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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA05-83
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          3 January  2006
DEBORAH PERRY,
Employee,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              From the North Carolina
Industrial Commission
U.S. ASSEMBLIES, RTP,                                                                           I.C. No.  752385
Employer
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Carrier,
Defendants
Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  an  opinion  and  award  entered                                   1
September 2004 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.   Heard
in the Court of Appeals  14 September  2005.
Law  Offices  of  George  W.  Lennon,  by  George  W.  Lennon,  for
plaintiff-appellant.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Jan N. Pittman
and Jacob H. Wellman, for defendant-appellees.
HUNTER, Judge.
Deborah Perry (“plaintiff”) appeals from an opinion and award
of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (“Commission”) entered
1  September  2004.    For  the  reasons  stated  herein,  we  affirm  the
Commission’s opinion and award.
                                                                                                Plaintiff was employed by U.S. Assemblies in August of  1997,
and  sustained  a  back  injury  on                                                             3  September                                                    1997  while  lifting




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boxes.    Plaintiff  was  treated  for  a  mechanical  lower  back  injury
and muscular injury to the lower abdomen, and provided with light-
duty  work  in  accordance  with  the  treating  physician’s  orders.
Plaintiff left U.S. Assemblies’s employment for personal reasons on
7 October  1997, but continued to complain of severe back pain and
sought further treatment.
In  plaintiff’s  initial  claim  to  the  Commission  in  1998,  the
deputy   commissioner   found   that   plaintiff   had   sustained   a
compensable back injury, that suitable light work had been offered
to  plaintiff,  and  that  plaintiff  had  refused  such  work  without
justification  by  her  termination  of  employment.     The  deputy
commissioner further found that plaintiff reached maximum medical
improvement  by  July                                                        1998  and  sustained  no  permanent  partial
disability as a result of the injury, and found plaintiff’s claim
of  chronic  pain  lacked  credibility.     The  deputy  commissioner
concluded  that  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  medical  compensation
arising  from  the  injury  only,  and  was  not  entitled  to  temporary
total or permanent partial disability.
Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which affirmed the
deputy commissioner’s holding with some minor amendments, including
a  conclusion  that  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  have  defendants
provide  for  either  a  psychological  evaluation  or  psychological
care.    Plaintiff did not appeal the Full Commission’s order.
In  November                                                                 2001,  plaintiff  filed  a  Form               33  request  for  a
hearing,  alleging  a  claim  for  change  of  condition  due  to  a
psychological  condition  and  chronic  disabling  pain,  as  well  as




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additional   medical   expenses.                                              Defendants   moved   to   dismiss
plaintiff’s  claim  related  to  her  psychological  condition  on  the
ground  of  res  judicata,  and  the  motion  was  granted.    The  deputy
commissioner found the evidence showed plaintiff did not develop a
somatoform pain disorder or depression as a result of the September
1997 injury, and that plaintiff’s chronic pain was not related to
the injury.    The deputy commissioner denied plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff   appealed   to   the   Full   Commission.                          The   Full
Commission found that plaintiff’s claim regarding her psychological
condition was not properly dismissed on the ground of res judicata,
as  no  final  judgment  had  been  made  on  the  merits.    However,  the
Full Commission determined, on the basis of the evidence of record
regarding  plaintiff’s  psychological  condition,  that  “plaintiff’s
disability, if any, is due to the psychological conditions and not
to  the  compensable  injury.    The  psychological  conditions  are  not
causally related to the September 1997 low back strain.”   The Full
Commission denied plaintiff’s claim.    Plaintiff appeals.
I.
We first note the appropriate standard of review for appeals
from the Industrial Commission.    The standard of review is narrow
in  worker’s  compensation  cases,  “limited  to  the  consideration  of
two  issues:                                                                  (1)  whether  the  Commission’s  findings  of  fact  are
supported by competent evidence; and (2) whether the conclusions of
law  are  supported  by  the  findings  of  fact.”    Cannon  v.  Goodyear
Tire  &  Rubber  Co.,  ___  N.C.  App.  ___,  ___,  614  S.E.2d  440,  444,
disc.  review  denied,  ___  N.C.  ___,  621  S.E.2d  177  (2005).                                                                       “‘In




