Preview:

NO. COA02-29
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  31 December  2002
EVELYN POWELL, MAMIE WHITEHEAD, McARTHUR KING, MOTHER’S CARE AND
INFANTS CENTER and MORNINGSTAR BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.,
Plaintiffs
v.
WALTER PHILLIP BULLUCK, VICKY LYNN BULLUCK, and HANOR COMPANY,
INC.,
Defendants
Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 12 October 2001 by
Judge Frank R. Brown in Edgecombe County Superior Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  9 October  2002.
Land  Loss  Prevention  Project,  by  Marcus  Jimison  and  Pamela
Thombs, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Poyner  &  Spruill,  LLP,  by  J.  Nicholas  Ellis;  and  Etheridge,
Sykes,  Britt  &  Hamlett,  LLP,  by  Raymond  M.  Sykes,  Jr.,  for
defendants-appellees  Walter  Phillip  Bulluck  and  Vicky  Lynn
Bulluck.
Hunton & Williams, by Jason S. Thomas, for defendant-appellee
Hanor Company, Inc.
WALKER, Judge.
Prior  to  filing  their  original  complaint,  plaintiffs  Evelyn
Powell  and  Morningstar  Baptist  Church,  Inc.                           (Morningstar)  and
Concerned Citizens of Edgecombe II (CCE II), a group of Morningstar
residents  joined  to  oppose  the  operation  of  industrial-sized  hog
farms in the Morningstar community, requested and participated in
pre-litigation  mediation  concerning  a  hog  farm  nuisance  dispute
against defendants.   The mediation did not resolve the dispute, and
on 11 February 1999, the mediator certified an impasse.   On 15 June




-2-
1999, plaintiffs Evelyn Powell, Morningstar   and others, including
CCE II, initiated a hog farm nuisance action against defendants.
On  14 June  2000, Superior Court Judge Russell Duke dismissed
plaintiffs Powell and Morningstar without prejudice and dismissed
CCE II with prejudice for failing to allege in its complaint that
it had complied with pre-litigation mediation requirements.    On  4
June  2001,  plaintiffs  including  Powell  and  Morningstar  filed  the
present farm nuisance action against defendants, who counterclaimed
alleging   malicious   and   false   statements   and   intentional
interference with contractual relations.   Subsequently, defendants
moved for costs and to dismiss plaintiffs pursuant to N.C.R. Civ.
P.                                                                          12(c)   for   failing   to   initiate   pre-litigation   mediation.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss defendants’ counterclaim
and  sought  N.C.R.  Civ.  P.                                               11  sanctions  against  defendants  for
filing their counterclaim.
All  motions  were  heard,  and  on                                         10  October                                                           2001,  the  trial
court  entered  an  order  allowing  defendants’  motion  to  dismiss
plaintiffs  Whitehead,  King  and  Mother’s  Care  and  Infants  Center
(Mother’s Care) and defendants’ motion for costs.   The trial court
denied plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions and to dismiss defendants’
counterclaim.   Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the trial court erred
in  dismissing  plaintiffs  Whitehead,  King  and  Mother’s  Care,
awarding  costs  to  defendants  and  in  denying  their  motions  for
sanctions and to dismiss defendants’ counterclaim.
First, we consider the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs
Whitehead,  King  and  Mother’s  Care.    We  note  that  this  issue  is




