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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling
legal  authority.  Citation  is  disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the
provisions  of  Rule  30(e)(3)  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure.
NO. COA10-1200
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 June  2011
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              North Carolina State Bar
No.  09 DHC  6
MARK H. BADGETT, Attorney,
Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from a disciplinary order entered 5 April
2010 by the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina
State Bar.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  9 March  2011.
The North Carolina State Bar, by Deputy Counsel David R. Johnson
and Counsel Katherine Jean, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
J. Clark Fischer for Defendant-Appellant.
BEASLEY, Judge.
Mark  H.  Badgett                                                                               (Defendant)  appeals  from  an  order  of  the
Disciplinary  Hearing  Commission  of  the  North  Carolina  State  Bar
(DHC), disbarring him from the practice of law.    For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I.    Factual and Procedural Background




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Admitted to the North Carolina State Bar (Bar) in 1984, Defendant
has  been  either  in  private  practice  or  a  member  of  the  judiciary
since then.    While this appeal arises from a complaint filed by the
Bar after Defendant had been removed from judicial office, the request
for disciplinary action was based on various instances of misconduct
during Defendant=s tenure as a district court judge in dereliction
of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct.
A.    Judicial Standards Proceedings
During 2005 and 2006, the Judicial Standards Commission (JSC)
commenced  two  investigations  into  alleged  violations  of  the  Code
of Judicial Conduct by Defendant and recommended censure both times.
See In re Badgett  (Badgett I), 362 N.C. 202, 657 S.E.2d 346  (2008)
(censuring Defendant and suspending him from the bench for violations
related to his existing business relationship with a lawyer often
appearing  before  him);  In  re  Badgett  (Badgett  II),  362  N.C.  482,
666  S.E.2d                                                                   743   (2008)   (removing  Defendant  from  judiciary  for
persistent acts of willful misconduct and behavior that brought the
judicial  office  into  disrepute).    Although  the  facts  involved  in
the judicial standards proceedings are laid out in these opinions,
we discuss those upon which this DHC action is largely based.
Prior  to  his  service  as  a  district  court  judge,  Defendant
maintained  a  private  law  practice  and,  after  being  elected  as  a
district court judge in November 2004, arranged to lease his building




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and  sell  his  client  files  to  attorney  Clarke  Dummit.    Mr.  Dummit
represented  clients  before  Defendant  on  multiple  occasions,  but
Defendant never disclosed their business relationship.    Complaints
from  the  district  attorney=s  office  about  Defendant=s  perceived
favorable  treatment  of  Mr.  Dummit  led  to  a  JSC  investigation  in
December  2005  (JSC  Proceeding  I).    The  Executive  Director  of  the
JSC advised Defendant that his business relationship with Mr. Dummit
was potentially grounds for disqualification from matters in which
Mr. Dummit was involved.    The JSC found that Defendant then directed
Mr.  Dummitt  to  draft  a  document  titled   AIn  re  Remittal  of
Disqualification,@ asserting that, Apursuant to an opinion rendered
by the [JSC],@ the landlord-tenant relationship between them was Aboth
insubstantial  and  immaterial  to  the  administration  of  justice  in
the  District  Courts  of  Stokes  County.@    Although  no  such  opinion
was ever rendered by the JSC, Defendant signed the Remittal and made
several  unsuccessful  efforts  to  obtain  District  Attorney  Ricky
Bowman=s signature.    On one occasion, at the bench in open court,
Defendant lied to Mr. Bowman telling him that JSC Proceeding I was
over and that the JSC had instructed Mr. Bowman to sign the Remittal.
On  2  October  2006,  the  JSC  filed  a  complaint  based  on  these
facts,  and  several  hearings  were  conducted.    Defendant  testified
under oath that he neither directed Mr. Dummit to prepare the Remittal
nor made the untrue statements to Mr. Bowman.    The JSC specifically




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found Defendant=s testimony lacked credibility and on 19 March 2007,
recommended censure.    Our Supreme Court held that the JSC=s findings
were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that Defendant=s
actions not only prejudiced the administration of justice but also
constituted willful misconduct, including:
(1) his participation in the preparation of a
remittal                                                                    of                                 disqualification,   despite
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
the  contrary;                                                              (2)  his  untruthful  statements
concerning the state of the investigation and
the opinions purportedly tendered by the [JSC];
and (3) his pressure on Mr. Bowman to sign the
remittal,  using  threats  and  the  power  of  his
office.
Badgett I, 362 N.C. at 209, 657 S.E.2d at 351.    Of particular concern
to  the  Court  was  Defendant=s  testimony  regarding  the  remittal  of
disqualification, noting that,
although [Defendant] testified under oath that
he did not direct Dummit to prepare the remittal,
plenary evidence contradicted him.
.    The [JSC] also found that [Defendant]
told Mr. Bowman that Paul Ross [of the JSC] had
said  that  Bowman  needed  to  sign  the  document
and the [JSC=s] investigation was over.    Neither
of these statements was true. In addition, the
[JSC] also determined that  [Defendant] became
angry and threatened Mr. Bowman upon his refusal
to sign the form.    The  [JSC] made an explicit
determination   that                                                        [Defendant=s]   Atestimony
concerning his conversation at the bench with
Mr. Bowman was not credible.@




