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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA06-1056
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  19 June  2007
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Cumberland County
No.  02 CRS  28008-25
WILLIAM GLENN BAREFOOT and                                                                      02 CRS  28026-42
TIMOTHY LEE JORDAN
red 14 October 2002 by
Judge  Robert  F.  Floyd,  Jr.  in  Cumberland  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  22 March  2007.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Special  Deputy  Attorney
Generals Buren R. Shields, III and Alexander McC. Peters, for
the S
Geoff                                                                                           endant-Barefoot.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Anne M. Gomez, for defendant-Jordan.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Defendants                                                                                      (William  Glenn  Barefoot  and  Timothy  Lee  Jordan)
appeal  judgments  entered  on  their  convictions  for  the  following
offenses:  attempted  murder;  felony  breaking  and  entering;  felony
speeding to elude arrest; assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill inflicting serious injury; robbery with a dangerous weapon;
assault  by  pointing  a  gun;  assault  with  a  firearm  on  a  law
enforcement  officer;  larceny  after  breaking  and  entering;  second
degree kidnaping; and assault with a deadly weapon.   Barefoot also




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appeals a judgment entered upon his conviction of possession of a
firearm by a felon.    We find no error.
The  State’s  evidence  at  trial  tended  to  show  the  following:
The Barefoot and Jordan families resided in a group of mobile homes
in a rural area in western Cumberland County, North Carolina.    At
the  time  of  the  events  resulting  in  defendants’  indictments,
defendant Barefoot was thirty-six years of age  (36) and defendant
Jordan was seventeen  (17) years of age.
On 13 March 2001, Richard Allen found two men later identified
as  defendants  at  his  airplane  hangar.    Allen  observed  that  the
personnel door was open and the alarm system damaged.   Allen found
two  men  inside  who  were  wearing  ski  masks.    Allen  testified  that
one  of  the  men  put  a  .38  caliber  handgun  to  his  head  and  stated
that he would “blow [his] f[------] brains out.”   Allen was kicked
in the head and tied up; had duct tape wrapped over his mouth; and
was  placed  in  the  trunk  of  one  of  his  vehicles.    The  men  stole
certain  items  of  property,  including  Allen’s  black  Jeep  Cherokee
vehicle.    Before  being  placed  in  the  trunk  of  a  vehicle,  Allen
observed a  “sideways D tattoo” on one of the men’s upper arm.   Law
enforcement officers later discovered Allen’s credit cards in the
Jeep Cherokee.
Ronnie Jordan is defendant Jordan’s uncle.   He testified that,
sometime  in  2000,  he  tattooed  a  symbol  that  looked  like  “a  side
ways D” on defendant Jordan’s upper arm.
On  30 March  2001, individuals later identified as defendants
were  involved  in  a  series  of  property  offenses  in  Robeson,  Hoke,




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and  Scotland  Counties.    At  each  home,  defendants  obtained  entry
through a door that was either kicked in or torn apart.   The homes
were searched for items such as guns, ammunition and electronics.
Numerous  property-related  offenses  occurring  on  or  about  30
March  2001 are briefly summarized as follows:
(1)  The  Elliot  Residence                                                -  Betty  Elliot  noticed  that
someone had broken into their home.   A gun, jewelry, and
a  heating  pad  were  taken.    The  heating  pad  was  later
discovered by law enforcement in a Jeep Cherokee after a
crash described in more detail below.
(2)  The  Carter  Residence                                                -  It  appeared  that  someone
pushed a chair through glass French doors in the back of
the  home.                                                                 No  items  were  missing  from  the  Carter
residence.
(3)  The  Montgomery  Residence                                            -  At  approximately                          10:00
a.m. on 30 March 2001, Courtney Montgomery returned home
and observed a red Camaro on the side of the road and a
black Jeep Cherokee in her driveway.   When she heard her
house alarm, Montgomery called law enforcement.    As the
Cherokee   began   to   leave   her   residence,   Montgomery
followed the vehicle and observed that the license plate
number began with the letters “H-X”.   Montgomery alerted
911  about  the  car’s  direction  of  travel  and  the  tag
number.    A  safe  was  missing  from  Montgomery’s  home  and
later recovered by law enforcement officers.   The Camaro
parked  on  the  road  belonged  to  Dixie  Jordan-McKinley.
Agents found court papers inside the Camaro bearing the
name Timothy Jordan.
(4) The Dew Residence - Joshua Dew was home alone when he
heard  banging  at  the  back  door  of  the  home.    He  saw  a
man, approximately 6'2” and wearing a ski mask, kick the
door  in  with  his  boots  and  enter  with  a  gun.    A  second
man entered behind him; this person was approximately the
same  height,  but  not  as  heavy.    The  second  man  was  not
wearing a mask, but had his collar pulled up to cover his
face.    Through  a  door,  Dew  observed  the  robber’s  dark
blue  or  black  vehicle.     The  man  with  the  ski  mask
threatened Dew at gunpoint while the other man looted the
house.    The man with the mask handcuffed Dew to a chair
before he and the other man left.    Dew identified a ski
mask,  found  near  the  location  where  the  Jeep  Cherokee
later crashed, as similar to the one worn by the man who
first  entered  his  home.     A  Colt                                     .38  caliber  gun  and