-3-
interlocutory, but in our discretion, we elect to treat plaintiffs’
appeal  on  this  issue  as  a  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  as  it
affects the proper parties to the lawsuit.    See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
7A-32(c)  (2001);  N.C.R.  App.  P.  21(a)(1);  Coca-Cola  Bottling  Co.
Consol. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,  141 N.C. App.  569,  574,
541 S.E.2d  157,  161  (2000).
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial
court “is to consider only the pleadings and any attached exhibits,
which become part of the pleadings.”   Minor v. Minor,  70 N.C. App.
76,  78,  318  S.E.2d  865,  867  (1984);  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,
Rule 12(c) (2001).   In a Rule 12(c) motion, “[n]o evidence is to be
heard, and the trial judge is not to consider statements of fact in
the  briefs  of  the  parties  or  the  testimony  of  allegations  by  the
parties in different proceedings.”   Minor, 70 N.C. App. at 78, 318
S.E.2d at 867; see Cash v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 N.C.
App.  192,  202,  528  S.E.2d  372,  378  (2000).    In  reviewing  a  Rule
12(c) motion, the trial court must accept all material allegations
in  the  complaint  as  true  and  accurate  and  consider  them  in  the
light  most  favorable  to  the  non-moving  party.    Affordable  Care,
Inc. v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners, __ N.C. App.
__, __, 571 S.E.2d 52, 57 (2002); Garrett v. Winfree, 120 N.C. App.
689,  691,  463 S.E.2d  411,  413  (1995).
Prior  to  initiating  a  farm  nuisance  action,  a  party  is
required to submit to pre-litigation mediation.   N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-38.3(c) (2001).   The purpose of this mandatory mediation is “to
facilitate  ...  settlement  ...  and  to  make  civil  litigation  more




-4-
economical,  efficient,  and  satisfactory  to  litigants  and  the
State.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. §  7A-38.1(a)  (2001).   If a party brings a
farm  nuisance  action  before  “a  farm  resident  or  any  other  party”
has  initiated  pre-litigation  mediation,  then  that  action  “shall,
upon the motion of any party prior to trial, be dismissed without
prejudice  by  the  court.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                              §                                                            7A-38.3(c).    Farm
nuisance  pre-litigation  mediation  is  conducted  pursuant  to  N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1 which provides that parties “shall attend the
mediated  settlement  conference  unless  excused  by  rules  of  the
Supreme  Court  or  by  order  of  the  senior  resident  superior  court
judge.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7A-38.1(f)  (2001).
Specifically,  all  individual  parties  and  counsel  for  each
party  must                                                                   “physically  attend  until  an  agreement  is  reduced  to
writing  and  signed  ...  or  an  impasse  has  been  declared.”    N.C.R.
Super. Ct. Mediated Settlement Conf. Rule  4  (2002).    However, the
attendance requirement will be “excused or modified, including the
allowance  of  that  party’s  or  person’s  participation  without
physical attendance  ...  [b]y agreement of all parties and persons
required to attend and the mediator....”    Id.
Here, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint:
On  April  29,  1997,  Plaintiffs  initiated  pre-
litigation   mediation   of   a   farm   nuisance
dispute.                                                                      Plaintiffs   have   completed   pre-
litigation mediation as required by N.C. Gen.
Stat.                                                                         §                                                            7A-38.3.                                              See   Attachment   A   to
                                                                                                                                           Complaint, Report of Mediator.   Attorney Henry
                                                                                                                                           Gorham   served   as   mediator   for   this   farm
                                                                                                                                           nuisance   pre-litigation   mediation.                The
                                                                                                                                           mediation  impassed  and  Plaintiffs  filed  suit
                                                                              on  August                                                   27,                                                   1999.    The  original  complaint
                                                                                                                                           was  dismissed  without  prejudice  on  June          14,
2000.    By order of the Court, Plaintiffs were




