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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal  authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule  30(e)(3) of the  North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA11-1471
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  7 August  2012
Dr. Janice Elizabeth Barron
Rushing
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Burke County
No.  08 CVS  1269
Dr. John I. Barron, Individually
and as Co-Trustee of the Nelle W.
Barron Revocable Trust Agreement,
THE NELLE BARRON REVOCABLE TRUST,
THE NELLE W. BARRON AMENDED
REVOCABLE TRUST, WILLIAM ELLIS
BARRON, Individually and as Co-
Trustee of the Nelle W. Barron
Trust,
Defendants.
Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  an  order  entered  22  March  2010  by
Judge  Forrest  D.  Bridges,  and  from  orders  entered  15  April  2010,
and  6  April  2011  by  Judge  Beverly  T.  Beal,  all  in  Burke  County
Superior Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  10 May  2012.
Mr. Clyde Gary Triggs, attorney for plaintiff.
Mr.  Forrest  A.  Ferrell  and  Mr.  Stephen  L.  Palmer,  of
SIGMON,   CLARK,   MACKIE,   HUTTON,   HANVEY   &   FERRELL,   PA,
attorneys for defendants.
ELMORE, Judge.




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Dr.  Janice  Elizabeth  Barron  Rushing                                       (plaintiff)  appeals
from  a  collection  of  orders  from  the  trial  court                      1)  granting
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  her  father  and  brother,                  2)  ruling
in  favor  of  her  father,  Dr.  John  Barron,  on  her  defamation
claim,  and                                                                   3)  awarding  attorney’s  fees  in  favor  of  her  father
and brother.    After careful consideration, we affirm.
I. Background
Plaintiff  is  the  daughter  of  Nelle   W.  Barron                          (who  is
deceased)  and  Dr.  John  Barron.     She  has  two  brothers,  John
Barron,  Jr.                                                                  (also  deceased)  and  William  E.  Barron.     Plaintiff
had  a  poor  relationship  with  her  family,  and  she  was  estranged
from  them  for  many  years.    From                                         1981  until                                                  1994,  plaintiff  had
no  contact  with  anyone  in  her  immediate  family.     During  this
time,  her  mother  executed  a  last  will  and  testament                   (the  will)
and  a  revocable  trust,  which  entirely  excluded  plaintiff  from
inheritance.
However,  in                                                                  1994,  plaintiff  met  with  her  parents,  and  she
then  began  having  intermittent  contact  with  them.    In  December
2004,  her  mother  died.    In  2006,  plaintiff  filed  a  caveat  action
contesting  her  mother’s  will.    In  that  action  she  alleged  that
her  mother  lacked  testamentary  capacity  and  that  her  will  was
the  product  of  undue  influence  and  duress  committed  by  her




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father  and  brother.    Plaintiff  also  filed  a  civil  action  against
her  father  and  brother  for                                                 1)  defamation,   2)  civil  conspiracy,
3)  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress,                          4)  breach  of
fiduciary  duty,  and  5)  unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices.    In
that   action,   she   also   sought   injunctive   relief,   punitive
damages,  and  attorney’s  fees.    Plaintiff  based  these  claims  on
her  belief  that  her  father  and  brother  turned  her  mother  against
her.
On  22  March  2010,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order  granting
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff’s  father  and  brother  for
all  claims  except  one  part  of  the  defamation  claim.    The  trial
court  allowed  plaintiff  to  proceed,  in  part,  with  her  defamation
claim  against  her  father  for  a  statement  he  allegedly  made  about
her  stealing  her  mother’s  money.     Plaintiff  then  appealed  the
trial  court’s  decision  to  grant  summary  judgment,  and  she  also
filed  a  motion  to  stay  trial  on  the  remaining  defamation  claim
pending  her  appeal.    On  15  April  2010,  the  trial  court  issued  an
order  denying  plaintiff’s  motion  to  stay,  and  the  defamation
claim  proceeded  to  trial.    At  the  conclusion  of  the  trial,  the
trial  court  ruled  in  favor  of  plaintiff’s  father.     The  trial
court  then  issued  an  order  on                                             6  April          2011,  assessing  both  her
father’s  and  her  brother’s  attorney’s  fees  against  plaintiff.




