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NO. COA09-1562
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       21 December  2010
JILL C. SHEFFER,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                                                                                                 Dare County
                                                                             No.                                                                   09-SP-285
TIMOTHY B. RARDIN,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  respondent  from  order  entered  1  September  2009  by
Judge Alma L. Hinton in Superior Court, Dare County.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  12 May  2010.
Vandeventer  Black  LLP  by  Norman  W.  Shearin,  for  petitioner-
appellee.
Robertson,  Medlin  &  Blocker,  PLLC  by  John  F.  Bloss,  for
respondent-appellant.1
STROUD, Judge.
Timothy B. Rardin (“respondent”) appeals from a trial court’s
order  that  land  co-owned  by  respondent  and  Jill  C.  Sheffer
(“petitioner”) be sold for partition at a public auction.   For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
On                                                                           6  May                                                                2009,  petitioner  filed  a  verified   “Petition  For
Partition  of  Real  Property”  in  Superior  Court,  Dare  County.    The
petition  alleged  that  petitioner  and  respondent  jointly  owned  as
tenants  in  common  two  separate  parcels  of  real  estate  in  Kitty
1
                                                                             In  respondent’s  reply  brief  filed                                 6  May                                  2010,  the  firm
                                                                             listed below respondent’s counsel’s signature is “Robertson, Medlin
& Bloss, PLLC[.]”




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Hawk,  North  Carolina                                                        (“the  subject  properties”).     Petitioner
further alleged that  “the nature and size of the Property is such
that an actual partition thereof cannot be made without injury to
the  several  interested  persons[,]”  and  “[t]he  parties  have  made
unequal  contributions  to  the  purchase  price  of  the  Property  and
equal  payments  of  the  mortgage  and  expenses  from  the  date  of
purchase through August 31, 2008 toward maintaining the Property.”
Petitioner requested an order directing that the subject properties
be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties according to
their ownership interests.
On                                                                            1  June                                        2009,  respondent  filed  a  pro  se  answer  to  the
petition.   Respondent’s answer did not deny any of the allegations
of the petition but instead set forth respondent’s contentions as
to   the   parties’   relationship   and   its   demise;   finances   and
contributions  of  the  parties;  financial  equity;                          “mitigation[,]”
which  addressed  settlement  negotiations  between  the  parties;
petitioner’s  real  estate,  which  addressed  other  separately  owned
real  estate  of  petitioner;  and  “other”  which  addressed  the  fact
that both parties are  “real estate licensed[,]” the poor state of
the  real  estate  market  at  the  time  in  Dare  County,  and  the  fact
that respondent was relying upon equity in the subject properties
for his retirement; a request for trial by jury; and his  “prayer”
that the case be dismissed as “dismissal of this case will cause no
harm  whatsoever  to  the  Plaintiff,  but  will  avoid  irreparable
financial harm to me.”    Respondent summarized his main contention
as follows:




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It  has  never  been  an  issue  that  I  won’t  sell
(or ever buy her out again). I am prepared and
willing  to  sell  when  the  market  strengthens.
The  house  has  even  been  shown  at  least  three
(3)  different  occasions  this  Spring
Therefore, the issue and underlying reason for
the  Plaintiff  filing  this  Petition  cannot  be
that  I  am  refusing  to  sell  the  house.  My
issue, as stated several times already, is the
critical nature of the timing.
Following  a  hearing  on                                                     1  July                                    2009,  the  Clerk  of  Superior
Court,  Dare  County  entered  an  order  on  14  July  2009  finding  that
respondent  had  “acknowledged  at  a  hearing  in  front  of  the  Court
that  an  actual  partition  of  said  lands  cannot  be  made  without
substantial  injury  to  one  or  both  of  the  parties.”    The  Clerk’s
order  then  concluded  that                                                  “having  considered  the  petition,  the
answer, and having heard from the parties finds as a fact that an
actual partition of said lands described in the Petition cannot be
made among the tenants in common without substantial injury to some
[or] all of the parties interested[,]” and ordered that “the lands
described in the petition be sold for partition at public auction
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  N.C.G.S.                           §46-28,  and,  if
necessary,  on  such  terms  and  conditions  as  set  forth  in  other
orders  of  this  Court.”     The  Clerk‘s  order  then  appointed  a
Commissioner to make the sale.    On  21 July  2009, respondent filed
a notice of appeal from the Clerk’s order to Superior Court, Dare
County and posted a bond to stay the courthouse sale of the subject
properties.   Following a hearing on 31 August 2009, the trial court
entered an order on  1 September  2009 upholding the Clerk’s order.
On 8 September 2009, respondent gave written notice of appeal from
the trial court’s order.