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Workers’ Compensation cases, the Industrial Commission’s findings
of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence
to support them, even if there is conflicting evidence.’”   Brown v.
Family  Dollar  Distrib.  Ctr.,  129  N.C.  App.  361,  363,  499  S.E.2d
197,                                                                         198    (1998)       (citation  omitted).   “‘[T]his  Court  is   “not  at
liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings . . .
simply  because  other  .  .  .  conclusions  might  have  been  reached.”
“This  is  so,  notwithstanding  [that]  the  evidence  upon  the  entire
record  might  support  a  contrary  finding.”’”                             Id.    (citations
omitted).    We now address plaintiff’s assignments of error.
II.
Plaintiff first contends the Commission erred as a matter of
law  in  failing  to  decide  all  matters  in  controversy.    Plaintiff
contends that the failure of an expert to answer cross-examination
questions relating to records not in evidence created a matter of
controversy  between  the  parties  which  was  not  addressed  by  the
Industrial Commission.    We disagree.
Plaintiff  cites  as  authority  the  case  of  Bank  v.  Motor  Co.,
216  N.C.                                                                    432,   5  S.E.2d    318                    (1939).               In  Bank,  the  Industrial
Commission found a death to be in the course of employment when a
salesman for Reid Motor Co. was shot.   Id. at 433, 5 S.E.2d at 319.
The finding was based on the testimony of Jack Freeze  (“Freeze”),
the individual who shot the salesman.   Id. at 435, 5 S.E.2d at 321.
At  the  hearing  before  the  Commission,  Freeze  answered  some  of
claimant’s questions, then refused to answer further.   Id. at 433,
5 S.E.2d at 320.   On cross-examination, Freeze again answered some




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questions,   then   refused   to   answer   additional   questions   of
consequence.   Id.   The Supreme Court stated that, “where a witness
refuses  to  answer  pertinent  questions  on  cross-examination,  his
testimony  on  direct  examination  should  be  stricken  out.”    Id.  at
434, 5 S.E.2d at 320.                                                        “‘This doctrine rests on the common law rule
that no evidence should be admitted but what was or might be under
the  examination  of  both  parties  and  that  ex  parte  statements  are
too uncertain and unreliable to be considered in the investigation
of controverted facts.’”   Id. (citation omitted).   As a result, the
Court  determined  the  findings  based  on  Freeze’s  testimony  were
founded upon incompetent evidence and not conclusive, and therefore
ordered them set aside.    Id. at  435,  5 S.E.2d at  321.
Here,  plaintiff  was  examined  by  Dr.  Siegel,  an  independent
medical   examiner,   in   November                                          2002.                                          During   Dr.   Siegel’s
deposition,  defendants  instructed  him  to  not  answer  plaintiff’s
questions concerning reports by Dr. Rollins, a psychiatrist who had
previously examined plaintiff, as evidence concerning plaintiff’s
psychological condition, including Dr. Rollins’s reports, had not
yet been admitted pending a ruling by the deputy commissioner.   Dr.
Siegel did not answer the questions.
Plaintiff  was  afforded  the  opportunity  to  cross-examine  Dr.
Siegel as to all pertinent issues other than the reports related to
plaintiff’s psychological condition.   Plaintiff’s cross-examination
questions  as  to  Dr.  Rollins’s  reports,  which  defendants  had  not
questioned  plaintiff  regarding,  related  to  items  not  in  evidence
pending a specific ruling by the Commission as to whether matters




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pertaining   to   plaintiff’s   psychological   condition   could   be
considered  in  the  claim.     As  such,  they  were  not                     “pertinent
questions” to issues  “‘under the examination of both parties’” at
the time of the deposition.   Bank, 216 N.C. at 434, 5 S.E.2d at 320
(citation omitted).   We find no evidence in the record to indicate
that plaintiff sought an opportunity to further depose the witness
as  to  the  issue  of  plaintiff’s  psychiatric  condition  after  such
evidence was admitted by the deputy commissioner.    The deposition
testimony therefore need not be stricken from the record.
Further, assuming arguendo that Dr. Siegel’s failure to answer
such questions would require his testimony to be stricken, we note
that  the  Commission’s  finding  that  plaintiff’s  psychological
condition  was  not  related  to  the  work-related  injury  incurred  in
September 1997 is supported by competent evidence from plaintiff’s
own witnesses, as addressed infra in Section IV.   We therefore find
no merit to plaintiff’s assignment of error.
III.
Plaintiff next contends the Industrial Commission erred as a
matter  of  law  in  failing  to  recognize  that  the  burden  of  proof
shifted  to  defendants  as  to  plaintiff’s  claims  for  additional
medical compensation.    We disagree.
In claims for “additional compensation for medical treatment,
the  medical  treatment  sought  must  be                                      ‘directly  related  to  the
original compensable injury.’”   Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators,
Inc., 136 N.C. App. 255, 259, 523 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1999) (citation
omitted).    In  the  case  of  Parsons  v.  Pantry,  Inc.,  126  N.C.  App.