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jewelry box taken from the home were later found in the
Cherokee.
(5)   and                                                                 (6)   The   Matthews   and   Sandy   Residences      -
Firearms,  jewelry,  handcuffs,  food,  money,  and  other
items of property were taken from the Matthews home.   The
door of the Sandy home was “split” and shotguns, violins,
money,  and  other  personal  property  were  missing.     A
Browning  .22  caliber  gun  and  case  and  a  Department  of
Corrections uniform were taken from the Matthews and were
found in the Cherokee, as were two violins belonging to
the Sandys.
(7)  and                                                                  (8)  The  Nadeau  and  Warwick  Residences           -  Jean
Nadeau’s neighbor, Catherine Warwick, observed two men at
Nadeau’s  home  at  approximately  10:30  a.m.  on                        30  March
2001.                                                                     When   Warwick   drove   to   Nadeau’s   home   to
investigate, two men shot at her.    Warwick thought they
left in a black  “van-type vehicle” that may have been a
Cherokee.   As the vehicle drove away, the passenger fired
a gun at her again.    In addition, when Warwick returned
to  her  own  house,  the  door  was  left  open.    Jewelry  and
old coins were missing.
(8) The Cabell Residence  - Cabell’s neighbor phoned her
to  inform  her  that  her  home  alarm  was  activated.    The
front  door  was  “forced  in”  and  a  Sony  Playstation  and
other games were missing.   These items were later located
by law enforcement inside the Cherokee.
Raeford  Police  officer  Ronnie  McGee  observed  a  black  Jeep
Cherokee traveling at high speeds approximately five miles from the
Warwick residence on the morning of 30 March 2001.   McGee attempted
to turn around, but could not do so because of heavy traffic.    At
that time he was not aware of a search for the Cherokee.   At  11:18
a.m.,  McGee  responded  to  a  dispatch  regarding  the  breaking  and
enterings,  and  shots  fired,  at  the  Nadeau/Warwick  residences.
During his investigation, McGee heard radio traffic from Major Dan
Skamperele of the Scotland County Sheriff’s Department requesting
that a tag be run on a Jeep he observed on Route  211.    Skamperele
then radioed that shots were being fired at him.   Skamperele chased




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the vehicle and its two occupants, later identified as defendants,
at speeds as high as 90 miles per hour.   During this chase, one man
from the Cherokee fired shots from the sunroof of the vehicle.   The
driver  of  the  Cherokee  lost  control  of  the  vehicle  through  the
parking lot of a grocery store before crashing into the door of a
thrift  shop.    Skamperele  rammed  his  vehicle  into  the  back  of  the
Cherokee, trapping it against the thrift shop door.   Because of the
impact, Skamperele’s gun fell out of his hand and onto the ground.
As he reached across the seat to retrieve his gun, the two men got
out  of  the  Cherokee.    They  went  to  Skamperele’s  driver  side  door
and  “screamed” at him to get out of the car.   The door was jammed,
but  the  two  men  managed  to  “rip the  door  open.”    One  man  grabbed
Skamperele  by  the  leg  and  began  “pulling  [him]  out  the  door  and
shooting  at  [him].”    The  other  man  went  around  to  the  passenger
side and hit Skamperele on the head.    He grabbed Skamperele’s gun
from his hand.   As Skamperele was pulled from the car, he heard one
man say,  “I told you to kill him.”    Skamperele then  “saw a flash”
and  “felt a sting and felt his body go numb.”   The two men left in
Skamperele's vehicle.   At trial, Skamperele identified the two men
as Jordan and Barefoot.
At approximately noon on 30 March 2001, Michael Parks observed
the  police  vehicle  crash  into  the  rear  of  the  Cherokee  and  the
Cherokee  crash  into  the  door  of  a  thrift  shop.    When  he  stepped
outside of the store, Parks observed an officer reaching inside his
car  as  a  man  descended  from  the  top  of  the  Cherokee  and  fired