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On  appeal,  respondent  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
determining that an actual partition would cause substantial injury
to  an  interested  party.    In  reviewing  a  trial  court’s  order  for
partition by sale, we have held that
the  standard  of  review  on  appeal  is whether
there  was  competent  evidence  to  support  the
trial court’s findings of fact and whether its
conclusions  of  law  were  proper  in  light  of
such  facts.  Findings  of  fact  by  the  trial
court  in  a  non-jury  trial  have  the  force  and
effect of a jury verdict and are conclusive on
appeal  if  there  is  evidence  to  support  those
findings.   A trial court’s conclusions of law,
however,    are    reviewable    de    novo.    The
determination as to whether a partition order
and  sale  should  be  issued  is  within  the  sole
province and discretion of the trial judge and
such   determination   will   not   be   disturbed
absent some error of law.
Lyons-Hart  v.  Hart,                                                        ___  N.C.  App.___,   ___,                    695  S.E.2d   818,   821
(2010)  (quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted).
In its order, the trial court stated as follows:
This hearing coming on before the undersigned
Judge  at  the  August                                                       31,                   2009,  term  of  Dare
County  Superior  Court  from  an  appeal  by  the
Respondent  of  an  Order  entered  by  the  Dare
County  Clerk  of  Court  on  14  July  2009.    The
Clerk  of  Court’s  Order  found  that  an  actual
partition  of  said  lands  described  in  the
Petition  could  not  be  made  among  the  tenants
in  common  without  substantial  injury  to  some
or all of the parties interested, and ordered
that  the  lands  described  in  the  petition  be
sold   for   partition   at   public   auction   in
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  N.C.G.S                               §
46-28.
After  a  hearing  in  open  court  in  which
the  Petitioner  was  represented  by  Robert  P.
Trivette,  and  the  Respondent  was  represented
by  himself,  this  Court,  after  reviewing  the
petition, the answer, the Order of the Clerk,
and  hearing  arguments  of  the  Respondent  and
the   Petitioner’s   counsel,   and   finding   no
issues  in  dispute  from  the  Clerk’s  Order  for




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this Court to rule on, Upholds the findings of
fact and conclusions of law found by the Clerk
of Court in her Order, therefore Upholds said
Order  entered  by  the  Clerk  of  Court  dated  14
July  2009.
The order of the Clerk of Superior Court which was  “upheld” by the
trial court provided as follows:
This proceeding coming on from hearing on July
1,                                                                             2009  upon  a  Petition  alleging  that  the
Petitioner   and   Respondent   are   tenants   in
common of the lands described in the Petition;
that all the necessary parties are before the
Court; that the Petitioner desires a partition
thereof,  but  that  an  actual  partition  cannot
be  made  without  injury  to  some  or  all  the
parties  interested.    It  further  appearing  to
the Court that the Respondent has been served
with   summons,   and   has   filed   an   answer
admitting the parties are tenants in common of
the  lands  described  in  the  Petition,  and  has
acknowledged  at  a  hearing  in  front  of  the
Court  that  an  actual  partition  of  said  lands
cannot  be  made  without  substantial  injury  to
one or both of the parties.
Therefore,  the  trial  court  concluded  that                                 “no  issues                                    [were]  in
dispute  from  the  Clerk’s  Order  for  this  Court  to  rule  on”  and
upheld the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order entered
by  the  Clerk  on  14  July  2009  that  the  subject  properties  be  sold
for partition at public auction.
Respondent’s  brief  never  clearly  identifies  whether  his
argument is a challenge to a finding of fact, a conclusion of law,
or  both.     In  all  fairness,  the  trial  court’s  order  does  not
differentiate  between  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law
either.     The  Clerk’s  order  presents  the  issue  of                      “substantial
injury”  as  a  finding  of  fact:                                             “The  Court  having  considered  the
petition, the answer, and having heard from the parties finds as a