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This   course   of   events   is   especially
troubling because respondent was under oath and
sworn to tell the truth.
Id.
A second JSC investigation (JSC Proceeding II), also resulting
in  the  filing  of  a  complaint,  examined  Defendant=s  conduct  in  a
domestic  violence  case.    On  24  February  2005,  Defendant  presided
over a hearing in the matter of Carreon v. Carreon,  05 CVD  164, in
which  Mrs.  Carreon  sought  a  domestic  violence  protective  order
against Mr. Carreon.    Mr. Carreon was compelled to proceed pro se
after Defendant gave him only an hour to retain an attorney. Although
Mrs. Carreon did not request support in her complaint or offer any
evidence therefor, Defendant ordered Mr. Carreon to pay her $150.00
per week in spousal support after she indicated that she had no money.
As Mr. Carreon attempted to object to the award of support, Defendant
replied that Ayou people always find a way@ to get money and remarked,
AI don=t know how you treat women in Mexico, but here you don=t treat
them that way.@    Defendant then ordered the courtroom clerk to search
Mr. Carreon=s wallet and give any cash to Mrs. Carreon.    Mr. Carreon
subsequently filed a motion for relief on the grounds that he needed
more  time  to  procure  counsel.    Defendant  granted  the  motion  but
instructed Mr. Carreon=s counsel to draw an order stating that, due
to a language barrier, he had not understood that Mr. Carreon wanted
an attorney.    Upon notice of JSC Proceeding II, Defendant discussed




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the events of the 24 February hearing with the courtroom clerk and
Mrs.  Carreon=s  attorney,  both  potential  witnesses  in  the  matter.
Attempting  to  influence  her  recollection,  Defendant  suggested  to
the clerk that Mr. Carreon had appeared violent and requested that
she  prepare  a  written  statement  to  that  effect.  Defendant  was
interviewed by an SBI agent and denied ever directing the clerk to
search Mr. Carreon=s wallet or take his money, stating that the clerk
approached Mr. Carreon because she was suspicious of him and concerned
for  the  safety  of  others  in  the  courtroom.    Defendant  made  other
inconsistent,  false,  and  misleading  statements  to  the  SBI  agent,
and the JSC recommended censure for Defendant=s conduct during both
the Carreon case and the investigation.
Our  Supreme  Court  adopted  the  JSC=s findings that: Defendant
made remarks  Adirected to  [Mr. Carreon=s] ethnicity as an Hispanic
person@, who was clearly aware he wanted to hire an attorney; the
clerk approached Mr. Carreon only after Defendant twice ordered her
to and not out of any concern for courtroom security; and Defendant
made  untrue  statements  Awith  the  intent  to deceive@  the SBI agent
during the investigation.    Badgett II, 362 N.C. at 485-87, 666 S.E.2d
at 745-46.    Agreeing that censure was warranted for the statements
Aindicative  of  a  bias  against  Mr.  Carreon@  and misuse of judicial
power, the Court viewed as more serious Defendant=s untruthful and
deceptive statements to the SBI agent and Ahis attempts to influence




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the  recollections@  of  potential  witnesses.    The  Court  reproached
Defendant for the willful misconduct of  Aattempt[ing] to cover up
his misdeeds@ rather than Amerely relating the truth and letting the
chips  fall  where  they  may,@  noting  A[t]his  behavior  is  entirely
unacceptable for a lawyer or a judge.@    Id. at  490,  666 S.E.2d at
748  (emphasis  added).    The  Court  thus  ordered,  not  only  censure,
but also removal from judicial office.    Id. at  483,  666 S.E.2d at
744.
B.    DHC Proceedings
On  10  June  2009,  the  Bar  filed  an  amended  complaint  seeking
disciplinary  action  for  the  misconduct  that  led  to  Badgett  I  and
Badgett  II.    The  Bar  alleged  discipline  was  warranted  under  N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 84-28(b)(2) in that Defendant violated several of the
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules), first, by Adirecting
Mr.  Dummit  to  prepare  the  Remittal  containing  false  statements,@
thus knowingly assisting or inducing him to violate the Rules and
engaging in misconduct through another=s acts in violation of Rule
8.4(a),  and  in  conduct  involving  dishonesty,  fraud,  deceit,  or
misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c).    The Bar alleged that
Defendant also violated the Rules by:  (i)  Aknowingly making false
representations   to   the   District   Attorney   about   the               [JSC=s]
investigation  and  statements  by  Paul  Ross@  in  violation  of  Rule
8.4(c); (ii) Afalsely testifying under oath at the hearing in [JSC]




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Proceeding I,@ thus making false statements of material fact to a
tribunal in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1), committing a criminal act
(i.e. perjury) reflecting adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness
or fitness as a lawyer in violation of Rule  8.4(c) and engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation
of  Rule  8.4(d);  (iii)  Amaking  comments  from  the  bench  indicative
of bias and directed toward  [a] defendant=s Hispanic ethnicity and
by depriving the defendant of his rights without due process,@ thus
violating Rule  8.4(d);  (iv)  Adirecting defense counsel in Carreon
to prepare an order containing false statements and by signing that
order on behalf of the court@ and then Aattempting to influence the
recollection  of  potential  witnesses  about  the                          24  February                                2005
events,@  thus  violating  Rules  8.4(c)  and  (d);  and  (v)  Aknowingly
making  false  statements                                                   [of  material  fact]  to  the  SBI  agent
investigating  [JSC] Proceeding II,@ in violation of Rules  4.1 and
8.4(c).
On 21 July 2009, the Bar filed a motion for summary judgment,
requesting that preclusive effect be given to Badgett I and Badgett
II to dispose of any factual issues.    The DHC entered an order for
partial summary judgment on 16 November 2009, finding that the Bar
complaint=s allegations Amirror the findings and conclusions of the
[JSC] as affirmed and adopted by [our] Supreme Court,@ and that the
offensive  use  of  non-mutual  collateral  estoppel  would  not  be