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In   that   order,   the   trial   court   found   that   plaintiff   had
improperly   used   the   legal   process   to   harass   her   family.
Plaintiff now appeals.
II. Arguments
A. Summary judgment
Plaintiff   first   argues   that   the   trial   court   erred   by
granting  partial  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendants.     We
disagree.
“Our  standard  of  review  of  an  appeal  from  summary  judgment
is  de  novo;  such  judgment  is  appropriate  only  when  the  record
shows  that                                                                    ‘there  is  no  genuine  issue  as  to  any  material  fact
and  that  any  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a  matter  of
law.’”    In  re  Will  of  Jones,  362  N.C.  569,  573,  669  S.E.2d  572,
576                                                                            (2008)                                                        (quoting  Forbis  v.  Neal,   361  N.C.   519,   524,   649
S.E.2d  382,  385  (2007)).
Here,  the  trial  court  granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of
defendants  on  the  following  claims:                                        1)  civil  conspiracy,                                        2)
intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress,                              3)  motion  to  set
aside  conveyances,  4)  injunctive  relief,  5)  unfair  and  deceptive
trade  practices,  and  6)  punitive  damages.    The  trial  court  also
granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendants  on  plaintiff’s




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defamation  claim,  except  with  regards  to  statements  allegedly
made by her father.    We will address each claim in turn.
i. Civil Conspiracy
With   regards   to   her   civil   conspiracy   claim,   plaintiff
alleged   that   her   father   and   brother   engaged   in   a   civil
conspiracy  to  alienate  her  mother’s  affection  and  to  convince
her  mother  to  exclude  plaintiff  from  inheritance.                                                                               However,
“[t]here   is   no   independent   cause   of   action   for   civil
conspiracy.”     Toomer  v.  Garrett,                                         155  N.C.  App.                                  462,   483,       574
S.E.2d  76,  92  (2002).                                                      “Only  where  there  is  an  underlying  claim
for  unlawful  conduct  can  a  plaintiff  state  a  claim  for  civil
conspiracy  by  also  alleging  the  agreement  of  two  or  more  parties
to   carry   out   the   conduct   and   injury   resulting   from   that
agreement.”    Id. at  483,  574 S.E.2d at  92.
North  Carolina  has  never  recognized  alienation  of  affection
for  any  relationship  other  than  that  of  spouses.                       “[A]lienation
of  affection  involves  a  wrongful  act  that  deprives  a  married
person   of   the   affection,   love,   society,   companionship,   and
comfort  of  the  spouse.    The  tort  protects  a  spouse’s  interest  in
having  a  peaceful  and  uninterrupted  marriage.”    Am.  Mfrs.  Mut.
Ins.  Co.  v.  Morgan,                                                        147  N.C.  App.                                  438,   443,       556  S.E.2d   25,               28
(2001)                                                                        (quotations   and   citations   omitted).                                        Thus,   because




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plaintiff  has  not  alleged  an  unlawful  act  recognized  in  the
state  of  North  Carolina,  a  civil  conspiracy  claim  necessarily
could  not  have  arisen  between  the  parties.    As  such,  we  conclude
that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  by  granting  summary  judgment  in
favor of defendants with regards to this claim.
ii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
With  regards  to  plaintiff’s  next  claim,  she  alleged  that
years   of   emotional   distress   arising   from   the   strained
relationship  with  her  family  was  intentionally  directed  at  her
by defendants.
“The   elements   of   intentional   infliction   of   emotional
distress  are:  ‘(1)  extreme  and  outrageous  conduct,  (2)  which  is
intended                                                                       to   cause   and   does   cause                                (3)   severe   emotional
                                                                               distress.’”     Denning-Boyles  v.  WCES,  Inc.,               123  N.C.  App.            409,
                                                                               412,  473  S.E.2d  38,  40-41  (1996)  (citations  omitted).                              “Conduct
is  extreme  and  outrageous  when  it  is  so  outrageous  in  character,
and  so  extreme  in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all  possible  bounds  of
decency,   and   to   be   regarded   as   atrocious,   and   utterly
intolerable  in  a  civilized  community.”    Guthrie  v.  Conroy,             152
N.C.  App.  15,  22,  567  S.E.2d  403,  408-09  (2002)  (quotations  and
citations omitted).
The  liability  clearly  does  not  extend  to
mere                                                                           insults,                                                       indignities,               threats,




