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NO. COA01-1204
NO. COA01-1205
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  31 December  2002
NEUSE RIVER FOUNDATION, INC.; RICHARD J. DOVE; D. BOUTON
BALDRIGE, d/b/a THE CAPE FEAR RIVERKEEPER; NEW RIVER FOUNDATION,
INC.; TOM MATTISON, d/b/a THE NEW RIVERKEEPER; and THE WATER
KEEPER ALLIANCE,
Plaintiffs
v.
SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.; CARROLL’S FOODS, INC.; BROWN’S OF
CAROLINA, INC.; MURPHY FARMS, INC.; WENDELL H. MURPHY, SR.;
Individually; WENDELL H. MURPHY, JR., Individually; and JOSEPH W.
LUTER, III,
Defendants
*                                                                          *           *
THOMAS E. JONES; BILL HARPER; MARY ANN HARRISON; NATALIE SALTER
BAGGETT; DON WEBB; CHARLES ROGERS HUGHES; CRAIG CRUMPLER; SIDNEY
WHALEY; MARGARET HANRAHAN JONES; DAVID LEE JONES; SETH AUSTIN
WILLIS; ERIC MARK BLETTNER; FRED ROHDE; and NEIL JULIAN SAVAGE,
Plaintiffs
v.
SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.; CARROLL’S FOODS, INC.; BROWN’S OF
CAROLINA, INC.; MURPHY FARMS, INC.; WENDELL H. MURPHY, SR.;
Individually; WENDELL H. MURPHY, JR., Individually; and JOSEPH W.
LUTER, III,
Defendants
Appeal  by  plaintiffs  from  orders  entered                              27  March   2001  by
Judge Donald W. Stephens in Wake County Superior Court.    Heard in
the Court of Appeals  20 August  2002.
Pursuant to Rule  40 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure  and  defendants’  motion  to  consolidate,  COA01-1204  and
COA01-1205  are  consolidated  for  appeal  and  we  address  both  this
opinion.
Abrams & Abrams, P.A., by Douglas B. Abrams; Womble, Carlyle,
Sandridge  &  Rice,  PLLC,  by  Burley  B.  Mitchell,  Jr.,  for
plaintiff-appellants.
Ward and Smith, P.A., by Gary J. Rickner; McGuire Woods, LLP,
by Anne Marie Whittemore; Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Wells




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&  Bryan,  by  Joseph  B.  Cheshire,  V;  and  J.  Phil  Carlton  for
defendant-appellees.
THOMAS, Judge.
Plaintiffs  filed  suit  in  these  cases  seeking  two  forms  of
relief.   They ask for the establishment of a "Court Approved Trust"
to pay for the complete remediation of several of North Carolina's
waterways  as  well  as  a  prohibition  of  defendants'  use  of  swine
lagoons and sprayfields.
Plaintiffs do not pray for individual compensation.
The  trial  court  dismissed  their  claims  under  Rules  12(b)(1)
and                                                                        12(b)(6)  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,
concluding  “all  plaintiffs  lack  standing  to  prosecute  any  claims
before   this   Court,   that   this   Court   lacks   subject   matter
jurisdiction as to any claims pending, and that the complaint fails
to state a single claim upon which this Court by law is authorized
to grant relief.”   Plaintiffs appeal, arguing a common law right to
bring their causes of action.
For the reasons herein, we affirm the trial court.
Plaintiffs  can  be  divided  into  five  categories:                      (1)  river
associations, including The Neuse River Foundation, Inc., The New
River  Foundation,  Inc.,  and  the  Waterkeeper  Alliance                 (“river
associations”); (2) persons employed by nonprofit organizations as
monitors of the rivers (“riverkeepers”); (3) noncommercial users of
the  rivers;  (4)  riparian  landowners  who  are  downstream  from  the
alleged pollution; and  (5) commercial users of the rivers.
They  filed  suit  against  three  hog  farming  companies,  the




