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NO. COA97-299
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  17 March  1998
BARRY LEWIS OSBORNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
LYNNE LINETT OSBORNE,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  order  entered  18  October  1996  by
Judge Margaret L. Sharpe in Forsyth County District Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  29 October  1997.
Morrow, Alexander, Tash & Long, by C.R. “Skip” Long, Jr., and
James Barrett Wilson, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
Rabil & Rabil, by S. Mark Rabil, for defendant-appellee.
LEWIS, Judge.
Plaintiff  and  defendant  were  married  in  September                      1989.
Defendant  gave  birth  to  the  only  child  of  the  marriage  in  April
1990.    On  17  February  1995,  plaintiff  filed  a  complaint  seeking
divorce from bed and board, alimony, equitable distribution, child
custody, child support, and attorney fees.      Plaintiff also moved
that defendant be ordered to submit to a psychological evaluation.
Defendant  answered  and  moved  that  both  parties  and  their  minor
child be ordered to undergo psychological evaluations.
Plaintiff sent defendant a "Notice of Hearings" stating that
on                                                                           13  April   1995,  he  would  move  for  child  custody  and  child
support,  exclusive  possession  of  the  marital  homeplace,  alimony




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pendente lite, and attorney fees.   Plaintiff's Notice to defendant
continued,  "YOU  WILL  HEREBY  TAKE  NOTICE  that,  unless  the  said
hearings are commenced and concluded on the said dates and times,
the  same  will  be  continued  from  time  to  time  upon  Order  of  a
Presiding Judge without further notice until the same are heard and
concluded."
An  order  filed                                                               4  April                                                      1995  awarded  defendant  temporary
custody of the child and set forth plaintiff's visitation rights.
The  hearing  scheduled  for  13  April  1995  was  continued  to  19
June  1995.   The  19 June hearing was rescheduled for 31 August  1995
at  plaintiff's  request.    On  31  August,  plaintiff  again  moved  to
continue the hearing.    The district court reset the hearing for  5
December                                                                       1995  and  ordered  each  party  to  undergo  psychological
evaluations.    On  13  November  1995  plaintiff  was  held  in  contempt
and  ordered  imprisoned  for  not  meeting  his  interim  child  support
obligations.
The hearing scheduled for  5 December  1995 did not take place
because plaintiff had not completed his psychological evaluations
as ordered.    The hearing was continued to  8 February  1996, but on
that day the parties’ child had chicken pox and the hearing never
occurred.    According to plaintiff's affidavit, it was agreed that
defendant's  attorney  would  secure  a  new  hearing  date  and  notify
plaintiff's attorney.
On  28  February  1996,  the  district  court  signed  an  "Order  of
Continuance," nunc pro tunc 8 February 1996, continuing the hearing
to  11  April  1996  at  2:00  p.m.    This  order  was not filed  until  15




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May  1996.    Plaintiff's sworn statement is that his attorney first
learned  of  the  11  April  hearing  on  10  April  1996,  at  3:30  p.m.,
when   counsel   for   defendant   mentioned   it   in   a   telephone
conversation.
At the 11 April 1996 hearing plaintiff's attorney moved for a
continuance on the ground that he had not received proper notice.
This  motion  was  denied.    The  district  court  found  that  plaintiff
had been notified of the hearing on 28 February  1996, when  (1) the
hearing date was posted with the secretary for the District Court
Judges  on  the  chamber's  hearing  calendar;  and                           (2)  defendant's
attorney "placed a copy of  [the] order of continuance in the mail
box (located in the Clerk's office)" of plaintiff's attorney.   The
"mail box" mentioned here refers to one of a series of open boxes
located  in  the  Forsyth  County  Clerk's  Office,  each  of  which  is
reserved for a different attorney.    The boxes are used to receive
information from the clerk's office and from other attorneys.   They
are not official depositories for the United States Postal Service.
Plaintiff's attorney was present during the entire hearing on
11 April  1996.   Plaintiff arrived at  4:25 p.m. and was present for
the last thirty minutes of the hearing.
On 23 August 1996, before the district court had made a final
disposition  of  the  matters  raised  at  the  11  April  1996  hearing,
plaintiff  moved  for  a  new  trial  on  the  ground  that  he  received
insufficient notice of the 11 April hearing.   This motion was heard
and denied on 5 September 1996.   Sometime before 18 September 1996,
the district court judge made it known that she intended to award