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annoyances,   petty   oppressions,   or   other
trivialities.                                                                .    plaintiffs    must
necessarily  be  expected  and  required  to  be
hardened  to                                                                 .  occasional  acts  that  are
definitely  inconsiderate  and  unkind.     There
is  no  occasion  for  the  law  to  intervene  in
every  case  where  some  one's  feelings  are
hurt.
Briggs  v.  Rosenthal,  73  N.C.  App.  672,  677,  327  S.E.2d  308,  311
(1985).
Here,   plaintiff   alleged,   in   sum,   that   her   father   and
brother                                                                                                       “systematically  exclud[ed]   [her]  from  family  functions”
and                                                                          “treated                         [her]  as  though             [she]  did  not  exist[.]”    However,
this  conduct,  while  perhaps  painful  to  plaintiff,  is  not  of  the
extreme  or  outrageous  nature  contemplated  by  this  cause  of
action.     Plaintiff  may  have  in  fact  suffered  some  painful  and
hurtful  emotions  following  years  of  strained  relations  with  her
family,  but  she  has  not  alleged  that  it  resulted  from  acts  so
egregious  as  to  be  utterly  intolerable  in  a  civilized  community.
Thus,  we  conclude  that  summary  judgment  as  to  this  claim  was
proper.
iii. Motion to Set Aside Conveyances
Plaintiff’s   next   claim   was   a   motion   to   set   aside
conveyances.    Here,  she  alleged  that  conveyances  of  property  to
her  mother’s  revocable  trust  were  invalid  due  to  fraud,  duress,
or   undue   influence   by   her   father   and   brother.                  In   the




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alternative,   plaintiff   alleged   that   the   revocable   trust
agreement  was  invalid  from  the  time  of  its  creation  due  to  her
mother’s alleged incapacity.
However,   our   General   Statutes   require   that   actions
contesting  the  validity  of  a  revocable  trust  must  be  made  within
three   years   of   the   settlor’s   death   or,   at   the   trustee’s
election,                                                                    120  days  after  the  settlor’s  death  if  the  trustee
gives proper notice.    See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  36C-6-604  (2011).
Here,  Nelle  Barron  died  on  13  December  2004  and  this  action
was  filed  on                                                               18  July                                                    2008.        Thus,  it  is  clear  that  plaintiff
failed   to   timely   file   this   action   within   the   statute   of
limitations   prescribed   by   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                          §                                                           36C-6-604.
Accordingly,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants for this claim.
iv. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff  next  sought  injunctive  relief  to  prevent  the
distribution   of   assets   from   her   mother’s   revocable   trust.
However,  again  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  36C-6-604  requires  that  actions
contesting  the  distribution  of  trust  property  be  made  within
three   years   of   the   settlor’s   death   or,   at   the   trustee’s
election,                                                                    120  days  after  the  settlor’s  death  if  the  trustee
gives  proper  notice.    Id.    Thus,  for  the  same  reason  set  forth




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supra   with   regard   to   plaintiff’s   motion   to   set   aside
conveyances,  we  conclude  that  summary  judgment  was  properly
entered as to plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief.
v. Unfair  / Deceptive Trade Practices
Plaintiff  next  alleged  that  the  creation  of  her  mother’s
revocable  trust  and  conveyances  of  certain  real  property  to  it
constituted  an  unfair  or  deceptive  trade  practice,  because  they
were   done   under   circumstances   of   fraud,   duress,   or   undue
influence.     However,  in  order  to  show  a  prima  facie  case  for
unfair  or  deceptive  trade  practices,  a  plaintiff  must  allege,
“1)  an  unfair  or  deceptive  act  or  practice,  (2)  in  or  affecting
commerce,    and                                                               (3)                               which    proximately    caused    injury    to
plaintiffs.”     Walker  v.  Fleetwood  Homes  of  N.  Carolina,  Inc.,
362 N.C.  63,  71-72,  653 S.E.2d  393,  399  (2007).
Here,  plaintiff  argues  that  the  transfer  of  real  property
to  her  mother’s  trust  meets  the                                           “in  commerce”  requirement  of
this test.    We disagree.
“Our  courts  have  established  that  the  private  sale  of  a
residence  by  an  individual  is  not  an  act                                ‘in  or  affecting
commerce,’  and  is  thus  beyond  the  purview  of  G.S.                      75-1.1.    The
law  is  otherwise  as  to  persons  who  offer  or  sell  real  estate  for
a  business.”    Stephenson  v.  Warren,  136  N.C.  App.  768,  773,  525