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shots.    Parks  testified  that  Jordan  was  the  shooter  and  the  one
originally seated on the passenger side of the Cherokee.
Patricia  Bullock  testified.     She  observed  the  driver  and
passenger get out of the Cherokee at the grocery store.    Both men
approached Skamperele’s car; opened the car door; and began firing
at  the  officer.     Bullock  heard  the  Cherokee  driver  tell  his
passenger  to                                                                “shoot  him.”     Bullock  identified  Barefoot  as  the
driver  of  the  Cherokee  and  Jordan  as  the  passenger.    Stephanie
Miller  was  leaving  the  grocery  store  when  a  coworker  entered,
pushed her back inside the door, and told her there was a shooting
going on outside.    Miller also identified Barefoot as the driver,
but could not identify the passenger.
John Shippioto also witnessed the events involving Skamperele.
He  observed  two  men  at  Skamperele’s  driver-side  window  making
downward motions.   He then heard shots and observed one of the men
come around the passenger side of the officer's vehicle carrying a
handgun.
James  Gregorio,  co-operator  of  the  thrift  store,  observed  a
hunter's ski mask on the ground near the Cherokee after it crashed.
He gave the mask to N.C. State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) Agent
Charles Newcomb.    Hair was retrieved from the Cherokee; this hair
was determined to belong to Jordan.   Hair from the ski mask matched
Barefoot’s hair.
Misty  Whitley  testified  that  she  heard  Barefoot  and  Jordan
tell Brian Ratley about how they had been breaking into houses on
30  March  2001  and  that  someone  had  called  the  police  after  they




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fired  their  weapons  at                                                       “an  old  lady.”    They  also  said  they  had
“shot a cop.”
Plaster castings of footprints and tire prints were taken from
the Elliot, Montgomery, and Nadeau residences.   Tire prints around
the Nadeau residence were consistent with the tire size and design
on  the  Jeep  Cherokee.    The  shoe  impressions  taken  from  where  the
Elliots’  back  door  was  kicked  in  measured  approximately  13  to  14
inches  long  and  were  consistent  with  a  boot.    Foot  prints  taken
from the Nadeau residence were also consistent with a size 13 boot.
Bullets,  fragments  and  casings  retrieved  from  these  crime  scenes
were  fired  from  a  .9  mm  and  a  .357  or  .38  caliber  handgun.    The
bullets  and  fragment  retrieved  from  Skamperele’s  thighs  were
consistent with a  .38 or  .357 caliber magnum type bullet.
Agent  Mark  Boodee,  also  of  the  SBI,  collected  blood  samples
from the Cherokee and Skamperele’s police cruiser.   Blood found in
the  front  driver-side  and  rear  passenger  seats  of  the  Cherokee
belonged to Barefoot.   Blood from inside of the passenger-side door
of the Cherokee belonged to Jordan.   Blood stains on the dashboard
on the passenger side of Skamperele’s car, and on a blue rag found
between the two front seats, belonged to Jordan.
Neither  defendant  presented  any  evidence  at  trial.    A  jury
convicted both defendants of one count of attempted murder; eight
counts of felony breaking or entering; six counts of larceny after
breaking  and  entering;  one  count  of  felony  speeding  to  elude
arrest;  one  count  of  assault  with  a  deadly  weapon  with  intent  to
kill  inflicting  serious  injury;  two  counts  of  robbery  with  a




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dangerous weapon; one count of assault by pointing a gun; one count
of assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer; one count
of second degree kidnaping; and one count of assault with a deadly
weapon.    Barefoot  was  also  convicted  separately  of  one  count  of
possession of a firearm by a felon.    Both defendants appeal.
The Barefoot Appeal
In Barefoot’s first argument on appeal, he contends that the
trial  court  erred  by  admitting  a                                       “sanitized”  version  of  his
inculpatory   statement   to   law   enforcement   which   deleted   all
references to co-defendant Jordan.   Specifically, Barefoot contends
that the trial court, by omitting all references to Jordan in his
statement,  made  him  appear  to  act  “more  egregiously”  in  that  he
acted alone.    This argument lacks merit.
[W]hen                                                                      a                               nontestifying   co-defendant's
post-arrest statement is admitted in evidence
at  a  joint  trial  in  a  manner  that  invites  or
permits the jury to use the statement against
the   non-declarant   defendant,   fundamental
conflicts  with  the  non-declarant  defendant's
state  and  federal  right  to  confrontation  may
arise.  See  Lilly  v.  Virginia,                                           527  U.S.                       116,
144  L.  Ed.  2d  117  (1999).    As  a  result,  the
United  States  Supreme  Court  has  held  that
before                                                                      a                               nontestifying   co-defendant's
post-arrest   statement   may   be   admitted   in
evidence,  it  must  be  redacted  to  remove  all
references to the non-declarant defendant, and
the   jury   should   be   instructed   that   the
statement   was   admitted   as   evidence   only
against  the  declarant  co-defendant.    Gray  v.
Maryland,                                                                   523  U.S.                       185,            140  L.  Ed.     2d   294
(1998); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
20 L. Ed.  2d  476.
State v. Tirado,  358 N.C.  551,  580,  599 S.E.2d  515,  535  (2004).
An  out-of-court  statement  that  contains  deleted  references  to  a
co-defendant  is  admissible  as  long  as  the                             “‘deletions                     [do]  not




