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NO. COA  02-92
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       4 March  2003
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL DUANE MAXWELL,
Respondent.
Appeal by Petitioner from an order entered  23 October  2001 by
Judge John R. Jolly, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court.    Heard in
the Court of Appeals  10 October  2002.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Lisa Granberry Corbett, for petitioner-appellant.
Voerman  &  Gurganus,  by  David  E.  Gurganus,  for  respondent-
appellee.
HUDSON, Judge.
Respondent, Michael Duane Maxwell, was employed by Petitioner,
North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of
Vocational  Rehabilitation  (“State VR”)  from  6  July  1998  until  his
termination  on                                                              30  April       1999.   Thereafter,  he  appealed  through
internal  grievance  procedures  without  success  and  then  filed  a
Petition  for  a  Contested  Case  with  the  Office  of  Administrative
Hearings  (“OAH”).    The  Administrative  Law  Judge  (“ALJ”)  and  State
Personnel Commission  (“SPC”) ruled in his  favor, and the State VR
sought  review  in  superior  court.    The  superior  court  adopted  the
decision of the SPC and remanded for entry of the appropriate order
and for compliance.    The State VR appealed to this Court, and, for
the reasons explained below, we affirm.




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Respondent   suffers   from   diabetes   mellitus,   peripheral
neuropathy, and hypothyroidism.   He has had diabetes since birth and
is completely insulin dependent.   Fluctuations in his medication and
his diet, coupled with his hypothyroidism, can result in lethargy,
loss  of  concentration,  difficulty  with  short-term  memory,  and
depression.
Among  the  severe  effects  of  Respondent’s  diabetes  is  visual
impairment.   He has had six operations on his eyes since 1989, most
recently in March of  1999, one month prior to his termination.    He
suffers  from  detached  retinas,  macular  holes,  and  floaters  in  his
eyes.    Respondent testified that the effect of these conditions is
to “distort[] [his] vision in such a fashion that it’s like looking
at  a  fun-house  mirror.”     Respondent  testified  further  that  his
vision  “oscillated back and  forth rather rapidly.”    He uses over-
the-counter  reading  glasses  and  a  magnifying  glass  to  read,  but
reading  still  takes  him  four  times  longer  than  it  would  a  person
with normal vision.   Respondent testified that his visual impairment
also affects his ability to write.
Respondent  served  as  an  intern  in  the  Kinston  office  of  the
State  VR  from                                                               26  March   1998  until   2  July   1998.   During  his
internship, the Kinston office afforded him various accommodations,
including additional illumination with a built-in magnifier for his
work space.    Respondent also had an assistant.
On  6 July  1998, the State VR  hired Respondent to work in its
Greenville  office.    Shortly  thereafter,  Respondent  began  to  have
trouble keeping up with his case load, due to his difficulties with




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the  paperwork  requirements  of  the  job.                                  In  September   1998,
Respondent  met  with  his  manager,  Carlton  Hardee,  and  provided  him
with  a  written  summary  of  his  visual  problems  and  trouble  with
short-term memory.
As  the  paperwork  became  more  difficult  for  Respondent,  he
repeatedly requested assistance, and he also contacted the Division
of Services for the Blind to request accommodations.   Specifically,
Respondent   requested   the   following   accommodations:   a   table
(provided); a lamp for his workspace  (not provided); a copy of the
Vocational  Rehabilitation  Manual  index  on  audio  tapes  or  compact
discs  (not  provided  to  Respondent  but  provided  to  others);  and  a
technical  or  other  clerical  assistant  to  help  with  his  paperwork
(provided by telephone from off-site).
Petitioner   terminated   Respondent   on                                    30   April      1999,   and
Respondent filed an internal grievance.   Department Secretary David
Bruton  upheld  Respondent’s  dismissal  on  26  July  1999.    Respondent
then  filed  a  petition  for  a  contested  case  with  the  Office  of
Administrative  Hearings,  which  held  a  hearing  on  25  August  1999.
On 3 August 2000, Administrative Law Judge Robert Roosevelt Reilly,
Jr.,  filed  a  Recommended  Decision  proposing that  the  dismissal  be
overturned.    On  14  December  2000,  the  case  came  before  the  SPC.
It’s order, entered  11 January  2001, adopted the ALJ’s Recommended
Decision   with   modifications   and   ordered   that   Respondent   be
reinstated with back pay, benefits, and attorneys’ fees.   Petitioner
then  filed  a  Petition  for  Judicial  Review  on                          21  February    2001.
Superior Court Judge John R. Jolly, Jr., heard the matter on 21 May