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S.E.2d  809,  812-13  (2000)  (citation  omitted).    The  conveyance  in
this  case  was  a  private  transaction  between  plaintiff’s  parents
and  a  trust  they  established,  which  in  no  way  affected  commerce.
“Although  commerce  is  defined  broadly  under  G.S.  §  75-1.1(b)  as
‘all  business  activities,  however  denominated,’  the  fundamental
purpose  of  G.S.                                                               §                                     75-1.1  is  to  protect  the  consuming  public.”
Durling  v.  King,  146  N.C.  App.  483,  488,  554  S.E.2d  1,  4  (2001)
(quotations  and  citations  omitted).     The  transactions  in  the
case  sub  judice  were  not  business  transactions  nor  did  they
involve the  “consuming public.”
As  a  result,  we  conclude  that  plaintiff  has  failed  to
establish  a  claim  for  unfair  or  deceptive  trade  practices.
Summary  judgment  was  properly  entered  in  favor  of  defendants  as
to this claim.
vi. Defamation
Next,  with  regards  to  plaintiff’s  defamation  claim,  the
trial  court  granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendants  on
all  parts,  except  to  a  statement  made  by  plaintiff’s  father  on  8
December                                                                        2007.    That  statement  was  that   “[plaintiff]  stole  all
of  her  mother’s  money,  and  she  stole  from  me.    Now  she  is  trying
to  take  my  land.    She  will  tell  you  those  things  are  not  true
but  they  are.”    Plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in




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limiting  her  defamation  claim  to  only  this  statement.                 We
disagree.
The  statute  of  limitations  for  defamation  actions  including
libel  and  slander  is  one  year.     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                    §                                    1-54(3)
(2011).    Plaintiff’s  complaint  was  filed  22  April  2008,  thus  the
only  actionable  instances  of  defamation  are  those  which  occurred
on  or  after                                                                22  April                            2007.    Defendants  correctly  note  in  their
brief  that  plaintiff  did  not  allege  any  specific  instances  of
defamation   occurring   within   this   time   period,   except   the
statement  by  her  father.     Additionally,  plaintiff  concedes  in
her  reply  brief  that  most  of  the  defamatory  statements  she
alleged  were  made  outside  of  the  statute  of  limitations.    Thus,
we  conclude  that  the  trial  court  correctly  granted  summary
judgment in favor of defendants for this claim.
However,   in   her   reply   brief,   plaintiff   argues   in   the
alternative   that   evidence   of   other   alleged   instances   of
defamation  should  have  been  considered  as  evidence  at  trial.
But  we  decline  to  address  this  additional  argument,  as  it  was
not  presented  in  plaintiff’s  principal  brief,  and  it  is  not  a
response  to  any  new  issue  raised  by  appellee  in  their  brief.
                                                                             See  Beckles-Palomares  v.  Logan,                                                     202  N.C.  App.   235,   246,          688
S.E.2d                                                                       758,                                 765,  disc.  review  denied,                      364  N.C.         434,   702  S.E.2d




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219                                                                           (2010)   (holding  that  defendant,  by  its  failure  to  advance
the  issue  in  its  principal  brief,  has  abandoned  its  assignment
of  error  relating  to  the  denial  of  its  motion  for  summary
judgment).
vii. Punitive Damages
Finally,  we  address  plaintiff’s  claim  for  punitive  damages.
“Punitive  damages  may  be  awarded  only  if  the  claimant  proves
that  the  defendant  is  liable  for  compensatory  damages  and  that
one  of  the  following  aggravating  factors  was  present  and  was
related   to   the   injury   for   which   compensatory   damages   were
awarded:  (1)  Fraud.  (2)  Malice.  (3)  Willful  or  wanton  conduct.”
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1D-15  (2011).
Here,  we  have  already  determined  that  summary  judgment  was
proper  for  each  of  plaintiff’s  substantive  claims.    As  such,  the
trial  court  did  not  err  in  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of
defendants on plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
B. Motion to Continue, Motion to Stay Pending Appeal
Plaintiff  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion  by  denying  a  motion  to  continue  pending  appeal  and  a
motion to stay pending appeal.    We disagree.
“Whether  to  grant  a  motion  to  continue  is  within  the  sound
discretion  of  the  trial  court.”    Skelly  v.  Skelly,  ___  N.C.  App.