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materially  change  the  nature  of                                            [the]  statement.’”     State  v.
Stafford, 150 N.C. App. 566, 570, 564 S.E.2d 60, 63 (2002) (quoting
State v. Giles, 83 N.C. App. 487, 494, 350 S.E.2d 868, 872 (1986)).
The statement admitted into evidence was generally inculpatory
in  that  Barefoot  acknowledged  that  he  (1)  broke  into  a  number  of
homes, though he could not recall some of the specific houses; (2)
drove another individual’s black Jeep Cherokee; (3) was present not
only during the events described by Warwick, supra, but also during
the events as regards the crash and the shooting of Skamperele.   In
the  statement,  Barefoot  also  acknowledged  having  a  gun  in  his
possession  but  denied  shooting  at  anyone.    He  stated  that  he  was
the driver of the Cherokee when it crashed, and that the gun “fell
out  of  his  coat  pocket  and  went  off”  when  he  exited  the  Cherokee
after the crash.   Barefoot also explained his activities after the
crash,   including   his   taking   Skamperele’s   vehicle   and   later
“ditching  it”,  and  his  efforts  to  conceal  his  whereabouts  before
surrendering himself to law enforcement.
Barefoot’s central argument is that, by omitting a portion of
his  original  statement  that  implicated  Jordan  in  the  shooting  of
Skamperele, the statement made it appear  “as though all the shots
came  from  his  gun.”    The  statement,  however,  included  Barefoot’s
denial  that  he  deliberately  shot  Skamperele.    Moreover,  numerous
witnesses  testified  that  two  individuals  exited  the  Cherokee  and
assaulted  Skamperele.    It  was,  in  fact,  uncontradicted  that  two
individuals were involved in the Skamperele shooting, and numerous
witnesses  testified  that  two  individuals  were  involved  in  the




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activities  surrounding  the  break-ins.     We  conclude  that  the
“sanitized”  statement  by  Barefoot  was  not  misleading  and  did  not
materially  change  the  nature  of  the  original  statement.     The
relevant assignments of error are overruled.
Barefoot next argues that the trial court erred by failing to
sustain  his  objection  to  the  State’s  closing  argument  that  the
defendants were  “rouges  [sic], scoundrels and thieves.”
“The  standard  of  review  for  improper  closing  arguments  that
provoke timely objection from opposing counsel is whether the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to sustain the objection.”
State v. Jones,  355 N.C.  117,  131,  558 S.E.2d  97,  106  (2002).    We
do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion unless
the ruling is so arbitrary that it “could not have been the result
of  a  reasoned  decision.”    State  v.  Burrus,  344  N.C.  79,  90,  472
S.E.2d  867,  875  (1996).                                                    “When  applying  the  abuse  of  discretion
standard to closing arguments, [we] first determine[]if the remarks
were  improper  .  .  .                                                       .    Next,  we  determine  if  the  remarks  were  of
such  a  magnitude  that  their  inclusion  prejudiced  defendant,  and
thus  should  have  been  excluded  by  the  trial  court.”    Jones,  355
N.C. at  131,  558 S.E.2d at  106.
This argument was not properly preserved for appellate review
because  no  ruling  by  the  trial  court  was  obtained.                    “In  order  to
preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have  .  .  .
obtain[ed]  a  ruling  upon  the  party's  .  .  .  objection  or  motion.”
N.C.R. App. P.  10(b)(1).                                                     “[We] will not consider arguments based
upon  matters  not  presented  to  or  adjudicated  by  the  trial




