Preview:

An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling   legal   authority.   Citation   is   disfavored,   but   may   be   permitted   in
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Rule                                                        30(e)(3)  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of
Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA09-122
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  8 December  2009
JERRY RIVAS,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                                                 Wake County
Nos.  07 CVS  18949
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  petitioner  from  order  entered  4  November  2008  by
Judge  Orlando  F.  Hudson,  Jr.  in  Wake  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  14 September  2009.
Alan McSurely for petitioner-appellant.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper  III,  by  Assistant  Attorney
General Tina A. Krasner for respondent-appellee.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
On                                                                                                 18  April                                                                                                    2006,  Jerry  Rivas’s                                                                         (“petitioner”)  employment
                                                                                                                                                   with  the  North  Carolina  Department  of  Transportation                                                                                                                              (“DOT”  or
                                                                                                                                                                                                                “respondent”)  was  terminated  due  to  a  willful  violation  of  the
DOT’s  Workplace  Violence  Policy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         (“the  policy”).                                Petitioner
                                                                                                                                                                                                                appeals   from   the   trial   court’s   order   affirming   the   State




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Personnel  Commission’s                                                      (“SPC”)  order,  which  upheld  the  DOT’s
decision  to  terminate  petitioner.     After  careful  review,  we
reverse and remand.
Background
Petitioner began working for the DOT on  3 February  2003 as a
temporary  transportation  worker  in  the  Lee  County  Maintenance
Unit.    At that time, he signed a Violence in the Workplace Policy
Acknowledgment   Statement,   which   stated   that                          “[i]t   is   the
commitment  of  the  North  Carolina  Department  of  Transportation  to
strive   to   maintain   a   work   environment   which   is   free   from
intimidation,  threat  and/or  acts  of  violence.    It  is  with  this
commitment  in  mind  that  this  policy  is  developed  and  will  be
enforced.”                                                                   According   to   the   policy,   workplace   violence
“[i]ncludes,   but   is   not   limited   to   intimidation,   threats,
physical attack, domestic violence or property damage.”    Physical
attack is defined as  “[u]nwanted or hostile physical contact such
as hitting, fighting, pushing, shoving or throwing objects.”    The
policy also forbids  “the use or carrying of weapons of any kind.”
The policy further states that  “[a] violation of  [the] policy  .  .
.  may  be  grounds  for  disciplinary  action,  up  to  and  including
dismissal.”
Petitioner  became  a  permanent  employee  on  5  July  2003,  and
the  record  indicates  that  he                                             “maintained  good  work  performance




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ratings”  and  received  a  “very  good”  performance  rating  two  weeks
prior to his termination.
On  13  April  2006,  at  approximately  noon,  petitioner  arrived
at  the  break  room  area  of  the  Lee  County  Maintenance  Unit,  also
know  as  the  “bullpen,”  where  employees  gathered  to  socialize  and
eat  meals.    Michelle  Hughes  (“Hughes”),  the  Office  Assistant  for
Lee  County  Maintenance,  came  into  the  bullpen  area  between  noon
and                                                                           12:30  p.m.  after  purchasing  lunch  at  Burger  King.     Hughes
placed  her  lunch  bag  on  one  of  the  break  room  tables  and
proceeded  to  call  her  mother  on  her  cellular  phone.    Petitioner
was standing approximately three to five feet from the end of the
table.                                                                        Petitioner   extracted   the   blade   of   his   Swiss   Army
pocketknife, which was two and one half inches long, and gestured
as  if  he  intended  to  throw  the  knife  overhand  toward  the  table.
Though  the  parties  disagree  as  to  whether  Hughes  had  her  hand  on
the table at that time, the trial court found as fact:
Petitioner  asked  Ms.  Hughes  to  move  her  hand
away  from  the  table.    Ms.  Hughes  responded,
“No.    I’m  going  to  eat  my  lunch.”    She  ended
her   conversation   with   her   mother,   and
Petitioner  again  asked  her  to  move  her  hand.
Ms.                                                                           Hughes                                                                refused,    and    immediately
thereafter  Petitioner  threw  the  knife  toward
the  table.                                                                   The  knife  hit  the  table  and
deflected off of the Burger King bag, veering
to the other side of the table.
[]  James  (“Jimmy”)  McQuage  .  .  .  was  sitting
on  the  other  side  of  the  table,  diagonally