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inequitable  to  Defendant.    Therefore,  the  factual  issues  proven
before  the  JSC  and  articulated  in  Badgett  I  and  Badgett  II  would
not be relitigated and conclusively established the facts alleged
by the Bar.    The DHC concluded as a matter of law that the established
facts were sufficient to support the alleged Rules violations and
granted   the   Bar=s   motion   to   that   extent,   thus   leaving   for
determination  only  of  the  type  of  appropriate  discipline.    After
the dispositional hearing on  19 February  2010, the DHC entered an
order disbarring Defendant.    The order sets out the findings of fact
Aestablished  by  summary  judgment,@  consistent  with  the  factual
history  recited  above  and  the  allegations  of  the  Bar  complaint.
As set forth in the partial summary judgment order, the DHC concluded
Defendant=s conduct constituted violations of the Rules as alleged
and  thus  grounds  for  discipline  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.          §
84-28(b)(2).    On appeal, Defendant does not challenge any of these
findings of fact or conclusions of law related to the adjudicatory
phase, which established his violations of the Rules as grounds for
discipline.    Rather, Defendant=s issues on appeal concern only the
dispositional phase, and additional portions of the DHC order related
thereto are further discussed below.
II.    Newspaper Evidence
Defendant first argues that the DHC committed prejudicial error
by admitting into evidence copies of several local newspaper articles




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and  editorials  covering  the  JSC  proceedings  involving  Defendant.
Specifically,  Defendant  contends  that  the  particulars  of  the
newspaper   coverage   regarding   Defendant=s   judicial   discipline
constituted  hearsay,  were  irrelevant  to  the  determination  of  an
adequate sanction, and unfairly prejudiced Defendant.    We disagree.
A.    Relevance
Following the testimony of local attorney Stephen Royster on
the impact Defendant=s conduct had on the administration of justice
and the public, the Bar offered a compilation of newspaper articles
as  a  sample  of  the  local  press  coverage  of  the  JSC  proceedings.
Defendant  objected  on  the  grounds  that  the  information  contained
in the articles was  Airrelevant and hearsay and should not factor
into  the  Committee=s  deliberations.@    The  Bar  believed  that  the
articles  were  relevant  to  show  A[h]arm  to  the  profession,@  often
proved  by  evidence  Athat  demonstrates  what  effect  the  misconduct
had on public perception,@ and were not hearsay because they were
Anot offered for the truth of the matter asserted@ but, rather,  Ato
show what was out there and what effect they may have on the public
perception in this case.@    The exhibit was allowed Afor the limited
purpose of . . . tending to show harm, to the profession,@ specifically
sustaining Defendant=s objection to the extent that the panel would
not  Aconsider these articles for the[ir] truth.@




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The DHC is clearly bound by the Rules of Evidence in any hearing,
N.C. Admin. Code tit. 27, r. 1B.0114(t) (2009), Aincluding the rules
excluding hearsay statements  [and irrelevant evidence], as in any
other case,@    N.C. State Bar v. Mulligan,  101 N.C. App.  524,  527,
400 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1991), and DHC procedures are also to resemble
bench trials, N.C. Admin. Code tit. 27, r. 1B.0114(n) (encouraging
hearing panels to Aconform as nearly as practicable@ with the rules
Afor trials of nonjury civil causes@).    Thus, A[t]he Commission [sits]
as  both  judge  and  jury  in  this  proceeding,  much  as  a  trial  judge
in Superior Court hears nonjury trials.@    N.C. State Bar v. Talman,
62  N.C.  App.  355,  361,  303  S.E.2d  172,  179  (1983);  see  also  N.C.
State Bar v. Sheffield, 73 N.C. App. 349, 361, 326 S.E.2d  320,  327
(1985)  (ADefendant  initially  observes  that  the  rules  of  evidence
are  relaxed  in  a  disciplinary  hearing,  modeled  as  it  is  after  a
non-jury trial in a civil case.@).
Relevant evidence is that which has  Aany tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.@    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2009).    We accord
great deference to DHC=s rulings on the admission of evidence based
on relevancy.    N.C. State Bar v. Gilbert,  151 N.C. App.  299,  307,
566 S.E.2d 685, 690 (2002), aff=d per curiam, 357 N.C. 502, 586 S.E.2d
89                                                                             (2003).   Where  the  DHC  has  authority  to  consider  various