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custody of the child to defendant.   Another hearing was held on  18
September 1996 to determine the amount of child support.   Plaintiff
received  full  notice  of  and  testified  at  this  hearing.    By  order
dated 18 October 1996, the district court awarded defendant custody
of the child and ordered plaintiff to pay child support.   Plaintiff
appeals.
Plaintiff  has  abandoned  assignments  of  error                             3  and                                 4  by
failing to argue them in his brief.    N.C.R. App. P.  10 and  28.
We  first  address  whether  plaintiff  was  properly  notified  of
the  28  February  1996  "Order  of  Continuance,"  which  continued  the
hearing  on  custody  and  child  support  to  11  April  1996.    Statute
provides,  "The  procedure  in  actions  for  custody  and  support  of
minor children shall be as in civil actions, except as provided in
this  section  and  in  G.S.                                                  50-19."    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.           §                                                      50-13.5(a)
(1995).    It is further provided,
Motions  for  support  of  a  minor  child  in  a
pending  action  may  be  made  on  10  days  notice
to the other parties and compliance with G.S.
50-13.5(e).    Motions  for  custody  of  a  minor
child  in  a  pending  action  may  be  made  on  10
days  notice  to  the  other  parties  and  after
compliance with G.S.  50A-4.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.5(d)(1).   In this case, defendant requested
both  child  custody  and  child  support  at  the  11  April  hearing  and
presented argument in support of her request.    Therefore, she was
required  to  give  plaintiff  ten  days'  notice  of  the                    11  April
hearing.
Rules                                                                         4  and                                 5  of  the  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  govern  the
                                                                              service of process in civil actions.




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[E]very  written  notice,  appearance,  demand,
offer  of  judgment  and  similar  paper  shall  be
served upon each of the parties  .  .  .
N.C.R. Civ. P.  5(a)  (emphasis added).
With  respect  to  all  pleadings  subsequent  to
the   original   complaint   and   other   papers
required  .  .  . to be served, service with due
return may be made in the manner provided for
service  and  return  of  process  in  Rule                              4  and
may  be  made  upon  either  the  party  or
upon his attorney of record.    With respect to
such other pleadings and papers, service upon
the attorney or upon a party may also be made
by  delivering  a  copy  to  him  or  by  mailing  it
to  him  at  his  last  known  address  or,  if  no
address is known, by filing it with the clerk
of court.   Delivery of a copy within this rule
means  handing  it  to  the  attorney  or  to  the
party; or leaving it at the attorney's office
with  a  partner  or  employee.    Service  by  mail
shall be complete upon deposit of the pleading
or  paper  enclosed  in  a  post-paid,  properly
addressed wrapper in a post office or official
depository   under   the   exclusive   care   and
custody of the United States Postal Service.
N.C.R. Civ. P.  5(b)  (emphasis added).    Rule  4 lists three ways in
which process may be served on a "natural person":
a.  By  delivering  a  copy                                              .  to  him  or  by
leaving  copies  thereof  at  the  defendant's
dwelling  house  or  usual  place  of  abode  with
some  person  of  suitable  age  and  discretion
then residing therein; or
b.  By  delivering  a  copy                                              .  to  an  agent
authorized  by  appointment  or  by  law  to  be
served  or  to  accept  service  of  process  or  by
serving  process  upon  such  agent  or  the  party
in a manner specified by any statute.
c.  By  mailing  a  copy                                                 .  registered  or
certified   mail,   return   receipt   requested,
addressed  to  the  party  to  be  served,  and
delivering to the addressee.
N.C.R. Civ. P.  4(j).
Defendant  did  not  give  plaintiff  notice  of  the                    11  April




