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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No.  87PA99
CHARLIE STEVE SPRUILL
v.
LAKE PHELPS VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC. and CRESWELL
VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S.  §  7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,  132 N.C. App.  104,
510 S.E.2d  405  (1999), reversing an amended order of summary
judgment entered  10 December  1997 by Griffin, J., in Superior
Court, Washington County, and remanding for trial on the
remaining issues.    Heard in the Supreme Court  15 September  1999.
Hardee & Hardee, by G. Wayne Hardee and Charles R.
Hardee, for plaintiff-appellee.
Baker, Jenkins, Jones & Daly, P.A., by Kevin N. Lewis
and Ronald G. Baker, for defendant-appellant Lake
Phelps Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.
Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by Barry S. Cobb, for
defendant-appellant Creswell Volunteer Fire Department,
Inc.
LAKE, Justice.
The question presented for review is whether the
statute affording limited liability to firemen, N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-
5, exempts a rural fire department from liability for ordinary
negligence when a fire department performs acts which relate to
the suppression of a reported fire, even though such acts do not
occur at the scene of the fire.    We conclude that it does.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.




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Plaintiff made the following basic allegations in the
complaint initiating this action.    Defendants are Lake Phelps
Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.  (Lake Phelps) and Creswell
Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.  (Creswell).    On  10 March  1996,
defendants responded to a fire in the vicinity of rural paved
road  1149 in Washington County.    While responding to this fire,
defendants filled the tanks of their fire trucks from a hydrant
approximately one-half mile from the fire, and in so doing,
defendants spilled water on rural paved road  1149 from their
vehicles or hoses.    This spilled water then froze on the pavement
of this road.    At approximately  3:00 a.m. on  10 March  1996,
plaintiff was operating a  1995 Chevrolet Corvette in this
vicinity on rural paved road  1149.    Plaintiff’s car hit this ice,
skidded and ran off the roadway, and collided with a ditch bank
on the side of the road.    Plaintiff sustained personal injuries
and property damage as a result of this accident.
On  19 February  1997, plaintiff instituted this action
against defendants Lake Phelps and Creswell to recover damages
for his resulting personal injuries and property damage.    On or
about  25 March  1997, defendant Creswell filed a Rule  12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, asserting immunity.    On  1 April  1997,
defendant Lake Phelps filed its answer in which it denied all
pertinent allegations.    On  8 April  1997, defendant Lake Phelps
filed an amendment to its answer in which it added the defenses
of immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.    On  8 April  1997, defendant Lake Phelps also filed a
Rule  12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.    On or about  16 April  1997,




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defendant Creswell filed an amended motion to dismiss.    On  16
April  1997, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his
complaint.
Plaintiff’s motion to amend and defendants’ motions to
dismiss were heard on  10 July  1997 in Superior Court, Washington
County.    The trial court allowed plaintiff’s motion to amend his
complaint, and the amendment was filed  11 July  1997.    On  23 July
1997, the trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s
action against defendant Lake Phelps, and    on  4 August  1997, the
trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s action
against defendant Creswell.    The trial court then entered an
amended order on  10 December  1997 which superseded its two prior
orders of dismissal and granted summary judgment in favor of both
defendants.    Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment.    Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire
Dep’t, Inc.,  132 N.C. App.  104,  510 S.E.2d  405  (1999).    Defendant
Lake Phelps and defendant Creswell each petitioned this Court for
discretionary review.    On  8 April  1999, this Court entered orders
allowing discretionary review as to both defendants.    Defendants
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court’s order of summary judgment for defendants which was
entered on the ground that N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b) provides
immunity to rural fire departments.    We agree.
The issue presented is thus one of statutory
construction.    When confronting an issue involving statutory
interpretation, this Court’s  “primary task is to determine




