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NO. COA01-606
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                      4 June  2002
WENDLE SHEEHAN,
Employee,
Plaintiff;
v.                                                                          N.C. Industrial Commission
                                                                            I.C. File No.  261808
PERRY M. ALEXANDER
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Employer,
SELF-INSURED
PCA SOLUTIONS,
Servicing Agent,
Defendant.
Appeal by Plaintiff from opinion and award entered 14 February
2001  by  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission.    Heard  in  the
Court of Appeals  21 February  2002.
H. Paul Averette, for plaintiff-appellant.
Teague,  Rotenstreich  &  Stanaland,  L.L.P.,  by  Elizabeth  M.
Stanaland and Paul A. Daniels, for defendant-appellee.
HUDSON, Judge.
Wendle Sheehan (“plaintiff”) appeals from an opinion and award
of  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission                            (the                         “Commission”)
denying him workers’ compensation benefits.    We affirm.
Plaintiff  was  born  on                                                    19  June                     1948.    He  has  a  ninth-grade
education and served in the U.S. Army from 1966 until  1969.   Since
his  discharge  from  the  Army,  plaintiff  has  worked  primarily  in
heavy  equipment  and  construction.    Prior  to  his  employment  with
Perry  M.  Alexander  Construction  Company  (“defendant”),  plaintiff




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had a history of lower back problems and work-related injuries.   He
underwent  three  lumbar  procedures  in                                       1980,    1982,   and                                            1990.
Although plaintiff continued to experience pain and discomfort in
his back following the  1990 surgery, he was able to work.
Plaintiff began working as a bulldozer operator for defendant
in November  1990.    He alleges that on  13 April  1992, while he was
working at a construction site in Marion, North Carolina, he hurt
his back while operating the bulldozer.    According to plaintiff’s
testimony  before  the  Deputy  Commissioner,  he  backed  up  his
bulldozer over a large rock, and the bulldozer fell about three to
four  feet,  jarring  him  and  causing  pain  in  his  back  and  down  his
leg.
On                                                                             4  May   1992,  plaintiff  went  to  the  emergency  room  at
Transylvania Community Hospital, where he reported that he had hurt
his  back  in  a  bulldozer  accident.    Plaintiff  continued  to  work,
although he experienced continual pain and discomfort.    On  19 May
1992, plaintiff was terminated from his job with defendant.
On  27 July  1992, plaintiff began a course of treatment at the
Veteran’s Administration Medical Center (the “VAMC”).   He reported
to medical personnel at the VAMC that he had injured his back in a
bulldozer accident.   He was first seen in the orthopaedic clinic of
the VAMC on 17 August 1992.   On 8 November 1993, after his leg gave
way causing him to fall at home, plaintiff was seen by Glyndon B.
Shaver, Jr., M.D., Chief of Orthopaedic Surgery at the VAMC.
Plaintiff filed a Form 18, Notice of Accident to Employer, on
18  September  1992,  and  defendant  denied  workers’  compensation  to




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plaintiff.   Plaintiff’s claim was heard by a Deputy Commissioner on
26  November  1996.    The  Deputy  Commissioner  awarded  compensation,
and defendant appealed.    On  1 September  1999, the Full Commission
reversed the Deputy Commissioner’s opinion and award, and plaintiff
appealed to this Court.
In an unpublished opinion, we vacated the opinion and award of
the Full Commission.   We overruled several assignments of error to
certain of the Commission’s findings of fact, but we found merit in
plaintiff’s assignment of error to the following findings:
11.   Plaintiff’s  claim  that  he  injured  his
back  while  operating  a  bulldozer  on  13  April
1992 is not credible.
13.   Given our finding that plaintiff’s claim
that  he  suffered  an  accidental,  work-related
injury is not credible, his current condition
is due to non-compensable causes.
We held as follows:
In   the   case   at   bar,   the   Commission
impermissibly disregarded the testimony of Dr.
Shaver.    The  Commission  made  no  reference  to
Dr. Shaver’s testimony in its findings of fact
or  conclusion  of  law.     This  omission  was
error,   particularly   because   Dr.   Shaver’s
testimony corroborated plaintiff’s testimony.
Accordingly, we vacate the opinion and remand
the case to the Commission for it to consider
all of the evidence, make complete findings of
fact and proper conclusions of law, and enter
an appropriate award.
On remand, the Commission replaced the findings of fact quoted
above with the following new findings:
11.   Plaintiff  sought  medical  treatment  for
his   back   on                                                            4   May   1992   at   Transylvania
Community  Hospital  and  subsequently  through
the  Veteran’s  Administration  Medical  Center