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aggravating  and  mitigating  factors  in  arriving  at  an  appropriate
sanction, see N.C. Admin. Code tit. 27, r. 1B.0114(w), when disbarment
is an option, a panel must consider whether the defendant=s actions
had a Anegative impact@ on the Apublic=s perception of the profession@
and     Aon    the    administration    of    justice.”    Id.    at    r.
1B.0114(w)(1)(E)-(F).    Thus, evidence that has even a slight logical
tendency to make more or less likely the existence of these factors
in aggravation is admissible.
Defendant acknowledges that the DHC was required to consider
matters in aggravation and that the panel specifically limited its
consideration of the newspaper articles to whether they showed harm
to  the  profession,  but  he  argues  that  Athere  is  no  authority  for
basing a disciplinary ruling, either in whole or in part, on what
may have been said about a lawyer in a newspaper.@    Defendant focuses
on the articles= including  Afar more than factual accounts of [his]
travails  before  the  [JSC]  and  the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court,@
such as  Anumerous statements of opinion from lawyers and editorial
columnists@  and  Aa  disparaging  political  cartoon.@    However,  the
newspaper  articles  were  to  be  treated  as  evidence,  not  of  those
certain  statements  or  opinions,  but,  rather,  to  illustrate  that
Defendant=s  misconduct  in  general  had  garnered  considerable  media
coverage.    That this issue merited repeated publication tended to
show that Defendant=s misconduct had attained a palpable interest,




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was widely known among the community, and contributed to a negative
public perception of those critical to the operation of the court
system and the administration of justice.    Thus, the media attention
and  resultant  publicity  were  certainly  relevant  to  prove  that
Defendant=s actions leading to his removal from the bench and the
instant  DHC  action  negatively  impacted  the public=s perception of
the   legal   profession   and   the   administration   of   justice.
Accordingly,  the  newspaper  articles  were  indeed  admissible  as
evidence of these aggravating factors.
Moreover, the newspaper evidence was relevant to corroborate
the testimony of various witnesses at the dispositional hearing who
agreed that Defendant=s misconduct had harmed the reputation of the
profession and the courts among the public at large and indicated
that such notoriety was due, at least in part, to local press coverage
thereof.    The clerk who was in the courtroom during the Carreon matter
testified  that  Defendant=s  JSC  cases  were  covered  in  her  local
newspaper and followed by people in her community: AIt=s a small town
and  .  .  . when the story was in the paper, it seemed like it was
on  everybody=s  topic  of  discussion  at  that  time.@     Mr.  Royster
testified  that  Defendant=s  misconduct  had   Aan  impact  on  the
administration of justice in [his] judicial district@ and Aupon the
public, as well,@ explaining that the Amatter was in the newspapers
on  a  regular  basis,  and  it  was  discussed  .  .  .  in  public.@    He




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referenced particular local newspapers that had covered the matter
and testified that the coverage  Awas clearly a horrible black eye
on the judicial system in our district.@    District Court Judge Angela
Puckett also referenced the impact of the newspapers in connection
with whether the events of Defendant=s JSC hearings and removal from
office had any effect on the public=s perception of the openness and
honesty  of  the  justice  system  in  Stokes  and  Surry  Counties.    She
attributed harm to the profession, in part, to the newspaper articles
that were the talk of both counties for many months.    Judge Puckett
also indicated the fact that the events of Defendant=s JSC proceedings
were circulated in the newspapers proved Asignificant discredit [was]
brought  upon  the  judicial  system.”    Even  witnesses  who  testified
favorably to Defendant=s character and reputation agreed that members
of the public formed a negative opinion of Defendant from reading
the newspaper accounts.    In fact, Defendant himself testified that
his clients had Aknown about what happened@ because A[t]hey all read
the newspapers.@    Defendant acknowledged that A[t]his has pretty much
been all over Surry and Stokes County@ and that AThe Surry Messenger
.  .  . had a lot of articles in the newspaper@ and then apologized
Afor all the adverse publicity that . . . appeared in the newspapers.@
Accordingly, a sampling of the newspaper articles that were so heavily
referenced during the hearing was properly admitted as corroborative
evidence.




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Defendant also contends that even if relevant, the newspaper
evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403, under which even
relevant  evidence   Amay  be  excluded  if  its  probative  value  is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay,  waste  of  time,  or  needless  presentation  of  cumulative
evidence.@    N.C. Gen. Stat.  '  8C-1, Rule  403  (2009).    However, as
noted above, the DHC clearly stated that the articles were admitted
for the limited purpose of showing harm to the profession, and they
were clearly relevant to prove that the JSC proceedings were widely
publicized.    While  it  is  possible  to  speculate  that  inadmissible
or                                                                           unfairly   prejudicial   evidence   could   be   gleaned
therefrom-Defendant points to the articles= inclusion of Asubjective
opinions of third parties not directly involved in the case against
him@-we presume that the Commission did not consider the incompetent
evidence.    Talman, 62 N.C. App. at 361, 303 S.E.2d at 178; see also
In re Paul,  84 N.C. App.  491,  497,  353 S.E.2d  254,  258  (1987)  (AIn
a trial before a judge without a jury, it is presumed that the judge
disregarded  any  incompetent  evidence  and  did  not  draw  inferences
from testimony otherwise competent which would render such testimony
incompetent.@).
In support of his argument, Defendant cites only criminal cases
arising from jury trials, but where DHC hearings are to mimic nonjury