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___,                                                                        ___,                  715  S.E.2d                               618,                                               620                                                                          (2011)                                                                 (quotation  and  citations
                                                                                                                                                                                               omitted).    Likewise,  “the  denial  of  a  motion  to  stay  or  dismiss
                                                                                                                                                                                               rests  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge  and  will
                                                                                                                                                                                               not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  absent  an  abuse  of  that  discretion.”
                                                                                                                                            Park  E.  Sales,  LLC  v.  Clark-Langley,  Inc.,                                                                                                                                                       186  N.C.  App.                                  198,
202,                                                                        651   S.E.2d                                                    235,                                               238                                                                          (2007)                                                                 (quotations   and   citations
                                                                                                                                                                                               omitted).    Furthermore,  this  Court  has  held  that  an  appeal  from
an  order                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   “granting  partial  summary  judgment  is  interlocutory.”
                                                                            Johnson  v.  Lucas,                                             168  N.C.  App.                                                                                                                 515,                                                         518,      608  S.E.2d                     336,             338,
aff'd,                                                                      360  N.C.             53,                                                                                          619  S.E.2d                                                                  502                                                          (2005).   And                             “there  is  no
                                                                                                                                                                                               right   of   immediate   appeal   from   interlocutory   orders   and
                                                                                                  judgments.”     Sharpe  v.  Worland,                                                                                                                                      351  N.C.                                                    159,      161,                            522  S.E.2d
                                                                                                  577,  578  (1999)  (citations omitted).
                                                                                                                                            Here,  plaintiff  appealed  from  an  order                                                                                                                                                            “granting  Partial
                                                                                                                                                                                               Summary   Judgment   in   favor   of   the   Defendants[.]”                                                                                                                         Thus,
                                                                                                                                            plaintiff’s   appeal   was   interlocutory.                                                                                                                                                            As   such,   the   trial
court’s  denial  of  plaintiff’s  motion  to  stay  and  motion  to
continue  pending  appeal  was  proper.    We  conclude  that  the  trial
court did not err with regards to this issue.
C. Attorney’s Fees




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Lastly,  plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion  by  awarding  attorney’s  fees  to  defendants  in  the
amount of  $42,213.50.    We disagree.
“Our  review  of  the  trial  court’s  award  is  limited  to  the
determination  of  whether  the  record  demonstrates  a  manifest
abuse  of  discretion  by  the  judge.    The  trial  court’s  discretion
                                                                                                                                  is  practically  unlimited.”     Ollo  v.  Mills,                        136  N.C.  App.        618,
623,                                                                           525  S.E.2d                                        213,                                                216    (2000)        (citation  omitted).   If  a
pleading  is  signed  in  violation  of  Rule  11  of  our  Rules  of  Civil
Procedure,   a   trial   court   may   impose   appropriate   sanctions,
including  attorney’s  fees.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  11
(2011).
According  to  Rule                                                            11,  the  signer  certifies
that  three  distinct  things  are  true:  the
pleading  is                                                                   (1)  well  grounded  in  fact;                     (2)
warranted  by  existing  law,  or  a  good  faith
argument  for  the  extension,  modification,  or
reversal                                                                       of                                                 existing                                            law    (legal
sufficiency);  and  (3)  not  interposed  for  any
improper    purpose.                                                           A    breach    of    the
certification  as  to  any  one  of  these  three
prongs is a violation of the Rule.
Bryson  v.  Sullivan,                                                          330  N.C.                                          644,                                                655,   412  S.E.2d   327,                   332
(1992)  (quotations omitted).
Here,  the  trial  court  found  that                                          “this  action  was  brought
in   furtherance   of                                                          [plaintiff’s]   pursuit   of   an   inter-family
dispute  which  began  in  the  1970’s”  and  that  plaintiff  filed  suit




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“for   an   improper   purpose,   namely   to   harass,   persecute,   or
otherwise  vex  the  Defendants.”    Thus,  the  trial  court  found  that
plaintiff  violated  the  third  prong  of  Rule                             11,  that  plaintiff
advanced  her  claims  for  an  improper  purpose.                           As  such,  we
conclude  that  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in
awarding attorney’s fees to defendants.
III. Conclusion
In  sum,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court  properly  granted
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  defendants  with  regards  to  each  of
plaintiff’s  claims.     Furthermore,  we  conclude  that  the  trial
court   did   not   abuse   its   discretion   in   denying   plaintiff’s
motions  to  continue  or  stay  pending  appeal.    Lastly,  we  conclude
that  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  awarding
attorney’s fees to defendants.
Affirmed.
Judges GEER and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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