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where he was seen in the orthopaedic clinic on
17 August 1993.   Thereafter, plaintiff fell at
home  when  his  leg  gave  way.     Consequently,
plaintiff was then seen on 8 November 1993 for
the  first  time  by  Dr.  Glyndon  Shaver  who  was
Chief of Orthopaedic Surgery at the Veteran’s
Administration   Medical   Center.                                        Plaintiff
related the alleged injury of 13 April 1992 to
Dr.   Shaver   as   well   as   to   several   other
physicians.   Next, Dr. Shaver saw plaintiff on
19  November  1993  at  which  time  plaintiff  was
rated   with   a                                                          40-50%   permanent   partial
impairment   to   the   back   under   the   AMA
guidelines.
12.   Plaintiff’s  claim  that  he  injured  his
back  while  operating  a  bulldozer  on  13  April
1992   is   not   credible.                                               Furthermore,   any
medical  evidence  of  record  that  corroborates
plaintiff’s   alleged   injury   including   the
records  and  testimony  of  Dr.  Shaver  is  given
little weight as it is based on an inaccurate
history  provided  by  plaintiff.                                         Moreover,
although  Dr.  Shaver  based  his  opinion  that
plaintiff suffered an exacerbation of his back
condition  on                                                             13  April                      1993  on  a  thorough
review  of  plaintiff’s  medical  records,  these
records  also  contain  inaccuracies  and  lack
credibility.
14.   Given  that  plaintiff’s  claim  that  he
suffered an accidental, work-related injury is
not   credible   and   any   medical   evidence
supporting plaintiff’s claim including that of
Dr.  Shaver  has  been  tainted  by  an  inaccurate
history  provided  by  plaintiff,  plaintiff’s
current  condition  is  due  to  non-compensable
causes.
Plaintiff now appeals, assigning error to these findings of fact.
On review of a decision of the Commission, we are “limited to
reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission’s
findings  of  fact  and  whether  the  findings  of  fact  support  the
Commission’s conclusions of law.”    Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp.,
352 N.C.  109,  116,  530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000).   An appellate court




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“does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue
on the basis of its weight.   The court’s duty goes no further than
to  determine  whether  the  record  contains  any  evidence  tending  to
support the finding.”    Adams v. AVX Corp.,  349 N.C.  676,  681,  509
S.E.2d  411,  414  (1998)  (internal quotation marks omitted).
The  Full  Commission  is  the                                                 “sole  judge  of  the  weight  and
credibility of the evidence.”    Deese,  352 N.C. at  116,  530 S.E.2d
at  553.    Furthermore,
the  Commission  does  not  have  to  explain  its
findings of fact by attempting to distinguish
which evidence or witnesses it finds credible.
Requiring   the   Commission   to   explain   its
credibility  determinations  and  allowing  the
Court  of  Appeals  to  review  the  Commission’s
explanation                                                                    of                                   those             credibility
determinations would be inconsistent with our
legal system’s tradition of not requiring the
fact finder to explain why he or she believes
one witness over another or believes one piece
of evidence is more credible than another.
Id.  at                                                                        116-17,                              530  S.E.2d  at   553.    Additionally,  in  making  its
determinations, the Commission “is not required . . . to find facts
as  to  all  credible  evidence.     That  requirement  would  place  an
unreasonable burden on the Commission.   Instead the Commission must
find those facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of
law.”    Peagler  v.  Tyson  Foods,  Inc.,  138  N.C.  App.  593,  602,  532
S.E.2d                                                                         207,                                 213               (2000)                                                (internal   quotation   marks   omitted)
                                                                                                                                      (alteration  in  original);  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                          97-86   (1999).
Moreover, the Commission must “make specific findings with respect
to  crucial  facts  upon  which  the  question  of  plaintiff’s  right  to
compensation depends.”    Gaines v. Swain & Son, Inc.,  33 N.C. App.
575,  579,  235 S.E.2d  856,  859  (1977).