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across   from   Ms.   Hughes,   with   his   chair
leaning  against  the  wall,  one  leg  crossed,
facing   Petitioner.                                                          After   striking   Ms.
Hughes’  lunch  bag,  the  knife  slid  in  Mr.
McQuage’s  direction,  approximately                                          6  to                                8
inches  from  his  knee  and  fell  off  of  the
table, landing in the middle chair right next
to him.
Petitioner  then  picked  up  the  knife,  held  it  approximately
thirty  inches  above  the  table,  and  released  it.    The  blade  stuck
into  the  wood  table.     Petitioner  pulled  the  knife  out  of  the
table, closed it, and put it in his pocket.
Petitioner then walked over to the kitchenette and removed a
steak  knife  from  a  butcher’s  block  and  gestured  as  if  he  were
going  to  throw  the  knife  at  a  nearby  cabinet.    Hughes  testified
at  the  hearing  in  this  matter:                                           “[S]everal  times  during  all  of
this,  I  had  asked  him,  please,  to  stop.    He  didn’t  need  to  be
doing this.    And when he did  - with the steak knife, I told him  -
I  said,  ‘You  really  need  to  go outside  if  you want  to do  that.’”
Petitioner  put  the  knife  back  in  the  butcher  block,  without  ever
throwing   it,   and   walked   out   of   the   building.                    Other   than
petitioner, Hughes, and James McQuage  (“McQuage”), the only other
people  in  the  bullpen  at  that  time  were  Lee  Stone  (“Stone”)  and
Jeff Brown  (“Brown”).
Later that day, McQuage reported the incident to Chuck Dumas
(“Dumas”),  District  Engineer.    Dumas  instructed  Johnny  Ransdell




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(“Ransdell”)  to  investigate  the  situation.    Ransdell  spoke  with
petitioner,  who  claimed  that  he  was  “playing”  when  he  threw  the
knife.    Ransdell  also  interviewed  the  other  employees  who  were
present  at  the  time  of  the  incident.    On  17  April                    2006,  Stone,
Brown,  and  Hughes  provided  written  statements  to  Ransdell.    The
trial court found that  “[n]one of the statements make any mention
of  the  knife  being  thrown  at  Ms.  Hughes,  and,  in  fact,  all  three
statements state that the knife was thrown at the table or toward
Ms. Hughes’ lunch bag.”
On                                                                             17                                                              April   2006,   Ransdell    placed    petitioner    on
investigatory  suspension  with  pay.     That  same  day,  petitioner
received  a  Notice  of  Pre-Disciplinary  Conference.     The  notice
stated:                                                                        “The  purpose  of  this  conference  is  to  provide  you  an
opportunity   to   respond   to   the   recommendation   that   you   be
dismissed  for  an  incident  of  Workplace  Violence  that  constitutes
Unacceptable  Personal  Conduct.”     The  conference  was  held  the
following day and was conducted by Ransdell and Dumas.    According
to Ransdell’s hearing notes,  “Rivas stated that he  ‘had no malice
or  intent  to  hurt  anyone.’”     Additionally,                              “Rivas  stated  that
there  was                                                                     ‘no  attempt  to  intimidate  or  any  intent  to  hurt
anyone.’”  1  After  the  conference,  Ransdell  and  Dumas  recommended
1
The  trial  court  later  found  that                                          “[p]etitioner  described  his
actions with the pocketknife as ‘being stupid’ and admitted that it