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fact  that  an  actual  partition  of  said  lands  described  in  the
Petition  cannot  be  made  among  the  tenants  in  common  without
substantial  injury  to  some  or  all  of  the  parties  interested.”
(Emphasis added.)   The trial court’s order upheld the “findings of
fact  and  conclusions  of  law”  as  found  by  the  Clerk’s  order.
However,  despite  the  identification,  or  lack  thereof,  of  a
provision of the order as finding of fact or conclusion of law, we
must base our consideration upon the proper identification of the
issue.      Where  “findings of fact” should have been  “more properly
designated  conclusions  of  law[,]”  this  Court  will  “treat  them  as
such for the purposes of . . . appeal.”   In re Helms, 127 N.C. App.
505,  510,  491 S.E.2d  672,  675  (1997).
The   classification   of   a   determination   as
either  a  finding  of  fact  or  a  conclusion  of
law  is  admittedly  difficult.  As  a  general
rule, however, any determination requiring the
exercise of judgment, see Plott v. Plott,  313
N.C.                                                                        63,                                    74,   326  S.E.2d  863,   870   (1985),  or
the application of legal principles, see Quick
v.  Quick,  305  N.C.  446,  452,  290  S.E.2d  653,
657-58  (1982),  is  more  properly  classified  a
conclusion  of  law.  Any  determination  reached
through                                                                     “logical    reasoning    from    the
evidentiary facts” is more properly classified
a finding of fact. Quick, 305 N.C. at 452, 290
S.E.2d at 657-58 (quoting Woodard v. Mordecai,
234 N.C. 463, 472, 67 S.E.2d 639, 645 (1951)).
Id.   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-22 sets forth the procedure for a sale in
lieu of partitioning a property:
(a)   The  court  shall  order  a  sale  of  the
property described in the petition, or of any
part, only if it finds, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that an actual partition of the
lands   cannot   be   made   without   substantial
injury to any of the interested parties.




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(b)                                                                    “Substantial   injury”   means   the   fair
market  value  of  each  share  in  an  in-kind
partition  would  be  materially  less  than  the
share of each cotenant in the money equivalent
that  would  be  obtained  from  the  sale  of  the
whole, and if an in-kind division would result
in   material   impairment   of   the   cotenant's
rights.
(c)   The  court  shall  specifically  find  the
facts  supporting  an  order  of  sale  of  the
property.
(d)   The party seeking a sale of the property
shall  have  the  burden  of  proving  substantial
injury under the provisions of this section.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  46-22  (2009)2.
This  Court  has  previously  noted  that  the  determination  of
“substantial injury” is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact.
In Partin v. Dalton Property Assoc., 112 N.C. App. 807, 436 S.E.2d
903  (1993), we explained that
the  trial  court  concluded  as  a  matter  of  law
that                                                                   “an  actual  partition  of  the  subject
property  cannot  be  made  without  substantial
injury  to  the  co-tenants.”    To  be  sustained,
this conclusion must be supported by a finding
of fact that an actual partition would result
in  one  of  the  cotenants  receiving  a  share  of
the property with a value materially less than
the value the cotenant would receive were the
property  partitioned  by  sale  and  that  an
actual  partition  would  materially  impair  a
cotenant’s  rights.     These  findings  of  fact
must be supported by evidence of the value of
the  property  in  its  unpartitioned  state  and
evidence  of  what  the  value  of  each  share  of
the property would be were an actual partition
to take place.
2
N.C. Gen. Stat § 46-22 was amended in 2009 but those changes
became                                                                 “effective  October                           1,   2009,  and  applie[d]  to  partition
actions filed on or after that date.”                                  2009 N.C. Sess. Laws  512  §§
2 and  6.    However, petitioner filed her petition for partition of
the subject properties on 6 May 2009.   Therefore, the amendments to
N.C. Gen. Stat  §  46-22 are not applicable in the case before us.




