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NO. COA03-45
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                        4 November  2003
CHARLES SEMON,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                            Wake County
                                                                              No.  01 CVD  00715
MARCHETA SEMON,
Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 8 October 2002 by Judge
William  C.  Lawton  in  Wake  County  District  Court.    Heard  in  the
Court of Appeals  15 October  2003.
Robert  A.  Miller,  P.A.,  by  Robert  A.  Miller,  for  plaintiff-
appellant.
Smith Debnam Narron Wyche Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P., by John
W. Narron and Cynthia V. McAlister, for defendant-appellee.
TYSON, Judge.
Charles  Semon                                                                (“plaintiff”)  appeals  from  a  consent  order
entered  8 October  2002 confirming an arbitration award entered  11
September  2002.
I.    Background
Plaintiff and Marcheta Semon (“defendant”) were married on 21
December  1985.    In  1998,  plaintiff’s  father  died  and  left  him  an
estate worth several hundred thousand dollars, $75,000.00 of which
was deposited into a Charles Schwab account on 30 December 1998 in
both plaintiff’s and defendant’s names.   Plaintiff became extremely
depressed  after  the  death  of  his  father  and  attempted  suicide  in
early  March,                                                                 1999.    Immediately  prior  to  this  suicide  attempt,




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plaintiff  attempted  to  liquidate  the  funds  held  in  the  Charles
Schwab  account  and  transfer  them  to  his  first  cousin,  whom  he
considered  a  brother.     Defendant,  after  talking  to  plaintiff’s
physician  and  an  attorney,  transferred  all  the  funds  in  the
parties’ joint accounts into accounts in her sole name.   Defendant
also  countermanded  the  liquidation  of  the  funds  in  the  Charles
Schwab  account  and  prevented  the  transfer  of  the  funds  to
plaintiff’s cousin.
Several  weeks  after  plaintiff’s  suicide  attempt,  plaintiff
returned home.    Plaintiff was prescribed numerous medications and
testified that he remained in a  “drugged state” for approximately
fifteen  months  from  the  time  he  was  released  from  the  hospital
until  the  end  of  the  marriage.     Defendant  testified  that  the
parties  made  joint  decisions  about  investing  the  money  plaintiff
had received from his father’s estate.
On 10 July 2000, plaintiff and defendant separated.   Following
the  separation,  all  accounts  remained  in  defendant’s  sole  name.
Plaintiff  requested  that  defendant  return  his  property  but  she
refused.     On                                                            28  December                                              2000,  defendant  sold   1,000  shares  of
WorldCom stock from the Charles Schwab account at $14.50 per share
for a loss of $38.675 per share.   Defendant testified that the sole
purpose of this sale was to claim a large capital gains loss on the
parties’  joint                                                            2000  tax  return.     Defendant  was  unaware  of  the
$3,000.00 limit on capital losses for stock sales.   One week later,
defendant bought 725 shares of WorldCom stock at $19.25 per share.
Thereafter,  defendant  conducted  no  further  transactions  in  the




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Charles Schwab account.
On  12 April  2001, plaintiff filed his equitable distribution
inventory  affidavit.    Numerous  values  were  listed  as  unknown  on
this  affidavit  on  the  grounds  that  defendant  had  placed  all
accounts  in  her  sole  name  and  would  not  provide  plaintiff
information pertaining to the values.    On  19 June  2001, defendant
filed her equitable distribution inventory affidavit that included
specific values for the items plaintiff listed as “unknown” on his
affidavit.
The parties entered into numerous stipulations during a pre-
trial conference on  3 June  2002.    The parties stipulated that the
Chevrolet  Silverado  truck,  listed  on  Schedule  B  of  the  pre-trial
order, was worth $28,000.00 and should be distributed to defendant,
but disagreed on its classification.    The parties also stipulated
that  they  disagreed  regarding  the  value,  classification,  and
distribution of the Charles Schwab account.
At the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator found both the
Charles   Schwab   account   and   the   Chevrolet   Silverado   to   be
plaintiff’s  separate  property.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Plaintiff  also  offered  into
                                                                                                                                          evidence  all  of  his  account  statements  with  regards  to  his  MCI
                                                                                                                                          401(k)  account  from  the  date  of  separation  to  the  hearing.    This
evidence  showed  that:                                                                                                                                                                                                 (1)  at  the  date  of  separation  the  balance
was                                                                         $21,106.00;                                                                                                                                 (2)   plaintiff   made   contributions   totaling
$16,690.00   after  separation;  and                                        (3)   on  the  last  available
statement the total amount was only $26,120.00, substantially less
than  the                                                                   $37,797.00  that  was  in  the  account  after  plaintiff’s




