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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA08-27
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  18 November  2008
OLIPHANT FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Halifax County
No.  06-CVS-316
ALVIN SILVER and GLENDORA
N.
SILVER,urDefendantsof Appeals
Appeal by defendants from judgment and order entered 27 August
2007 by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood in Halifax County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  22 May  2008.
Clontz & Clontz, PLLC, by Ralph C. Clontz III, for plaintiff
appellee.
Alvin  Silver  and  Glendora  N.  Silver,  Pro  Se,  defendant
appellants.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Alvin Silver and Glendora Silver  (collectively  “defendants”)
appeal  from  the  grant  of  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Oliphant
Financial Corporation  (“plaintiff”).
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On
21 September 1995, defendants applied for and received an extension
of  credit  in  the  amount  of  $11,780.00  from  Household  Bank,  N.A.
(“Household  Bank”)  to  finance  the  purchase  of  vinyl  siding  from
American Remodeling, Inc. (“American Remodeling”).   By signing the




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credit application, defendants agreed to the terms set forth in a
credit agreement entitled “Household Bank Cardholder Agreement and
Disclosure  Statement”                                                       (“finance  agreement”).    Defendants  signed
this agreement at the time that they applied for such credit.
Thereafter, American Remodeling failed to complete the vinyl
siding installation as promised, leaving substantial areas of the
house’s exterior exposed.    Defendants complained about the matter
repeatedly to American Remodeling, but defendants did not take any
legal action against the company.
Defendants continued to make payments to Household Bank until
25  September                                                                2003,  when  they  defaulted  under  the  terms  of  the
financing  agreement.  On                                                    19  October                                                2004,  Household  Bank  sold,
assigned,   and   conveyed   all   rights,   title   and   interest   in
defendants’   credit   account   to   plaintiff.   As   part   of   the
transaction, plaintiff acquired all of the billing records related
to such credit account.
On 14 April 2005, defendants advised plaintiff that they were
not  going  to  make  further  payments  on  the  account  because  the
siding  was  defective  and  faxed  plaintiff  an  undated  inspection
report, documenting gaps, cracks, and severe deterioration of the
siding.   On 13 March 2006, plaintiff filed suit against defendants
to  collect  the  outstanding  balance.  On  6  June  2006,  defendants,
acting  pro  se,  responded  to  plaintiff’s  complaint  by  filing  with
the  court  a  letter  to  plaintiff’s  counsel,  which  is  dated  8  May
2006. Defendants’ letter provides in part:
We  have  disputed  the  validity  of  this
debt   over   and   over   again   with   Oliphant




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Financial Corporation  (Nick). We paid monthly
installments  to  Household  continuously,  we
decided  to  stop  payments  until  they  could
return to finish the job that we agreed upon.
On  29 May  2007, plaintiff moved for summary judgment against
defendants.  On  28  June  2007,  defendants,  acting  pro  se,  filed  a
supplemental  answer  and  asserted  counterclaims  pursuant  to  the
North  Carolina  Retail  Installment  Sales  Act,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §§
25A-25  and  -35  (2007);  North  Carolina  Unfair  and  Deceptive  Trade
Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  75-1.1  (2007); The F.T.C. Holder
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a); and the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§  1601, et seq. Defendants also asserted counterclaims for breach
of  contract  and  failure  of  consideration.  After  a  hearing  on  the
motions,  on  27  August  2007,  the  trial  court  concluded  that  there
was no genuine issue of material fact, that plaintiff was entitled
to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law,  and  entered  judgment  against
defendants  jointly  and  severally  for  the  principal  balance  of
$17,573.59 plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees in the amount
of  $3,220.52.
Defendants appeal the trial court’s entry of summary judgment.
Under  N.C.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(c)  (2007),  summary  judgment  is  properly
granted    when                                                                “the    pleadings,    depositions,    answers    to
interrogatories,   and   admissions   on   file,   together   with   the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material  fact  and  that  any  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a
matter  of  law.”  Thus,  "the  standard  of  review  on  appeal  from
summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material
fact  and  whether  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a




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matter of law. Further, the evidence presented by the parties must
be  viewed  in  the   light  most  favorable  to  the  non-movant.”
Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co.,  130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504
S.E.2d  574,  577  (1998).
I.
First   on   appeal   defendants   contend   that   the   affidavit
submitted  in  support  of  plaintiff’s  motion  for  summary  judgment
should not have been considered by the court because it failed to
meet  the  foundational  requirements  of  Rule                            56(e)  of  the  North
Carolina  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.    Defendants  contend  that  the
affidavit  of  plaintiff’s  employee,  Sherri  Lapointe,  which  sets
forth facts concerning the contents of the billing records of the
credit account that plaintiff purchased from Household Bank, does
not  satisfy  the  foundational  requirements  of  Rule  803(6)  of  the
North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence  because  Lapointe  is  not  an
employee of Household Bank or any of its affiliates. We disagree.
Affidavits  submitted  in  support  of  a  motion  for  summary
judgment must meet the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
56(e):
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.
“The converse of this requirement is that affidavits or other
material  offered  which  set  forth  facts  which  would  not  be
admissible in evidence should not be considered when passing on the