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companies'  corporate  parent,  and  some  of  the  current  and  former
officers    of    the    companies                                         (collectively,                                       “defendants”).
Plaintiffs,  represented  by  the  same  attorneys,  were  divided  as
litigants  between  two  fundamentally  similar  actions  against  the
same   defendants.                                                         The   hearing   at   the   trial   level   was   a
consolidation of the two, as is this appeal.
Plaintiffs  allege  defendants  improperly  handled  hog  waste,
resulting in massive pollution and contamination of the Neuse, New,
and Cape Fear Rivers, and those rivers’ tributaries and estuaries.
Their claims are based on negligence, trespass, strict liability,
public  nuisance,  unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices,  private
nuisance and the public trust doctrine.
The  complaints  contain  comprehensive  background  information
regarding  injury  to  North  Carolina’s  coastal  plain.     One,  for
example, alleges:
Largely   as   a   result   of   Defendants’
activities,                                                                [North  Carolina’s]  coastal  plain
has   experienced   an   explosion   in   its   hog
population as traditional North Carolina style
family  hog  farming  has  given  way  to  mass
production pork factories first conceived and
devised by Defendants.
A   Tradition   of   Land   Stewardship   and
Animal  Husbandry  is  Lost  -  The  family  farmer
traditionally  spreads  the  manure  of  a  few
hundred  hogs  as  fertilizer  on  the  same  crop
land from which he derives produce to feed his
herd.    In  accordance  with  traditions  of  good
land    stewardship,    animal    husbandry    and
agricultural   practices,   the   family   farmer
maintained a relatively small herd of hogs in
an  area  sufficient  to  accommodate  the  hog
waste   without   significant   contamination.
Traditional   farmers   thus   achieve   a   rough




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balance  by  assimilating  the  nutrients  in  hog
waste[.]
Defendant’s  hog  farms  quickly  triumphed
over family farmers in the market place.
Contaminated   Lagoons                                                       -   Whereas   North
Carolina  hog  farmers  were  once  largely  self-
sufficient   in   producing   and/or   obtaining
locally  produced  feed  for  their  livestock  on
their  own  farms,  Defendants’  hog  factories
must  import  approximately  20,000  metric  tons
of   feed   each   day   from   Midwestern   grain
producers.
The feces and urine of the hogs, instead
of  being  purified  through  sewage  treatment,
fall through a slatted floor to a cellar below
the  warehouses  which  defendants  periodically
flush    into    open    air    earthen    pits                              -
euphemistically referred to as  “lagoons.”
The  complaints  go  on  to  detail  the  harmful  effects  of  the
contamination and to request non-individualized, or public, forms
of relief.
Plaintiffs  now  argue  that  such  non-individualized  forms  of
relief  are  appropriate  and  the  trial  court  erred  by  finding  they
lack standing to pursue them.    We disagree.
As the party invoking jurisdiction, plaintiffs have the burden
of  proving  the  elements  of  standing.    See  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of
Wildlife,  504 U.S.  555,  561,  119 L. Ed.  2d  351,  364  (1992).
Since  [the elements of standing] are not mere
pleading                                                                     requirements    but   rather    an
indispensable  part  of  the  plaintiff’s  case,
each element must be supported in the same way




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as  any  other  matter  on  which  the  plaintiff
bears  the  burden  of  proof,  i.e.,  with  the
manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation.
Id.  (citations omitted).                                                    “At the pleading stage, general factual
allegations  of  injury  resulting  from  the  defendant’s  conduct  may
suffice,  for  on  a  motion  to  dismiss  we                                ‘presum[e]  that  general
allegations  embrace  those  specific  facts  that  are  necessary  to
support  the  claim.’”     Id.                                               (quoting  Lujan  v.  National  Wildlife
Federation,  497 U.S.  871,  889,  111 L. Ed.  2d  695,  717  (1990)).
"Standing  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  a  court’s  proper
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.”   Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C.
App.                                                                         320,                                      324,                 560   S.E.2d                                                   875,   878                       (2002).   Accordingly,
defendants’ standing argument implicates Rule 12(b)(1).   See Fuller
v. Easley, 145 N.C. App. 391, 395, 553 S.E.2d 43, 46 (2001).   It is
proper  to  conduct  de  novo  review  of  a  trial  court’s  decision  to
dismiss a case for lack of standing.    Id.
Standing is among the  “justiciability doctrines” developed by
federal courts to give meaning to the United States Constitution’s
“case or controversy” requirement.    U.S. Const. Art.  3,  §  2.    The
term  refers  to  whether  a  party  has  a  sufficient  stake  in  an
otherwise   justiciable   controversy   so   as   to   properly   seek
adjudication of the matter.      Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.  727,
731-32,                                                                      31   L.   Ed.                             2d                   636,                                                           641    (1972).                   The       “irreducible
                                                                                                                                            constitutional minimum” of standing contains three elements:
                                                                             (1)                                       “injury  in  fact”                                                                         --  an  invasion  of  a
                                                                                                                                            legally   protected   interest   that   is                                                                (a)
concrete and particularized and  (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2)
the   injury   is   fairly   traceable   to   the