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that   petitioner   be   terminated   because   of   the   DOT’s          “zero-
tolerance”  policy,  which  they  believed  required  termination  in
this  case.    Petitioner  was  terminated  for  unacceptable  personal
conduct  in  that  he  willfully  violated  the  Workplace  Violence
Policy.
                                                                                                                                                                                     Petitioner appealed his dismissal through the DOT’s internal
grievance  procedures.    On                                                                                                                                                                                                                        26  June                                                                                                           2006,  Chief  Deputy  Secretary
Daniel  H.  DeVane                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               (“DeVane”)  upheld  the  dismissal  of  petitioner.
On                                                                        21  July                                                                                                                                                                  2006,  petitioner  appealed  the  DOT’s  decision  to  the
                                                                                                                Office of Administrative Hearings  (“OAH”), and a hearing was held
on                                                                        29  March                  2007.      On                                                                   11  July                                                                                                                                                                          2007,  Administrative  Law  Judge
(“ALJ”) Donald W. Overby issued a  “Proposed Decision[,]” in which
he made the following determination:
Respondent has failed to meet its burden that
it  had  just  cause  to  dismiss  the  Petitioner,
and,  therefore,  the  Respondent’s  decision  to
dismiss  Petitioner  from  his  position  as  a
Transportation   Worker   with   the   DOT   is
REVERSED,   and   the   Petitioner   shall   be
reinstated    to    his    position    with    the
Respondent   with   all   back   pay   and   other
benefits                                                                  retroactively;             however,   the
Petitioner shall be suspended without pay for
a   period   of   sixty                                                   (60)   days,   and   the
restoration shall be adjusted accordingly.
was wrong to throw a knife in the middle of a workplace situation
where people are present.”




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On  17 December  2007, the State Personnel Commission reversed
the  ALJ’s  decision  and  found  that                                        “Respondent                                 [had]  met  it’s
burden of proving that Respondent had just cause for Petitioner’s
dismissal.”    The  SPC  adopted  the  majority  of  the  ALJ’s  findings
of  fact,  but  altered  portions  of  its  findings  to  reflect  its
determination,  based  on  the  hearing  transcript,  “that  the  knife
hit  the  table,  near  [Ms.  Hughes’s]  hand[.]”    The  SPC  also  added
to   its   findings   that                                                    “[r]egardless   of   intent,   Petitioner
knowingly  violated  the  policy  by  throwing  a  knife—a  dangerous
object—in  the  direction  of  another  employee,  posing  a  serious
safety violation in the workplace.”
Petitioner  appealed  the  SPC’s  decision  to  the  Wake  County
Superior  Court.    On                                                        4  November                                 2008,  upon  de  novo  review,  the
trial  court  affirmed  the  order  of  the  SPC.     Petitioner  now
appeals the order of the trial court.
Analysis
Petitioner  argues  on  appeal  that  the  trial  court  erred  when
it:  (1)  concluded  that  respondent  met  its  burden  of  proof  as  to
just  cause  to  terminate  petitioner;  (2)  failed  to  give  deference
to  the  ALJ’s  decision;  and  (3)  held  that  the  level  of  discipline
administered  was  within  respondent’s  discretion  and  was  not
subject to review.
I. Standard of Review