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2001,  and entered an order  23  October  2001 upholding the decision
of the SPC.    Petitioner now appeals to this Court.
This  Court’s  review  of  the  superior  court’s  order  on  appeal
from  an  administrative  agency  decision  generally  involves               “(1)
determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope
of review and,  if appropriate,  (2) deciding whether the court did
so properly.”    Amanini  v.  N.C. Dept. of Human Resources,  114 N.C.
App.  668,  675,  443 S.E.2d  114,  118-19  (1994).    Thus, in its order
regarding  an  agency  decision,  the  superior  court  facilitates  our
review  when  it  states  the  standard  of  review  it  applied  to  each
issue.  Deep  River  Citizen’s  Coalition  v.  N.C.  Dep’t  of  Env.  and
Natural  Res.,  149  N.C.  App.  211,  215,  560  S.E.2d  814,  817  (2002)
(citation omitted). However, this Court recently explained that:
an  appellate  court’s  obligation  to  review  a
superior  court  order  for  errors  of  law  can  be
accomplished   by   addressing   the  dispositive
issue(s)  before  the  agency                                                 .  and  the
superior  court  without                                                      [(1)]  examining  the
scope of review utilized by the superior court
and  (2) remanding the case  .  .  .
Capital Outdoor, Inc. v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment (II), __
N.C. App.  __,  567 S.E.2d  440  (2002)  (quoting Capital Outdoor, Inc.
v. Guilford County Bd.  of  Adjustment  (I),  146 N.C. App.  388,  390,
392, 552 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001), (Greene, J., dissenting), rev'd per
dissent, 355 N.C. 269, 559 S.E.2d 547 (2002)); Cf. Hedgepeth v. N.C.
Div.  of  Servs.  for  the  Blind,  142  N.C.  App.  338,  543  S.E.2d  169
(2001),  appeal  after  remand,                                               ___  N.C.  App.                                                ___,   571  S.E.2d   262
(2002).                                                                       Here,  the  superior  court’s  order  clearly  reflects  the
standard of review applied to each issue.    Thus, we must determine




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whether the superior court properly applied that standard of review.
On  review  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  support  the
findings  of  fact,  this  Court  applies  the                                “whole  record”  test.
Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnston County Bd. of Adjust.,  132 N.C.
App.  465,  468,  513 S.E.2d  70,  73  (1999).    Under the  “whole record”
test,  we  must  determine                                                    “whether  the                                   [agency’s]  findings  are
supported  by  substantial  evidence  contained  in  the  whole  record.”
Id.    Substantial  evidence  is  that  which  a  reasonable  mind  might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.    Id.    Moreover,
The                                                                           “whole  record”  test  does  not  permit  the
reviewing court to substitute its judgment for
the   agency’s   as   between   two   reasonably
conflicting views; however, it does require the
court  to  take  into  account  both  the  evidence
justifying   the   agency’s   decision   and   the
contradictory  evidence  from  which  a  different
result could be reached.
Floyd v. N.C. Dept. of Commerce,  99 N.C. App.  125,  128,  392 S.E.2d
660,  662  (1990), disc. review denied,  327 N.C.  482,  357 S.E.2d  217
(1990) (citations omitted).   As to the credibility of the witnesses,
this Court noted that:
Credibility  determinations  and  the  probative
value  of  particular  testimony  are  for  the
administrative  body  to  determine,  and  it  may
accept or reject in whole or part the testimony
of any witness.    Moreover, even though the ALJ
has  made  a  recommended  decision,  credibility
determinations,  as  well  as  conflicts  in  the
evidence, are for the agency to determine.
                                                                                                                              Oates  v.  N.C.  Dept.  of  Correction,            114  N.C.  App.                               597,   601,   442
S.E.2d                                                                        542,                                            545                                       (1994)   (internal  citations  and  quotation  marks
omitted).
However,  “[w]hen  the  petitioner  contends  the  agency  decision