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tribunal.”   State v. Eason,  328 N.C.  409,  420, 402 S.E.2d 809,  814
(1991).   Here, the trial court never ruled on defendant’s objection
to  the  State’s  closing  argument.                                      After  the  objection,  the
attorneys  approached  the  bench;  this  bench  conference  was  not
transcribed,  and  there  were  no  objections  stated  on  the  record
regarding this issue after the bench conference was completed.   The
record further reveals that the closing argument continued without
any further reference by the State to defendants as “rogues” or the
like.    This assignment of error is overruled.
In a related argument, Barefoot contends that the trial court
erred by not intervening ex mero motu to a portion of the State’s
closing  argument  that  characterized  Barefoot’s  statement  to  law
enforcement as a  “bunch of self serving lies.”    We disagree.
The standard of review when a defendant fails
to  object  at  trial  is  whether  the                                   [closing]
argument complained of was so grossly improper
that  the  trial  court  erred  in  failing  to
intervene   ex   mero   motu.                                             In   determining
whether  the  prosecutor's  argument  was
grossly improper, this Court must examine the
argument in the context in which it was given
and   in   light   of   the   overall   factual
circumstances   to   which   it   refers.                                 [T]he
impropriety  of  the  argument  must  be  gross
indeed in order for this Court to hold that a
trial  judge  abused  his  discretion  in  not
recognizing  and  correcting  ex  mero  motu  an
argument which defense counsel apparently did
not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.
State v. McCollum,  177 N.C. App.  681,  685,  629 S.E.2d  859,  861-62
(2006)  (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has concluded that “[w]ith reference to the
prosecutor's  argument  that  defendant  had  lied,  we  note  that  a




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prosecutor  may  properly  argue  to  the  jury  that  it  should  not
believe a witness.”   State v. Scott,  343 N.C. 313,  344,  471 S.E.2d
605,  623  (1996)(citing  State  v.  McKenna,  289  N.C.  668,  687,  224
S.E.2d  537,  550  (1976)); see also State v. Solomon,  340 N.C.  212,
218-20,  456 S.E.2d  778,  782-84  (1995)  (no error where trial court
did  not  intervene  ex  mero  motu  where  prosecutor  stated  that
defendant lied during his testimony), and State v. Ocasio, 344 N.C.
568,                                                                        580,   476  S.E.2d   281,   288   (1996)(no  error  when  trial  court
failed  to  intervene  ex  mero  motu,  when,  inter  alia,  the  State
“implicitly  called  defendant  a  liar”).     We  conclude  that  the
State’s isolated reference to Barefoot’s statement as a  “bunch of
self serving lies” was not so grossly improper as to have required
the  trial  court  to  intervene  ex  mero  motu  during  the  State’s
closing argument.    This assignment of error is overruled.
Barefoot next contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search of his
home.    Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, Barefoot asserts
that he did not give consent to the search.
Generally,  an  appellate  court's  review  of  a
trial  court's  order  on  a  motion  to  suppress
“is  strictly  limited  to  a  determination  of
whether   its   findings   are   supported   by
competent  evidence,  and  in  turn,  whether  the
findings  support  the  trial  court’s  ultimate
conclusion.”    State v. Allison,  148 N.C. App.
702,  704,  559 S.E.2d  828,  829  (2002).    Where,
however,  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact
are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed
to be supported by competent evidence and are
binding  on  appeal.    State  v.  Baker,  312  N.C.
34,                                                                         37,    320  S.E.2d   670,   673   (1984).
Accordingly, we review the trial court's order
to determine only whether the findings of fact
support the legal conclusion[s].  .  .




-13-
State v. Roberson,  163 N.C. App.  129,  132,  592 S.E.2d  733,  735-36
(2004).
In  the  instant  case,  Barefoot  has  not  challenged  any  of  the
trial  court’s  findings  of  fact.     They  are,  therefore,  deemed
supported  by  competent  evidence  and  binding  on  appeal.    We  are
therefore only left to determine whether the findings support the
conclusions of law.
Concerning the inevitable discovery doctrine, the trial court
concluded:
That   even   if   the   consent   to   search   was
involuntary,   the   State   has   proven   by   a
preponderance of the evidence that the stolen
property  discovered  at  defendant’s  residence
at                                                                             7842  Camden  Road  on  April   4,   2001,  would
inevitably  have  been  discovered  by  lawful
means.
Pursuant to the doctrine of inevitable discovery:
“evidence  which  is  illegally  obtained  can
still   be   admitted   into   evidence   as   an
exception  to  the  exclusionary  rule  when  ‘the
information  ultimately  or  inevitably  would
have  been  discovered  by  lawful  means.’  .  .  .
Under  this  doctrine,  the  prosecution  has  the
burden  of  proving  that  the  evidence,  even
though  obtained  through  an  illegal  search,
would    have    been    discovered    anyway    by
independent lawful means.”
State v. Woolridge, 147 N.C. App. 685, 689, 557 S.E.2d 158, 160-61
(2001)  (quoting  Nix  v.  Williams,  467  U.S.  431,  444,  81  L.  Ed.  2d
377,  387-88  (1984)).
Barefoot does not challenge the   trial court’s conclusion that
the  stolen  property  discovered  during  the  search  would  have  been
discovered independent of Barefoot’s consent, and we observe that