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In  his  first  assignment  of  error,  plaintiff  contends  that
Finding of Fact No.  11 is not supported by competent evidence.   In
particular, plaintiff assigns error to the finding that “Plaintiff
sought medical treatment for his back on 4 May 1992 at Transylvania
Community   Hospital   and   subsequently   through   the   Veteran’s
Administration Medical Center where he was seen in the orthopaedic
clinic on  17 August  1993.”    Plaintiff observes that, according to
his  medical  records  from  the  VAMC,  he  first  sought  treatment  for
his back there on  27 July  1992.   Plaintiff argues that the date on
which  he  first  sought  treatment  is  a  crucial  fact,  and  that  the
Commission’s inaccurate finding of this fact demonstrates that the
Commission   disregarded   competent   evidence,   namely   all   of
plaintiff’s  visits  to  the  VAMC  occurring  between  July                   1992  and
August  1993.
Although  plaintiff  first  sought  treatment  at  the  VAMC  on  27
July                                                                           1992,  he  was  not  seen  in  the  orthopaedic  clinic  until   17
August 1992.   We do not believe the Commission erred in focusing on
the date that plaintiff was seen in the orthopaedic clinic rather
than the date on which plaintiff was seen in the triage area of the
hospital, especially since it accurately found that the first date
he sought any treatment after the alleged accident was 4 May 1992.
With respect to the year, our review of plaintiff’s medical records
reveals  that  he  was  not  seen  at  the  VAMC  on  17  August  1993,  but
that he was seen there on  17 August  1992.   We agree with defendant
that  the  Commission’s   use  of                                              “1993”  rather  than                                             “1992”  is
apparently a typographical error.    In light of our disposition of




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the plaintiff’s next contentions, we do not believe that the error
is grounds for reversal.   Accordingly, this assignment of error is
overruled.
Plaintiff  next  assigns  error  to  Findings  of  Fact  No.  12  and
No. 14, on the ground that these findings are “totally unsupported
by  competent  evidence”  and  are                                            “so  arbitrary  that  they  do  not
appear to be the result of a reasoned decision.”   Hence, plaintiff
argues, the Commission’s conclusion that plaintiff’s injury was not
compensable, being based on unsupported findings, is also in error.
We disagree.
Plaintiff  contends  that  there  is  no  competent  evidence
supporting the Commission’s finding that the medical evidence that
tends to corroborate plaintiff’s account is based on an inaccurate
history  provided  by  plaintiff.    Plaintiff  observes  that  “all  of
Plaintiff’s  statements  given  to  medical  personnel  from  his  first
visit to the emergency room on 4 May 1992 and continuing throughout
the  course  of  his  treatment  say  the  same  thing--that  he  began
experiencing  pain  in  his  lower  back  and  right  leg  after  being
involved  in  a  bulldozer  accident  on  the  job  in  April  of             1992.”
Although this accurately characterizes the record evidence, it does
not  resolve  the  credibility  of  plaintiff’s  statements,  which
assessment  is  not  within  our  province.    See  Deese,                    352  N.C.  at
116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553; see also Weaver v. American National Can
Corp.,  123  N.C.  App.  507,  510,  473  S.E.2d  10,  12  (1996)  (stating
that  the  Commission  is  “the  sole  judge  of  the  credibility  of  the
witness  and  the  weight  to  be  given  its  testimony”                     (internal