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As  a  preliminary  matter,  petitioner  did  not  assign  error  to
any  of  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact;  therefore,  these
findings  are  deemed  conclusive  on  appeal.    Hedingham  Cmty.  Ass’n
v.  GLH  Builders,  Inc.,                                                     178  N.C.  App.                            635,   645,   634  S.E.2d   224,
230, disc. review denied,  360 N.C.  646,  636 S.E.2d  805  (2006).
When reviewing a trial court’s order affirming a decision by
an  administrative  agency,  the  scope  of  review  of  this  Court  is
the  same  as  it  is  for  other  civil  cases.    We  must  examine  the
trial  court’s  order  for  errors  of  law  and  determine  whether  the
trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and whether
the  trial  court  properly  applied  this  standard.     As  in  other
civil  cases,  we  review  errors  of  law  de  novo.    Hilliard  v.  N.C.
Dep’t of Corr.,  173 N.C. App.  594,  596,  620 S.E.2d  14,  17  (2005).
Accordingly, we must first determine whether the trial court
in this case exercised the correct standard of review and, if so,
whether the court properly applied this standard.
In   reviewing   a   final   decision   in   a
contested case in which an administrative law
judge  made  a  decision,  in  accordance  with
G.S.                                                                          150B-34(a),  and  the  agency  does  not
adopt    the    administrative    law    judge’s
decision, the court shall review the official
record,  de  novo,  and  shall  make  findings  of
fact  and  conclusions  of  law.     In  reviewing
the  case,  the  court  shall  not  give  deference
to  any  prior  decision  made  in  the  case  and
shall not be bound by the findings of fact or
the   conclusions   of   law   contained   in   the
agency’s  final  decision.     The  court  shall




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determine  whether  the  petitioner  is  entitled
to  the  relief  sought  in  the  petition,  based
upon  its  review  of  the  official  record.  The
court  reviewing  a  final  decision  under  this
subsection  may  adopt  the  administrative  law
judge’s   decision;   may   adopt,   reverse,   or
modify  the  agency’s  decision;  may  remand  the
case  to  the  agency  for  further  explanations
under G.S.  150B-36(b1),  150B-36(b2), or  150B-
36(b3),   or   reverse   or   modify   the   final
decision  for  the  agency’s  failure  to  provide
the  explanations;  and  may  take  any  other
action allowed by law.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  150B-51(c)  (2007).
Here,  we  find  that  the  trial  court  correctly  exercised  and
applied  the  de  novo  standard  by  reviewing  the  record  anew  and
making  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law.    Nevertheless,
alleged  errors  of  law  are  reviewed  de  novo  by  this  Court.
Hilliard,  173 N.C. App. at  596,  620 S.E.2d at  17.
II.    Just Cause for Disciplinary Action
Petitioner  argues  that  his  actions  on  13  April  2006  did  not
amount  to  just  cause  for  termination  and  that  the  trial  court
erred  in  concluding  as  a  matter  of  law  that                        “the  DOT  had  just
cause  to  dismiss  Petitioner  for  unacceptable  personal  conduct  in
accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  126-35.”
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  126-35  (2007)  (emphasis added) states that
“[n]o  career  State  employee  subject  to  the  State  Personnel  Act
shall  be  discharged,  suspended,  or  demoted  for  disciplinary




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2
                                                                         reasons, except for just  cause.”                                                                                                                                                                                                       “‘Just cause is a legal basis,
                                                                                                               set  forth  by  statute,  for  the  termination                                                                                                                                                                                       [or  demotion]  of  a
                                                                                                                                                                    State employee, and requires the application of legal principles.
                                                                                                                                                                    Thus,  its  determination  is  a  question  of  law.’”    Skinner  v.  N.C.
Dep’t  of  Corr.,                                                                                              154  N.C.  App.                                      270,                                                                          280,                                                           572  S.E.2d                         184,                           191
(2002)                                                                                                                                                              (quoting  Gainey  v.  N.C.  Dep’t  of  Justice,                                                                                                                                  121  N.C.  App.
                                                                                                               253,  259 n.2,  465 S.E.2d  36,  41 n.2  (1996)).
                                                                                                                                                                    Though  not  defined  in  the  statute,  “just  cause”  may  consist
of                                                                                                             “unacceptable  personal  conduct.”                                                                                                                                                                25  N.C.A.C.                                                       1J.0604(b)
(2008).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           It  is  undisputed  that  petitioner  was  dismissed  for
                                                                                                               unacceptable  personal  conduct,  which  includes:                                                                                                                                                                                    “(4)  the  willful
                                                                                                               violation  of  known  or  written  work  rules[.]”                                                                                                                                                                                    25   N.C.A.C.
1J.0614(i)                                                               (2008).                               “One  act  of                                                                                                                                                                                     [unacceptable  personal  conduct]
presents                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ‘just  cause’  for  any  discipline,  up  to  and  including
dismissal.”    Hilliard,                                                                                                                                            173  N.C.  App.  at                                                                                                                          597,                                620  S.E.2d  at                17.
“Under  subsection                                                                                             (4)  of                                              25  N.C.A.C.                                                                                                                                                                     1J.0614(i),  the  employer’s
work  rules  may  be  written  or                                        ‘known’  and  a  willful  violation
occurs  when  the  employee  willfully  takes  action  which  violates
the  rule  and  does  not  require  that  the  employee  intend  his
conduct  to  violate  the  work  rule.”    Id.                           (citing  N.C.  Dep't  of
2
It  is  undisputed  that  petitioner  qualified  as  a  career  State
employee.




