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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA09-315
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          2 March  2010
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA on
relation of YOUTHON TRENT REDMOND,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Cleveland County
No.  08 CVS  1919
CLEVELAND COUNTY SHERIFF
RAYMOND HAMRICK, in his Official
Capacity; LAURIE S. BUMGARNER,
M.D., as Doctor at Cleveland County
Detention Center, in her Individual
and Official Capacity; KIM JACKSON,
LPN, as Nurse at Cleveland County
Detention Center, in    her Individual
and Official Capacity; SOUTHERN HEALTH
PARTNERS, INC., as Medical Services
Contractors for Cleveland County
Detention Center; and JOHN DOE SURETY
COMPANY, as Surety for Cleveland
County Sheriff’s Department,
Defendants.
Appeal  by  defendants  from  order  entered  17  November  2008  by
Judge  Forrest  D.  Bridges  in  Superior  Court,  Cleveland  County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  29 September  2009.
J. Neal Rodgers for plaintiff-appellee.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Sean F. Perrin, for
defendants-appellants.
WYNN, Judge.
“[W]aiver of a sheriff’s official immunity may be shown by the




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existence of his official bond . . .                                          .”  1 Here, Defendant Cleveland
County Sheriff Rodney Hamrick argues that the trial court erred by
denying him summary judgment on Plaintiff Youthon Trent Redmond’s
claim on grounds of sovereign immunity.   Because Defendant Hamrick
waived  sovereign  immunity  by  purchasing  a  surety  bond,  and
Plaintiff effectively joined the surety as a party to the action,
we affirm the order of the trial court.
Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence tended to show the following:
On  or  about                                                                 8  August                              2005,  Plaintiff  was  incarcerated  at  the
                                                                              Cleveland  County  Detention  Center   (“Detention  Center”).     On                  11
August  2005,  Plaintiff  suffered  a  seizure  from  Xanax  withdrawal,
which  caused  him  to  fall  and  fracture  his  left  ankle.    Plaintiff
received  treatment  at  Cleveland  Regional  Medical  Center  from           11
August to  17 August  2005.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on  11 August  2008, alleging that
his  seizure  and  other  resultant  medical  issues  stemmed  from  the
lack  of  medical  care  and  attention  he  received  at  the  Detention
Center.    Plaintiff  asserted  four  claims  for  relief:  (1)  medical
negligence as to Defendant Southern Health Partners, Inc. (“SHP”),
the  medical  services  provider  for  the  Detention  Center,  and
Defendants Dr. Laurie S. Bumgarner and Nurse Kim Jackson, both SHP
employees; (2) corporate negligence and negligent supervision as to
Defendant SHP; (3) gross negligence as to Defendants Bumgarner and
Jackson in their individual capacities, and negligent retention and
1
Smith v. Phillips,  117 N.C. App.  378,  384,  451 S.E.2d  309,
314  (1994).




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supervision as to Defendant SHP; and (4) negligence as to Defendant
Hamrick under the doctrine of respondeat superior and for failure
to comply with his statutory duties under N.C. Gen. Stat. sections
153A-221,  -224  (2009).
Defendant  Hamrick  filed  an  answer  on                                    16  September   2008,
denying  Plaintiff’s  claims.    He  then  filed  a  motion  for  summary
judgment  on                                                                 18  September   2008,  alleging  that  Plaintiff’s  claims
against  him  were  barred  by  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  immunity.
After considering Defendant Hamrick’s motion, the trial court filed
an  order  on  17  November  2008,  granting  summary  judgment  in  part,
and denying summary judgment in part.    The trial court stated:
The   Court   GRANTS   the   Motion   for   Summary
Judgment  as  to  Defendant  Hamrick,  in  his
official  capacity  as  Sheriff  of  Cleveland
County,   except   to   the   extent   that   the
Plaintiff  seeks  to  assert  a  claim  against
Defendant  Hamrick  arising  out  of  a  statutory
duty  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                               §§              153A-221,  et
seq.
To  the  extent  that  the  Plaintiff  seeks  to
sound  a  claim  against  Defendant  Hamrick,  in
his official capacity as Sheriff of Cleveland
County,  asserting  claims  for  tort  liability
including   but   not   limited   to   claims   for
medical   malpractice   or   medical   negligence
under  the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior,
concerning   acts   or   omissions   of   agents
contracted  pursuant  to  any  plan  adopted  for
providing  medical  care  for  prisoners  in  the
Cleveland County Detention Center, such claims
are  hereby  DISMISSED  WITH  PREJUDICE  against
Defendant Hamrick.
On appeal,  (I) Defendant Hamrick argues that the trial court
erred by denying summary judgment in part because Plaintiff’s claim
under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §§  153A-221,  -224,  is  barred  by  sovereign




