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NO. COA02-1503
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                      4 November  2003
NUTEK CUSTOM HOSIERY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDY ROEBUCK d/b/a ROEBUCK HOSIERY,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 May 2002 by Judge
Timothy S. Kincaid in Catawba County Superior Court.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  27 August  2003.
SIGMON,  CLARK,  MACKIE,  HUTTON,  HANVEY  &  FERRELL,  P.A.,  by
Warren A. Hutton, for plaintiff appellee.
LECROY AYERS & WILLCOX, PLLC, by M. Alan LeCroy, for defendant
appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Judy Roebuck d/b/a Roebuck Hosiery (“defendant”) appeals from
a  judgment  of  the  trial  court  granting  damages  resulting  from  a
breach  of  contract,  the  interest  thereon,  and  attorney’s  fees  to
Nutek Custom Hosiery, Inc.  (“plaintiff”).    For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The  pertinent  facts  of  the  instant  appeal  are  as  follows.
Plaintiff  is  a  hosiery  company  owned  by  Quince  Lee  Spencer
(“Spencer”).     Defendant  is  the  majority  owner  of  the  hosiery
company, Roebuck Sports, Inc.  (“Sports”).
                                                                            Sports  incorporated  on   3  August   1981  and  administratively
dissolved  on                                                               1  April                   1998.       Defendant  has  acted  as  Sports’
registered agent since 1994.   Defendant became president of Sports




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in  1998.
In  October  of                                                               1999,  defendant  requested  Spencer’s  help  in
obtaining yarn to fulfill her business obligations.   Defendant and
Spencer testified that they knew each other personally before the
onset  of  this  litigation.    Spencer  further  testified  that  he  had
knowledge of defendant’s current financial difficulties and agreed
to procure yarn for her at no additional cost.   Defendant requested
that plaintiff provide additional services.   Plaintiff complied and
charged defendant commercially reasonable rates for said services.
Defendant failed to pay either plaintiff or Spencer the invoiced
amount of  $10,066.75 for the yarn and services.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant purchased
goods and services from plaintiff and failed to pay for said goods
and  services.    The  matter  came  on  for  hearing  before  the  trial
court  on  23  May  2002,  at  which  time  the  trial  court  entered  the
following pertinent findings of fact:
6.                                                                            In                                                 1999,  the  Defendant  contracted  with
the  Plaintiff  through  Plaintiff’s  President,
Quince Spencer.
7.                                                                            The  Defendant  told  Mr.  Spencer  that  she
needed  him  to  obtain  yarn  for  a  new  business
venture because she could not obtain credit to
purchase yarn herself.
8.                                                                            Mr.    Spencer,    through    Nutek    Custom
Hosiery, Inc., did comply with the request of
the Defendant as a favor.
9.                                                                            Invoices were submitted to the Defendant
for payment.
13.   Roebuck Sports, Inc. operated in Valdese,




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North Carolina.
14.   The    building    Roebuck    Sports,    Inc.
occupied and equipment used by Roebuck Sports,
Inc. were sold.
16.   The  checks  which  the  Defendant  produced
showing  payment  to  the  Plaintiff  in  the  name
of  Roebuck  Sports,  Inc.  showed  addresses  of
Valdese,  North  Carolina  as  well  as  an[sic]
Hickory, North Carolina address where the “new
business” was located.
17.   The  Defendant  used  Wilson  Hosiery  Mill,
Inc. invoices and/or delivery tickets in order
to save money.    Wilson Hosiery Mill, Inc. was
the name of Roebuck Sports, Inc. prior to its
change of name.
18.   Quince   Spencer   did   personally   loan
certain money to Roebuck Sports, Inc. and the
Defendant  in  the  past,  and  at  such  time  the
Defendant personally signed, and as President
of Roebuck Sports, Inc. signed as guarantors.
19.   Roebuck Sports,  [Inc.] has not been made
a party to this matter.  .  .
20.                                                                          $10,066.75 is due and owing the Plaintiff
upon the terms  [of the invoice].
After  concluding  as  a  matter  of  law  that  defendant  breached  her
contract with plaintiff, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of  plaintiff  for  the  principal  sum  claimed  and  interest  thereon,
and reasonable attorney’s fees.    Defendant appeals this judgment.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to
dismiss this action for failure to join Roebuck Sports, Inc., as a
necessary  party;  and  (2)  finding  as  fact  that  defendant  acted  on




