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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA07-106 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: NANCY SNYDER, Petitioner, v. MAXINE DUNCAN, JEAN WILSON, and PAUL BUCHANAN, Respondents. Mitchell County No. 05 SP 15 15 July 2008

Court of Appeals Slip Opinion
Maxine Duncan Heard in

Appeal by petitioner from judgment entered 5 October 2006 by Judge James U. Downs in Mitchell County Superior Court. the Court of Appeals 11 September 2007.

Stephen L. Snyder, for petitioner-appellant. Gerald R. McKinney, for Paul Buchanan, respondents-appellees. Lloyd Hise, Jr., for respondents-appellees. JACKSON, Judge. Nancy Snyder ("petitioner") appeals from a judgment declaring that (1) Paul Buchanan ("Buchanan") possessed a two-thirds and Jean Wilson,

undivided interest in an approximately twenty-nine-acre tract of land ("the subject property"); (2) Sara Jean Wilson ("Wilson") and Maxine Duncan ("Duncan") possessed a collective one-fourth

undivided interest in the subject property; and (3) petitioner

-2possessed a one-twelfth undivided interest in the property. the following reasons, we affirm. On 26 November 2000, Charlie Z. Buchanan ("Charlie") died intestate, survived by his wife -- Rosa Buchanan ("Rosa") -- and his four children -- petitioner, Duncan, Wilson, and Buchanan. On 26 For

October 2002, Rosa died, seized of her undivided interest in the subject property. Thereafter, petitioner offered for probate a

paper writing purporting to be Rosa's last will and testament and devising all of her property to petitioner. Wilson and Duncan

initiated a caveat proceeding, and a jury determined that the paper writing was Rosa's will. By agreement entered into at the caveat

proceeding, petitioner conveyed to Wilson and Duncan a collective one-fourth undivided interest in the subject property out of Rosa's undivided interest in exchange for a release of all of Wilson's and Duncan's claims in the caveat proceeding. On 7 March 2005, petitioner filed a petition seeking to have the subject property partitioned into severalty between herself and Duncan, Wilson, and Buchanan (collectively, "respondents"). October 2006, the trial court filed judgment On 5

determining

petitioner's and respondents' respective interests in the subject property. Thereafter, petitioner filed timely notice of appeal.

When, as in the instant case, "a trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review upon appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the court's findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of the facts. The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." City of

-3Wilmington v. Hill, __ N.C. App. __, __, 657 S.E.2d 670, 671 (2008) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Petitioner has failed to assign error to any of the trial court's findings of fact, and accordingly, these findings are deemed binding on appeal. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 183 N.C. App. 648, 650, 645 S.E.2d 156, 157 (2007) (quoting In re A.S., 181 N.C. App. 706, 709, 640 S.E.2d 817, 819, aff'd, 361 N.C. 686, 651 S.E.2d 883 (2007) (per curiam)). Additionally, petitioner has failed to

assign error to the trial court's findings, conclusions, and decree with respect to the collective one-fourth undivided interest in the subject property shared by Wilson and Duncan, and therefore, Wilson's and Duncan's ownership interest is not at issue before this Court. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (2006); In re J.A.A. & S.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 74, 623 S.E.2d 45, 50 (2005) (noting that failure to assign error to a conclusion of law "`constitutes an acceptance of the conclusion and a waiver of the right to challenge said conclusion as unsupported by the facts'" (quoting Fran's Pecans, Inc. v. Greene, 134 N.C. App. 110, 112, 516 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1999))). On appeal, petitioner first contends that the trial court erred in finding and concluding that the Charlie made advancements to Duncan and petitioner.1
1

We disagree.

Petitioner assigned error to the trial court's conclusion of law number 2, which provided that Charlie's conveyances of real property to Wilson and Duncan constituted advancements. However, petitioner has failed to argue in her brief that the trial court erred in concluding that Charlie made an advancement to Wilson. Therefore, we review conclusion of law number 2 only to determine whether the findings support the conclusion that the

-4An "advancement" is defined as "an irrevocable inter vivos gift of property, made by an intestate donor to any person who would be his heir or one of his heirs upon his death, and intended by the intestate donor to enable the donee to anticipate his inheritance to the extent of the gift." N.C. Gen. Stat.

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