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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA07-1303
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 May  2008
DAVID GERALD POTCHAK,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                                              Durham County
No.  06 CVS  6512
GEORGE TATUM, COMMISSIONER,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  p                                                                                   er  from  judgment  entered  23  March  2007  by
Judge Donald W. Stephens in Durham County Superior Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  28 April  2008.
Amos  Granger  Tyndall,  P.A.,  by  Amos  Granger  Tyndall,  for
petitioner-appellant.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
John W. Congleton, for respondent-appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Where  the  trial  court’s  finding  of  a  willful  refusal  by
petitioner to submit to a chemical analysis under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  20-16.2(c) was supported by competent evidence, the trial court
did  not  err  in  affirming  respondent’s  revocation  of  petitioner’s
driver’s license for twelve months.




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At  the  outset  of  his  de  novo  hearing  in  superior  court,  see
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  20-16.2(e),  petitioner  stipulated  that  he  had
been charged with driving while impaired (DWI), that North Carolina
Highway  Patrol  Trooper  M.G.  Blake  had  reasonable  grounds  for  the
charge,  and  that  petitioner  was  properly  advised  of  his  rights.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(d)(1), (2), (4) (2007).   Accordingly,
the sole issue before the court was whether petitioner  “willfully
refused to submit to a chemical analysis.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  20-
16.2(d)(5).
Trooper Blake testified that he arrested petitioner for DWI on
the  night  of                                                                 22  February                                                   2006.   Upon  stopping  the  defendant,
Trooper  Blake  administered  an  alco-sensor  test  and  subsequently
transported defendant to the Durham County Jail for testing by an
Intoxilyzer  5000.    Blake  was  present  when  Durham  Police  Officer
J.J. Ellsworth attempted to administer the Intoxilyzer.
Officer  Ellsworth,  a  certified  chemical  analyst,  testified
that he advised petitioner of his rights and obtained petitioner’s
signature indicating his understanding of his rights at  11:01 p.m
on 22 February 2006.   At 11:19 p.m., Trooper Blake asked petitioner
to  give  a  breath  sample.    Petitioner  stood  up  and  vomited  into  a
trash can, requiring Ellsworth to record a “no-test” at 11:22 p.m.
and  re-start  the  observation  period.    At  11:43  p.m.,  petitioner
provided a valid breath sample which registered his blood alcohol
level  as                                                                      .17.     As  Ellsworth  prepared  the  Intoxilyzer  for  the
required  second  sample,  petitioner  “sort  of  belched,  stood  back,
went  and  sat  down.”    Ellsworth  asked  him,  “Are  you  going  to  take




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this  test?”    Petitioner  “shook  his  head,  no.”    Seconds  later,  he
leaned  over  the  trash  can  and  vomited  a  second  time.    Ellsworth
pushed  the  button  on  the  Intoxilyzer  indicating  a  refusal  by
petitioner  at  11:43  p.m.    Although  he  was  advised  that  Ellsworth
“was treating it as a refusal when he shook his head[,]” petitioner
did not ask to complete the test.
Petitioner testified that he did not remember the events of 22
February                                                                      2006,  but  hypothesized  he                 “wouldn’t  have  refused”  the
Intoxilyzer if he had understood the consequences of a refusal.
In  its  judgment  affirming  the  revocation  of  petitioner’s
driver’s   license,   the   trial   court   found,   inter   alia,   that
petitioner  was  properly  advised  of  his  Intoxilyzer  rights  under
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  20-16.2(a), that he  “signed the rights form[,]”
and that he “understood his rights.”   The court made the following
additional  findings  regarding  petitioner’s  actions  following  his
initial breath sample indicating a blood alcohol level of  .17:
20.   Petitioner was advised that he would have
to provide a second valid sample of breath by
Officer Ellsworth.
21.                                                                           Before  being  asked  by  the  officer  to
provide that second breath sample, petitioner
sat   down   due   to   his   physical   condition.
Officer  Ellsworth  then  asked  petitioner  to
provide a second sample of breath. . .                                        . [T]he
officer observed the petitioner shake his head
from  side  to  side,  which  the  officer  took  to
mean that petitioner had declined the request
to  submit  a  second  breath  test  and  that
petitioner  would  not  submit  to  the  test.
Immediately  following  this  indication  of  the
petitioner  by  shaking  his  head,  he  began  to
vomit  again.     Officer  Ellsworth  was  of  the
opinion   that   the   petitioner                                             .   had
willfully refused the second breath test.




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23.                                                                         .  .  . The Court finds as a fact from the
totality  of  the  evidence  that  the  petitioner
willfully refused the second breath test.
In its conclusions of law, the court reiterated its determination
that petitioner was informed of his rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
20-16.2(a) and “willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis”
after being arrested on reasonable grounds for an implied consent
offense.
On   appeal,   petitioner   claims   that   the   evidence   was
insufficient  to  show  that  he  willfully  refused  to  submit  to  the
Intoxilyzer under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(c)-(d).   He argues that
the  evidence  established  his  inability  to  provide  a  sequential
breath sample, rather than his unwillingness to do so.   Petitioner
further contends that Officer Ellsworth’s  11:43 p.m. inquiry into
whether he “was going to take the test” did not constitute a proper
request to submit to chemical analysis under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-
16.2(c), inasmuch as Ellsworth was required to wait fifteen minutes
after petitioner vomited before using the Intoxilyzer.
In reviewing a judgment entered following a bench trial, “‘the
court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by
competent  evidence,  even  though  there  may  be  evidence  to  the
contrary.’”    Gibson  v.  Faulkner,  132  N.C.  App.  728,  732-33,  515
S.E.2d 452, 455 (1999) (quotation omitted).   As trier of fact, the
superior court is entitled to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve  conflicts  or  discrepancies  in  the  evidence,  and  draw  any
reasonable inferences supported thereby.    In re Whisnant,  71 N.C.




