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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA on behalf of BARBARA M. HARNES,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAUL A. LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellee
No. COA99-1254
(Filed  5 December  2000)
1.                                                                    Child Support, Custody, and Visitation--support--New Jersey
order--continuing exclusive jurisdiction
The trial court erred by finding a  1995 North Carolina child
support order controlling over a  1982 New Jersey order where
plaintiff and the child continued to reside in New Jersey and
plaintiff did not sign or consent to North Carolina exercising
jurisdiction to modify the New Jersey order.    Under the Full
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act,    New Jersey
retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the action and
the North Carolina court erred in failing to register the New
Jersey order and in entering a North Carolina Voluntary Support
Agreement contrary to the terms of the New Jersey order.
2.                                                                    Child Support, Custody, and Visitation--support--New Jersey
order--continuing until age  22
The trial court erred by finding a  1995 North Carolina child
support order controlling over a  1982 New Jersey order, contrary
to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.    The plain meaning
of N.C.G.S.  §  52C-2-207 requires that, if the current home state
of the child issued the support order, then that state retains
continuing exclusive jurisdiction.    Our state’s courts must apply
New Jersey law in the enforcement of the child support order,
even if the law of New Jersey is contradictory to the law of
North Carolina, and the New Jersey court in this case had the
authority to order child support until the age of twenty-two
under its state law.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered  29 June  1999 by Judge
Jerry F. Waddell in Carteret County District Court.    Heard in the
Court of Appeals  25 August  2000.
Attorney  General  Michael  F.  Easley  by  Assistant  Attorneys
General Gerald K. Robbins, Kathleen U. Baldwin and Susana E.
Honeywell for plaintiff-appellant.
No brief filed for defendant-appellee.
McGEE, Judge.
This action arises out of plaintiff Barbara M. Harnes' attempt




to  enforce  a  New  Jersey  child  support  order.     Plaintiff  and
defendant  Paul  A.  Lawrence  were  married  to  each  other  on             17
September  1977  and  their  daughter  was  born  3  December  1979.    The
parties were divorced in Ocean County, New Jersey Superior Court on
29  January                                                                   1982.                                                      The  Final  Judgment  of  Divorce  ordered  the
defendant to provide support for the couple's daughter "until the
infant  child  reaches  the  age  of  twenty-two                              (22)  years,  or  is
emancipated whichever event will occur first."   The order required
defendant  to  pay  child  support  in  the  amount  of  $65.00  per  week.
Attorneys   for   plaintiff   and   defendant   signed   the   judgment
consenting to its form.
Plaintiff,  who  still  resides  in  New  Jersey,  initiated  this
action on  13 January  1995 by transmitting a Certificate and Order
and a Uniform Support Petition from the Chancery Division, Family
Part, Ocean County Probation Division, Superior Court of New Jersey
to  the  North   Carolina  Division  of  Social  Services  and  its
department  of  Child  Support  Enforcement.  Plaintiff's  petition
requested  entry  of  an  order  for  child  support  of  $65.00  per  week
and collection of an arrearage of  $2805.00 as of  9 December  1994.
Plaintiff  included  copies  of  the  New  Jersey  reciprocal  child
support statute pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support  Act                                                                  (URESA)  and  the  original  New  Jersey  child  support
order.   She alleged in her petition that defendant was residing in
Morehead City, North Carolina.
Defendant  responded  to  plaintiff's  petition  by  signing  a
voluntary  support  agreement  and  order  entered  in  Carteret  County
District Court by Judge Kenneth Crow on  30 August  1995.    Pursuant




to this order, defendant agreed to pay an arrearage of $5945.00 at
a  monthly  rate  of  $50.00  per  month,  in  addition  to  ongoing  child
support of $282.00 per month beginning 1 September 1995.   However,
plaintiff  neither  consented  to  a  modification  of  the  New  Jersey
child  support  order  nor  did  she  authorize  any  approval  of  the
voluntary  support  agreement  and  order.    The  IV-D  Attorney  signed
the  voluntary  order  as  a  representative  of  the  Carteret  County
Child  Support  Enforcement  Division.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  110-
130.1(c)                                                                      (1995)                                      (no   attorney   client   relationship   shall   be
considered to have been created between the attorney who represents
the  child  support  enforcement  agency  and  any  person  by  virtue  of
the  action  of  the  attorney  in  providing  the  services  required.)
The New Jersey order was not registered in Carteret County District
Court as requested by plaintiff.
Defendant again failed to pay child support for his daughter
in  compliance  with  the                                                     1995  North  Carolina  Voluntary  Support
Agreement and Order and an order of willful contempt of court was
entered  against  him  in  Carteret  County  District  Court  on  24  July
1998.    The  court  ordered  defendant  to  pay                              $200.00  per  month  in
arrearage   but   terminated   defendant's   ongoing   child   support
obligation  "as  of  30  June  1998  as  the  child  is  18  and  graduated
from  high  school."    The  provision  of  the  order  terminating  child
support at age eighteen directly controverted the  1982 New Jersey
child  support  order  to  continue  child  support  until  the  daughter
attained the age of twenty-two.
Plaintiff   forwarded   another   New   Jersey   child   support
enforcement  transmittal  to  Carteret  County  on                            24  July                                    1998,