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trials  unless  otherwise  specified,  we  apply  the  presumption  that
the  DHC  panel  members  disregarded  any  incompetent  information  in
the newspaper articles and understood the limitations under which
they were admitted.    The DHC did not recite any of the challenged
statements or opinions from the newspaper articles in its findings
of fact.    That the DHC panel even considered the articles is reflected
in only one finding, which demonstrates that the evidence was indeed
limited  to  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  allowed-namely,  that  the
story was covered by the media:
2.    Some of Defendant=s misconduct occurred in
open  court.     All  of  Defendant=s  misconduct
became   publicly   known.                                                     As   a   result   of
Defendant=s  misconduct,  the                                                  [JSC]  held  two
hearings   which   received   media   coverage.
Defendant=s                                                                    misconduct             received   public
attention, bringing the legal profession into
disrepute  and  significantly  undermining  the
public=s  confidence  in  the  integrity  of  the
justice system.
While Defendant attacks the impropriety of allowing Amedia accounts
and opinions to factor into a bar disciplinary determination under
the  guise  of  showing  harm  to  the  public,@  there  is  no  indication
in the record that the panel based any of its findings, conclusions,
or  its  final  decision  on  the  contents  of  the  articles.    In  fact,
the DHC found that the A[e]vidence relating to Defendant=s character
and reputation was in conflict@ and made no definitive finding on
the issue, suggesting that the panel did not rely on the controverted




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aspects  of  the  evidence.     Thus,  any  adverse  thoughts  or  views
appearing in the newspapers caused no unfair prejudice, and Defendant
points to nothing in the order itself or otherwise in the panel=s
words or conduct that would indicate improper evidence was relied
upon.    See In re Oghenekevebe,  123 N.C. App.  434,  438,  473 S.E.2d
393,397                                                                        (1996)   (AIn  a  nonjury  trial,  if  incompetent  evidence  is
admitted  and  there  is  no  showing  that  the  judge  acted  on  it,  the
trial  court  is  presumed  to  have  disregarded  it.@).     As  such,
Defendant  fails  to  overcome  the  presumption  that  the  panel
disregarded any incompetent newspaper evidence.
B.    Hearsay
Defendant  also  challenges  the  admission  of  the  articles  on
hearsay  grounds,  Anotwithstanding  the  assertion  that  they  were
neither  offered  nor  received  for  the  truth  thereof.@    See  Rankin
v. Food Lion, __ N.C. App. __, __, 706 S.E.2d 310, 315 (2011) (noting
the  common  understanding  among  courts  in  the  Fourth  Circuit  that
newspaper articles are hearsay when  Aintroduce[d] in reliance upon
the truth of their contents@ (emphasis added)).    Initially, as noted
above, we presume that the panel observed the restrictions placed
on  the  evidence  and  did  not,  as  the  chairman  specified  would  not
be done,  Aconsider these articles for the[ir] truth.@
In another Fourth Circuit case, United States v. ReBrook,  58
F.3d 961, 967 (4th Cir. 1995), the defendant argued Ahe was attempting




-18-
to  use                                                                         [various  newspaper]  articles  solely  to  establish  what
information was available in the public domain,@ and although the
district court=s refusal to admit them into evidence was upheld, the
Court  distinguished   Athe  permissible  use  of  the  articles  to
demonstrate general public knowledge and the impermissible use of
the articles  .  .  . to prove the factual matters asserted therein.@
Id. at  58 F.3d at  968.    Whereas the DHC in this case sat as both
the judge and jury, we have no reason to believe the panel members
did not understand the hearsay nature of the articles, to the extent
inadmissible hearsay was contained therein, or were unable to observe
the line between permissible and impermissible uses of the evidence.
The newspaper articles at issue, therefore, were properly admitted
by the DHC as evidence tending to show harm to the legal profession
through the negative impact Defendant=s conduct had on the public=s
perception thereof.
III.    The Disciplinary Order
Defendant argues that his  Adisbarment was disproportionate to
his  ethical  violations  which  had  already  been  the  subject  of
discipline by the Supreme Court.@
We first note that, while Defendant accurately states that we
review  a  DHC  order  Aunder  the  >whole  record  test,=@  N.C.  State  Bar
v. Talford, 356 N.C. 626, 632, 576 S.E.2d 305, 309 (2003), our Supreme
Court has expressly disavowed any notion that the appellate courts




-19-
conduct a proportionality review of attorney disciplinary actions.
Id. at  641 n.4,  576 S.E.2d at  315 n.4.    The whole-record test
requires  the  reviewing  court  to  determine  if
the  DHC=s  findings  of  fact  are  supported  by
substantial  evidence  in  view  of  the  whole
record,  and  whether  such  findings  of  fact
support   its   conclusions   of   law.                                       Such
supporting   evidence   is   substantial   if   a
reasonable person might accept it as adequate
backing  for  a  conclusion.    The  whole-record
test also mandates that the reviewing court must
take  into  account  any  contradictory  evidence
or evidence from which conflicting inferences
may  be  drawn.    Moreover,  in  order  to  satisfy
the    evidentiary    requirements    of    the
whole-record test in an attorney disciplinary
action, the evidence used by the DHC to support
its findings and conclusions must rise to the
standard of  Aclear[, cogent,] and convincing.@
Ultimately, the reviewing court must apply all
the aforementioned factors in order to determine
whether the decision of the lower body, e.g.,
the DHC, Ahas a rational basis in the evidence.@
Id. at 632, 576 S.E.2d at 309-10 (internal citations omitted).    We
undertake  a  three-part  inquiry,  which  must  be  applied  separately
to  both  the  adjudicatory  and  dispositional  phases,  to  determine
whether  the  DHC=s  decision  Ahas  a  rational  basis  in  the  evidence@
under  the  whole-record  test:  A(1)  Is  there  adequate  evidence  to
support the order's expressed finding(s) of fact? (2) Do the order=s
expressed  finding(s)  of  fact  adequately  support  the  order's
subsequent conclusion(s) of law? and (3) Do the expressed findings
and/or  conclusions  adequately  support  the  lower  body=s  ultimate
decision?”    Id.  at  634,  576  S.E.2d  at  311.    Defendant  does  not