-14-
the  trial  court’s  detailed  order,  including  74  findings  of  fact,
support  this  conclusion.    Thus,  even  assuming  arguendo  the  trial
court  erred  by  concluding  Barefoot  gave  consent  to  search,  the
trial court order on the motion to suppress would still have been
proper.    This assignment of error is overruled.
Barefoot  next  contends  that  the  trial  court  committed  plain
error  by  failing  to  declare  a  mistrial  after  learning  that
Barefoot’s brother, Chad Barefoot, had spoken to two jurors about
the  case.     This  argument  has  not  been  preserved  for  appellate
review.
Because defendant failed to object at trial, he now attempts
to  invoke  plain  error  review  pursuant  to  N.C.R.  App.                10(c)(4).
Plain error review is only available for errors in the admission of
evidence and jury instructions.   State v. Wolfe, 157 N.C. App. 22,
33,                                                                         577  S.E.2d   655,   663           (2003).   In  the  instant  case,  as
defendant's  argument  pertains  neither  to  jury  instructions  nor
evidentiary issues, plain error review is unavailable.    Hence, as
this  issue  was  not  properly  preserved  for  appellate  review,  we
reject this assignment of error.   Accord State v. McCall, 162 N.C.
App.                                                                        64,           70,    589  S.E.2d   896,      900                           (2004)   (plain  error  review
unavailable to review failure to declare mistrial sua sponte after
court learned that individuals in the courtroom had been signaling
to the witness during testimony).
In  Barefoot’s  final  argument,  he  contends  the  trial  court
erred  by  denying  his  motion  to  suppress  his  statement  to  law




-15-
enforcement because a multi-day crack binge rendered his statement
unknowing and involuntary.    We disagree.
Barefoot has not challenged any of the trial court’s findings
of  fact  as  regards  his  statement.     They  are  therefore  deemed
supported  by  competent  evidence  and  binding  on  appeal.    State  v.
Euceda-Valle,  __ N.C. App.  __,  __, 641 S.E.2d 858,  862 (2007).   We
are therefore only left to determine whether the findings support
the conclusions of law.
The trial court found, in relevant part, that:
27.   Several   times   during   the   interview,
Defendant hesitated in answering questions and
appeared  not  to  be  concentrating.    Defendant
would  look  at  the  floor  or  “look  past”  Agent
Deaver  as  if  he  were                                                     “looking  at  the  wall.”
Agent  Deaver  would  repeat  the  question  a
second time and Defendant would then answer.
Agent Deaver testified that Defendant appeared
tired throughout the course of the interview,
but remained awake and coherent.    Defendant’s
answers were appropriately responsive to the
questions.
28. Agent Deaver is currently assigned to the
Narcotics Unit of the SBI and is familiar with
controlled substances, specifically with crack
cocaine.                                                                     Agent    Deaver    has    observed
individuals  who  were  “high”  on  crack  cocaine
during  his  law  enforcement  career  and  has
received training on recognizing the signs of
impairment   from   cocaine.                                                 Agent   Deaver
testified that Defendant did not appear to be
impaired   on   crack   cocaine   or   any   other
impairing  substance.     Defendant  told  Agent
Deaver that he had last used a small amount of
crack  cocaine  on  Sunday  morning,  April                                  1,
2001.                                                                        Agent  Deaver  specifically  looked  at
Defendant's   eyes   and   did   not   notice   any
jerking eye movements or avoidant behavior. In
Agent  Deaver's  opinion,  Defendant  was  not
impaired.    Agent Pinkston also testified that
Defendant  did  not  appear  to  be  impaired  on
crack    cocaine    or    any    other    impairing
substance.