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540,  485 S.E.2d  867  (1997), this Court held that once an employee
has established a compensable injury, the employer bears the burden
of  proof  as  to  causation  in  a  claim  for  additional  medical
compensation  which                                                          “lessens  the  period  of  disability,  effects  a
cure or gives relief” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25 (2003).   Id. at
541-42,                                                                      485  S.E.2d  at                                                  869.   In  Parsons,  the  plaintiff  had
established causation between the workplace injury and headaches,
and  had  been  awarded  future  medical  treatment.    Id.  at  542,  485
S.E.2d  at                                                                   869.    The  Court  found  that  in  a  claim  for  additional
medical  compensation  for  treatment  of  continued  headaches,  the
defendant  bore  the  burden  of  producing  evidence  showing  that  the
plaintiff’s headaches were not related to the original injury.   Id.
Here, in the prior unappealed order of  6 July  2000, the Full
Commission determined that plaintiff had suffered a lumbar strain
from the September 1997 injury and had reached full maximum medical
improvement  as  of  July                                                    1998.    The  Commission  further  held  that
plaintiff lacked credibility as to claims of chronic pain and did
not  injure  her  cervical  spine  as  a  result  of  the  September  1997
incident.    The order limited compensation to medical compensation
arising  from  the  injury  by  accident  and  specifically  found  that
plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  treatment  for  unrelated  conditions
and psychological care.   Plaintiff’s claims for additional medical
compensation  relate  to  care  for  chronic  pain  and  a  psychological
condition,  conditions  specifically  excluded  from  the  finding  of
plaintiff’s  original  compensable  injury,  a  lumbar  strain.     As
plaintiff   had   not   established   causation   for   these   medical




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conditions  in  the  initial  order,  we  find  that  the  Commission  did
not improperly shift the burden of proof in determining plaintiff’s
claim.
IV.
Plaintiff next contends the Industrial Commission erred as a
matter of law in the findings and conclusions, specifically in its
findings and conclusions that plaintiff’s psychological condition
and resulting disability were not causally related to plaintiff’s
compensable injury, and that plaintiff had failed to prove a change
of condition.    We disagree.
As discussed supra, this Court’s review of a Commission order
is  limited  to  the  consideration  of  two  issues:                         “(1)  whether  the
Commission’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence;
and                                                                           (2)  whether  the  conclusions  of  law  are  supported  by  the
findings  of  fact.”    Cannon,  ___  N.C.  App.  at  ___,  614  S.E.2d  at
444.                                                                          “The Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal
if supported by competent evidence even though there is evidence to
support a contrary finding.   The Commission’s findings of fact may
be  set  aside  on  appeal  only  where  there  is  a  complete  lack  of
competent  evidence  to  support  them.”     Jones  v.  Candler  Mobile
Village,                                                                      118  N.C.  App.                                                    719,   721,   457  S.E.2d   315,   317   (1995)
(citations omitted).
When seeking a modification of a final order on the basis of
a change of condition,  “‘[t]he burden is on the party seeking the
modification to prove the existence of the new condition and that
it is causally related to the injury that is the basis of the award




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the  party  seeks  to  modify.’”    Grantham  v.  R.  G.  Barry  Corp.,  127
N.C. App. 529, 534, 491 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1997) (citation omitted).
“An  employee  satisfies  this  burden  by  producing  medical  evidence
showing ‘he is physically or mentally, as a consequence of the work
related  injury,  incapable  of  work  in  any  employment.’”     Id.
(emphasis added)  (citation omitted).
Here,  a  review  of  the  record  shows  that  the  Commission  made
numerous  findings  that  supported  the  conclusion  that  plaintiff’s
claims were not caused by the original compensable injury, and that
plaintiff  failed  to  carry  her  burden  to  show  that  a  change  of
condition  had  occurred.    The  Commission  found  that  plaintiff  was
diagnosed with a somatoform pain disorder and that her chronic pain
was  psychologically  based.    The  Commission  also  found  that  Dr.
Blau, one of plaintiff’s treating physicians, was unable to state
whether plaintiff’s injury or somatoform disorder originated first,
and  that  Dr.  Rollins,  a  psychiatrist  who  examined  plaintiff,  was
unable to provide an opinion as to whether the somatoform disorder
was related to plaintiff’s compensable injury, and further opined
that  plaintiff’s  psychological  problems  were  very  long  standing,
going back to childhood.   The Commission found that Dr. Siegel, the
independent medical examiner, opined that plaintiff’s compensable
injury did not cause chronic pain syndrome, that plaintiff was not
credible, and that there was no pathological basis for plaintiff’s
pain.   Finally, the Commission found that Dr. Hernandez, a treating
psychologist, opined that plaintiff’s psychological conditions were
caused by plaintiff’s compensable injury, but gave little weight to