-20-
challenge  any  aspects  of  the  adjudicatory  phase  establishing  his
misconduct, and we thus limit our review to the DHC=s determination
of the appropriate sanction for committing such misconduct.
The  order  sets  out  Afindings  of  fact  regarding  discipline,@
including findings that: Mr. Carreon was vulnerable as a non-native
English  speaker  who  had  little  knowledge  of  the  court  system  and
was unrepresented by counsel; while evidence showed that Defendant
experienced a MRSA infection and clinical depression at the relevant
times herein, Athe misconduct at issue was not caused by the physical
afflictions@ or the mental and emotional ones-as Defendant=s expert
testified,  uncontradicted,  that  Adishonesty  is  not  a  symptom  of
depression@ and such problems did not mitigate Defendant=s misconduct;
our  Supreme  Court  characterized  Defendant=s  behavior  as  willful
conduct,  Aentirely  unacceptable  for  a  lawyer  or  a  judge,
amounting to a serious betrayal of the trust that the public invests
in the judiciary,@ and has described his Atenure as a district court
judge  as  .  .  .  fraught  with  disrespect  for  the  parties  appearing
before him, persistent failure to be truthful and a disregard for
the laws and ethical rules that govern the judiciary[;]@ ADefendant
has a persistent tendency to blame others for his predicament and
not to acknowledge that he himself engaged in deceitful conduct[;]@
and our Supreme Court saw his removal and disqualification from future




-21-
judicial  office  as  Aessential  to  the  protection  of  the  people  of
this State.@
The panel concluded that several factors in aggravation listed
in  N.C.  Admin.  Code  tit.  27,  r.  1B.0114(w)  were  applicable  here,
including:  acts  of  dishonesty,  misrepresentation,  deceit,  or
fabrication and dishonest or selfish motive; vulnerability of the
victim, Mr. Carreon; a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses;
Defendant=s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct;
and his more than twenty years of experience in the practice of law.
Evidence  relating  to  Defendant=s  character  and  reputation  was
conflicting, and the panel did Anot conclude that Defendant has good
character or . . . a good reputation for truthfulness.@    Mitigating
factors, such as an absence of prior disciplinary offenses and A[t]he
imposition  of  other  penalties  or  sanctions,  i.e.,  the  removal  of
Defendant from the district court,@ were also considered before the
DHC  made  the  following  Aconclusions  regarding  discipline@:  (i)  as
a result of Defendant=s misconduct, some of which occurred in open
court  and  all  of  which  became  publicly  known,  the  JSC  Aheld  two
hearings which received media coverage,@ and ADefendant=s misconduct
received  public  attention,  bringing  the  legal  profession  into
disrepute and significantly undermining the public=s confidence in
the integrity of the justice system[;]@  (ii)  A[b]y committing acts
of dishonesty, including giving untruthful testimony under oath to




-22-
the [JSC], Defendant has shown himself to be a person who lacks the
character necessary to be a lawyer@ and Aa person who cannot be trusted
to  serve  as  an  officer  of  the  court;  and  (iii)  while  ADefendant
testified that he was sorry that his conduct had caused a stain on
the  honor  of  his  family,@  he  Ahas  not  expressed  remorse  for  his
misconduct@  and  “[b]y  continuing  to  deny  that  he  engaged  in  acts
of dishonesty and by failing to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his
conduct, Defendant has indicated that he has not been rehabilitated.@1
Carefully considering all forms of discipline available, the
panel concluded that the lesser alternatives of license suspension,
public censure, reprimand, or admonition
would not be sufficient discipline because of
the  gravity  of  the  actual  harm  Defendant=s
conduct caused to the public, the administration
of justice, and the legal profession and because
of the gravity of the significant potential harm
to   potential   clients,   the   public,   the
administration   of   justice,   and   the   legal
profession  if  Defendant  were  permitted  to
continue practicing law.
Sanctions  short  of  disbarment  would  not  adequately  Aprotect  the
public, the profession and the administration of justice@ because:
1                                                                                      We note  that  some  of  these  Aconclusions@  or  parts  thereof  are
better  evaluated  as  findings  of  fact  and  will  treat  them  as  such  in  our
review  pursuant  to  the  standard  articulated  below.    See  N.C.  State  Bar
v. Key, 189 N.C. App. 80, 88, 658 S.E.2d 493, 499 (2008) (AThe classification
of a determination as either a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is
admittedly difficult,@ but an order=s classification Ais not determinative,
and,  when  necessary,  the  appellate  court  can  reclassify  an  item  before
applying  the  appropriate  standard  of  review.@).




