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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA10-328
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  21 December  2010
LYNN A. ROLLS,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Guilford County
No.  08 CVD  12537
FREDERICK ALVIN ROLLS,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered  10 July  2009 by Judge
Joseph E. Turner in Guilford County District Court.    Heard in the
Court of Appeals  29 September  2010.
Katherine Freeman, PLLC, by Katherine Freeman, for plaintiff-
appellee.
Fredrick Alvin Rolls, pro se, for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Where  defendant  failed  to  assign  error  to  the  denial  of  his
motion  for  a  continuance,  this  argument  is  dismissed.     Where
subsequent  to  asserting  a  claim  for  equitable  distribution  in
contravention  of  the  parties’  Separation  Agreement,  defendant
accepted  the  benefits  of  the  Separation  Agreement  in  a  domestic
relations order, the trial court properly concluded that defendant
ratified the Separation Agreement and granted summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff.
I.    Factual and Procedural Background




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Lynn  Rolls  (plaintiff)  and  Frederick  Rolls  (defendant)  were
married  on  1  August  1980  and  separated  on  23  October  2007.    One
child  was  born  of  the  marriage,  who  has  reached  the  age  of
majority.     Plaintiff  and  defendant  entered  into  a  Separation
Agreement  on                                                                 23  October   2007.    In  the  agreement,  plaintiff  and
defendant  acknowledged  that  a  full  disclosure  of  all  assets  and
debts  had  been  made  by  each  of  the  parties  and  that  they  waived
equitable distribution pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20, et seq.
On 24 October 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an absolute
divorce  from  defendant.    On  22  December  2008,  defendant  filed  an
answer and counterclaim alleging that plaintiff had failed to make
a full disclosure of all her assets as required by the Separation
Agreement; that defendant was entitled to specific performance of
that  provision  of  the  agreement;  and  that  he  was  entitled  to  an
equitable  distribution  of  marital  property  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.
Stat. § 50-20.   Defendant’s allegations were made “upon information
and  belief”  and  did  not  specifically  assert  fraud,  duress,  undue
influence, or coercion on the part of plaintiff.   Defendant further
requested  an  unequal  division  of  marital  property.     Plaintiff
replied  to  defendant’s  counterclaim  and  pled  the  Separation
Agreement in bar of defendant’s claim for equitable distribution.
On  14 January 2009, the trial court entered a judgment of divorce,
reserving the other claims for further determination by the court.
On  17 April  2009, with the consent of all parties, the trial
court entered a domestic relations order, directing the transfer of
one-half  of  plaintiff’s  Individual  Retirement  Account  with  The




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Hartford  to  defendant,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the
Separation Agreement.   On 3 June 2009, plaintiff filed a motion for
summary  judgment  seeking  dismissal  of  defendant’s  counterclaim.
When the motion was called for hearing, defendant’s counsel moved
for a continuance, asserting that she did not have adequate time to
obtain copies of plaintiff’s discovery responses and that she had
not  received  plaintiff’s  memorandum  of  law  in  support  of  summary
judgment until the afternoon before the hearing.    The trial court
denied defendant’s motion.   Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
was  granted,  and  defendant’s  counterclaim  was  dismissed  with
prejudice.
Defendant  appeals.                                                           Defendant’s  counsel  was  allowed  to
withdraw following entry of summary judgment.
II.    Motion for Continuance
In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial court
erred  by  denying  his  motion  for  a  continuance.    We  dismiss  this
argument.
Prior  to  the  amendments  to  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of
Appellate Procedure, effective 1 October 2009, these rules required
appellants to set forth assignments of error upon which the appeal
was  predicated.    N.C.R.  App.  P.                                          10(c)(1)                                 (2009).    The  scope  of
review  on  appeal  was  confined  to  those  assignments  of  error  set
forth  in  the  record.    N.C.R.  App.  P.  10(a)  (2009).    Our  Supreme
Court  amended  these  Rules,  and  abolished  the  requirement  of
assignments of error in favor of proposed issues on appeal.   N.C.R.
App. P. 10(b) (2009) (amended October 1, 2009).   Proposed issues on




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appeal  do  not  limit  our  scope  of  review.    In  the  instant  case,
defendant  filed  his  notice  of  appeal  on  10  August  2009.    Because
the  notice  of  appeal  was  filed  prior  to                                 1  October                                               2009,  the
amendments to the Rules of Appellate Procedure are not applicable.
See  Latta  v.  Rainey,  ___  N.C.  App.  ___,  ___,  689  S.E.2d  898,  905
n.4 (2010).   Our scope of review is thus limited to the assignments
of error set forth in the record.    Defendant’s only assignment of
error  states,                                                                 “Defendant  challenges  the  Summary  Judgment  ruling
entered                                                                        10 th July                                               2009  from  Guilford  County  District  Court[.]”
Defendant failed to assign error to the trial court’s denial of his
motion to continue and has waived appellate review of this issue.
Id. at  ___,  689 S.E.2d at  905.    This argument is dismissed.
III.    Ratification of Separation Agreement
In  his  second  argument,  defendant  contends  that  the  trial
court  erred  by  granting  plaintiff’s  motion  for  summary  judgment
because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether
defendant had ratified the Separation Agreement.    We disagree.
A.    Standard of Review
Summary  judgment  is  proper                                                  “if  the  pleadings,  depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as
a  matter  of  law.”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                        §                                                        1A-1,  Rule                                         56(c)   (2009).
“Summary judgment should be looked upon with favor where no genuine
issue of material fact is presented.”   Lowry v. Lowry, 99 N.C. App.
246,  249,  393 S.E.2d  141,  143  (1990)  (citation omitted).