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hearing by any means prescribed by Rules 4 and 5.   Nor is there any
evidence that plaintiff had actual notice of the hearing ten days
before it occurred.    Therefore, plaintiff was not notified of the
hearing as required by G.S.  50-13.5.
Plaintiff argues that because he was not properly notified of
the 11 April 1996 hearing, the district court erred in denying his
motion  for  continuance.    Because  plaintiff's  motion  was  based  on
his right to notice and a hearing under the Due Process Clause, the
trial court's denial of that motion is fully reviewable on appeal.
See State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 530-31, 467 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1996).
Plaintiff was represented by counsel during the entire hearing
on  11 April  1996.    Almost a full year had passed since the issues
of  child  support  and  custody  were  first  scheduled  for  hearing.
Plaintiff  has  made  no  showing  in  the  record  of  what  evidence  or
witnesses he would have presented had he been duly notified of the
hearing.     We  hold  that  even  though  plaintiff  was  not  properly
notified,  the  trial  court's  denial  of  his  motion  to  continue  was
not  error  because  plaintiff  has  not  shown  that  he  was  materially
prejudiced  by  the  denial.    See  State  v.  Covington,  317  N.C.  127,
130,  343 S.E.2d 524,  526  (1986).   For the reasons stated above, we
also  find  no  error  in  the  trial  court's  denial  of  plaintiff's
motion for a new hearing.
Plaintiff  next  argues  that  the  district  court  erred  when  it
based  its  award  of  child  support  on  plaintiff's  potential  income
rather than his actual income.    We disagree.
The  district  court's  extensive  findings  on  this  issue  are




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summarized  as  follows.                                                       Plaintiff  worked  in  the  engineering
department  of  the  City  of  Winston-Salem  from  1968  to  1993.    When
plaintiff retired in  1993, he was  51 years old and earning  $15.76
per  hour  as  a  survey  party  chief.    The  child  of  his  marriage  to
defendant  was  three  years  old.    At  the  time  of  the  hearing  in
September 1996, plaintiff was unemployed and collecting retirement
benefits from the Local Governmental Employees Retirement System of
North Carolina  (LGERS) in the gross monthly amount of  $1,902.00.
The  personnel  supervisor  for  the  City  of  Winston-Salem
documented  that  plaintiff  is  eligible  to  return  to  work  with  the
City  and  earn  up  to                                                        $20,000.00  per  year  without  jeopardizing
receipt of his full retirement benefits; that plaintiff could work
for  any  unit  of  local  government  which  participates  in  LGERS  and
earn up to $20,000.00 per year without jeopardizing receipt of his
full  retirement  benefits;  and  that  plaintiff  could  work  for  any
governmental employer that does not participate in LGERS, such as
the North Carolina Department of Transportation, or for any private
employer, earn an unlimited amount of income, and yet receive his
full retirement benefits.
At the time of the hearing in September 1996, plaintiff was an
able-bodied 54-year-old who suffered from no health problems.   His
only  income  was  retirement  income.     Plaintiff  testified  that
although  he  completed                                                        2½  years  of  study  at  Forsyth  Community
College and received a degree in electronics, he never applied for
a job in the electronics field.   He also testified that one of his
hobbies  is  computers  and  that  he  recently  applied  for  a  job  as  a




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computer technician.
On  these  findings,  the  district  court  judge  concluded  that
plaintiff   was   voluntarily   unemployed   and   was   deliberately
depressing his income by refusing to seek employment to support his
six-year-old daughter.   The district court found that plaintiff has
the ability to earn  $15.76 per hour, his income at the time of his
retirement,  and  that  plaintiff  has  the  ability  to  earn  $2,710.00
per month.    The court then determined the amount of child support
based on plaintiff's potential income.
Because  the  district  court's  findings  on  this  issue  are
supported  by  competent  evidence,  they  are  conclusive  on  appeal.
Goodhouse v. DeFravio,  57 N.C. App.  124,  126,  290 S.E.2d  751,  753
(1982).   We further hold that the district court's use of potential
income in setting the amount of child support was appropriate based
on its findings.
Awards  of  child  support  must  be  determined  by  applying  the
North Carolina Child Support Guidelines ("Guidelines").   N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  50-13.4  (Cum. Supp.  1997).    The Guidelines state,
If  a  parent  is  voluntarily  unemployed  or
underemployed, child support may be calculated
based   on   a   determination   of   potential
income  .  .  .
Determination  of  potential  income  shall  be
made  by  determining  employment  potential  and
probable earnings level based on the parent's
recent                                                                      work   history,   occupational
qualifications                                                                     and        prevailing     job
opportunities   and   earning   levels   in   the
community.
In this case, plaintiff retired at age  51 with a three-year-
old  daughter  to  support.     It  was  his  choice  to  take  early