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contributions.    Plaintiff also produced evidence to show that the
investment  portion  of  the  Charles  Schwab  account,  placed  into
defendant’s sole name, had drastically declined from $134,965.00 to
$16,375.00  since  the  date  of  separation.    Plaintiff  also  showed
that the cash portion of the account had declined from  $20,489.00
to  $6,046.00.
II.    Issues
The issues in this appeal are whether the arbitrator erred in:
(1)  distributing  the  Chevrolet  Silverado  truck  to  plaintiff;  (2)
utilizing  a  mathematically  incorrect  methodology  for  valuing  the
marital share of plaintiff’s MCI  401(k) account;  (3) finding that
all  the  loss  in  the  Charles  Schwab  account  was  the  result  of
passive market conditions; and (4) valuing the plaintiff’s Charles
Schwab account as of the date of division rather than the date of
separation.
III.    Modification and Correction of an Arbitration Award
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-55  (2001) of The Family Law Arbitration
Act sets forth the procedures for the modification and correction
of an arbitration award:
(a) Upon application made within 90 days after
delivery   of   a   copy   of   an   award   to   an
applicant,  the  court  shall  modify  or  correct
the award where at least one of the following
occurs:                                                                    (1)   There    is    an    evident
miscalculation   of   figures   or   an   evident
mistake in the description of a person, thing,
or property referred to in the award;  (2) The
arbitrators  have  awarded  upon  a  matter  not
submitted  to  them,  and  the  award  may  be
corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the issues submitted; or (3) The
award  is  imperfect  in  a  matter  of  form,  not
affecting the merits of the controversy.




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N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §                                        50-55   (2001)  requires  an  application  to
modify or correct an arbitrator’s award must be made within ninety
days  after  the  delivery  of  a  copy  of  the  award  to  the  applicant.
This  Court  has  held  that  a  party  who  fails  to  seek  judicial
modification of an arbitrator’s award, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  1-567.14, whose provisions are virtually identical to N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  50-55,  waives  their  right  to  contend  that  the  award  was
imperfect.    Crutchley  v.  Crutchley,                                        53  N.C.  App.                           732,    738,                                    281
S.E.2d  744,  747-748  (1981), rev’d on other grounds,  306 N.C.  518,
293 S.E.2d  793  (1982).
Here, plaintiff never applied for judicial modification of the
arbitration award pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-55.    Plaintiff
was the party who successfully moved for the original arbitration
award to be confirmed by the court.    Plaintiff attempts to appeal
to  this  Court  for  a  modification  of  that  award.    Since  plaintiff
failed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-55,  his
right to contend that the award is imperfect under the provisions
of  this  statute  is  waived  and  the  order  of  the  trial  court
confirming the award is affirmed.    Id.
IV.    Judicial Review of an Arbitration Award
Presuming this appeal is properly before this Court, we hold
that plaintiff failed to establish any of the specific grounds for
modifying an award under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-55.
The   purpose   of   arbitration   is   to   settle
matters  in  controversy  and  avoid  litigation.
It  is  well  established  that  parties  to  an
arbitration  will  not  generally  be  heard  to
impeach  the  regularity  or  fairness  of  the
award.                                                                         Exceptions   are   limited   to   such




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situations    as    those    involving    fraud,
misconduct,  bias,  exceeding  of  powers  and
clear illegality.   Ordinarily, an award is not
vitiated  or  rendered  subject  to  impeachment
because   of   a   mistake   or   error   of   the
arbitrators  as  to  the  law  or  facts.     The
general rule is that errors of law or fact, or
an erroneous decision of matters submitted to
the    judgment    of    the    arbitrators,    are
insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and
honestly made.
Fashion Exhibitors v. Gunter, 41 N.C. App. 407, 410-411, 255 S.E.2d
414,                                                                          417-418                  (1979)       (internal  citations  omitted).   “[J]udicial
review  of  an  arbitration  award  is  confined  to  determination  of
whether there exists one of the specific grounds for vacation of an
award  under  the  arbitration  statute.”     Id.,                            (citing                  6  C.J.S.,
Arbitration,  §  162, p.  427).
As noted earlier, in order to modify or correct an arbitration
award  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-55  (2001),  one  of  three  factors
must be shown:
(1)  There  is  an  evident  miscalculation  of
figures   or   an   evident   mistake   in   the
description  of  a  person,  thing,  or  property
referred to in the award;  (2) The arbitrators
have  awarded  upon  a  matter  not  submitted  to
them,  and  the  award  may  be  corrected  without
affecting the merits of the decision upon the
issues   submitted;   or                                                      (3)   The   award   is
imperfect  in  a  matter  of  form,  not  affecting
the merits of the controversy.
Our  Supreme  Court  has  interpreted  the  legislative  intent  of  N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-567.14, whose provisions are virtually identical to
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-55, in Cyclone Roofing Co. v. LaFave Co. and
held that:
[O]nly awards reflecting mathematical errors,
errors relating to form, and errors resulting
from arbitrators[’] exceeding their authority