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her  own  behalf  in  contracting  with  plaintiff  for  the  goods  and
services invoiced.   For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court’s
finding  of  fact  that  defendant  acted  on  her  own  behalf  in
contracting with plaintiff was supported by competent evidence in
the record.
The  standard  of  review  for  findings  made  by  a  trial  court
sitting without a jury is whether any competent evidence exists in
the record to support said findings.   Hollerbach v. Hollerbach, 90
N.C. App.  384,  387,  368 S.E.2d  413,  415  (1988).    Findings of fact
and  conclusions  of  law  allow  meaningful  review  by  the  appellate
courts.    O’Neill  v.  Bank,  40  N.C.  App.  227,  231,  252  S.E.2d  231,
234                                                                            (1979).   Findings  of  fact  are  conclusive  if  supported  by
competent  evidence,  irrespective  of  evidence  to  the  contrary.
Associates,  Inc.  v.  Myerly  and  Equipment  Co.  v.  Myerly,  29  N.C.
App.  85,  89,  223 S.E.2d  545,  548  (1976).
Corporate officers and directors are generally not liable for
the debts of their corporation.   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55B-9(b) (2001).
When a corporate officer acts as an agent for the corporation and
enters into a contract with a third party, providing notice that he
is acting as the agent for the corporation, the corporate officer
is not personally liable for corporation obligations arising from
said contract.    See Baker v. Rushing,  104 N.C. App.  240,  248,  409
S.E.2d                                                                         108,      112-13                                                   (1991).   However,  if  the  corporate  officer
enters   into   a   contract   allegedly   for   the   benefit   of   the




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corporation,  but  fails  to  inform  the  third  party  of  his  agency
status, or if the corporate officer enters into a contract with a
third  party  for  the  officer’s  own  benefit,  the  corporate  officer
may not use the corporation name as a shield to personal liability.
See generally id., Embree Construction Group v. Rafcor, Inc.,  330
N.C.  487,  499-500,  411 S.E.2d  916,  924  (1992).
The court found as fact that defendant acted in her personal
capacity  when  contracting  with  plaintiff.     There  is  competent
evidence in the record to support said finding.   See Hollerbach, 90
N.C.  App.  at  387,  368  S.E.2d  at  415.    First,  defendant  informed
plaintiff that the yarn was needed for a  “new business” venture.
Second, defendant sought Spencer out because Spencer had personally
loaned  money  to  defendant  and  Sports  in  the  past.                    Third,
defendant’s name was listed on the invoice as the party to whom the
products and services were sold.   At no time did defendant sign or
indicate that she was doing business in a representative capacity.
The  trial  court  made  findings  of  fact  that  defendant  used
Wilson Hosiery Mill, Inc. invoices and/or delivery tickets in order
to save money.   Although Sports’ place of business was in Valdese,
North  Carolina,  three  of  the  four  checks  in  the  record  showed
Sports’  address  as  Hickory,  North  Carolina,  the  location  of
defendant’s  “new business.”
The  record  also  reveals  that  plaintiff  and  defendant  were
friends prior to the agreement.   Plaintiff and defendant testified
that  plaintiff  charged  defendant  only  the  purchase  price  of  the
yarn  and  a  reasonable  fee  for  the  additional  services  defendant




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requested.   Plaintiff did this as a “favor” for defendant.   We hold
that defendant entered into the contract with plaintiff for her own
benefit and she will not be permitted to use the corporation as a
shield to her personal liability.    Although we note that there is
evidence  to  the  contrary,  we  conclude  that  there  is  competent
evidence in the record to support the court’s finding of fact that
defendant  personally  contracted  with  plaintiff  for  the  goods  and
services at issue.    Thus, the assignment of error is overruled.
Having   found   competent   evidence   in   support   of   the
determination  of  the  trial  court  that  defendant  was  personally
liable,   it   is   unnecessary   to   address   defendant’s   remaining
assignment  of  error  regarding  joinder  of  Sports  as  a  necessary
party.
Affirm.
Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.

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