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App.  439,  441,  322  S.E.2d  434,  435  (1984).    Whether  the  court’s
findings of fact support its conclusions of law is fully reviewable
on appeal.   State v. Barber, 335 N.C. 120, 129, 436 S.E.2d 106, 111
(1993).
“A  person’s  refusal  to  give  the  sequential  breath  samples
necessary  to  constitute  a  valid  chemical  analysis  is  a  refusal
under  G.S.  20-16.2(c).”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  20-139.1(b3)  (2007).
For purposes of this statute,
[a] ‘willful refusal’ occurs whenever a driver
‘(1) is aware that he has a choice to take or
to  refuse  to  take  the  test;  (2)  is  aware  of
the  time  limit  within  which  he  must  take  the
test;  (3)  voluntarily  elects  not  to  take  the
test; and (4) knowingly permits the prescribed
thirty-minute  time  limit  to  expire  before  he
elects to take the test.’
White  v.  Tippett,  ___  N.C.  App.  ___,  652  S.E.2d  728,  731  (2007)
(quoting  Mathis  v.  Division  of  Motor  Vehicles,  71  N.C.  App.  413,
415,  322  S.E.2d  436,  437-38  (1984)  (quoting  Etheridge  v.  Peters,
                                                                             Comr.  of  Motor  Vehicles,                              301  N.C.                             76,                                                       81,   269  S.E.2d   133,                      136
(1980))).                                                                                                                             Our  courts  have  further  defined                                                                                 “refusal”  in  this
context                                                                      “as                                                                                            ‘the  declination  of  a  request  or  demand,  or  the
omission to comply with some requirement of law, as the result of
a positive intention to disobey.’”   Mathis at 415-16, 322 S.E.2d at
438  (quoting Joyner v. Garrett, Comr. of Motor Vehicles,  279 N.C.
226,                                                                         233,                                                     182   S.E.2d                          553,                                                      558   (1971)        (quoting   Black’s  Law
Dictionary,  4th  Ed.)).    Accordingly,  “[a]  finding  that  a  driver
‘did refuse’ to take the test is equivalent to a finding that the
driver                                                                       ‘willfully  refused’  to  take  the  test.”    Id.  at   416,                                  322
S.E.2d at 437 (quoting Joyner, 279 N.C. at 233, 182 S.E.2d at 559).




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Whether  characterized  as  a  finding  of  ultimate  fact,  e.g.,
Tolbert  v.  Hiatt,                                                           95  N.C.  App.                                            380,   385,   382  S.E.2d   453,   456
(1989),  or  a  conclusion  of  law,  e.g.,  Etheridge,  301  N.C.  at  82,
269  S.E.2d  at                                                               137,  the  court’s  determination  that  petitioner
willfully refused to submit to the Intoxilyzer was fully supported
by  the  evidence.                                                            Officer  Ellsworth’s  testimony  showed  that
petitioner  was  aware  that  he  was  required  to  provide  sequential
breath samples and indicated his refusal to give the second sample
by  shaking  his  head  when  asked  if  he                                   “was  going  to  take  the
test[.]”                                                                      “Obviously, one may refuse the test by inaction as well
as  by  words.”    Mathis  at  415,                                           322  S.E.2d  at  438.    Petitioner’s
negative response to Ellsworth’s query, and his subsequent failure
to  offer  a  second  breath  sample,  gave  rise  to  a  reasonable
inference   that   his                                                        “action   constituted   a   conscious   choice
purposefully   made”   not   to   submit   to   the   Intoxilyzer,   thus
supporting  a  conclusion  that                                               “his  omission  to  comply  with  this
requirement of our motor vehicle law amounts to a willful refusal.”
Seders v. Powell, Comr. of Motor Vehicles,  298 N.C.  453,  461,  259
S.E.2d  544,  550  (1979).    The  fact  that  Ellsworth  would  have  been
required  to  wait  fifteen  minutes  after  petitioner  vomited  before
accepting a breath sample does not alter the conclusive nature of
petitioner’s indication that he was not “going to take the test[.]”
See In re Suspension of License of Rogers,  94 N.C. App.  505,  509,
380 S.E.2d  599,  601  (1989)  (holding that  “the validity of testing
procedures is not relevant where a motorist has refused to take the
test[,]” absent a “causal relationship between the defect, if any,




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and petitioner’s alleged refusal”); cf. Mathis at  416,  322 S.E.2d
at  438  (“The  Legislature  did  not  intend  .  .  .  to  impose  ‘such  a
rigid  sequence  of  events  as  contended’  by  plaintiff.”)  (quoting
Rice v. Peters, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 48 N.C. App. 697, 700, 269
S.E.2d  740,  742  (1980)).
AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER and MCCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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