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Corr.  v.  McNeely,  135  N.C.  App.  587,  592-93,  521  S.E.2d  730,  734
(1999))  (emphasis added).
In   the   present   case,   the   trial   court   concluded   that
petitioner  had  willfully  violated  known  or  written  work  rules  in
the  form  of  the  Workplace  Violence  Policy  and  that  his  “actions
posed  a  potential  detrimental  impact  on  the  safety  of  other
employees[.]”     These  actions  amounted  to  unacceptable  personal
conduct  according  to  the  trial  court.    Petitioner  argues  that  he
did  not  violate  known  or  written  work  rules  and  points  to  the
ALJ’s   determination   that   petitioner’s   actions   amounted   to
“horseplay”   and   that                                                      “[t]he   contention   that                         ‘horseplay’   is
prohibited  by  the  Workplace  Violence  Policy  is  not  supported  by
the  plain  meaning  of  the  published  policy.”  3  However,  the  trial
court, in reviewing the evidence de novo, concluded:
The  DOT’s  Workplace  Violence  Policy  provides
that  workplace  violence                                                     “[i]ncludes,  but  is
not    limited    to    intimidation,    threats,
physical    attack,    domestic    violence    or
property    damage.”                                                          (Emphasis    addded).
Therefore,  the  policy  is  not  all  inclusive
and  not  strictly  limited  to  the  definitions
therein    provided.                                                          Whether    or    not
Petitioner’s actions met the plain definition
of  a                                                                         “physical  attack”  or  constituted  an
3
The SPC  adopted this finding of fact, concurring that horseplay
does  not  constitute  a  violation  of  the  policy;  nevertheless,  the
SPC  still  found  that  petitioner’s  actions  violated  the  policy
because  his  actions                                                         “pos[ed]  a  serious  safety  violation  in  the
workplace.”




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assault  is  not  the  determining  factor  for
constituting  a  violation  of  the  policy.    The
main objective of the policy is to maintain a
safe,                                                                            healthy    and    efficient    working
environment.
Though  petitioner  claims  that  his  motives  were  innocent  and
that  none  of  the  employees  were  placed  in  danger,  we  agree  with
the  trial  court’s  reasoning  above.    Even  though                           “horseplay”  is
not  listed  as  a  violation  of  the  Workplace  Violence  Policy,  the
actions of petitioner could have potentially caused physical harm
to  a  fellow  employee.    Petitioner  threw  a  knife  at  a  table  where
another  employee  was  in  close  proximity,  and  when  the  knife
bounced  off  the  table,  it  landed  near  another  employee.  4  Though
petitioner   never   meant   to   harm   anyone,   his   intentions   are
irrelevant   where  the  actions  he  took  constituted  a  willful
violation of known and/or written work rules.    Hilliard,  173 N.C.
App.  at  597,  620  S.E.2d  at  17.    In  sum,  we  find  no  error  in  the
trial  court’s  conclusion  of  law  that  “the  DOT  had  just  cause  to
dismiss Petitioner for unacceptable personal conduct[.]”
III.    Deference to the ALJ’s Recommendation
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to
give  deference  to  the  ALJ  because  the  ALJ  is  in  a  position  to
4
We note that the trial court did not find as fact that the   knife
thrown  by  petitioner  constituted  a                                           “weapon”  prohibited  by  the
Workplace Violence Policy.