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quotation marks omitted)).   The fact that plaintiff repeatedly gave
the  same  account  of  his  injury  tends  to  lend  credence  to  that
account.     Nevertheless,  the  Commission  found  that  plaintiff’s
account of his bulldozer accident was not credible, and we cannot
overturn    the    Commission’s    finding    regarding    plaintiff’s
credibility.    Moreover,  while  the  Commission  is  not  required  to
explain  its  credibility  determinations,  and  this  Court  does  not
review    the    Commission’s    explanation    of    its    credibility
determinations, see Deese,  352 N.C. at  116-17,  530 S.E.2d at  553,
we  note  that  the  Commission  found  facts  that  tended  to  undermine
plaintiff’s  allegation  that  he  sustained  an  injury  at  work.    For
example, the Commission made the following findings of fact, which
we  affirmed  as  supported  by  the  record  when  this  case  was
previously before us:
7.                                                                           Randy Lee Keever, plaintiff’s co-worker,
testified  that  there  were  no  large  rocks  on
the Marion project site at the time plaintiff
was  operating  his  bulldozer.    Plaintiff  was
scraping  topsoil  and  spreading  dirt,  and  no
rocks   were   unearthed   until   later   in   the
project  when  the  digging  was  much  deeper.
Plaintiff’s  explanation  of  the  cause  of  the
alleged specific traumatic incident is deemed
not credible.
8.                                                                           Plaintiff claimed to have told one of the
pan   operators,   probably   Randy   Keever,   to
report  to  Jerry  Cochran  that  plaintiff  had
hurt himself.   Thereafter, plaintiff testified
that  he  told  Cochran  himself  of  the  injury.
Plaintiff  stated  that  Mr.  Cochran  was  the
grading  foreman  and  in  charge  of  the  job.
Plaintiff  did  not  work  the  rest  of  the  day,
and  Cochran  finished  the  dozing.    Plaintiff
stated  that  he  also  told  another  co-worker,
Tony Keever, of his injury.
9.                                                                           Randy  Keever  testified  that  plaintiff




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never told him of a back injury.   Karen Smyly,
personnel    manager    and    bookkeeper    for
defendant,  testified  that  she  never  received
an injury report regarding plaintiff’s alleged
incident.   Kevin Hensley, a field mechanic for
defendant, was on the Marion job site checking
the  equipment  at  least  once  every  day  while
plaintiff   was   there.                                                      He   testified   that
plaintiff  never  told  him  he  had  injured  his
back   while   working   there.                                               Leroy   Peek,
superintendent  of  the  job  at  which  plaintiff
claimed  to  have  been  injured,  testified  that
plaintiff  never  reported  to  him  that  he  had
been  injured.    Further,  Mr.  Peek  worked  with
plaintiff daily at the next job he worked on,
and  plaintiff  never  mentioned  that  he  had
incurred a back injury on the Marion job.   Mr.
Peek also testified that had plaintiff injured
his  back  on  the  job,  he  knew  the  procedures
for  notifying  the  office  of  the  injury  and
obtaining medical care.
Plaintiff  also  asserts  that  the  history  of  the  injury  he
provided   to   medical   personnel   is                                      “unrefuted   and   without
contradiction”  in  his  medical  records.                                    We  first  note  that
plaintiff’s medical records and Dr. Shaver’s testimony suggest that
plaintiff  did  in  fact  re-injure  his  back,  and  the  Commission  did
not  make  a  contrary  finding.     However,  the  issue  here  is  not
whether  plaintiff  was  injured,  but  whether  his  injury  was  work-
related.   Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his injury was
work-related.    See  Gibbs  v.  Leggett  &  Platt,  Inc.,  112  N.C.  App.
103,  107,  434 S.E.2d  653,  656  (1993).
The medical records reflect that plaintiff reported to medical
personnel that he injured his back in a bulldozer accident, and Dr.
Shaver’s opinion that plaintiff’s back injury was exacerbated by a
bulldozer accident was based on the history provided by plaintiff
and  recorded  in  his  medical  records.     For  example,  Dr.  Shaver




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testified that “[t]he history that [plaintiff] gave from the record
was  that  he  had  injured  himself  in  a  bulldozer  accident.”    Dr.
Shaver  also  testified  that  it  was  his  “considered  opinion  .  .  .
that  Mr.  Sheehan,  by  history,  had  a  definite  exacerbation  of  a
preexisting  condition  as  the  result  of  his  bulldozer  accident.”
(emphasis  added).     Similarly,  Dr.  Shaver  testified  that              “Mr.
Sheehan’s  exacerbations,  according  to  the  record,  appear  to  be
related to a bulldozer accident in April, 1992.” (emphasis added).
After a colloquy revealed that Dr. Shaver did not personally take
plaintiff’s history, Dr. Shaver testified as follows:
Q.    Basically,   Dr.   Shaver,   you   read   the
record  .  .  ., didn’t you?
A.    Yes.
Q.    And  the  record  showed  clearly  that  Mr.
Sheehan  reported  that  he  had  had  a  bulldozer
accident?
A.    That’s correct.
Q.    And  not  only  on  just  one  occasion,  but
that  record  indicates  that  he  had  made  that
report several times, does it not?
A.    That’s true.
Q.    Now  you  may  go  ahead,  if  you  have  an
opinion.
A.    Well, I have an opinion, and the opinion
is  that  the  accident  certainly  was  of  the
degree  that  it  could  have  caused  a  recurrent
disk rupture at that level, even though he had
been operated on three times previously.
In sum, while Dr. Shaver indicated that plaintiff’s condition was
consistent  with  injury  in  a  bulldozer  accident,  as  plaintiff
described,  Dr.  Shaver  had  no  independent  knowledge  that  such  an