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motion for summary judgment.” Borden, Inc. v. Brower, 17 N.C. App.
249,  253,  193 S.E.2d  751,  753, rev’d on other grounds by  284 N.C.
54, 199 S.E.2d 414 (1973).   Generally, at trial, a “witness may not
testify  to  a  matter  unless  evidence  is  introduced  sufficient  to
support  a  finding  that  he  has  personal  knowledge  of  the  matter.”
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  8C-1, Rule  602  (2007). However, in U.S. Leasing
Corp.  v.  Everett,  Creech,  Hancock  and  Herzig,  88  N.C.  App.  418,
423,  363 S.E.2d  665,  667  (citation omitted), disc. review denied,
322  N.C.  329,  369  S.E.2d  364  (1988),  this  Court  determined  that
even  though  the  knowledge  of  the  witness  may  be  “limited  to  the
contents  of  plaintiff’s  file  with  which  he  had  familiarized
himself,  he  could  properly  testify  about  the  records  and  their
significance  so  long  as  the  records  themselves  were  admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule[.]” Under
the business records exception, the following items of evidence are
admissible at trial:
[a]   memorandum,   report,   record,   or   data
compilation,  in  any  form,  of  acts,  events,
conditions,  opinions,                                                       .  .  made  at  or  near
the  time  by,  or  from  information  transmitted
by,  a  person  with  knowledge,  if  kept  in  the
course   of   a   regularly   conducted   business
activity,  and  if  it  was  the  regular  practice
of   that   business   activity   to   make   the
memorandum,                                                                  report,    record,    or   data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of
the  custodian  or  other  qualified  witness,
unless the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  8C-1, Rule  803(6)  (2007).
In  this  case,  it  is  clear  that,  throughout  her  affidavit,
Lapointe refers to documents from plaintiff’s file and that she did




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not  have  personal  knowledge  of  the  matters  contained  in  those
documents.  However,  it  is  also  clear  that  the  documents  to  which
Lapointe  refers  are  admissible  in  evidence  under  the  business
records exception to the hearsay rule. The record shows that in the
course   of   ordinary   business,   Oliphant   Financial   purchased
defendant’s credit account and all of the billing records for that
account from Household Bank. Lapointe’s affidavit provides that the
documents  were  “kept  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  and  were
made at or around the time of the transactions described therein.”
Further, Lapointe’s affidavit provides that “[a]ffiant has custody”
of  the  records  and  that  “this  affidavit  is  based  upon  Affiant’s
personal  knowledge  of  those  records.”  Accordingly,  the  facts  set
forth  in  Lapointe’s  affidavit  would  be  admissible  at  trial  under
the  business  records  exception.  See  N.C.  Indus.  Capital,  LLC  v.
Clayton,  185  N.C.  App.  356,  375,  649  S.E.2d  14,  32-35  (2007).  It
was therefore proper for the trial court to consider this affidavit
in  support  of  plaintiff’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  under  N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e). Accordingly, defendants’ argument is
overruled.
II.
Next on appeal, defendants contend that the evidence of record
shows material issues of fact regarding the amount of the debt and
the applicable interest rate. Specifically, defendants contend that
issues of fact exist because (1) the financing agreement contained
in  the  record  is  printed  in  an  illegible  font  size  and              (2)




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plaintiff  did  not  produce  an  accounting  of  all  payments  made  by
defendants since  1995.    We disagree.
Where  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  is  supported  by  proof
which would require a directed verdict in his favor at trial, the
movant is entitled to summary judgment, unless the opposing party
comes forward to show a triable issue of material fact. Watson v.
Watson,                                                                     49  N.C.  App.    58,   63,   270  S.E.2d   542,   545   (1980).  The
opposing  party  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  motion  for  summary
judgment denied on the mere hope that at trial he will be able to
discredit the   movant’s evidence; he must, at the hearing, be able
to point out to the court something indicating the existence of a
triable issue of material fact. Kidd v. Early,  289 N.C.  343,  368,
222 S.E.2d  392,  408  (1976).
Here,  plaintiff  prepared  and  filed  a  motion  for  summary
judgment,  along  with  a  supporting  affidavit,  which  set  forth  the
contractual  basis  for  defendants’  liability  to  plaintiff,  the
nature   of   defendants’   default,   documentation   of   plaintiff’s
purchase  of  the  account  from  Household  Bank  in                       2004,  and  the
current  balance  on  the  account  and  applicable  interest  rate.  In
response, defendants asserted a defense, which if successful, would
bar  defendants’  liability  for  the  outstanding  balance  on  the
account, as a matter of law, and argued that plaintiff’s evidence
of defendant’s liability for the debt was insufficient as a matter
of  law;  however,  defendants  have  not  by  supporting  documents
produced  any  evidence  showing  that  plaintiff’s  documents  are
inaccurate as to the amount of the debt or as to the terms of the