requesting  registration  of  the  New  Jersey  child  support  order  in
accordance with the 1982 New Jersey judgment and included a copy of
the original order.   The URESA transmittal also noted that the New
Jersey court-ordered child support was to continue until the child
reached  the  age  of  twenty-two  and  that  the  child  was  attending
college and not emancipated.   The 1982 New Jersey order was finally
registered  in  Carteret  County  on                                        28  April                                    1999  and  a  notice  of
Registration of Foreign Support Order was served on defendant on 13
May  1999.
Carteret County Support Enforcement Agency, through its IV-D
agency  attorney,  filed  a  motion  in  the  cause  on                     11  May                                      1999
requesting  that  the  court  determine  whether  the  1982  New  Jersey
support  order  or  the                                                     1995  North  Carolina  support  order  was
controlling and to determine the amount of child support arrearage
based on the controlling order.    The matter was heard in Carteret
County District Court on 29 June 1999.   The trial court determined
that the 1995 North Carolina order was controlling "due to the fact
that the North Carolina order is newer and due to the lapse of time
considering that the New Jersey order dates from 1982."   Plaintiff
appeals.
Plaintiff  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding  the  1995
North Carolina order is controlling because: (I) the North Carolina
court  did  not  have  subject  matter  jurisdiction  under  the  federal
Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738B
(1994)  and                                                                 (II),  the                                   1982  New  Jersey  order  was  the  controlling
order  pursuant  to  the  Uniform  Interstate  Family  Support  Act
(UIFSA), Chapter  52C of the North Carolina General Statutes.




I.
[1]  Plaintiff  first  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
finding the 1995 North Carolina order controlling because the court
in                                                                             1995  was  without  subject  matter  jurisdiction.     Plaintiff
contends that the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support
Orders Act provides that the state in which a child support order
is issued has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order and
therefore the 1995 North Carolina child support order and the 1998
North Carolina order of contempt are void.    We agree.
The United States Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act  (FFCCSOA),  28 U.S.C.  1738B  (1994) on
20  October  1994.    The  FFCCSOA  requires  that  state  courts  afford
"full  faith  and  credit"  to  child  support  orders  issued  in  other
states and refrain from modifying or issuing contrary orders except
in limited circumstances. The purpose of FFCCSOA is
(1)  to  facilitate  the  enforcement  of  child
support  orders  among  the  States;                                           (2)  to
discourage continuing interstate controversies
over child support in the interest of greater
financial    stability    and    secure    family
relationships for the child; and  (3) to avoid
jurisdictional competition and conflict among
State  courts  in  the  establishment  of  child
support orders.
Pub. L. No. 103-383, § 2(c), 108 U.S. Stat. 4064 (to be codified at
28 U.S.C. §                                                                    1738B (1994)).   Section 1738B(a) provides that "[t]he
appropriate authorities of each State--(1) shall enforce according
to  its  terms  a  child  support  order  made  consistently  with  this
section  by  a  court  of  another  State;    and  (2)  shall  not  seek  or
make  a  modification  of  such  an  order  except  in  accordance  with
subsection  (e)."




"Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,
the provisions of FFCCSOA are binding on all states and supersede
any   inconsistent   provisions   of   state   law,   including   any
inconsistent  provisions  of  uniform  state  laws  such  as  URESA[.]"
Kelly v. Otte,  123 N.C. App.  585,  589,  474 S.E.2d  131,  134, disc.
review  denied,                                                                  345  N.C.                                      180,   479  S.E.2d   204   (1996).   FFCCSOA
"obligates  states  to  enforce,  according  to  its  terms,  a  child
support order issued by another state which is made consistent with
the  Act's  jurisdiction  and  due  process  standards."    Welsher  v.
Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 528, 491 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1997); see also
Kelly,  123 N.C. App. at  589,  474 S.E.2d at  134.   Modification of a
valid order is permitted only when:                                              (1) all parties have consented
to the jurisdiction of the forum state to modify the order;   or (2)
neither  the  child  nor  any  of  the  parties  remains  in  the  issuing
state  and  the  forum  state  has  personal  jurisdiction  over  the
parties.    Id.    Our  Court  held  in  Kelly  that  while  the  law  of  the
forum  state  may  apply  to  the  enforcement  and  remedy  applied  to  a
registered foreign support order, under URESA and FFCCSOA   the law
of  the  rendering  state                                                        (the  state  that  issued  the  order)  must
govern the order's interpretation.    Id.
In the case before us, consistent with this definition and the
statute's intended purpose to prevent the issuance of conflicting
child  support  orders  among  different  states,  New  Jersey  had
continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child support order in
1995.    Plaintiff and the child continued to reside in the issuing
state  of  New  Jersey.    Plaintiff  did  not  sign  nor  consent  to  the
State of North Carolina exercising jurisdiction to modify the New