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Id.  at  812,  436  S.E.2d  at  906.    Therefore,  the  provision  of  the
order which the respondent challenges is a conclusion of law.
We   will   therefore   consider   respondent’s   argument   as   a
challenge  to  the  trial  court’s  conclusion  of  law  that  actual
partition  would  result  in                                                  “substantial  injury”  to  the  parties.
Essentially,  respondent  argues  that  the  findings  of  fact  do  not
support  the  trial  court’s  conclusion  of  law  that  an  actual
partition would result in  “substantial injury” to a party because
there are no findings of fact as to the  “value of the property in
its  unpartitioned  state  and  evidence  of  what  the  value  of  each
share  of  the  property  would  be  were  an  actual  partition  to  take
place.”  (Emphasis in original.)    Respondent is correct that there
was  no  evidence  presented  and  no  specific  findings  of  fact  as  to
the values of the properties.   However, respondent’s own answer to
the  petition  and  his  representations  at  the  hearing  before  the
Clerk made such evidence unnecessary.   Respondent did not deny any
allegations  of  the  petition  and  he  acknowledged  before  the  court
that                                                                          “an  actual  partition  of  said  lands  cannot  be  made  without
substantial  injury  to  one  or  both  of  the  parties.”    Respondent
contends that the trial court’s conclusion as to substantial injury
“is completely at odds with the position he took in his Answer and
in his presentation to the trial court,” but this contention is not
accurate.   In fact, respondent essentially argued before the trial
court  that  either  an  actual  partition  of  the  two  properties  or  a
partition by sale would substantially injure him, if the partition
were  done  at  that  particular  time.    Respondent  objected  to  the




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timing  of  partition,  but  one  of  the  reasons  that  a  partition
proceeding may be necessary is that at least one of the co-owners
of  real  property  wants  to  end  the  joint  ownership  now,  while
another  co-owner  does  not,  for  whatever  reason.    The  partition
statute  has  no  provision  to  permit  the  trial  court  to  delay
partition  based  upon  one  party’s  objection  to  the  timing  of  the
partition.
In  addition  to  his  failure  to  deny  the  allegations  of  the
petition, respondent acknowledged before the trial court that one
of  the  properties  is  a  vacant  residential  lot  and  the  other
property  is  a  lot  and  house  where  respondent  was  living.
Respondent  himself  asserted  to  the  trial  court  that  the  two
properties  were  of  substantially  different  values  and  he  did  not
argue that either property could be actually partitioned.   His only
objections to selling the properties were the timing and method of
the sale.   He recounted his efforts to convince petitioner to reach
a settlement with him and argued that the trial court should order
“an  even  swap,  she  gets  the  lot,  she  gets
$121,000  of  my  equity  in  it  because  she  owns
the  lot  one  hundred  percent,  I  get  the  house
and  would  also  arrange  to  forgive  her  almost
$125,000  that  she  currently  owes  me  .  .  .
[T]his  .  .  . would also satisfy the intent of
allowing  for  a  physical  partition  of  the
property                                                                    by   my    legally,    physically,
financially   and   equitably   giving   her   my
unencumbered   fifty   percent   of   the   lot,
$121,000  worth,  in  exchange  for  a  dollar  per
dollar  reduction  in  her  share  of  the  other
property,  property  that  she’s  refused  to  pay
her share of the ongoing expenses for the last
twelve months.