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was affected by an error of law, . . . de novo review is the proper
standard.”    R.J.  Reynolds  Tobacco  Co.  v.  N.C.  Dep’t  of  Env’t  &
Natural  Res.,  148  N.C.  App.  610,  614,  560  S.E.2d  163,  166,  disc.
review  denied,  355  N.C.  493,  564  S.E.2d  44  (2002).    Upon  de  novo
review, this court must review the record  “as though the issue had
not yet been determined.”   Whiteco Outdoor Adver., 132 N.C. App. at
470,  513 S.E.2d at  74.
First,  we  note  that  Petitioner  assigned  error  to  the  ALJ’s
findings of fact  8,  13,  17,  18,  19,  24, and  25 through  30 in their
entirety and to findings of fact  5,  6,  7,  10,  11,  20,  21,  22, and
32  in  part.     In  its  brief,  however,  Petitioner  discusses  only
findings 13 and 29.   Thus, the assignments of error to the remaining
findings are deemed abandoned.    N.C. R. App. P.  28(b)(6)  (2002).
Petitioner first argues that the ALJ’s findings of fact 13 and
29  “are  not  supported  by  the  record  when  reviewed  as  a  whole  and
that  the  trial  court  erroneously  affirmed  these  findings.”    These
findings of fact properly before us read as follows:
13.                                                                            [Respondent]  is  a  handicapped  individual
because  he  suffers  from  diabetes  mellitus,
diminished  vision  and  hypothyroidism.    These
conditions affect his everyday life activities,
in respect to his ability to see like a normal
person, his ability to read and understand and
write like a normal person, and his ability to
work and concentrate like a normal person.   The
providing of vocational rehabilitation services
to                                                                             [Respondent]   by   the   North   Carolina
Commission of the Blind through the Department
of  Health  and  Human  Resources  of  the  State  of
North Carolina is evidence that he suffers from
a   handicapping   condition.                                                  [Respondent’s]
condition can be expected to last for the rest
of his life and there is no recognized cure for




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diabetes  mellitus  with  diminished  vision  and
hypothyroidism.                                                             [Respondent]   is   insulin
dependent and will remain insulin dependent for
the rest of his life.
29.                                                                         [Respondent]  was  dismissed  during  his
probationary and trainee status because of his
inability to provide necessary documentation in
his  case  load  files  and  his  inability  to,
essentially,   keep   up   with   the   paperwork
necessary  to  show  progress  in  respect  to  the
case  load  he  was  assigned.    In  addition,  the
placing  of                                                                 [Respondent]  in  a  separate  office
with  no  direct  access  to  clerical  assistance
directly  hampered  his  ability  to  perform  his
job.
As  to  finding  of  fact                                                   13,  Petitioner  argues  that  there  is
insufficient evidence to support this finding and that the finding
that  Respondent  is  handicapped  is  erroneous  as  a  matter  of  law.
Thus, we apply the whole record test to the finding of fact and de
novo review to the alleged error of law.
A review of the whole record discloses substantial evidence to
support  this  finding  of  fact.     In  his  testimony,  Respondent
described  having  had  diabetes  mellitus  since  birth  and  being
completely  insulin  dependent.                                             He  expects  to  remain  insulin
dependent for the duration of his natural life.   Further, Respondent
testified that it takes him four times longer to read than it does
a person with normal vision and that his  vision is distorted like
“looking at a fun-house mirror.”
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support this
finding,  Petitioner  argues  that  Respondent                              “was  not  a  credible
witness.”     However,  as  we  noted  above,  the  credibility  of  the
witnesses and the weight given to their testimony is for the agency




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to determine.    See Oates,  114 N.C. App. at  601,  442 S.E.2d at  545.
The  SPC  having  found  Respondent  to  be  credible,  his  testimony
supports  this  finding.    Thus,  substantial  evidence  in  the  whole
record supports this finding.
Petitioner  further  argues  that  “[t]he  portion  of  finding  of
fact 13 that Respondent received services from DSB and therefore is
a  handicapped  person                                                         .  is  erroneous  as  a  matter  of  law.”
Finding 13 itself does not support this contention.   The portion of
finding                                                                        13  that  Petitioner  challenges  reads:     “The  providing  of
vocational  rehabilitation  services  to                                       [Respondent]  by  the  North
Carolina Commission of the Blind  .  .  . is evidence that he suffers
from a handicapping condition.”    This finding does not purport to
conclude  that  because  Respondent  sought  assistance  from  Blind
Services  he  is  automatically  qualified  as  handicapped.    It merely
indicates that such assistance is evidence that he is handicapped,
which is supported by the evidence and not contrary to law.
Likewise, we find substantial evidence in the whole record to
support  finding  of  fact  29.    By  letter  12  April  1999,  Mr.  Hardee
notified Respondent that he would not be recommended for permanent
status and that his employment with Petitioner would be terminated
during  his  probationary  period  on                                          30  April                                    1999.                 Mr.  Hardee
explained to Respondent that  “there has been a significant lack of
progress and your overall adjustment has not been satisfactory” and
that Respondent has  “not closed a case during the past  8 months  .
.  .  .”    The record reflects that Respondent’s inability to keep up
with his case load was directly related to his visual impairment for