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hear  the  evidence  and  assess  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,
while the trial court reviews the cold record.
N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                           §     150B-51(c)    (emphasis   added)   clearly
states:
In  reviewing  the  case,  the  court  shall  not
give  deference  to  any  prior  decision  made  in
the  case  and  shall  not  be   bound  by  the
findings  of  fact  or  the  conclusions  of  law
contained  in  the  agency’s  final  decision.
The   court   shall   determine   whether   the
petitioner  is  entitled  to  the  relief  sought
in the petition, based upon its review of the
official record  .  .  .
Accordingly,   petitioner’s   argument   is   without   merit.
Granger  v.  Univ.  of  North  Carolina  at  Chapel  Hill,  __  N.C.  App.
__,                                                                           __,   678  S.E.2d   715,                           716-17   (2009)   (acknowledging  a  trial
court’s  obligation  to  review  contested  cases  de  novo,  without
deference to prior decisions in the case).
III.    Level of Discipline Administered
Petitioner  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  concluding
that  the  OAH  and  the  Commission  lack  the  authority  to  review  the
level  of  discipline  an  agency  chooses  to  administer.    We  agree.
Although we hold that there was just cause for dismissal due to a
violation  of  the  Workplace  Violence  Policy,  we  further  conclude
that   the   supervisors   presiding   over   the   pre-disciplinary
conference,  who  subsequently  recommended  dismissal,  were  under




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the erroneous impression that the DOT’s Workplace Violence Policy
required dismissal, as opposed to some other disciplinary action.
Pursuant to  25 N.C.A.C.  1J.0604(a)  (2008):
The  degree  and  type  of  action  taken  shall  be
based  upon  the  sound  and  considered  judgment
of  the  appointing  authority  in  accordance
with  the  provisions  of  this  Rule.  When  just
cause  exists  the  only  disciplinary  actions
provided for under this Section are:
(1)   Written warning;
(2)   Disciplinary suspension
without pay;
(3)   Demotion; and
(4)   Dismissal.
Based  on  the  regulation’s  plain  language,  dismissal  is  an
option  when  just  cause  is  established;  however,  there  are  other
alternatives.                                                                 “On judicial review, an agency’s interpretation of
its  own  regulations  will  be  enforced  unless  clearly  erroneous  or
inconsistent  with  the  regulation’s  plain  language.”     Hilliard,
173  N.C.  App.  at  598,  620  S.E.2d  at  17-18  (citing  Britt  v.  N.C.
Sheriff’s Educ. and Training Stds. Comm’n,  348 N.C.  573,  576,  501
S.E.2d  75,  77  (1998))  (emphasis  added).    In  reviewing  the  record
de  novo,  we  conclude  that  the  DOT’s  interpretation  of  its  own
regulation,  the  Workplace  Violence  Policy,  was  clearly  erroneous
and inconsistent with its plain language.




