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MARISSA A. OLSON, MICHAEL A. OLSON, and MARLENE A. OLSON,
Plaintiffs, v. REGINALD V. McMILLIAN and WILLIE McMILLIAN,
Defendants
No. COA00-1036
(Filed  3 July  2001)
1.                                                                    Costs--attorney fees--offer of judgment--findings
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence
action arising from an automobile accident by awarding attorney
fees pursuant to N.C.G.S.  §  6-21.1 where the court found that
defendants made a settlement offer of  $1,000 and that the jury
verdict was for  $1,930.    Although the court did not make any
findings regarding the timing of the settlement offer or the
exercise of superior bargaining power, the date was shown by the
undisputed evidence and the court made adequate findings on the
whole record to support an award of attorney fees.    Additionally,
it was noted that there is nothing in N.C.G.S.  §  6-21.1 that
limits the trial court’s consideration of unwarranted refusals to
settle by individual defendants.
2.                                                                    Appeal and Error--appealability--order not reduced to
writing
An assignment of error to an oral order denying the return
of a filing fee after arbitration was overruled where no written
order was entered.    A trial court order not reduced to writing
cannot support an appeal.
Appeal by defendants from judgment filed 12 May 2000 by Judge
A. Elizabeth Keever in Cumberland County District Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  5 June  2001.
Armstrong  &  Baggett,  by  Talmage  S.  “Tal”  Baggett,  Jr.,  for
plaintiff-appellees.
Walker, Clark, Allen, Herrin & Morano, L.L.P., by Gay Parker
Stanley, for defendant-appellants.
GREENE, Judge.
Reginald V. McMillian (Reginald) and Willie McMillian (Willie)
(collectively, Defendants) appeal from a judgment filed 12 May 2000
awarding attorney’s fees to Marissa A. Olson  (Marissa).
The record shows that on 15 October 1999, Marissa, Michael A.




Olson,  and  Marlene  A.  Olson                                               (collectively,  Plaintiffs)  filed  a
complaint  against  Defendants  alleging  claims  for  negligence.
Plaintiffs’  claims  arose  out  of  an                                       18  October                                        1996  automobile
accident in which a vehicle driven by Marissa was allegedly struck
by  a  vehicle  driven  by  Reginald  and  owned  by  Willie.     On          16
December 1999, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint
denying  any  alleged  negligent  conduct.     Additionally,  on              16
December  1999,  Defendants  filed  an  Offer  of  Judgment  (settlement
offer) in which they offered Plaintiffs $1,000.00 for settlement of
their  claims.    The  settlement  offer  stated  “if  this  offer  is  not
accepted within ten (10) days following service, it shall be deemed
withdrawn.”    Plaintiffs did not accept the settlement offer.
On 29 December 1999, Plaintiffs’ case was selected for court-
ordered, nonbinding arbitration pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7A-
37.1.    On  10 March  2000, subsequent to an arbitration hearing, an
arbitration  award  and  judgment  was  filed  awarding  Plaintiffs
$4,000.00.   On 15 March 2000, Defendants requested a trial de novo
pursuant  to  Rule  5(a)  of  the  Court-Ordered  Arbitration  Rules.    A
jury trial was therefore held on Plaintiffs’ claims.   Subsequent to
trial,  the  jury  found  Marissa  was  injured  by  the  negligence  of
Reginald and it awarded Marissa  $1,930.00 for personal injuries.
After the jury verdict was returned, Defendants made an oral
motion  requesting  that  the  filing  fee  for  the  trial  de  novo  be
returned  to  them  pursuant  to  Rule                                        5(b)  of  the  Court-Ordered
Arbitration  Rules                                                            (filing  fee  returned  to  demanding  party  if
position  of  demanding  party  is  improved  subsequent  to  trial  de
novo).    The  trial  court  orally  denied  this  motion;  however,  no




written order was entered.   Additionally, Marissa made a motion for
an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  6-21.1.
In a judgment filed 12 May 2000, the trial court made the following
pertinent findings of fact:
I.
The  jury,  after  hearing  the  evidence
presented by the parties and having been duly
impaneled, answered the issues as follows:
Issue                                                                  1                                             -  Was                                [Marissa]  injured  by  the
negligence of  [Reginald]?
Answer:    Yes
Issue                                                                  2                                             -   What   amount,   if   any,   is
[Marissa]  entitled  to  recover  for  personal
injuries?
Answer:                                                                $1,930.00
III.
That                                                                   .   Defendant[s]   made                       [a
settlement  offer]  in  the  amount  of  $1,000.00
in this case.
IV.
That  this  case  was  arbitrated  according
to  the  local  rules  of  District  Court  within
Cumberland  County,  North  Carolina;  that  the
arbitrator  made  an  award  of  $4,000.00,  which
in   the   opinion   of   the                                          [c]ourt,   included
attorney[’s]  fees;  that                                              .  Defendant[s]
appealed   this   award   to   a   jury   trial   in
District Court.
V.
That  the                                                              [c]ourt  makes  a  finding  that
virtually no settlement negotiations were made
by                                                                     .  Defendants;  that  such  inaction  by
                                                                       .  Defendants  constitutes  an  unwarranted
refusal  by  .  .  .  Defendants  to  pay  the  claim
which constitutes the basis of such suit.
Based  on  these  findings,  the  trial  court  concluded  Marissa                                                   “is