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Respondent wanted the Superior Court to consider the poor condition
of the real estate market in Dare County, his retirement investment
intentions, other real estate owned by petitioner in which he had
no interest, and other factors which were simply irrelevant under
the above noted sections of Chapter  46.  3 Therefore, respondent’s
argument that the Superior Court erred in its finding that he  “has
acknowledged  at  a  hearing  in  front  of  the  Court  that  an  actual
partition of said lands cannot be made without substantial injury
to one or both of the parties” is without merit.
Petitioner  argues  that  because  of  the  respondent’s  judicial
admission  to  the  Clerk  of  Court  that  substantial  injury  would
result  from  an  actual  partition,  the  trial  court  was  correct  in
upholding the Clerk’s order for the subject properties to be sold
for  partition  at  public  auction.    Respondent  counters  that  any
admission  of                                                                “substantial  injury”  during  the  hearing  before  the
Clerk  of  Court  was  an                                                    “extrajudicial  or  evidentiary  admission,”
which  could  be  “rebutted,  denied  or  explained  away”  and  was  not
made in a written pleading or stipulation and therefore was not a
binding judicial admission.
Our courts have described the distinction between a judicial
admission and an evidentiary admission.
A  judicial  admission  is  a  formal  concession
which  is  made  by  a  party  in  the  course  of
litigation  for  the  purpose  of  withdrawing  a
3
At the hearing before the Superior Court, respondent argued
that pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-3.1 (2009) it would be in the
“best  interests”  of  both  parties  for  the  trial  court  to  consider
his  financial  situation  and  the  real  estate  market  in  fashioning
its order.




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particular  fact  from  the  realm  of  dispute.
See  generally                                                                                                 2  Stansbury’s  North  Carolina
Evidence                                                                      §      166      (Brandis  rev.                                       1973).  Such  an
admission  is  not  evidence,  but  it,  instead,
serves  to  remove  the  admitted  fact  from  the
trial  by  formally  conceding  its  existence.
E.g.,  State  v.  McWilliams,  277  N.C.  680,  178
S.E.2d  476  (1971).
Outer  Banks  Contractors,  Inc.  v.  Forbes,  302  N.C.  599,  604,  276
S.E.2d  375,  379  (1981).
In  contrast,  an  evidential  or  extrajudicial
admission  consists  of  words  or  other  conduct
of  a  party,  or  of  someone  for  whose  conduct
the    party    is    in    some    manner    deemed
responsible,  which  is  admissible  in  evidence
against such party, but which may be rebutted,
denied,  or  explained  away  and  is  in  no  sense
conclusive.    Generally, a party’s statements,
given in a deposition or at trial of the case,
are  to  be  treated  as  evidential  admissions
rather than as judicial admissions.
Jones v. Durham Anesthesia Assocs., P.A.,  185 N.C. App.  504,  509,
648  S.E.2d                                                                   531,   535-36   (2007)           (citations  and  quotation  marks
omitted).
Petitioner  herein,  citing  Clapp  v.  Clapp,  241  N.C.  281,  85
S.E.2d  153  (1954),  contends  that  the  trial  court  did  not  need  to
make the findings enumerated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 46-22(b) and  (c)
as  respondent  made  a  judicial  admission  by  “acknowledg[ing]  at  a
hearing  in  front  of  the  Court  that  an  actual  partition  of  said
lands cannot be made without substantial injury to one or both of
the  parties.”    In  Clapp,  this  Court  considered  the  effect  of  a
judicial  admission  in  a  partition  proceeding.    Id.  at  284-85,  85
S.E.2d  at  155-56.    The  petitioner  filed  a  petition  for  a  special
proceeding  to  sell  real  property  from  decedent’s  estate  and  for
partition.   Id. at  282,  85 S.E.2d at  153-54.   The petition alleged