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retirement and it was his choice to remain unemployed despite his
many skills.   The personnel supervisor of his former employer, the
City of Winston-Salem, testified that plaintiff remained eligible
to  work  for  the  City  and  that  he  could  earn  at  least  $20,000.00
annually without decreasing the $22,000.00 he received each year in
retirement benefits.    On these facts, the trial court's choice to
award child support based on plaintiff's potential income was well
within its discretion, and we find no error.
Plaintiff next argues that he was entitled to a deduction from
gross income in calculating his child support obligation because he
was  supporting  another  minor  child  at  the  time  the  support
determination  was  made.    The  district  court  made  no  findings  or
conclusions  on  this  issue  even  though  plaintiff  asked  for  a
deduction  and  supported  his  request  with  some  evidence.     We
therefore remand for the district court to make findings on whether
plaintiff is entitled to a deduction, and if so, in what amount.
At  the  September                                                            1996  hearing,  plaintiff  testified  that  he
then had a seventeen-year-old child residing with him.    Plaintiff
presented  no  evidence  as  to  whether  this  seventeen-year-old  was
supported  by  anyone  other  than  himself.                                  The  Child  Support
Guidelines provide,
The    amount    of    a    party's    financial
responsibility . . . for his or her natural or
adopted  child(ren)  currently  residing  in  the
household who are not involved in this action
should be deducted from gross income.    Use of
this  deduction  is  appropriate  at  the  time  of
the establishment of a child support order . .
If  plaintiff's  seventeen-year-old  child  were  residing  with  him,




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then  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  a  deduction  from  his  gross
income until such time as his seventeen-year-old turned eighteen.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§  50-13.4(b),  48A-2  (1984).
The Guidelines further provide,
The   deduction   for   a   party's   financial
responsibility  for  other  child(ren)  is  one-
half of the basic child support obligation for
the  number  of  child(ren)  who  live  with  the
party  and  for  whom  the  party  owes  a  duty  of
support (other than the child(ren) involved in
the  instant  action).     For  purposes  of  this
deduction, the basic child support obligation
for the other child(ren) living with the party
is   based   on   the   combined   adjusted   gross
incomes of the party and the other responsible
parent of such child(ren).
Plaintiff  presented  no  evidence  of  the  income  of  any  "other
responsible  parent"  of  his  seventeen-year-old,  and  so  it  may  be
presumed to be zero.   On remand, the district court must determine
whether,  at  the  time  of  the  18  September  1996  hearing,  plaintiff
had a seventeen-year-old child of his residing with him.    If not,
then plaintiff is not entitled to a deduction.
If, however, the district court finds this to be true, it must
take  further  evidence  to  determine  when  the  seventeen-year-old
turned eighteen.   Based on these findings, and the presumption that
the income of an "other responsible parent" of this seventeen-year-
old was zero, the district court must recalculate plaintiff's child
support   obligation   for   the   period   during   which   plaintiff's
seventeen-year-old was still a minor and residing with him.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the district court abused its
discretion  by  ordering  plaintiff  to  pay  half  of  defendant's
attorney fees.    We disagree.




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In  an  action  for  the  custody  or  support,  or
both, of a minor child  .  .  . the court may in
its  discretion  order  payment  of  reasonable
attorney's fees to an interested party acting
in  good  faith  who  has  insufficient  means  to
defray  the  expense  of  the  suit.                                        Before
ordering payment of a fee in a support action,
the  court  must  find  as  a  fact  that  the  party
ordered  to  furnish  support  has  refused  to
provide  support  which  is  adequate  under  the
circumstances  existing  at  the  time  of  the
institution of the action or proceeding  .  .  .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6 (1995).   In this case, the district court
found  that  defendant  acted  in  good  faith  in  the  proceedings  and
that  defendant  could  not  "defray  the  expenses  of  the  lawsuit
without  impoverishing  herself."                                           The  court  also  found  that
plaintiff  had  not  furnished  adequate  support  for  several  months
during this litigation.    These findings are sufficient to support
the district court's award of attorney fees.   Plaintiff argues that
the parties' relative estates must be compared before attorney fees
are  awarded,  but  there  is  no  such  requirement.    See  Taylor  v.
Taylor,  343 N.C.  50,  57,  445 S.E.2d  33,  37  (1996).
In conclusion, we affirm the ruling of the district court on
all issues but one.    We remand the case to the district court for
further findings on whether plaintiff is entitled to any decrease
in his child support obligation in this case based on his support
of another child.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings.
Judges WALKER and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.

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