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immunity, and (II) Plaintiff cross-assigns error arguing the trial
court  erred  by  granting  Defendant  partial  summary  judgment  as  to
the  issue  of  medical  negligence  under  the  doctrine  of  respondeat
superior  because  Defendant  Hamrick  is  not  entitled  to  sovereign
immunity.    After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Defendant Hamrick appeals from the trial court’s order denying
summary judgment “to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks to assert
a claim against Defendant Hamrick arising out of a statutory duty
under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                      §§                153A-221,  et  seq.”    Defendant  Hamrick
argues that the trial court erred by not granting summary judgment
in his favor because Plaintiff’s action is barred by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.2
“Governmental immunity shields municipalities and the officers
or employees thereof sued in their official capacities from suits
based on torts committed while performing a governmental function.”
Kephart v. Pendergraph, 131 N.C. App. 559, 563, 507 S.E.2d 915, 918
(1998)  (citing  Taylor,  112  N.C.  App.  at  607,  436  S.E.2d  at  278).
Further,  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  immunity  bars  actions  against
public officials, including sheriffs, when they are sued in their
official  capacities.     See  Phillips  v.  Gray,                            163  N.C.  App.   52,
56-57, 592 S.E.2d 229, 232, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 545, 599
2
We note that Defendant Hamrick’s appeal is interlocutory.
However, because a denial of summary judgment on the basis of
sovereign immunity is immediately appealable, his appeal is
properly before this Court.    See Taylor v. Ashburn,  112 N.C. App.
604,  606,  436 S.E.2d  276,  278  (1993), cert. denied,  336 N.C.  77,
445 S.E.2d  46  (1994).




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S.E.2d  406  (2004).    Moreover,  “[i]t is generally established that
a sheriff is a public official entitled to sovereign immunity and,
unless the immunity is waived pursuant to a statute, is protected
from suit against him in his official capacity.”    Smith,  117 N.C.
App. at  381,  451 S.E.2d at  312.    Thus, because Plaintiff’s action
was  brought  against  Defendant  Hamrick  in  his  official  capacity,
Defendant  Hamrick  is  entitled  to  sovereign  immunity  unless  the
immunity is waived pursuant to statute.
As  this  Court  has  previously  recognized,  “[o]ur  Legislature
has  prescribed  two  ways  for  a  sheriff  to  be  sued  in  his  official
capacity, thus waiving sovereign immunity.”    Myers v. Bryant,  188
N.C. App.  585,  588,  655 S.E.2d  882,  885, disc. review denied,  362
N.C.                                                                             360,               664  S.E.2d   309   (2008).   First,  a  sheriff  may  waive
governmental immunity by purchasing a bond, so long as the surety
is joined as a party to the action.   Sellers v. Rodriguez, 149 N.C.
App. 619, 624, 561 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2002); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  58-76-5  (2009)  (“Every  person  injured  by  the  neglect  .  .  .  in
office  of  any  .  .  .  sheriff  .  .  ., may  institute  a  suit  or  suits
against said officer . . . and their sureties upon their respective
bonds for the due performance of their duties in office in the name
of the State, without any assignment thereof  . .  .                             .”).   Second, a
sheriff may waive sovereign immunity by the purchase of liability
insurance.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  153A-435  (2009)  (“Purchase  of
insurance   pursuant   to   this   subsection   waives   the   county’s
governmental immunity, to the extent of insurance coverage, for any
act  or  omission  occurring  in  the  exercise  of  a  governmental




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function.”).
Plaintiff  joined                                                              “John  Doe  Surety  Company”  as  surety  for
Defendant  Hamrick  as  a  party  to  the  action  in  his  11  August  2008
complaint  and  specifically  invoked  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                       §                                               58-76-5.
Defendant  Hamrick  admitted  in  his  answer  that                            “as  Sheriff  of
Cleveland  County  he  has  furnished  a  bond  to  Cleveland  County
pursuant to the requirements of state law.”   Although the record is
silent  as  to  an  amendment  to  the  complaint  by  Plaintiff,  we  hold
the joining of a  “John Doe Surety Company” sufficient to meet the
statutory requirements that the surety be joined as a party to the
action.
We note that Defendant Hamrick argues that Plaintiff’s motion
to  amend  his  complaint  to  name  the  surety  would  be  barred  by  the
statute of limitations.   He concludes from this that his sovereign
immunity was not waived by bond because Plaintiff has not properly
joined  the  surety.    This  argument  conflates  two  distinct  issues:
(1)  whether  Plaintiff’s  complaint  is  sufficient  to  meet  the
jurisdictional  requirements  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  58-76-5  and  (2)
whether  Plaintiff  could  proceed  against  the  surety  under  the
relation-back doctrine of N.C. Gen. Stat. §  1A-1, Rule 15.   We are
satisfied  that  the  designation                                              “John  Doe”  in  the  complaint  is
sufficient  to  meet  the  jurisdictional  requirements  of  N.C.  Gen.
Stat. § 58-76-5.   The latter issue of whether Plaintiff may proceed
against the surety under the relation-back doctrine is not before
us.    We  note  further  that  this  holding  is  not  inconsistent  with
Mellon  v.  Prosser  as  we  understand  that  opinion  to  enforce  the