-23-
(a)  Defendant  committed  misdeeds  involving
violations  of  the  public  trust,  including
material misrepresentations and deceit[,]  .  .
.  [which]  are  among  the  most  serious  that  an
attorney can commit. Such offenses demonstrate
that the offending attorney is not trustworthy.
The  public  should  be  able  to  assume  that  all
lawyers are trustworthy.
(b)  Entry  of  an  order  imposing  less  serious
discipline   would   fail   to   acknowledge   the
seriousness of the offenses Defendant committed
and would send the wrong message to attorneys
and to the public regarding the conduct expected
of members of the Bar of this State.
(c)  The  protection  of  the  public,  the  legal
profession  and  the  administration  of  justice
requires  that  Defendant  not  be  permitted  to
resume the practice of law until he demonstrates
the  following:  that  he  has  reformed;  that  he
understands his obligations to his clients, the
public,    the    legal    profession    and    the
administration of justice; and that permitting
him to practice law will not be detrimental to
the public or the integrity and standing of the
legal  profession  or  the  administration  of
justice.
Based  on  these  conclusions,  the  DHC  resolved  that  disbarment  was
the only appropriate sanction for Defendant.
A.    Findings of Fact Regarding Discipline
Defendant challenges findings that he failed to admit he had
engaged in dishonest acts, acknowledge the wrongful nature of his
conduct,  and  express  remorse  for  his  misconduct,  thus  indicating
Athat he has not been rehabilitated.@    Before reviewing the record,
we note that Defendant does not challenge a similar finding-Finding




-24-
of Fact Regarding Discipline  7-that he  Ahas a persistent tendency
to blame others for his predicament and not to acknowledge that he
himself engaged in deceitful conduct.@    This finding is thus binding
on appeal, see Key, 189 N.C. App. at 87, 658 S.E.2d at 498, and supports
the  disputed  finding  that  Defendant  has  not  been  rehabilitated.
Moreover, the findings are supported by adequate, substantial record
evidence in Defendant=s own testimony.
Defendant was given plenty of opportunities to admit that he
had engaged in misconduct and vocalize that he had learned from his
egregious misdeeds.    However, Defendant=s response to how he has been
affected by the Supreme Court=s findings and his removal from the
bench was that he had been Adenied the right to even be on the court
appointed list@ and had  Aa very slow practice.@    Even when defense
counsel  probed  for  a  deeper  response,  Defendant  accepted  no
responsibility but said only the Supreme Court=s findings were Avery
hurtful.@    Defendant did testify that he had  Astained  [his] family
name,@ as specifically found by the DHC, but offered no explanation
as to how, instead proceeding to portray himself as the victim:  AI
have  been  embarrassed,  and  it=s  been  very  hurtful.    And  I=ve  been
very, very bothered by it.    I=ve incurred great legal expenses, lost
income.@    Defendant also stated that he apologized to Mr. Carreon
and his bar councilor but continuously stated that he did not believe
he  had  lied  or  intentionally  misled  anyone.    That  Defendant  now




-25-
Adisclose[s] everything in court [that] is remotely relevant@ seems
to be the only effect the inappropriate business relationship with
Mr. Dummitt had on him.    For, upon the suggestion that his reputation
for honesty before a tribunal was  Atarnished,@ Defendant responded
only that he had  Anever been accused of dishonesty by any of  [his]
clients in  18 years of practicing law privately, three years as a
district attorney@ and that A[a]ll [his] problems began the day that
[he] crossed the city limits of Dobson.@
As  for  the  Carreon matter,  Defendant  maintained  that  he  did
not lie in stating that Mr. Carreon had trouble understanding the
English language.    Defendant said that he related only that which
he could remember, and when asked if he accepted that he probably
did direct[] the bailiff to get Mr. Carreon=s wallet, Defendant said
that he probably did but emphasized that Aif there was a tape, [he]
would know.    And that tape is not there.@    Defendant likewise refused
to acknowledge that he failed to tell the truth to the SBI and the
JSC, even in the various apologies he said he had made:
Q. For what did you apologize?
A. For any disrepute to the local Bar, for the
allegations that I had been, you know, mean to
defendants. I can=t remember what else we talked
about.  Mr.  Gehring  has  known  me  since  I  was
probably six years old. He=s an older man, and
he is our Bar Councilor. We talked about life.
We talked about my mother. We talked about my
father. He and my father were friends. He told
me  that,  AMark,  you've  always  been  a  lawyer.




-26-
That=s  what  you've  got  in  your  heart.  You've
always been a lawyer.@
Q. Did you apologize to him for lying under oath?
A. We didn=t talk about that. The only words that
we used were  Adisrepute to the local Bar.@ No,
I  didn=t  use  the  word  Alying@  because  I  didn=t
intentionally  mislead  anybody.    That=s  still
what I think.
Q. And did you apologize to Mr. Gehring for lying
to Special Agent Wilson?
A. Well, once again you use that word  Alying.@
I didn=t intentionally mislead anybody, so, no,
I  don=t  believe  I  did.  I  don=t  think  so.  I
apologized  for  bringing  disrepute,  which  was
a  word  that  was  used  in  the  Supreme  Court
opinion,  to  the  local  Bar.  That=s  what  I
apologized for.
Q.  So  do  I  understand  you  to  say  that  it  was
more  of  a  general  apology  and  not  a  specific
apology about the specific things that you did?
A. I apologized for bringing disrepute to the
local Bar.
Defendant believed that the Supreme Court=s findings had no effect
at all on public opinion of attorneys because  A[p]eople have a low
opinion  of  attorneys  anyway@  and  expressed  remorse,  not  for  any
misconduct, but only the consequences:  AI=m afraid that that=s true
[that I will never be a judge again], although I thought that I did
a decent job.    But obviously others think that I didn=t.@
We  conclude  that  this  is  substantial  evidence  in  support  of
the  DHC=s  findings  that  Defendant  has  not  shown  remorse  or