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shall   be   modified   or   corrected   by   the
reviewing courts. . .                                                      . If an arbitrator makes
a mistake, either as to law or fact [unless it
is  an  evident  mistake  in  the  description  of
any  person,  thing  or  property  referred  to  in
the award], it is the misfortune of the party.
.  There  is  no  right  of  appeal  and  the
Court has no power to revise the decisions of
“judges who are of the parties’ own choosing.”
312 N.C.  224,  236,  321 S.E.2d  872,  880  (1984)  (internal citations
omitted).    The Court explained that:
[a]n award is intended to settle the matter in
controversy,  and  thus  save  the  expense  of
litigation.     If  a  mistake  be  a  sufficient
ground  for  setting  aside  an  award,  it  opens
the door for coming into court in almost every
case;  for  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  some
mistake either of law or fact may be suggested
by  the  dissatisfied  party.                                              Thus
arbitration  instead  of  ending  would  tend  to
increase litigation.
Id.    This Court has held that:
[I]n  providing  that  awards  could  be  modified
or  corrected  for                                                         “evident  miscalculation  of
figures”,   we   think   our   legislature   had
reference    only    to    mathematical    errors
committed   by   arbitrators   which   would   be
patently  clear  to  a  reviewing  court.     G.S.
1-567.14(a)(1) is not an avenue for litigants
to persuade courts to review the evidence and
then reach a different result because it might
be    interpreted    differently.                                          Such    an
interpretation of the statute would completely
frustrate   the   underlying   purposes   of   the
arbitration process.
Gunter,  41 N.C. App. at  413,  255 S.E.2d at  419.
Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator erred in distributing the
Chevrolet Silverado truck to defendant.    However, plaintiff fails
to argue that any of the three factors under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-
55  are  present  to  support  a  modification  or  correction  of  the
arbitration award.    Plaintiff does not argue that the award was a




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miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description
of  the  Chevrolet  Silverado.    Plaintiff  does  not  argue  that  the
arbitrator ruled on a matter not submitted to him or that the award
could  be  corrected  without  affecting  the  merits  of  the  decision.
Further, plaintiff does not argue that the award was imperfect in
form.    Without  any  of  these  factors  present,  this  Court  has  no
authority to modify or correct the award of the arbitrator.
Plaintiff argues in his remaining assignments of error that:
(1) the arbitrator utilized a mathematically incorrect methodology
for  valuing  the  marital  share  of  plaintiff’s  MCI  401(k)  account,
(2) the arbitrator erred in finding that all the loss in value of
the  Charles  Schwab  account,  titled  in  the  name  of  defendant,  was
the  result  of  passive  market  conditions,  and  (3)  the  arbitrator
erred in valuing the plaintiff’s Charles Schwab account as of the
date of the division rather than the date of separation.
Again,  plaintiff  fails  to  argue  any  of  the  three  factors
required by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-55 are present.    Plaintiff fails
to   argue   that   the   arbitrator’s   methodology   is   an               “evident
miscalculation of figures” that is  “patently clear to a reviewing
court.”    Id.    Plaintiff  merely  argues  that  the  arbitrator  should
have used a different methodology in valuing the MCI 401(k) account
and  Charles  Schwab  account  and  determining  the  amount  of  loss  in
the Charles Schwab account.    Plaintiff fails to show what formula
should  have  been  used  by  the  arbitrator  to  value  the  accounts.
Plaintiff is unable to determine exactly the correct value of the
accounts.   This Court, in construing a statute virtually identical




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to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-55(a)(1),  stated  that  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
1-567.14(a)(1)  “is not an avenue for litigants to persuade courts
to review the evidence and then reach a different result because it
might be interpreted differently.”   Id.   Plaintiff’s assignments of
error are overruled.
V.    Conclusion
Plaintiff  failed  to  follow  the  statutory  requirements  for
modifying or correcting an arbitration award pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat.                                                                        §   50-55  and  has  waived  his  right  to  contend  the  award  is
imperfect.   Plaintiff has also failed to show that any of the three
factors needed to modify or correct an award under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  50-55 were present.    The arbitrator’s award as confirmed by the
trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges MCCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur.

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