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that testimony, as Dr. Hernandez’s opinion was based solely on the
fact  that  plaintiff  had  not  had  the  disabling  psychological
condition prior to September 1997.   We note that “[t]he Commission
is the sole judge of the credibility of a witness and the weight to
                                                                              be  given  to  his  testimony.”    Jones,   118  N.C.  App.  at                                  722,                457
S.E.2d  at                                                                    318.                                        Our  review  of  the  record  reveals  that  these
findings are supported by competent evidence.   As these findings of
fact  support  the  Commission’s  conclusion  of  law  that  plaintiff
failed  to  prove  causation  in  order  to  establish  a  change  of
condition, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.
V.
Plaintiff next contends the Industrial Commission erred as a
matter of law in disregarding competent evidence.    We disagree.
As  discussed  supra,  the  Commission’s  “‘findings  of  fact  are
conclusive on appeal if there is any competent evidence to support
them, even if there is conflicting evidence’ . . . [which] ‘“might
support  a  contrary  finding.”’”    Brown,  129  N.C.  App.  at  363,  499
S.E.2d at 198 (citations omitted).                                            “In making its findings of fact
.  .  .  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  consider,  weigh,  and
evaluate all of the competent evidence before it.”   Ward v. Beaunit
Corp.,                                                                        56  N.C.  App.                              128,                                                 134,  287  S.E.2d   464,  467  (1982).   “In
making  its  findings  of  fact,  the  Commission  may  not  ignore,
discount, disregard or fail to properly weigh and evaluate any of
the competent evidence before it.”    Id.
Here, plaintiff contends the Commission failed to consider all
competent  evidence  presented  by  plaintiff  as  to  causation  and




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disability,  in  particular  the  testimony  of  Drs.  Craig,  Blau,
Hernandez, and Rollins.   A review of the record indicates that the
Commission made specific findings as to the evidence given by Drs.
Craig,  Blau,  Hernandez  and  Rollins,  all  of  the  expert  witnesses,
and does not indicate that the Commission failed to properly weigh
and evaluate the evidence before it.    Further, competent evidence
supports the findings made by the Commission as to the testimony of
these doctors.    Although the Commission gave little weight to Dr.
Hernandez’s opinions, the Commission specifically noted that such
opinion was disregarded because it was based on the assumption that
a   temporal   connection   was   sufficient   to   establish   medical
causation.                                                                  “‘“‘[T]he  Commission  is  the  sole  judge  of  the
credibility  of  the  witnesses  and  the  weight  to  be  given  their
testimony.’”                                                                “Thus,  the  Commission  may  assign  more  weight  and
credibility  to  certain  testimony  than  other.”’”                        Renfro  v.
Richardson Sports Ltd., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 616 S.E.2d 317, 329
(2005)  (citation omitted).
As  the  record  indicates  the  Commission  properly  considered,
weighed, and evaluated all of the competent evidence before it, we
find no merit to plaintiff’s argument that the Commission failed to
consider all evidence as to causation.
VI.
Plaintiff finally contends the Industrial Commission erred in
finding the defense of the claim was reasonable.    We disagree.
“If the Industrial Commission shall determine that any hearing
has  been  brought,  prosecuted,  or  defended  without  reasonable




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ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings including
reasonable  fees  for  defendant’s  attorney  or  plaintiff’s  attorney
upon the party who has brought or defended them.”   N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  97-88.1  (2003).                                                         “The decision of whether to take such action is
consigned  to  the  discretion  of  the  Commission,  and  will  be  left
undisturbed  absent  an  abuse  of  discretion.”    Singletary  v.  North
Carolina Baptist Hosp., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 619 S.E.2d 888, 892
(2005).
Here, under the facts and circumstances of the case, we find
plaintiff’s arguments unpersuasive that defendants’ defense of the
claim was unreasonable.   Although the Full Commission determined on
review  that  the  issue  of  plaintiff’s  claim  for  a  change  of
condition  for  a  psychological  condition  was  not  barred  by  res
judicata, defendants’ arguments and evidence regarding plaintiff’s
claim  were  reasonable  and  successful  and  we  find  no  evidence  of
abuse of discretion by the Commission.
As  the  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  support  the
order of the Commission denying plaintiff’s claim, and as we find
no abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission, we affirm the
order for the foregoing reasons.
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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