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which he sought accommodations that were not provided.   Thus, after
reviewing the whole record, we find substantial evidence to support
these findings of fact.
Petitioner next argues that the SPC’s Conclusions of Law 2, 8,
and 9 are “not supported by the substantial credible evidence in the
record  as  a  whole,  and  [are]  contrary  to  existing  case  law.”    We
disagree.
The SPC’s Conclusions of Law  2,  8, and  9 provide as follows:
2.                                                                             The                                       [Respondent],   is   a   qualified
handicapped   individual   with   a   recognized
disability.
8.    Dismissal  of  [Respondent]  herein  from  his
trainee   position,   therefore,   was   directly
related    to    the    discrimination    against
[Respondent] based on his disability.
9.                                                                             [Respondent],   therefore,   has   been
discriminated against in violation of the provisions of N.C.G.S.  §
126-16,  in  that  he  was  discriminated  against  on  the  basis  of  his
disability.
Petitioner first contends that Conclusion of Law 2 is erroneous
because Respondent “failed to meet his burden of showing that he met
the statutory definition of a  ‘qualified handicapped person.’”    We
disagree.
The North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act (NCHPPA)
was   re-titled   the   North   Carolina   Persons   with   Disabilities
Protection  Act  effective                                                     1  October                                1999,  and  amended  such  that
“person with a disability” is generally substituted for “handicapped
person” throughout the chapter.   Section 168A-3 was also amended to




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include                                                                      “working”  as  a                               “major  life  activity.”     However,  since
Respondent’s  contested  case  was  filed  prior  to  the  effective  date
of the amendment, we apply the terminology of the NCHPPA.                    1999 N.C.
Sess. Laws ch. 160, § 1; see also Simmons v. Chemol Corp., 137 N.C.
App.  319,  322,  528 S.E.2d  368,  370  (2000).
“[O]ne’s  status  as  a  qualified  handicapped  person  must  be
preceded by a determination that one is a handicapped person  .  .  .
.”   Simmons, 137 N.C. App. at 323, 528 S.E.2d at 371 (citations and
quotation marks omitted).    Section  168A-3(4) defines a handicapped
person as:
any  person  who                                                             (i)  has  a  physical  or  mental
impairment  which  substantially  limits  one  or
more  major  life  activities;  (ii)  has  a  record
of  such  impairment;  or                                                    (iii)  is  regarded  as
having such an impairment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-3(4) (1998 Cum. Supp.).   Section 168A-3(4)(b)
defines  “major  life  activities”  as  “functions  such  as  caring  for
one’s  self,  performing  manual  tasks,  walking,  seeing,  hearing,
speaking, breathing, and learning.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  168A-3(4)(b)
(1998  Cum.  Supp.)                                                          (emphasis  added).    In  addition,  section   168A-
3(9)                                                                         (a)  defines  a                                “qualified  handicapped  person”  with  regard  to
employment as:
a  handicapped  person  who  can  satisfactorily
perform the duties of the job in question with
or   without   reasonable   accommodation,                                   (i)
provided that the handicapped person shall not
be  held  to  standards  of  performance  different
from other employees similarly employed.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  168A-3(9)(a)  (1998 Cum. Supp.).
This  Court  recently  held  that  the                                       “plain  language  of  the
statute  requires  the  disabled  person  be  able  to  satisfactorily