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challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it
is  likely,  as  opposed  to  merely  speculative,
that   the   injury   will   be   redressed   by   a
favorable decision.
Lujan,  504 U.S. at  560-61,  119 L. Ed.  2d at  364.
North  Carolina  courts  are  not  constrained  by  the  "case  or
controversy"  requirement  of  Article  III  of  the  United  States
Constitution.     Our  courts,  nevertheless,  began  using  the  term
“standing” in the  1960s and  1970s to refer generally to a party’s
right to have a court decide the merits of a dispute.    See, e.g.,
Stanley, Edwards, Henderson v. Dept. of Conservation & Development,
284 N.C.  15,  28,  199 S.E.2d  641,  650  (1973).    Standing most often
turns on whether the party has alleged “injury in fact” in light of
the applicable statutes or caselaw. See Empire Power Co. v. North
Carolina  Dep’t  of  E.H.N.R.,  337  N.C.  569,  447  S.E.2d  768  (1994);
Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 119, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993); Greene
v.  Town  of  Valdese,  306  N.C.  79,  88,  291  S.E.2d  630,  636  (1982);
N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. North Carolina Dept. of Natural Resources,
___  N.C.  App.  ___,  ___  S.E.2d  ___  (COA01-1329,  filed  19  November
2002); Ray Bergman Real Estate Rentals v. NCFHC, ___ N.C. App. ___,
568  S.E.2d  883  (2002);  In  re  Ezell,  113  N.C.  App.  388,  392,  438
S.E.2d  482,  484  (1994); Orange County v. Dept. of Transportation,
46  N.C.  App.                                                                 350,                           265  S.E.2d   890   (1980).   Here,  we  must  also
examine  the  forms  of  relief  sought.    See  Friends  of  Earth,  v.
Laidlaw Env. S.,  528 U.S.  167,  185,  145 L. Ed.  2d  610,  629  (2000)
("a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of
relief sought").
Prior  to  the  utilization  of  the                                           “standing”  label  by  North




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Carolina's courts, our Supreme Court, in Hampton v. Pulp Co.,  223
N.C.  535,  27 S.E.2d  538  (1943), addressed whether a private party
can  maintain  an  action  for  damages  caused  by  a  public  nuisance.
According  to  the  Hampton  Court,  it  may  be  appropriate  as  long  as
the party has suffered an injury that “cannot be considered merged
in  the  general  public  right[.]”    Hampton,  223  N.C.  at  543-44,  27
S.E.2d at  544.    The Hampton Court held:
[N]o individual may recover damages because of
injury  by  public  nuisance,  unless  he  has
received   a   special   damage   or   unless   the
creator  of  the  nuisance  has  thereby  invaded
some  right  which,  upon  principles  of  justice
and public policy, cannot be considered merged
in the general public right[.]
Id.    The  Hampton  Court  explained  “[t]he  real  reason  on  which  the
rule denying individual recovery of damages is based  . . . is that
a  purely  public  right  is  of  such  a  nature  that  ordinarily  an
interference  with  it  produces  no  appreciable  or  substantial
damage[.]”    Id. at  544,  27 S.E.2d at  544.
In  Hampton,  the  injured  riparian  landowner  asserted  claims
against an upstream manufacturing plant for trespass, damage to his
fishing business, and diminution of his riparian property value due
to  the  plant’s  pollution.    The  Hampton  Court  rejected  a  lack  of
standing argument:
The  law  will  not  permit  a  substantial  injury
to  the  person  or  property  of  another  by  a
nuisance, though public and indictable, to go
without individual redress, whether the right
of  action  be  referred  to  the  existence  of  a
special  damage,  or  to  an  invasion  of  a  more
particular and more important personal right.
The   personal   right   involved   here   is   the
security of an established business. The fact
that plaintiff had such established antedating




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the  nuisance,  and  that  the  injury  had  been
done  to  this,  takes  him  out  of  the  rule  and
makes his damage special and peculiar.
Id. at 547, 27 S.E.2d at 545-46.   Thus, “the existence of a special
damage,” is defined as the “invasion of a more particular and more
personal  right”  that  cannot  be  considered  “merged  in  the  general
public  right.”    Hampton,  223  N.C.  535,  27  S.E.2d  538.    The  more
particular  right  in  Hampton  was  the  security  of  an  established
fishery  business,  as  well  as  the  (diminished)  value  of  riparian
property.    See  also  Biddix  v.  Henredon  Furniture  Industries,  76
N.C.  App.  30,  40,  331  S.E.2d  717,  724  (1985)  (riparian  landowner
has  standing  to  pursue  damages  to  his  property  for  wastewater
discharge in violation of a state permit).
Under  North  Carolina  law,  an  environmental  plaintiff  must
allege:                                                                       (1)   injury  to  a  protected  interest  that   cannot  be
considered merged in the general public right;  (2) causation; and
(3) proper, or individualized, forms of relief.    See Hampton,  223
N.C.                                                                          535,                                                          27  S.E.2d   538;  see  also  Biddix,  76  N.C.  App.   30,   331
S.E.2d  717  (holding  the  General  Assembly’s  omission  of  a  citizen
suit provision does not preempt common law claims of nuisance and
continuing  trespass  for  damage  to  riparian  landowner’s  property
caused by wastewater discharges in violation of state permit).
Plaintiffs  here  contend  that  since  each  of  them  either  owns
property  adjacent  to,  works  on,  protects,  or  has  concern  for  the
welfare  of  the  rivers  allegedly  polluted  by  defendants,  they  all
suffer special damages to a degree different from those suffered by
the general public.   However, there is no North Carolina authority