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jurisdictional  requirement  alone.  126  N.C.  App.  620,  624-25,  486
S.E.2d  439,  442-43  (1997)  (Wynn,  J.  dissenting)  (writing  not  to
allow remand for amendment of complaint where the plaintiff failed
to  join  any  party  as  surety  or  otherwise  plead  any  waiver  of
immunity by the sheriff), aff’d in part, rev’d in part for reasons
stated in the dissent, 347 N.C. 568, 494 S.E.2d 763-64 (1998) (per
curiam).
Having  found  that  Defendant  Hamrick  waived  his  immunity  by
purchasing a surety bond, we dismiss Defendant Hamrick’s claim that
he is barred from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
a  matter  of  law,  and  affirm  the  trial  court’s  partial  denial  of
summary judgment.
II.
We now address Plaintiff’s cross assignment of error, in which
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment
in favor of Defendant on the issue of medical negligence under the
doctrine  of  respondeat  superior.     The  threshold  issue  here  is
whether Plaintiff’s appeal is premature, and therefore not properly
before this Court.
“An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an
action,  which  does  not  dispose  of  the  case,  but  leaves  it  for
further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine
the entire controversy.”    Veazey v. Durham,  231 N.C.  357,  362,  57
S.E.2d  377,  381  (1950).    This Court has explained:
Where                                                                        .  an  order  entered  by  the  trial
court   does   not   dispose   of   the   entire
controversy   between   all   parties,   it   is
interlocutory.    As a general rule, a party is
not   entitled   to   immediately   appeal   an




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interlocutory  order.    However,  there  are  two
situations  in  which  an  appeal  of  right  lies
from  an  order  that  is  interlocutory.     The
first situation is where the order represents
a  final  judgment  as  to  one  or  more  but  fewer
than  all  of  the  claims  or  parties  and  the
trial  court  certifies  in  the  judgment  that
there  is  no  just  reason  to  delay  the  appeal.
Secondly, a party may appeal an interlocutory
order    where    delaying    the    appeal    will
irreparably impair a substantial right of the
party.
Hudson-Cole  Dev.  Corp.  v.  Beemer,                                        132  N.C.  App.                341,   344,   511
S.E.2d  309,  311  (internal quotations citations omitted); see also
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7A-27(d)(2009).
Here, the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment is
interlocutory  and  the  trial  court  did  not  certify  this  issue  for
immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure.   See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2009).
Thus,  Plaintiff’s  right  to  an  immediate  appeal,  if  one  exists,
depends on whether the order affects a substantial right.
Plaintiff   argues   that   his   substantial   right                        “to   have
determined in a single action, the question of whether [Plaintiff]
was  injured  by  the  acts  of  one,                                        [all],  or  neither  of  the
defendants”  will  be  lost  absent  immediate  review.     DeHaven  v.
Hoskins,  95 N.C. App.  397,  399,  382 S.E.2d  856,  858, disc. review
denied, 325 N.C. 705, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989).   However, this Court’s
decision to allow the immediate appeal of the interlocutory order
in DeHaven was predicated on its finding that delaying the appeal
created  the  possibility  of  inconsistent  verdicts.    Id.    Here,  no
such possibility exists.
In this case, the trial court’s order granted summary judgment




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in  favor  of  Defendant  Hamrick  as  to  Plaintiff’s  claims  of  tort
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.   Accordingly,
Defendant Hamrick’s liability for medical negligence is derivative,
or premised on the liability of SHP and its employees.   See, e.g.,
Griffith v. Glen Wood Co., 184 N.C. App. 206, 215,  646 S.E.2d  550,
557 (2007) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer
may be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employee who is
acting  within  the  scope  of  his  employment.”).    Because  Defendant
Hamrick’s  liability  depends  upon  the  liability  of  the  other
Defendants, there can be no possibility of inconsistent verdicts.
See Long v. Giles,  123 N.C. App.  150,  152-53,  472 S.E.2d  374,  375
(1996)  (holding no substantial right exists to have the liability
of  both  employer  and  employee  determined  in  the  same  trial  if
respondeat  superior  is  the  only  theory  of  liability  against  the
employer); Jarrell v. Coastal Emergency Services of the Carolinas,
121 N.C. App. 198, 200, 464 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1995) (no possibility
of  inconsistent  verdicts  in  action  based  solely  on  respondeat
superior  because  second  trial  would  involve  only  the  issue  of  a
master/servant relationship between the defendants).
Accordingly, because there was no final judgment in this case,
nor were there any substantial rights of the parties affected, we
hold that Plaintiff’s appeal is premature, and therefore, dismiss
his cross-assignment of error as interlocutory.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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