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perform the job, either ‘with or without’ reasonable accommodation.
Therefore,   to   be   classified   as   a                                    ‘qualified   person   with   a
disability’  the  employee  must  be  capable  of  performing  the  job
duties with reasonable accommodations.”    Campbell v. N.C. Dep’t of
Transp.,  ___N.C. App.___,  ___,  ___S.E.2d  ____,  ____  (2003).
The term reasonable accommodation with regard to employment as
defined under the NCHPPA is:
making   reasonable   physical   changes   in   the
workplace,   including,   but   not   limited   to,
making    facilities    accessible,    modifying
equipment  and  providing  mechanical  aids  to
assist   in   operating   equipment,   or   making
reasonable changes in the duties of the job in
question   that   would   accommodate   the   known
handicapping   conditions   of  the  handicapped
person seeking the job in question by enabling
him or her to satisfactorily perform the duties
of that job.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  168A-3(10)(a)  (1998 Cum. Supp.).
Here, Respondent testified that his diabetic retinopathy causes
visual distortion.   Because of this impairment, he takes four times
as  long  to  read  materials  and  comprehend  them  as  one  with  normal
vision.    Further, fluctuations in his blood sugar level due to his
diabetes  and  insulin  dependency  cause  him  to  be  lethargic  and
inattentive.    Respondent  testified  that  he  sought  accommodations
from  Petitioner,  including  better  lighting  for  his  work  area  and
access to the Vocational Rehabilitation Manual index in audio form,
and that such accommodations would have enabled him to perform his
job duties satisfactorily.   Thus, after de novo review, we conclude
that Respondent is a qualified handicapped person.
Petitioner next argues that the SPC’s conclusions of law 8 and




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9 and the superior court’s conclusion of law  1(g) are erroneous as
a  matter  of  law  because  Respondent  did  not  put  on  any  direct
evidence  of  discrimination  and  failed  to  satisfy  the  three-prong
test set out in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,  411 U.S.  792,  36
L.Ed.2d  668  (1973).    We disagree.
According to McDonnell-Douglas, the plaintiff (here Respondent)
bears  the  burden  of  showing  prima  facie  that  he  is  a  member  of  a
protected  class,  here  handicapped,  and  that  adverse  employment
action  was  taken  against  him  because  he  is  handicapped.    Once  he
makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant
(here Petitioner) to produce legitimate non-discriminatory reasons
for dismissing plaintiff.   If the defendant shows non-discriminatory
reasons for the discharge, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to show that those reasons were pretextual.   Dep’t of Correction v.
Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 137-40, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82-84 (1983) (adopting
evidentiary standards set forth in McDonnell-Douglas as appropriate
for state law claims).
Here, Respondent’s evidence established prima facie that he is
a  member  of  a  protected  class                                              (handicapped)  and  that  he  was
terminated while requesting accommodations to enable him to do his
work despite his handicap.    Thus, the burden shifted to Petitioner
to   articulate   legitimate   business   reasons   for   Respondent’s
termination.     Petitioner  contended  that  Respondent  was  a  poor
employee because in the nine months he was employed there he did not
successfully close a single case.    However, the record shows that
the  particular  unit  Respondent  was  assigned  to,  Greenville’s




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Probation  and  Parole,  had  among  the  most  difficult  case  loads  to
handle.     Ellis  Parker  Stokes,  a  twenty-six  year  employee  of
Vocational Rehabilitation, testified that Probation and Parole had
“[p]robably the most difficult clientele [Respondent] could have to
work  with”  and  that  not  having  an  on-site  assistant  would  hamper
even his  (Stokes’) ability to manage such a caseload.
The SPC specifically found that Respondent’s inability to keep
up  with  the  case  load,  including  the  paperwork,                       “was  directly
related to [his] handicapping condition.”   This finding (No. 21) was
not discussed by Petitioner in its brief and is thus binding.   This,
and the other findings that are supported by the evidence, in turn
support  the  conclusions  of  law  that  Respondent’s  dismissal            “was
directly  related  to  the  discrimination  against  [Respondent]  based
on  his  disability”  and  that  “he  was  discriminated  against  on  the
basis of his disability.”    On de novo review, we conclude, as the
superior  court  did,  that  in  order  to  reach  the  conclusion  that
Respondent was dismissed because of discrimination on the basis of
his disability, the SPC necessarily rejected the State VR’s argument
that the dismissal was for a legitimate reason.   Thus, we hold that
the  superior  court’s  conclusion  of  law  1(g),  which  provides  that
“even though the Final Decision does not specifically set forth the
three prong test established by  [McDonnell-Douglas], that both the
Administrative Law Judge and the State Personnel Commission  .  .  .
considered  evidence  in  respect  thereto                                   .  and  addressed  each
issue set forth in that decision,” was adequate as a matter of law.
We do not believe that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.




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In sum, we hold that the findings of the SPC are supported by
the whole record, that the findings support the conclusions of law,
and that the conclusions of law are consistent with the applicable
law.    Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the superior court.
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.

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South Carolina Law