-16-
The court then observed and concluded:
4.  That,  although  Defendant  was  tired  during
the  interrogation,  there  is  no  evidence  that
Defendant  suffered  from  the  effects  of  sleep
deprivation to a degree that would affect his
ability   to   understand   his   rights   or   the
consequences  of  waiving  his  rights.    To  the
contrary,  Defendant  was  alert,  coherent,  and
rational  during  the  advisement  of  his  rights
and interrogation.
5.  That  there  is  no  evidence  that  Defendant
was suffering from the effects of drug use or
was in any way impaired during the advisement
of his rights or interrogation.
15.                                                                          That    Defendant    freely,    knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived each of
his Constitutional Rights and thereupon gave a
statement to Agent Deaver, with a full
understanding of the consequences.
Because the trial court’s findings support its conclusions of law,
this assignment of error is overruled.
The Jordan Appeal
Jordan first contends that the trial court erred by overruling
his  objection  to  the  admission  of  Barefoot’s  statement  to  law
enforcement.    Citing Bruton v. United States,  391 U.S.  123,  20 L.
Ed.                                                                          2d                                           476   (1968),  defendant  asserts  that  his  constitutionally
protected right to confrontation was violated when the trial court
admitted Barefoot’s statement, which Jordan claims implicated him.
During  the  trial,  defendant  based  his  objection  to  the
admission of Barefoot’s statement on hearsay.                                “[A] constitutional
question  which  is  not  raised  and  passed  upon  in  the  trial  court
will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”   State v. Castrejon,




-17-
__ N.C. App. __, __, 635 S.E.2d 520, 527 (2006)(internal quotation
marks  and  citations  omitted),  disc.  review  denied,  361  N.C.  222,
642  S.E.2d  709  (2007);  N.C.  R.  App.  P.  10(b)(1).                     “Defendant  may
not swap horses after trial in order to obtain a thoroughbred upon
appeal.”    State v. Benson,  323 N.C.  318,  322,  372 S.E.2d  517,  519
(1988).                                                                      We   conclude   that   Jordan   failed   to   preserve   this
constitutional issue for appellate review.
Jordan  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  failing  to
grant his motion to dismiss the breaking and entering charges for
the  Elliot,  Sandy,  Cabell,  Dew  and  Matthews  homes;  and  the  armed
robbery and second degree kidnaping charges as regards Joshua Dew.
Jordan  asserts  that  the  State  failed  to  present  substantial
evidence  that  he  was  the  perpetrator  of  these  offenses.     We
disagree.
When  ruling  on  a  motion  to  dismiss,                                    “the  trial  court  must
determine  only  whether  there  is  substantial  evidence  of  each
essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being
the perpetrator of the offense.”    State v. Crawford,  344 N.C.  65,
73,  472 S.E.2d  920,  925  (1996).
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant and
adequate  to  convince  a  reasonable  mind  to
accept a conclusion.    In considering a motion
to dismiss, the trial court    must analyze the
evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the
State and give the State the benefit of every
reasonable  inference  from  the  evidence.    The
trial    court    must    also    resolve    any
contradictions in the evidence in the State's
favor.     The  trial  court  does  not  weigh  the
evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the
State, or determine any witness' credibility.




-18-
State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336, 561 S.E.2d 245, 255-56 (2002)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).                             “‘[T]he rule for
determining  the  sufficiency  of  evidence  is  the  same  whether  the
evidence  is  completely  circumstantial,  completely  direct,  or
both.’”    State v. Crouse,  169 N.C. App.  382,  389,  610 S.E.2d  454,
459  (quoting  State  v.  Wright,  302  N.C.  122,  126,  273  S.E.2d  699,
703                                                                           (1981)),  disc.  review  denied,       359  N.C.   637,   616  S.E.2d   923
(2005).    Our jurisprudence does not require that:
the  evidence  be  direct;  rather,  the  evidence
must  be  substantial.    It  is  well-established
in  the  appellate  courts  of  this  State  that
jurors may rely on circumstantial evidence to
the   same   degree   as   they   rely   on   direct
evidence.                                                                     The   law   makes   no   distinction
between  the  weight  to  be  given  to  either
direct  or  circumstantial  evidence.     Rather,
the  law  requires  only  that  the  jury  shall  be
fully satisfied of the truth of the charge.
State  v.  Salters,                                                           137  N.C.  App.                        553,        557,   528  S.E.2d   386,   390
(2000) (quoting State v. Sluka, 107 N.C. App. 200, 204, 419 S.E.2d
200, 203 (1992)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We  have  carefully  reviewed  the  record  in  this  case,  and
conclude  that  the  State  presented  sufficient  evidence  to  show
Jordan perpetrated not only the challenged home break-ins, but also
the  robbery  and  kidnaping  of  Dew.    In  addition  to  the  evidence
detailed above, we observe that Barefoot and Jordan were together
on 30 March 2001; the evidence revealed a common modus operandi as
regards  the  multiple  break-ins;  stolen  items  from  the  Elliot,
Cabell,  Dew,  Mathews  and  Sandy  homes  were  found  in  the  Jeep
Cherokee; DNA analysis linked blood and hair fibers to Jordan; and