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agreement  nor  have  they  by  affidavit  alleged  that  they  have  made
payments  that  are  not  reflected  in  the  statements  produced  by
plaintiff.  Thus,  defendants  have  failed  to  establish  a  triable
issue  of  fact  regarding  the  amount  of  the  outstanding  balance  on
the  account  or  the  applicable  interest  rate.  See  United  Virginia
Bank/Citizens  &  Marine  v.  Woronoff,  50  N.C.  App.  160,  272  S.E.2d
618                                                                          (1980),  cert.  denied,   302  N.C.   629,   280  S.E.2d   449   (1981).
Defendants are not entitled to have the motion for summary judgment
denied  on  the  mere  hope  that  at  trial  they  will  be  able  to
discredit  the  movant’s  evidence.  This  assignment  of  error  is
overruled.
III.
Next on appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred
in  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff  because
defendants’  liability  to  plaintiff  is  barred  by  affirmative
defenses. We disagree.
Rule  15 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides, in
part:
A  party  may  amend  his  pleading  once  as  a
matter   of   course   at   any   time   before   a
responsive  pleading  is  served  or,  if  the
pleading   is   one   to   which   no   responsive
pleading  is  permitted  and  the  action  has  not
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so
amend  it  at  any  time  within  30  days  after  it
is  served.  Otherwise  a  party  may  amend  his
pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
be  freely  given  when  justice  so  requires.  A
party  shall  plead  in  response  to  an  amended
pleading  within  30  days  after  service  of  the
amended  pleading,  unless  the  court  otherwise
orders.




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N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  15  (2007).
“[T]he  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  promote  the  orderly  and
uniform administration of justice, and all litigants are entitled
to  rely  on  them.  Therefore,  the  rules  must  be  applied  equally  to
all  parties  to  a  lawsuit,  without  regard  to  whether  they  are
represented  by  counsel.”  Goins  v.  Puleo,  350  N.C.  277,  281,  512
S.E.2d  748,  751  (1999).
Here, defendants did not amend their answer within the 30-day
period allowed by Rule  15. Accordingly, under Rule  15, defendants
could  not  amend  or  supplement  their  answer  without  obtaining
consent  of  opposing  counsel  or  filing  a  motion  with  the  court.
Defendants  did   neither  of  these  things  before  filing  their
supplemental answer and counterclaims, which were filed more than
a  year  after  defendants’  original  answer.  Accordingly,  the  only
counterclaim or defense properly before the trial court in ruling
on the motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule  15, was the
counterclaim  for  breach  of  contract  contained  in  defendants’
original  answer.  We  conclude  that  this  counterclaim  is  barred  by
the statute of limitations.
In general, an action for breach of contract must be brought
within  three  years  from  the  time  of  the  accrual  of  the  cause  of
action.  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                    §   1-52(1)   (2007).   This  statute  of
limitations  is  also  applicable  to  counterclaims  for  breach  of
contract. PharmaResearch Corp. v. Nash, 163 N.C. App. 419, 425, 594
S.E.2d  148,  153-54, disc. review denied,  358 N.C.  733,  601 S.E.2d
858 (2004). A cause of action generally accrues and the statute of




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limitations  begins  to  run  as  soon  as  the  right  to  institute  and
maintain  a  suit  arises.  Reidsville  v.  Burton,  269  N.C.  206,  211,
152  S.E.2d                                                                   147,                                          152.  The  statute  begins  to  run  on  the  date  the
                                                                              promise  is  broken.  Pickett  v.  Rigsbee,   252  N.C.                                                 200,   204,   113
S.E.2d  323,  326  (1960).
Here, the facts relevant to whether the statute of limitations
has  expired  on  defendants’  counterclaims  are  not  in  dispute.  The
statute of limitations on the claim for breach of contract against
American Remodeling began to run in  1995 on the date that American
Remodeling  broke  its  promise  to  finish  the  installation  of  the
vinyl  siding  on  defendants’  home.  While  defendants  complained  to
American Remodeling about this breach, defendants did not assert a
cause of action against American Remodeling for such claim during
the  three-year  window  provided  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                      §                                             1-52(1).
Because the statute of limitations with respect to that claim has
expired, defendants cannot now assert such claim against plaintiff.
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff was
entitled to summary judgment.
Because defendants’ remaining assignments of error relate to
claims  that  were  not  timely  filed  and  were  not  considered  by  the
trial  court  pursuant  to  Rule                                              15  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of
Civil Procedure, they are without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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