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legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its
natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires
otherwise.”    Turlington v. McLeod,  323 N.C.  591,  594,  374 S.E.2d
394,  397  (1988).    The limited liability section of the Authority
and Liability of Firemen Act provides:
A rural fire department or a fireman who
belongs to the department shall not be liable
for damages to persons or property alleged to
have been sustained and alleged to have
occurred by reason of an act or omission,
either of the rural fire department or of the
fireman at the scene of a reported fire, when
that act or omission relates to the
suppression of the reported fire or to the
direction of traffic or enforcement of
traffic laws or ordinances at the scene of or
in connection with a fire, accident, or other
hazard by the department or the fireman
unless it is established that the damage
occurred because of gross negligence, wanton
conduct or intentional wrongdoing of the
rural fire department or the fireman.
N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b)  (1999).    It is apparent that in enacting
this statute, the overall purpose of the General Assembly was to
protect rural volunteer fire departments from liability for
ordinary negligence when responding to a fire.
In the decision below, the Court of Appeals observed
with respect to the wording of this section that the General
Assembly failed to define  “what constitutes  ‘the scene’ of a
reported fire.”    Spruill,  132 N.C. App. at  106,  510 S.E.2d at
407.    The Court of Appeals then reasoned that  “[t]he words  ‘at
the scene’ provide immunity for defendants for acts and omissions
only in a specific place”  (i.e., at the precise location of the
fire), and that a  “broader reading of the statute would be
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.”    Id. at  108,




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510 S.E.2d at  408.    Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded
that  “[t]he fact that plaintiff’s wreck occurred where defendants
had filled their fire trucks with water from a fire hydrant, one-
half mile away from the reported fire, is insufficient for
defendants to claim immunity.”    Id.    Under the Court of Appeals’
interpretation, the words  “at the scene of a reported fire” apply
not just to individual firemen but to fire departments as well.
The Court of Appeals thus determined that defendant fire
departments were not immune from liability in this case by virtue
of this statute.    For the reasons stated below, we disagree with
this interpretation.
Although the Court of Appeals focused on the phrase
within this statutory section which specifies  “the scene” of the
fire, it is clear that the underlying premise of N.C.G.S.  §  58-
82-5(b) is that  “[a] rural fire department  .  .  . shall not be
liable  .  .  . by reason of an act or omission  .  .  . when that act
or omission relates to the suppression of the reported fire
.”    This is the overall thrust of this statute, as it
relates to rural fire departments, and this should be the focus.
In this case, plaintiff sued only the fire departments.
Considering this statute as a whole, it establishes
immunity for the ordinary negligence of either a rural fire
department or a fireman of the department  “at the scene.”    In
order for immunity to attach to either of these entities, the act
or omission must be related to  “suppression of the reported fire
or to the direction of traffic.”    The alternative conduct
involving direction of traffic may occur either  “at the scene” of




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or  “in connection with” a fire.    When viewed in this context, it
clearly appears that immunity would attach to a rural fire
department if its acts or omissions complained of were either  (1)
related to the suppression of a reported fire, or  (2) related to
direction of traffic in connection with a fire.    This Court must
always  “‘accord words undefined in  [a] statute their plain and
definite meaning’” when the statutory language at issue is
“‘clear and unambiguous.’”    Hieb v. Lowery,  344 N.C.  403,  409,
474 S.E.2d  323,  327  (1996)  (quoting Poole v. Miller,  342 N.C.
349,  351,  464 S.E.2d  409,  410  (1995)).    In the case sub judice,
plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the acts or omissions
occurred while defendants were responding to a fire and arose
from defendants’ alleged failure to warn plaintiff of a traffic
hazard.    It would thus appear that both alternatives for immunity
as set forth in N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b) are met and apply in this
case.
Further, we do not find persuasive the contention that
the fire departments’ acts or omissions must take place at  “the
scene” simply by virtue of the phrase  “either of the rural fire
department or of the fireman at the scene of a reported fire.”
Considering the language and grammar of this statutory phrase,
the word  “or” separates the terms  “rural fire department” and
“fireman at the scene of a reported fire.”    The phrase  “at the
scene of a reported fire” modifies the word  “fireman,” thus
providing the single descriptive phrase,  “fireman at the scene of
a reported fire.”    If the General Assembly in enacting this
statute had intended for rural fire departments to be protected