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supporting the contention that injury to aesthetic or recreational
interests  alone,  regardless  of  degree,  confers  standing  on  an
environmental plaintiff.    See Hampton,  223 N.C. at  542,  27 S.E.2d
at                                                                            543                                                (emphasizing  the  difference  between  injury  to  a  fishery
business owner, who has standing in an action opposing the proposed
location of a bridge on the river, and recreational anglers, who do
not); but see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636
(under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which has a citizen
suit provision, environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury
in  fact  when  they  claim  that  they  use  the  affected  area  and  are
persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area
will  be  lessened  by  the  challenged  activity).    The  environmental
river  associations,  riverkeepers,  and  recreational  fishermen,
therefore,  do  not  have  standing  to  maintain  an  action  against
defendants under the circumstances alleged.
Certain plaintiffs do claim injury to their riparian property
or  businesses.                                                               They  include  eight  riparian  landowners,  two
commercial  fishermen,  and  a  marina  owner.     These  plaintiffs
conceivably could have standing to pursue individual recovery under
North  Carolina  law  for  injury  to  their  “more  particular  and  more
important personal right[s].”   Hampton, 223 N.C. at 547, 27 S.E.2d
at  545.  Here,  however,  none  of  these  plaintiffs  seeks  individual
compensation  for  the  "invasion  of  a  more  particular  and  more
personal  right"  that  cannot  be  considered  "merged  in  the  general
public right."   Id.   Defendants, in response, contend plaintiffs do
not have standing to seek the forms of relief sought.   See Friends




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of Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 185, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 629 ("a plaintiff
must  demonstrate  standing  separately  for  each  form  of  relief
sought"); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, n.6, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606
622  (1996)  (“[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.”); Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (notwithstanding the
fact that the plaintiff had standing to pursue damages, he lacked
standing to pursue injunctive relief).   The issue for them becomes,
therefore,  whether  they  are  seeking  proper,  or  individualized,
forms of relief.
In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs seek: (1) "[a] judgment
prohibiting   forthwith   Defendant's   use   of   sprayfields   and
cesspools;"  and  (2)  monetary  damages  to  be  deposited  in  a  court-
approved trust for the "complete cost of . .  . the restoration and
remediation" of the rivers.
As to defendants’ lagoon waste management systems, they exist
pursuant to express legislative authority.    See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
143-215.10A through 215.10M (2001).   Under the separation of powers
doctrine,                                                                    “[t]he  legislative,  executive,  and  supreme  judicial
powers  of  the  State  government  shall  be  forever  separate  and
distinct  from  each  other.”    N.C.  Const.  Art.  I,  §  6.               “[C]ourts
will  not  enjoin  as  a  nuisance  an  action  authorized  by  valid
legislative  authority[.]”    Twitty  v.  State  of  N.C.,  527  F.Supp.
778,  781  (E.D.N.C.  1981)  (refusing  to  enjoin  the  operation  of  a
toxic waste dump); see also Rope Co. v. Aluminum Co., 165 N.C. 572,
576,  81 S.E.  771,  772  (1914)  (refusing to enjoin the operation of
a dam constructed  “under express legislative authority”).