Jersey order.   Therefore, New Jersey retained continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the action.    See  28 U.S.C.  1738B(d).
In addition, New Jersey had continuing exclusive jurisdiction
over  the  child  support  action  when  the  trial  court  in  North
Carolina entered a contempt order in  1998 for defendant's failure
to  pay  support.    It  was  error  for  the  trial  court  to  terminate
defendant's ongoing child support in 1998 based on the finding that
the child was eighteen and graduated from high school.      This  1998
order arose from the invalid 1995 child support proceedings and is
also governed by FFCCOSA.   Therefore, the law of New Jersey must be
applied and the New Jersey support order requiring payments to the
child until the age of twenty-two years must be upheld.   The North
Carolina  court  did  not  have  jurisdiction  to  modify  the  1982  New
Jersey  order  in                                                            1995  nor  in  1998.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §               52C-2-205
(1995).                                                                      We also note that the court in Carteret County failed to
register plaintiff's  1995 URESA transmittal and instead defendant
signed a voluntary support agreement that was entered as an order
of the court.   Our Court in Williams v. Williams, 97 N.C. App. 118,
121,                                                                         387  S.E.2d                                                217,        219   (1990)  held  that  "N.C.G.S.   §   52A-29
(repealed by Sessions Law 1995 and codified in 1996 under N.C.G.S.
§ 52C-6-602, Procedure to register order for enforcement) requires
only that certain documents be transmitted to the clerk of court.
After  submitting  the  required  documents,  an  obligee  seeking
registration has no other duties under the statute."      The record
in this case shows that plaintiff met the requirements by properly
transmitting all of the required URESA documentation in 1995.   The
North  Carolina  trial  court  erred  both  in  failing  to  register  the




New Jersey order in 1995 and in entering a North Carolina Voluntary
Support  Agreement  contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  New  Jersey  order.
Once  the  documentation  was  sent  to  the  clerk  of  court,  North
Carolina  became  the  registering  tribunal  of  the  New  Jersey  child
support order and the North Carolina court was required to register
and enforce the New Jersey order.    Welsher,  127 N.C. App. at  526,
491 S.E.2d at  664.
II.
[2]  Plaintiff  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
finding the 1995 North Carolina order controlling in conflict with
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, codified as Chapter 52C
of  the  North  Carolina  General  Statutes.    Plaintiff  contends  that
the  plain  meaning  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  52C-2-207  (1995)  requires
that  if  the  current  home  state  of  the  child  issued  the  support
order, then that state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction.
We agree.
N.C.G.S.  §                                                                  52C-2-207  established  a  priority  scheme  for  the
                                                                             recognition  and  enforcement  of  multiple  existing  child  support
obligations.    N.C.G.S.  §                                                  52C-2-207(a).    The  official  comment  to
N.C.G.S.  §                                                                  52C-2-207 notes that
A   keystone   of   UIFSA   is   to   provide   a
transitional   procedure   for   the   eventual
elimination   of   existing   multiple   support
orders in an expeditious and efficient manner
.[i]n  choosing  among  existing  multiple
orders, UIFSA subsection (b)(1) gives priority
to the order issued by the only tribunal that
is                                                                           entitled                                                                to    continuing   exclusive
jurisdiction  .  .  .[when]  an  individual  party
or the child continues to reside in that State
[which issued the original order].
Our   Court   stated   in   Welsher   that   "UIFSA   governs   the