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that  actual  partition  of  the  real  property  could  not  be  made
without injury to some or all of the parties, and that a sale for
partition  was  necessary.    Id.  at  282-83,  85  S.E.2d  at  154.    The
respondents answered  “admitting that actual partition of the land
cannot  be  made  without  injury  to  some  or  all  of  the  owners
thereof[,]” but filed a plea alleging that one of the respondents
owned a portion of the subject property “by virtue of an agreement”
between  the  decedent  and  respondent  Vick  Clapp.    Id.  at  283,  85
S.E.2d at 154.   In a hearing before the Clerk, respondents’ counsel
stated  that  respondents  did  not  have  any  written  contract  or
documentation in support of their claim, but stated they intended
to  bring  suit  against  the  decedent’s  estate  for  breach  of  a
contract.   Id.   Accordingly, the Clerk entered judgment appointing
a Commissioner and directed sale of all the land described in the
petition. Id. at 283,  85 S.E.2d at 154-55.   On respondents’ appeal
to the Superior Court, respondents admitted there was no contract
between the decedent and respondent Vick Clapp, the Superior Court
affirmed the Clerk’s order, and respondents appealed to our Supreme
Court.    Id.  at  283,  85  S.E.2d  at  155.    The  Court  noted  that  the
issue  of  fact  raised  by  respondents’  plea  of  sole  seizin               “was
eliminated  and  the  necessity  for  jury  trial  removed  when  the
[respondents] conceded by solemn admission, first made to the Clerk
and  later  reiterated  in  response  to  an  inquiry  of  the  presiding
Judge in term time, that their plea of sole seizin is not supported
by  any  written  contract  or  document  to  convey  or  devise  the  land
claimed[,]” and, therefore, amounted to  “[a] judicial admission  .




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.  effectively  remov[ing]  the  admitted  fact  from  the  field  of
issuable matters.”   Id. at 284, 85 S.E.2d at 155 (Emphasis added.)
The  Court  then  held  that  in  view  of  this  judicial  admission,
respondents’ “claim of sole seizin is within the statute of frauds
and for that reason void, the judgment of the Clerk, as approved by
the  presiding  Judge,  directing  sale  of  all  the  land  is  free  of
prejudicial  or  reversible  error  and  will  be  upheld.”    Id.    Given
the respondents’ admission in their answer and the elimination of
their  plea  of  sole  seizin,  the  Court  concluded  that  petitioners
“were  entitled  upon  the  allegations  of  the  pleadings  to  sale  for
partition.”    Id.  at  285,  85  S.E.2d  at  156.    The  Court  then  held
that  “[t]he judgment below will be treated as having been entered
for that purpose, and as so modified will be affirmed.”    Id.
Respondent  argues  that  this  case  is  controlled  by  Partin  v.
Dalton Property Assoc.,  112 N.C. App.  807,  436 S.E.2d  903  (1993),
which  reversed  an  order  for  partition  because  it  did  not  contain
the  required  findings  of  fact  to  support  the  trial  court’s
conclusion of law regarding  “substantial injury.”    In Partin, the
petitioner filed a petition requesting that two properties be sold
in  lieu  of  actual  partition.    Id.  at  808,  436  S.E.2d  at  903-04.
The Clerk of Court entered an order that the property be sold, and
respondent appealed the Clerk’s order to the Superior Court.    Id.
at 809, 436 S.E.2d at 904.                                                     “The court adopted the findings of fact
of  the  Clerk  of  the  Superior  Court,  concluded  as  a  matter  of  law
that  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  an  actual  partition  of
the  property  could  not  be  had  without  substantial  injury  to  the




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cotenants, and ordered the sale of the property.”    Id. at  809-10,
436 S.E.2d at  905.    On appeal, respondent challenged  “whether the
trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support ordering a
partition by sale.”    Id. at  810,                                         436 S.E.2d at  905.      This Court
held that
[t]he trial court failed to make the required
findings  of  fact  that  actual  partition  would
result  in  one  of  the  cotenants  receiving  a
share  with  a  value  materially  less  than  the
value  of  the  share  he  would  receive  were  the
property  partitioned  by  sale  and  that  actual
partition would materially impair a cotenant’s
rights,  and  there  is  no  evidence  in  this
record  which  would  support  such  findings  of
fact.   Therefore, the trial court’s order must
be  reversed  and  the  case  remanded  for  a  new
trial.
Id. at  812,  436 S.E.2d at  906.
Here, as in Partin, neither the trial court in its order, or
the referenced Clerk’s order, made any specific findings regarding
whether                                                                     “the  fair  market  value  of  each  share  in  an  in-kind
partition would be materially less than the share of each cotenant
in the money equivalent that would be obtained from the sale of the
whole”  or  specific  findings  “supporting  an  order  of  sale  of  the
property”  as  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                              §                                                             46-22(b)  and      (c).
However,  in  Partin,  there  was  no  allegation  of  a  judicial  or
evidentiary  admission  as  to  the  relevant  facts.     Instead,  the
Partin  respondent  challenged  the  allegations  of  the  petition  and
the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the property’s
best use, terrain, access to a roadway, and the difficulty and cost
of   surveying   the   land.   Id.  at                                      809,                                                          436   S.E.2d  at   904-05.
Therefore,   Partin   is   distinguished   from   this   case   by   the