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In creating a permitting program for animal waste management
systems, the North Carolina General Assembly stated the following
purpose:
The  General  Assembly  finds  that  animal
operations  provide  significant  economic  and
other  benefits  to  this  State.    The  growth  of
animal   operations   in   recent   years   has
increased the importance of good animal waste
management practices to protect water quality.
It  is  critical  that  the  State  balance  growth
with prudent environmental safeguards.    It is
the  intention  of  the  State  to  promote  a
cooperative and coordinated approach to animal
waste  management  among  the  agencies  of  the
State  with  a  primary  emphasis  on  technical
assistance  to  farmers.     To  this  end,  the
General   Assembly   intends   to   establish   a
permitting program for animal waste management
systems  that  will  protect  water  quality  and
promote innovative systems and practices while
minimizing the regulatory burden.  .  .
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  143-215.10A  (2001).    In regulating the location
of swine lagoons, the General Assembly also stated:
The   General   Assembly   finds   that   certain
limitations on the siting of swine houses and
lagoons  for  swine  farms  can  assist  in  the
development    of    pork    production,    which
contributes to the economic development of the
State, by lessening the interference with the
use and enjoyment of adjoining property.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  106-801  (2001).
It  is  not  the  role  of  the  judicial  branch  of  government  to
pre-empt   the   legislative   branch’s   policy   considerations   and
appropriate authorization of an activity.   Wisely, the citizens of
this state have not granted judges wide latitude to dictate public
policy.   See, e.g., Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App.  672,  680,
562  S.E.2d                                                                82,   89   (2002).    It  is  critical  for  our  purposes  to
remain  focused  on  North  Carolina’s  timeless  separation  of  powers




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doctrine rather than be distracted by public policy debate embedded
in  any  ephemeral  issue  of  a  case.    To  even  weigh  the  benefits  of
result here is no different than weighing a political advantage or
personal  gain  prior  to  making  a  decision.     They  must  all  be
rejected.
Plaintiffs  do  not  contend  the  General  Assembly  exceeded  its
authority in violation of our state’s constitution.   Were that the
case,  it  would  be  incumbent  on  us  to  fully  examine  the  issue  as
part   of   our   independent   governmental   function.                        Under   the
circumstances  here,  we  decline  to  prohibit  an  activity  the
legislature has legally allowed.
Plaintiffs also demand that defendants pay the complete cost
of  clean-up  and  remediation  of  the  named  public  waters  with  the
funds  to  be  deposited  into  a  court-approved  trust.    Clearly,  a
court  may  award  monetary  damages  to  a  property  owner  where  a
nuisance  or  trespass  has  caused  damage  to  the  party’s  property.
Hampton, 233 N.C.  535, 27 S.E.2d 538; Biddix, 76 N.C. App.  30,  331
S.E.2d 717.   Here, however, no plaintiff seeks individual recovery.
Plaintiffs  merely  measure  damages  by  the  “complete  cost  of  .  .  .
the restoration and remediation” of public waterways.
The state is the sole party able to seek non-individualized,
or public, remedies for alleged harm to public waters.    Under the
public trust doctrine,
the  State  holds  title  to  the  submerged  lands
under navigable waters,  “but it is a title of
a different character than that which it holds
in  other  lands.  It  is  a  title  held  in  trust
for  the  people  of  the  state  so  that  they  may
navigate,  fish,  and  carry  on  commerce  in  the




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waters involved.”
State  v.  Forehand,                                                          67  N.C.  App.   148,   151,   312  S.E.2d   247,   249
(1984)  (citation omitted); see also Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe,
521  U.S.  261,  138  L.  Ed.  2d  438,  (1997)  (stating  that  “navigable
waters uniquely implicate [a state’s] sovereign interests”).   Only
the state, through the Attorney General, is authorized to bring “in
a  representative  capacity  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  using  and
consuming public of this State” actions deemed to be “advisable in
the public interest.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  114-2(8)(a)  (2001).    The
state’s  exclusive  authority  to  regulate  its  public  trust  waters
thus  limits  the  private  rights  of  riparian  landowners  bordering
such waters, subjecting them “to such general rules and regulations
as  the  Legislature,  in  the  exercise  of  its  powers,  may  prescribe
for  the  protection  of  the  public  rights  in  rivers  and  navigable
waters.”   Jones v. Turlington,  243 N.C. 681,  683, 92 S.E.2d 75,  77
(1956)  (citation omitted).
Entire,  or  permanent  damages,  which  are  awarded  for  past,
present,  and  future  injury,  are  available  only                          “[w]hen  the
defendant’s right to continue the alleged nuisance or trespass is
protected by its power of eminent domain,  [so that] the remedy of
abatement is not available to the landowner.”    Wiseman v. Tomrich
Construction  Co.,  250  N.C.  521,  524,  109  S.E.2d  248,  251  (1959).
There  is  no  allegation  that  eminent  domain  is  an  issue  here.
Plaintiffs' general prayer for  “[a]ny other relief that the Court
deems  equitable  and  proper”  does  not,  by  itself,  overcome  the
previously discussed deficiencies.




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The  trial  court,  therefore,  properly  granted  defendants’
motions  to  dismiss.    There  is  no  plaintiff  here  who  has  met  the
prerequisites of standing.
AFFIRMED.
Judges WYNN and MCGEE concur.

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