendant  waived  any  objections  regarding  the
adequacy  of  the  notice  by  participating  in  the  hearing.     See




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Anderson v. Anderson,  145 N.C. App.  453,  456,  550 S.E.2d  266,  269
(2001)  (stating  “[a] party waives notice of a motion by attending
the  hearing  of  the  motion  and  by  participating  in  the  hearing
without   objecting   to   the   improper   notice   or   requesting   a
continuance for additional time to produce evidence”).   The record
indicates defendant informed the trial court he had received notice
of the proceedings and attempted to make arguments in opposition to
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.   Accordingly, we overrule
this assignment of error.
Next,  defendant  argues  the  trial  court  erroneously  excluded
defendant’s  testimony  contesting  plaintiff’s  summary  judgment
motion.    We disagree.
G.S.                                                                       1A-1,  Rule   56(c)  of  the  Rules  of
Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment
will be granted if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file  together  with  the  affidavits,  if  any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material  fact  and  that  any  party  is  entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.   The burden of
establishing the lack of any triable issue of
fact  is  on  the  party  moving  for  summary
judgment,   and   the   movant’s   papers   are
carefully   scrutinized   while   those   of   the
opposing  party  are  regarded  with  indulgence.
If  the  party  moving  for  summary  judgment
successfully  carries  its  burden  of  proof  of
showing  that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  as  to
any  material  fact,  the  opposing  party,  by
affidavits  or  otherwise,  as  provided  by  Rule
56, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
Hillman v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 148,
296 S.E.2d 302, 304-05 (1982) (citations omitted).   Oral testimony
is  permissible  on  a  motion  for  summary  judgment;  however,  the
admission of such testimony is in the court’s discretion.    Id. at




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155,                                                                         296  S.E.2d  at                                                     308.   If  the  trial  court  considers  oral
testimony,  “the trial court is only to rely on such testimony in a
supplementary  capacity,  to  provide  a                                     ‘small  link’  of  required
evidence,  but  not  as  the  main  evidentiary  body  of  the  hearing.”
Strickland  v.  Doe,                                                         156  N.C.  App.                                                     292,   296,                                     577  S.E.2d   124,   129
(2003).
In  this  case,  the  trial  court  would  not  allow  defendant  to
orally  oppose  plaintiff’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  by  arguing
the  facts  and  defendant  has  not  shown  the  exclusion  of  this
testimony  constituted  an  abuse  of  discretion.     Accordingly,  we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant next argues the trial court failed to exercise its
jurisdiction to consider setting the appeal bond at an amount less
than                                                                         $250.00.    Specifically,  defendant  contends  the  trial  court
erred in ruling defendant should file his motion with the appellate
court.    However,  “[t]he  plain  language  of  [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1-
285(a)] places the amount of the surety bond in the sole discretion
of the trial court with but one caveat -- the surety amount cannot
exceed  $250.”    Markham v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,  125 N.C.
App. 443, 456, 481 S.E.2d 349, 358 (1997).   Although it appears the
trial court erroneously concluded it could not consider defendant’s
request  for  a  lower  appeal  bond,  this  Court  is  precluded  from
deciding  this  issue  as  the  issue  is  moot.                             “A  case  is  considered
moot  when                                                                   ‘a  determination  is  sought  on  a  matter  which,  when
rendered,  cannot  have  any  practical  effect  on  the  existing




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controversy.’”   Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 647, 588 S.E.2d 877,
879  (2003).
Finally, defendant contends the magistrate erroneously denied
his  motion  for  a  continuance  as  defendant’s  vacation  plans
conflicted with the court date.
Motions to continue are addressed to the sound
discretion   of   the   trial   judge,   who   must
determine                                                                                                                                   “whether  the  grant  or  denial  of  a
                                                                                          continuance   will   be   in   furtherance   of
                                                                                          substantial justice.”   Shankle v. Shankle, 289
N.C.                                                                        473,   483,   223                                               S.E.2d                                    380,   386
(1976).                                                                                                                                     .     The  trial  court’s  decision
whether to grant or deny a motion to continue
may  be  reversed  only  for  a  manifest  abuse  of
discretion.     An  abuse  of  discretion  occurs
where the ruling of the trial court could not
have been the result of a reasoned decision.
May v. City of Durham,  136 N.C. App.  578,  581-82,  525 S.E.2d  223,
227  (2000)  (citations  omitted).    As  defendant  has  not  shown  the
magistrate’s  decision  constituted  an  abuse  of  discretion,  we
overrule this assignment of error.
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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