proceedings over any foreign support order which is registered in
North  Carolina  after                                                        1  January                          1996,  UIFSA's  effective  date."
Welsher,  127  N.C.  App.  at  527,  491  S.E.2d  at  664.    In  the  case
before us, the New Jersey support order was registered in Carteret
County, North Carolina in  1999.    Upon notification of the filing,
defendant  did  not  contest  the  order  and  therefore  "a  tribunal  of
this  State  shall  recognize  and  enforce,  but  may  not  modify,  a
registered order[.]"    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  52C-6-603(c)  (1995).    New
Jersey is the child's home state in this case and the support order
of  the  New  Jersey  court  is  the  controlling  order.    The  1982  New
Jersey  order  issued  by  a  court  in  the  current  home  state  of  the
child had priority over the  1995 North Carolina order.    The trial
court  in  North  Carolina  was  required  to  recognize  the  New  Jersey
order as controlling.                                                         28 U.S.C.A.  1738B(f)(3)  (1994).
As to the choice of state law governing the support order, our
courts  have  clarified  that  the  law  of  the  issuing  state  must  be
applied  by  the  adopting  state.    UIFSA  requires  that  "a  support
order be interpreted according to the law of the state in which it
[was] issued."    Welsher,  127 N.C. App. at  524,  491 S.E.2d at  663.
"The FFCCSOA is very stringent in its mandate that a foreign child
support order be enforced according to its terms." Kelly, 123 N.C.
App. at 591, 474 S.E.2d at 135.   Therefore, our state's courts must
apply New Jersey law in the enforcement of the child support order,
even if the law of New Jersey is contradictory to the law of this
state.    The  1995  North  Carolina  court  order  implied  that  because
the  age  of  emancipation  in  North  Carolina  is  eighteen,  then  the
court could modify the New Jersey support order to end support at




age  eighteen,  not  age  twenty-two  as  required  by  the  New  Jersey
order.    This  is  not  in  accordance  with  New  Jersey  law,  which  we
must apply.    N.J.S.A.  2A:34-23  (1988) provides:
Pending any matrimonial action  .  .  . or after
judgment  of  divorce  .  .  .  the  court  may  make
such order as to the alimony or maintenance of
the  parties,  and  also  to  the  care,  custody,
education and maintenance of the children  .  .
. as the circumstances of the parties and the
nature of the case shall render fit  .  .  . and
require reasonable security for due observance
of such orders[.]
This  statute  has  been  applied  by  the  New  Jersey  courts  to  permit
enforcement  of  support  orders  for  children  over  the  age  of
eighteen.    Quinn  v.  Johnson,  247  N.J.  Super.  572,  589  A.2d  1077
(1991)                                                                        (holding  that  N.J.S.A.                           2A:34-23  gives  the  courts  broad
authority   to  continue  orders  for  children  over  the  age  of
eighteen); Sakovits v. Sakovits, 178 N.J. Super. 623, 429 A.2d 1091
(1981)  (duty to assure the necessary support for the education of
a child over the age of eighteen); Hoover v. Voightman, I, 103 N.J.
Super.  535,  248  A.2d  136  (1968)  (order  to  increase  support  for  a
child over the age of  18 who was attending college).
In  the  case  before  us,  plaintiff  and  defendant  were  both
represented  by  attorneys  at  the  time  of  their  divorce  and  their
attorneys  signed  the                                                        1982  Final  Judgment  of  Divorce.     The  New
Jersey court had the authority to order child support until the age
of  twenty-two  under  its  state  law.    The  record  shows  the  child,
born on 3 December 1979, was eighteen and attending college in New
Jersey and therefore not emancipated under New Jersey case law at
the  time  of  the  second  transmittal  request  in  1998  and  when  the
1998 order was entered.   Schumm v. Schumm, 122 N.J. Super. 146, 299




A.2d 423 (1973) (there is no fixed age for emancipation, custodial
parent primarily responsible for determining the factors, such as
education,  which  act  to  continue  a  child's  dependence  upon
support);  Keegan  v.  Keegan,                                                 326  N.J.  Super.                   289,   741  A.2d   134
(1999)  (child would not be emancipated, for support purposes when
she had plans to attend college and had not moved beyond the sphere
of her parents).   Therefore, the courts of this state are required
under  FFCCSOA  and  UIFSA  to  enforce  the  New  Jersey  support  order,
until the child of the parties reaches the age of twenty-two.
Plaintiff did not consent to the jurisdiction of this state to
modify  the  New  Jersey  order  in                                            1995  and  New  Jersey  therefore
retained  continuing,  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  the  order.    The
North  Carolina  trial  court  was  required  to  give  the  New  Jersey
order full faith and credit, enforcing the order and interpreting
the  order  according  to  the  law  of  the  state  of  New  Jersey.    The
order of the trial court is vacated and this action is remanded to
the  trial  court  for  the  entry  of  an  order  consistent  with  UIFSA,
FFCCSOA, and this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges WYNN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.

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