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B.    Analysis
It  is  well-established  that  parties  to  a  marriage  may  enter
into  a  written  agreement  which  provides  that  they  are  foregoing
their statutory right to equitable distribution and agreeing upon
a  division  of  their  marital  estate.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-20(d)
(2009).                                                                      “Whether entered into before, during, or after marriage,
‘[t]hese  agreements  are  favored  in  this  state,  as  they  serve  the
salutary purpose of enabling marital partners to come to a mutually
acceptable settlement of their financial affairs.’”   Hill v. Hill,
94  N.C.  App.                                                               474,                                                       480,   380  S.E.2d   540,   545   (1989)   (quotation
omitted).    An  agreement  waiving  equitable  distribution                 “will  be
honored by the courts and will be binding upon the parties.”    Id.
(quotation omitted).
In  order  for  such  an  agreement  to  be  valid,  it                      “must  be
untainted  by  fraud,  must  be  in  all  respects  fair,  reasonable  and
just,  and  must  have  been  entered  into  without  coercion  or  the
exercise  of  undue  influence,  and  with  full  knowledge  of  all  the
circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting parties.”
Eubanks v. Eubanks,  273 N.C.  189,  196,  159 S.E.2d  562,  567  (1968)
(quotation  omitted).     It  is  well-established  that  an  agreement
“procured  by  either  fraud,  duress  or  undue  influence  may  be
ratified by the victim so as to preclude a subsequent suit to set
the  transaction  aside.”    Link  v.  Link,                                 278  N.C.                                                  181,   197,          179
S.E.2d  697,  706  (1971)  (citations omitted).
A party ratifies an agreement by retroactively
“authorizing or otherwise approving it,  .  .  .
either  expressly  or  by  implication.”  Thus,
ratification  can  occur  where  a  party  accepts




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benefits and performs under an agreement. The
act  only  constitutes  ratification  if  it  is
done  with  full  knowledge  that  the  acceptance
of benefits or the performance arises pursuant
to  the  agreement  and  is  done  so  without  any
duress.
Goodwin  v.  Webb,  152  N.C.  App.  650,  656-57,  568  S.E.2d  311,  315
(2002) (Greene, J., dissenting) (internal quotation, citations, and
alterations  omitted),  per  curiam  rev’d  based  on  the  dissenting
opinion,  357 N.C.  40,  577 S.E.2d  621  (2003).
In  Hill  v.  Hill,  the  plaintiff  alleged  that  her  husband
wrongfully   procured   her   signature   on   the   parties’   property
settlement  agreement  and  a  subsequent  amendment,  and  argued  that
she was entitled to a statutory equitable distribution of marital
property.                                                                     94  N.C.  App.  at   478,                              380  S.E.2d  at     544.   However,
evidence  presented  to  the  trial  court  showed  she  had  accepted  a
$1,000.00  per  month  payment  from  the  defendant  pursuant  to  the
agreement after she became aware of his alleged wrongdoing.   Id. at
479,                                                                          380  S.E.2d  at      544.    This  Court  held  that   “[t]he  materials
before  us  plainly  show  that  the  wife  has  continued  to  accept  the
benefits  of  both  agreements  long  after  she  became  aware  of  the
alleged  wrongdoing.    She  cannot  now  avoid  the  same  contracts  she
acquiesced  in  for  months  and  the  benefits  of  which  she  still
enjoys.”    Id.  (citations omitted).
In the instant case, on  22 December  2008, defendant asserted
that  plaintiff  had  failed  to  disclose  all  of  her  marital  assets
pursuant  to  the  terms  of  the  Separation  Agreement.    Yet,  on         17
April 2009, defendant and his counsel executed a domestic relations
order  that  directed  the  transfer  of  one-half  of  plaintiff’s




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Individual Retirement Account to defendant in accordance with the
terms  of  the  Separation  Agreement.     This  order  contained  no
reservation concerning defendant’s counterclaim.   Defendant cannot
attack the Separation Agreement while simultaneously accepting its
benefits.    The  execution  of  the  domestic  relations  order,  which
enforced  one  of  the  provisions  of  the  Separation  Agreement,
constituted   a   ratification   of   the   Separation   Agreement   by
defendant.    Hill,  94 N.C. App. at  479,  380 S.E.2d at  544.
Defendant is not permitted to now argue that the provisions in
the agreement should be disregarded because he believes he received
a  bad  bargain.    See  generally  Blaylock  Grading  Co.  v.  Smith,  189
N.C. App.  508,  511,  658 S.E.2d  680,  682  (2008)  (“People should be
entitled to contract on their own terms without the indulgence of
paternalism  by  courts  in  the  alleviation  of  one  side  or  another
from  the  effects  of  a  bad  bargain.”  (quotation  omitted)),  disc.
review denied,  362 N.C.  469,  665 S.E.2d  737  (2008).
We  note  that  defendant’s  arguments  attempt  to  show  that  a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to possible assets that
were  not  disclosed  by  plaintiff.    These  arguments  are  based  upon
the  parties’  depositions  and  discovery  responses.    However,  only
portions of defendant’s deposition testimony are before this Court
on  appeal.     It  is  incumbent  on  an  appellant  to  provide  the
reviewing court  “with the materials necessary to decide the issue
on  appeal.    The  appellate  courts  can  judicially  know  only  what
appears  of  record.”    Jackson  v.  Housing  Authority  of  High  Point,




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321 N.C.  584,  586,  364 S.E.2d  416,  417  (1988)  (internal citations
omitted).    We do not consider these arguments.    Id.
DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
Judges BRYANT and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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