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Ransdell,   petitioner’s   immediate   supervisor,   and   Dumas,
Ransdell’s    supervisor,    presided    over    petitioner’s    pre-
disciplinary   conference   and   recommended   that   petitioner   be
dismissed  because  the  Workplace  Violence  Policy  was                      “black-and-
white.”     Ransdell  testified  at  the  administrative  hearing  that
based  on  the  language  of  the  policy  and  his  training  regarding
the  policy,  it  was  his  belief  that  the  DOT  had  a  “zero  tolerance
policy”  with  regard  to                                                      “[v]iolence  involving  a  weapon[,]”  and
that  dismissal  of  petitioner  was  the  only  option.     He  further
stated   that   suspension,   transfer,   mediation,   or   a   written
warning,  were  not  options  in  this  case.    Ransdell  also  testified
that it was his belief that throwing a knife, or even a wadded up
piece  of  paper,  in  an  empty  room  would  constitute  a  violation  of
the  policy.  5  After  Ransdell  and  Dumas  recommended  termination,
petitioner  received  a  letter  from  Timothy  Johnson                        (“Johnson”),
Division Engineer, which informed petitioner that he had  “decided
to  follow  the  recommendation  to  dismiss                                   [him]                                        .”    After
petitioner   filed   an   internal   grievance,   DeVane   upheld   the
decision to terminate petitioner.
5
Although it does not specifically go to the issue of petitioner’s
conduct  in  the  present  case,  we  note  that  this  interpretation  of
the  policy  is  also  erroneous.    The  plain  language  of  the  policy
reveals  that  the  intention  of  the  policy  is  to  prevent  certain
actions that could negatively impact other individuals.




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Based    on    Ransdell’s    testimony,    we    find    that    the
recommendation  that  petitioner  be  dismissed  was  based  on  an
erroneous   belief   that   the   policy   required   dismissal.                                                                            The
Workplace  Violence  Policy  states  that                                    “[a]  violation  of                                            [the]
policy                                                                       .  may  be  grounds  for  disciplinary  action,  up  to  and
including dismissal.”                                                        (emphasis added).    The policy includes all
manner  of  assault  and  physical  attack,  among  other  things,  and
states  that  dismissal  is  an  option,  not  that  it  is  the  only
option  in  circumstances  such  as  the  one  involving  petitioner.
Therefore,  the  other  alternatives  enumerated  in                         25  N.C.A.C.
1J.0604(a) were available to reprimand petitioner once just cause
was  established.    Had  Dumas  and  Ransdell  recommended  suspension,
which  the  ALJ  later  determined  was  the  appropriate  remedy,  it  is
reasonable  to  presume  that  Johnson,  and  later  DeVane,  may  have
followed   that   recommendation.                                            In   the   letter   terminating
defendant,  Johnson  did  not  specify  why  the  DOT  had  selected
termination  as  opposed  to  other  disciplinary  options;  he  simply
followed the recommendation of Dumas and Ransdell.6
In  sum,  the  supervisors  who  were  in  charge  of  investigating
the  allegations  against  petitioner  and  presiding  over  the  pre-
6
DeVane’s  decision  is  not  contained  in  the  record;  however,  it
appears that both Johnson and DeVane relied upon the recommendation
of   Ransdell   and   Dumas,   which   was   based   upon   an   erroneous
interpretation of the policy.




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disciplinary   conference   erroneously   interpreted   the   plain
language  of  the  policy.     The  policy  does  not  mandate                “zero
tolerance”  in  situations  such  as  the  one  involving  petitioner,
and  dismissal  was  not  the  only  option  available.  7  While  we  have
established  that  just  cause  was  present  for  disciplinary  action
up to and including dismissal, we find that the trial court erred
in refusing to review the DOT’s disciplinary action in this case.
Accordingly,  we  remand  for  further  proceedings  not  inconsistent
with  this  opinion.     The  actions  allowed  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.         §
150B-51(c)  are  still  available  to  the  trial  court  on  remand,
including adoption of the ALJ’s proposed decision.
Conclusion
We  hold  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  concluding  that
the  SPC  had  just  cause  to  administer  disciplinary  action  against
petitioner,  up  to  and  including  dismissal;  the  trial  court  did
not  err  in  failing  to  give  deference  to  the  ALJ  determination;
however,  the  trial  court  erred  in  concluding  that  it  could  not
review  the  DOT’s  interpretation  of  its  own  regulations,  which
were, in fact, misinterpreted in this case.
7
We  have  found  no  case  law  that  suggests  that  the  agency  must
consider other options prior to selecting termination; however, 25
N.C.A.C.  1J.0604(a)  clearly  lists  three  less  severe  options  from
which the agency may choose.




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Reversed and remanded.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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