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from liability only for negligent acts occurring at the scene of
a reported fire, it logically and more appropriately would have
applied this modifying phrase directly to the fire department
just as it did to the firemen actually working  “at the scene.”
Because  “or” separates the terms  “rural fire department” from the
phrase  “fireman at the scene of a reported fire,” it follows in
the normal grammatical sense that only individual firemen have
the limited immunity which is restricted to negligent acts or
omissions occurring  “at the scene” of a fire.
In further reflection of its intent, the legislature
amended the original immunity statute in  1987 in order to expand
the immunities allowed for rural fire departments and their
members.    Pursuant to this amendment, the General Assembly
inserted the following underlined language into the statute’s
text:
A rural fire department or a fireman who
belongs to the department shall not be liable
. by reason of an act or omission
. when that act or omission relates to
the suppression of the reported fire or to
the direction of traffic or enforcement of
traffic laws or ordinances at the scene of or
in connection with a fire, accident, or other
hazard by the department or the
fireman unless it is established that the
damage occurred because of gross negligence,
wanton conduct or intentional wrongdoing of
the rural fire department or the fireman.
N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b); see also Act of May  7,  1987, ch.  146, sec.
2,  1987 N.C. Sess. Laws  147,  147.    This underlined language, as
we have noted above, provides immunity for negligent acts or
omissions that relate to the suppression of a fire or to the
direction of traffic either  “at the scene of or in connection




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with a fire.”    N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b).    The addition of the phrase
“at the scene of or in connection with a fire” suggests that the
General Assembly intended to provide statutory immunity for the
ordinary negligence of a rural fire department’s acts or
omissions which relate to the suppression of a fire, and not
merely for those acts occurring at the scene of the fire.
The  1987 statutory amendment also creates another set
of circumstances in which immunity would apply; thus, the General
Assembly expanded the scope of the statute.                                “In construing a
statute with reference to an amendment, it is presumed that the
Legislature intended either  (1) to change the substance of the
original act or  (2) to clarify the meaning of it.”    Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Neill,  296 N.C.  503,  509,  251 S.E.2d  457,  461
(1979).    Here, the amendment adds an  “or” and then describes the
additional situations in which a rural fire department would
receive immunity.                                                          “‘Where a statute contains two clauses which
prescribe its applicability, and the clauses are connected by a
disjunctive  (e.g.  “or”), the application of the statute is not
limited to cases falling within both clauses, but will apply to
cases falling within either of them.’”    Davis v. N.C. Granite
Corp.,  259 N.C.  672,  675,  131 S.E.2d  335,  337  (1963)  (quoting  4
Strong’s North Carolina Index Statutes  §  5  (1 s ed.  1961)). t
Additionally, the Act which amended N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b) in  1987
was merely part of  “An Act to Expand the Traffic Control
Authority of Firemen and Rescue Squad Members in Emergency
Situations.”    This Court has previously ruled that the title of a
statute may be used as an aid in determining legislative intent.




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Equipment Fin. Corp. v. Scheidt,  249 N.C.  334,  340,  106 S.E.2d
555,  560  (1959).    Accordingly, we conclude that the General
Assembly intended to expand the scope of the statute, including
the immunity options within it, when it passed the  1987
amendment.    However, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of
N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b) contravenes this indicated intent because
it limits, rather than expands, the scope of the statute.    The
Court of Appeals’ construction results in a much narrower
interpretation of the statute which would restrict immunity and
thus frustrate the indicated intent to expand the statute’s
scope.
Finally, in the decision below, the Court of Appeals
relied on Geiger v. Guilford College Community Vol. Firemen’s
Ass’n,  668 F. Supp.  492  (M.D.N.C.  1987), in concluding that
defendants are not protected from liability under N.C.G.S.  §  58-
82-5(b).    The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Geiger is misplaced
because the facts in Geiger involve the rescue of two men trapped
in a gasoline tanker.    See id. at  493.    The court in Geiger
concluded that the fire department was not responding to a fire,
and thus no immunity applied under the statute.    Id. at  494.
However, defendant fire departments in the case sub judice were
performing acts that were  “in connection with a reported fire” as
required under N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that in order for
immunity to apply to a rural fire department, the statute
requires merely that the fire department’s negligent act or
omission must relate to the  “suppression of the reported fire.”




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N.C.G.S.  §  58-82-5(b).    Therefore, so long as the fire
department’s actions are related to the suppression of a fire, it
is irrelevant whether the fire department’s negligent act or
omission occurs precisely  “at the scene” of the fire.    Because
defendants’ alleged negligence occurred while defendant fire
departments were filling their tanks with water in response to a
fire, defendants’ alleged negligence constituted an  “act or
omission  [that] relat[ed] to the suppression of  [a] reported
fire.”    Id.    Since the legislature intended to provide immunity
to rural fire departments for ordinary negligence when responding
to a fire, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment in favor of both defendants.    Therefore, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
REVERSED.
Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.

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