entitled to an award of attorney[’s] fees under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §]
6-21.1 and costs incurred in the trial of this matter in addition
to  the  jury  award  of                                                    $1,930.00.”     The  trial  court,  therefore,
awarded  Marissa                                                            $1,930.00  in  compensatory  damages,            $2,100.00  in
attorney’s fees, and  $378.10 in costs.
The  issues  are  whether:                                                  (I)  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion  by  awarding  Marissa  attorney’s  fees  pursuant  to  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  6-21.1;  and  (II)  Defendants  preserved  for  appellate
review the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying their
motion requesting the return of their filing fee.
I
[1] Defendants argue the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding  Marissa  attorney’s  fees  pursuant  to  section  6-21.1.    We
disagree.
Section 6-21.1 provides that a trial court, in its discretion,
may award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in a personal injury or
property damage suit “where the judgment for recovery of damages is
ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less.”   N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 (1999).
In  determining  whether  to  award  attorney’s  fees  under  section
6-21.1, the trial court must consider the entire record, including
the following pertinent factors:
(1)  whether  any  settlement  offers  were  made
prior  to  the  institution  of  the  action;                               (2)
whether   the   defendant   unjustly   exercised
superior  bargaining  power  in  the  settlement
negotiation  process;                                                                                                                                                          (3)  the  timing  of  the
                                                                                                                             settlement offers; [and] (4) the amount of the
                                                                                                                             settlement  offers  as  compared  to  the  jury
verdict.
Culler  v.  Hardy,                                                          137  N.C.  App.                                  155,                                              158,                        526  S.E.2d   698,   701




(2000).   While the trial court must make adequate findings of fact
based on the whole record to support an award of attorney’s fees,
“detailed findings are not required for each factor.”    See Tew v.
West,                                                                         143  N.C.  App.   534,   537,   546  S.E.2d   183,   185   (2001).
Additionally,  a  trial  court’s  ruling  on  a  motion  for  attorney’s
fees under section  6-21.1  “will not be disturbed on appeal absent
a showing of abuse of discretion.”    Culler,  137 N.C. App. at  157,
526 S.E.2d at  700.
In  this  case,  the  trial  court  found  as  to  the  first  factor
that Defendants made a settlement offer of $1,000.00.   Although the
trial court did not make any findings regarding the timing of the
settlement  offer  under  the  third  factor,  the  undisputed  evidence
shows the settlement offer was made on or about  16 December  1999.1
Additionally,  as  to  the  fourth  factor,  the  trial  court  made
findings that the settlement offer was in the amount of  $1,000.00
and  the  jury  verdict  was  in  the  amount  of  $1,930.00.    Thus,  the
findings show the jury verdict was for an amount nearly twice the
settlement amount offered by Defendants.    Based on these findings
of fact, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
Marissa attorney’s fees under section  6-21.1.    Although the trial
court  did  not  make  any  findings  regarding  whether  Defendants
exercised “superior bargaining power” over Marissa pursuant to the
second  factor,  the  absence  of  such  a  finding  does  not  require
reversal when the trial court made adequate findings on the whole
1
Defendants   argue   in   their   brief   to   this   Court   that
“[D]efendants’ liability carrier offered the amount of $1,000.00 in
settlement of . . . [P]laintiffs’ claim over two years prior to the
filing  of  suit.”     The  record,  however,  does  not  contain  any
evidence regarding the existence of this settlement offer.




record to support an award of attorney’s fees.    See Tew,  --- N.C.
App.  at                                                                     ---,                                            546  S.E.2d  at     185   (trial  court  did  not  abuse  its
discretion by awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to section  6-21.1
when trial court made findings as to the settlement offers and jury
verdict  but  failed  to  make  findings  regarding  any  superior
bargaining power of the defendant).   Accordingly, the trial court’s
12 May  2000 judgment is affirmed.2
II
[2]  Defendants  argue  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying  their
oral motion requesting that the filing fee for a trial de novo be
returned  to  them  pursuant  to  Rule                                       5(b)  of  the  Court-Ordered
Arbitration Rules.
“When [a trial court’s] oral order is not reduced to writing,
it  is  non-existent  and  thus  cannot  support  an  appeal.”    Southern
Furn. Hdwe., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co.,  136 N.C. App.  695,
2
Defendants argue in their brief to this Court that the trial
court                                                                        “erred  in  finding  that  the  [a]rbitration   [a]ward  included
attorney[’s]  fees,  and  that  it  did  not  exceed  the                    [j]udgment
finally  obtained.”     In  this  case,  however,  the  trial  court’s
findings  of  fact  make  no  comparison  of  the  arbitration  award  to
“the [j]udgment finally obtained.”   Additionally, the record shows
the  trial  court  based  its  award  of  attorney’s  fees,  in  its
discretion, on Defendants’ settlement offer, the lack of settlement
negotiations, and the jury verdict.   Whether the arbitration award
included attorney’s fees, therefore, is not relevant to the trial
court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Marissa.   Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
Defendants  also  argue  in  their  brief  to  this  Court  that  any
“unwarranted refusal” by Defendants to settle Plaintiffs’ claims is
not  relevant  because  Defendants  are  not  an  insurance  company;
therefore,  the  trial  court  erred  by  considering  any  “unwarranted
refusal.”    We  disagree.    While  a  trial  court  must  consider  any
“unwarranted  refusal  by  the  defendant  insurance  company”  under
section 6-21.1, there is nothing in section 6-21.1 that limits the
trial   court’s   consideration   of                                         “unwarranted   refusal[s]”   by
individual defendants.    N.C.G.S.  §  6-21.1.




702,  526 S.E.2d  197,  201  (2000)  (citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court orally denied Defendants’ motion
requesting  the  return  of  their  filing  fee.    The  trial  court’s  12
May  2000 order, however, does not contain a ruling on Defendants’
oral motion.    Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and BRYANT concur.

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