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respondent’s denial of the petitioner’s claims and allegations as
well as the presentation of conflicting evidence.
This  case  is  much  more  similar  to  Clapp  than  to  Partin.
Here,  as  in  Clapp,  respondent  made  an  “acknowledg[ment]”  to  the
Clerk                                                                        “that  an  actual  partition  of  said  lands  cannot  be  made
without  substantial  injury  to  one  or  both  of  the  parties.”    In
addition, respondent failed to deny any of the allegations of the
petition, including the allegation that “the nature and size of the
Property  is  such  that  an  actual  partition  thereof  cannot  be  made
without  injury  to  the  several  interested  persons.”     Because
respondent failed to deny the allegations of the petition, all of
the allegations of the petition are deemed admitted.    See Hill v.
Hill,                                                                        11  N.C.  App.                                                    1,   10,   180  S.E.2d   424,   430   (“Averments  in
pleadings are admitted when not denied in a responsive pleading, if
a responsive pleading is required.”), cert. denied,  279 N.C.  348,
182 S.E.2d  580  (1971).    Just as in Clapp, the judicial admissions
of the respondent established the factual basis for the partition
order’s  conclusion  of  law.     These  admissions                          “remove[d]  the
admitted fact from the trial by formally conceding its existence.”
Outer Banks Contractors, Inc., 302 N.C. at 604, 276 S.E.2d at 379.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s conclusion of law that
the property could not be actually partitioned without substantial
injury  to  a  party  was  supported  by  the  respondent’s  judicial
admissions,  and  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in
ordering the sale of the subject properties.   Lyons-Hart, ___ N.C.




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App.  at                                                                       ___,                                                                695  S.E.2d  at   821.   Respondent’s  argument  is
overruled.
Respondent argues next that because he was proceeding pro se
any admission by him of “substantial injury”--a statutorily defined
term--“should  not  be  deemed  a  repudiation  of  the  absolutely
contrary positions that [he] took both before and after the hearing
before the Clerk.”   As noted above, we cannot agree that respondent
took a contrary position at any time. In addition, respondent cites
no authority of precedential value in support of his argument that
we  should  overlook  his  judicial  admissions  in  his  answer,  before
the Clerk of Superior Court, and before the Superior Court because
of his pro se status.   A person who chooses to represent himself is
bound  by  the  same  rules  as  one  who  is  represented  by  counsel;  to
hold otherwise would be manifestly unfair to the represented party
and contrary to established law. Just as the defendant in State v.
Pritchard,  227 N.C.  168,  41 S.E.2d  287  (1947), respondent  “proved
to  be  a  poor  lawyer  and  an  unwise  client.    After  [judgment],  he
employed counsel to prosecute an appeal. This has been done with as
much skill as the record would permit.”    Id. at  169,  41 S.E.2d at
287.                                                                           Based   upon   the   record   before   us,   we   must   overrule
respondent’s  argument  that  his  judicial  admissions  should  be
overlooked  because  he  was  representing  himself  and  did  not
understand all of the legal issues involved.
Lastly, respondent argues that petitioner’s argument regarding
respondent’s  alleged  admissions  was  not  raised  before  the  trial
court  and  therefore  was  not  properly  preserved  for  appellate




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review.   Contrary to respondent’s contention, at the 31 August 2009
hearing on this matter, petitioner’s counsel did argue to the trial
court that respondent admitted at the hearing before the Clerk that
actual partition of the subject properties would cause substantial
injury  to  both  parties.    Accordingly,    respondent’s  argument  is
overruled.
For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur.

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