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incident occurred.
Once the Commission determined that plaintiff’s account of his
injury was not credible, it acted within its authority in refusing
to  give  much  weight  to  Dr.  Shaver’s  opinion  based  on  the  history
supplied   by   plaintiff.                                                    Therefore,   we   conclude   that   the
Commission’s credibility determinations were within its discretion
and its findings are supported by competent evidence.   See Chapman
v. Southern Import Co.,  63 N.C. App.  194,  196, 303 S.E.2d 824,  825
(1983)  (“If  there  is  evidence  of  substance  which  directly  or  by
reasonable  inference  tends  to  support  the  findings,  the  Court  is
bound  by  such  evidence,  even  though  there  is  evidence  that  would
have  supported  a  finding  to  the  contrary.”                              (internal  quotation
marks omitted)).
The only record evidence regarding how plaintiff injured his
back consists of the account given by plaintiff and the statements
of  others  that  are  based  on  plaintiff’s  account.     Once  the
Commission rejected that account, no evidence remained indicating
that  plaintiff  sustained  his  injury  in  a  work-related  accident.
Accordingly the Commission did not act arbitrarily or contrary to
reason in concluding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden of
proving that his injury is compensable.    See Gibbs,  112 N.C. App.
at  107,  434 S.E.2d at  656.
In his final assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the
Commission failed to consider all of the evidence and make complete
findings  of  fact,  as  mandated  by  this  Court  on  remand.     As  a
result, plaintiff maintains, the Commission failed to make proper




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conclusions  of  law  and  failed  to  enter  an  appropriate  award.    We
disagree.
In its first opinion and award, the Commission made no mention
whatsoever  of  Dr.  Shaver’s  testimony.     We  were  thus  forced  to
conclude  that  the  Commission  had                                           “impermissibly  disregarded  the
testimony  of  Dr.  Shaver,”  which  it  may  not  do.    See  Harrell  v.
Stevens  &  Co.,  45  N.C.  App.  197,  205,  262  S.E.2d  830,  835,  disc.
review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980).   Therefore, we
remanded for the Commission “to consider all of the evidence, make
complete findings of fact and proper conclusions of law, and enter
an appropriate award.”
Our  directive  did  not  require  the  Commission  to  comment  at
length on all of the evidence it reviews.    Rather, the Commission
is  required  to  make                                                         “definitive”  factual  findings,  which  are
findings sufficient to “determine the critical issues raised by the
evidence in  [the] case.”    Id.; see Peagler,  138 N.C. App. at  602,
532  S.E.2d  at  213  (“[T]he  Commission  must  find  those  facts  which
are necessary to support its conclusions of law.”).   In the opinion
and  award  currently  before  us,  the  Commission  determined  that
plaintiff’s  account  of  the  injury  was  not  credible  and,  as  it
indicated  in  Finding  of  Fact  No.  12,  decided  not  to  rely  on  the
portion of the medical evidence based on plaintiff’s account.   See
Weaver,  123  N.C.  App.  at  510,  473  S.E.2d  at  12  (“The  Industrial
Commission  may  not  discount  or  disregard  any  evidence,  but  may
choose  not  to  believe  the  evidence  after  considering  it.”).
Therefore,  the  Commission  gave                                              “little  weight”  to  Dr.  Shaver’s




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testimony.    Finding that plaintiff was not injured in a bulldozer
accident   as   he   described,   the   Commission   concluded   that
“plaintiff’s current condition is due to non-compensable causes.”
We   hold   that   the   Commission   considered   the   evidence
appropriately,  made  sufficient  findings  of  fact,  drew  proper
conclusions of law based thereon, and entered an appropriate award.
Accordingly, we affirm the opinion and award.
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and CAMPBELL concur.

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