-27-
acknowledged the serious wrongful nature of his conduct.    We further
hold that upon review of the whole record, taking into account any
contradictory  testimony  by  which  Defendant=s  remorse  could  be
inferred, the evidence considered by the DHC rises to the standard
of clear, cogent, and convincing.    The record also shows that the
remaining, unchallenged findings of fact are likewise supported by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
B.    Choice of Sanction
Defendant contends that  A[t]he totality of the record did not
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the ultimate sanction
of  disbarment  was  the  appropriate@  one.    He  submits  that  the  DHC
erred by failing to afford any mitigating value to his health issues
and gave inadequate weight to his prior sanctions.
As  referenced  above,  the  Bar  has  adopted  aggravating  and
mitigating factors that a DHC shall consider during the dispositional
phase.    See N.C. Admin. Code tit. 27, r. 1B.0114(w).    In this case,
the DHC found the following aggravating factors applicable: (1) acts
of  dishonesty,  misrepresentation,  deceit,  or  fabrication;                (2)
vulnerability of the victim; (3) pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple
offenses;  (5)  refusal  to  acknowledge  wrongful  nature  of  conduct;
and                                                                           (6)  substantial  experience  in  practice  of  law.     It  found
Defendant=s conduct mitigated by the absence of prior disciplinary
offenses  and  the  imposition  of  other  penalties  or  sanctions,  but




-28-
the mitigating factors did not convince the DHC that any sanction
short of disbarment would suffice.
AIn  reviewing  the  DHC=s  consideration  of  mitigating  and
aggravating factors prior to imposing discipline, our standard of
review is abuse of discretion[,]@ under which we are  A>to determine
whether  a  decision  is  manifestly  unsupported  by  reason,  or  so
arbitrary  that  it  could  not  have  been  the  result  of  a  reasoned
decision.=@    N.C. Bar v. Ethridge, 188 N.C. App. 653, 667, 657 S.E.2d
378,  386-87  (2008)  (citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the panel failed Ato afford any mitigating
value  to  the  uncontradicted  testimony  regarding                        [his]  clinical
depression  during  the  events  at  issue@  and that he  Asuffered from
both physical and emotional afflictions at the time of his wrongdoing.
See N.C. Admin. Code tit. 27, r. 1B.0114(w)(3)(H)-(I) (listing the
Aeffect of any personal or emotional problems  .  .  .  [or] physical
or mental disability . . . on the conduct in question@ as mitigating
factors).     While  Defendant  charges  the  DHC  for  its   Acavalier
disregard  of  this  evidence,@  the  panel  did  indeed  consider  his
Aevidence  that,  during  the  times  in  question,  he  experienced  a
physical  affliction,  a  MRSA  infection,  and  that  he  experienced
significant  emotional  or  mental  problems,  including  clinical
depression,@ as stated in Findings of Fact Regarding Discipline  5.
However,  the  same  finding  states  that  the  panel  Afinds  that  the




-29-
misconduct at issue was not caused by the physical afflictions@ and
notes the expert=s uncontroverted testimony Athat dishonesty is not
a  symptom  of  depression@  before  resolving  Athat  the  physical  and
emotional or mental problems do not mitigate Defendant=s misconduct.@
By  specifically  providing  its  rationale  for  not  considering
Defendant=s  medical  condition  as  a  mitigating  factor,  the  DHC=s
decision was clearly supported by reason and, thus, did not constitute
an abuse of discretion.
Defendant also argues that the DHC Afailed to give appropriate
weight to the severity of the sanctions previously imposed upon him,@
including  a  sixty-day  suspension  from  the  bench  before  ultimate
removal therefrom, which Aresulted in severe financial hardship and
tremendous public humiliation@ and Awas more than ample to deter [him]
from similar ethical lapses in the future.@    In Ethridge, however,
this  Court also rejected a disbarred attorney=s argument that the
DHC  should  have  assigned  greater  weight  to  a  certain  mitigating
factor.    Ethridge,  188  N.C.  App.  at  668,  657  S.E.2d  at  387.    In
addition to the defendant=s Afail[ure] to cite any authority for his
[argument] regarding DHC=s failure to properly weigh the aggravating
and mitigating factors,@ id., as Defendant also fails to do here,
this Court stated that
even if defendant did not abandon the[] [issue],
we cannot say that the DHC improperly weighed
the  aggravating  and  mitigating  factors.    The




-30-
record  shows  the  DHC  weighed  mitigating  and
aggravating factors. We cannot say that the DHC=s
valuation  of  the  aggravating  and  mitigating
factors was Amanifestly unsupported by reason,
or so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.@
Id.    For the same reasoning applied in Ethridge, we cannot say that
the DHC allocated insufficient weight to the prior sanctions.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the evidence, findings,
and  conclusions,  we  hold  the  DHC=s  conclusions  of  law  declaring
defendant=s conduct posed significant harm to his client and the legal
profession has a rational basis in the evidence.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.

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