-5-
given  one  year  from  June  14,  2000  to  re-file
suit.    Plaintiffs now re-file.
The pre-litigation mediation request was submitted by Powell, CCE
II  and  Morningstar.     The  report  of  the  mediator  attached  to
plaintiffs’ complaint indicated that pre-litigation mediation was
conducted, and the report did not list any party as being absent.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and for costs
asserting plaintiffs Whitehead, King and Mother’s Care should have
been dismissed because the pleadings with attachments showed that
they  did  not  request  pre-litigation  mediation.    After  a  hearing,
the  trial  court  dismissed  the  complaints  of  Whitehead,  King  and
Mother’s Care without prejudice and allowed defendants’ motion for
costs.     Plaintiffs’  motions  to  dismiss  and  for  sanctions  were
denied.
Even though the pre-litigation mediation request does not list
the  names  of  all  of  the  plaintiffs,  the  action  is  not  subject  to
dismissal  as  to  those  plaintiffs.    The  statute  does  not  require
that all interested parties, who may later become plaintiffs, join
in  the  request  for  mediation.     The  statute  providing  for  pre-
litigation mediation specifically states that  “a farm resident or
any  other  party”  may  initiate  mediation.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7A-
38.3.
Here,  the  pleadings  allege  that  plaintiffs  participated  in
pre-litigation mediation, and the mediator’s report does not list
any party as being absent.    Taking the pleadings with attachments
in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  plaintiffs,  we  find  that
plaintiffs  have  satisfied  the  requirements  for  requesting  and




-6-
participating in   pre-litigation mediation as required by our rules
and statutes.
Next, we consider defendants’ argument to dismiss the appeal
as  interlocutory.    Although  the  trial  court  allowed  defendants’
motion for costs and denied plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions and
to dismiss defendants’ counterclaim, significant issues remain in
this  case.    Also,  the  trial  court  did  not  certify  this  case  as
immediately appealable pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b).   Judgments
and  orders  that  are  not  a  final  determination  of  the  entire
controversy  as  to  all  parties  are  interlocutory.     Carriker  v.
Carriker,  350  N.C.  71,  73,  511  S.E.2d  2,  4  (1999).    As  a  general
rule,  there  is  no  right  of  immediate  appeal  from  interlocutory
orders.   McCall v. McCall, __ N.C. App. __, __, 531 S.E.2d 894, 895
(2000);  See  Veazy  v.  City  of  Durham,  231  N.C.  357,  57  S.E.2d  377
(1950).    However,  plaintiffs  claim  the  trial  court’s  orders  are
appealable because they affect a substantial right.
An order, though interlocutory, is immediately appealable if
it  affects  a  substantial  right  that  would  be  lost,  prejudiced  or
less  than  adequately  protected  if  an  immediate  appeal  were  not
allowed.   N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1-277(a)  (2001).   The burden is on the
appellant  to  show                                                             “(1)  the  judgment  affects  a  right  that  is
substantial; and (2) the deprivation of that substantial right will
potentially work injury to him if not corrected before appeal from
final  judgment.”  Collins  v.  Talley,  135  N.C.  App.  758,  760,  522
S.E.2d  794,  796  (1999).




-7-
The  denial  of  a  motion  to  dismiss  is  not  immediately
appealable,  without  showing  a  substantial  right  is  affected.
Thompson  v.  Norfolk  S.  Ry.  Co.,                                          140  N.C.  App.   115,                          120-21,          535
S.E.2d  397,  401,  (2000).    Contrary  to  plaintiffs’  contentions,  a
denial of their motion to dismiss defendants’ counterclaim does not
affect a substantial right entitling them to an immediate appeal.
Id.
Finally,  “under  uncomplicated  circumstances,”  where  a  court
directs  a  party  to  pay  fees  or  costs,  no  substantial  right  is
involved that would allow an immediate appeal, Frost v. Mazda Motor
of  America,  Inc.,  353  N.C.  188,  194,  540  S.E.2d  324,  328  (2000);
see Cochran v. Cochran,  93 N.C. App.  574,  577, 378 S.E.2d 580,  582
(1989), and   absent a showing that a substantial right is involved,
an   order   refusing   to   impose   sanctions   is   not   immediately
appealable, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dean,  148 N.C. App.  405,  560
S.E.2d                                                                        886               (2002);  Routh  v.  Weaver,   67  N.C.  App.   426,   428,   313
S.E.2d  793,  795  (1984).
Reversed in part and dismissed in part.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and THOMAS concur.

Download 02-29-6.pdf

South Carolina Law