-19-
Jordan  made  an  inculpatory  statement  to  Whatley.    The  relevant
assignments of error are overruled.
Jordan  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  failing  to
find  a  fatal  variance  between  the  indictment  in                       01  CRS                          7508,
charging  the  assault  on  John  Shiffiano,  with  the  proof  at  trial.
Defendant  asserts  that  the  indictment  named  the  victim  as  “John
William Shiffiano, Jr”, while the evidence at trial identified the
victim  as  “John  Shippioto.”    However,  this  argument  has  not  been
properly preserved for appellate review.
“[T]he   scope   of   review   on   appeal   is   confined   to   a
consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record
on appeal.”   N.C. R. App. P. 10(a).                                         “[I]t is long settled that the
‘scope  of  appellate  review  is  limited  to  the  issues  presented  by
assignments  of  error  set  out  in  the  record  on  appeal;  where  the
issue presented in the appellant's brief does not correspond to a
proper assignment of error, the matter is not properly considered
by  the  appellate  court.’”    Walker  v.  Walker,                          174  N.C.  App.  778,
781,  624 S.E.2d  639,  641  (2005)  (quoting Bustle v. Rice,  116 N.C.
App. 658, 659, 449 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1994)), disc. review denied, 360
N.C.  491,  632 S.E.2d  774  (2006).
In  the  present  case,  Jordan  supports  his  fatal  variance
argument with assignment of error  23:
The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion
to  dismiss,  on  the  ground  the  evidence  was
insufficient  to  convince  a  reasonable  finder
of   fact   of   defendant’s   guilt   beyond   a
reasonable doubt.   The court’s action violated
the    Fourteenth    Amendment    to    the    U.S.
Constitution, Article I §§ 18, 19, 23, 24, and
35  of  the  North  Carolina  Constitution  and




-20-
North   Carolina   common   and   statutory   law.
Defendant asserts constitutional error, trial
error,    structural    error,    or    in    the
alternative, plain error.
Because  assignment  of  error                                                 23  fails  to  correspond  to  Jordan’s
argument  on  appeal  regarding  the  indictment,  it  is  not  properly
before this Court.   See, e.g., State v. Jordan,  162 N.C. App.  308,
313,  590 S.E.2d  424,  428  (2004).
Even  assuming  arguendo  that  this  argument  was  properly
preserved for appellate review, we nevertheless conclude, pursuant
to the doctrine of idem sonans, that there was not a fatal variance
here.   See State v. Wilson, 135 N.C. App. 504, 508, 521 S.E.2d 263,
265 (1999)(“Under the rule of idem sonans, absolute accuracy in the
spelling [of] names in legal proceedings .  . . is not required.”);
State  v.  Isom,  65  N.C.  App.  223,  226,  309  S.E.2d  283,  285  (1983)
(“Eldred”, “Elred”,“ and “Elton“ were sufficiently similar to fall
within the doctrine of idem sonans and that the variance, if any,
between   the   indictment   and   the   proof   at   trial   was   wholly
immaterial).   Where the victim's name as alleged in the indictment
is                                                                             “sufficiently  similar”  to  the  victim’s  name  as  presented  at
trial, and the proof at trial matches the indictment's allegations
in all other respects,  “defendant  [is] not surprised or placed at
any disadvantage in preparing his defense to the crimes charged in
the indictment.”   State v. Cameron, 73 N.C. App. 89, 92, 325 S.E.2d
635,                                                                           637                                                                   (1985).   This  is  the  circumstance  here,  and  this
assignment of error is overruled.
Jordan  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  failing  to
sustain   his   objection   to   the   State’s   closing   argument.




-21-
Specifically, Jordan incorporates by reference Barefoot’s argument
on appeal as regards the State’s referring to defendants as “rouges
[sic], scoundrels and thieves.”   For the same reasons stated above,
we   reject  Jordan’s  argument.                                           This  assignment  of  error  is
overruled.
Jordan next contends that the trial court erred by sentencing
him  for  both  assault  with  a  deadly  weapon  with  intent  to  kill
inflicting  serious  injury  and  attempted  murder  of  Skamperele  in
violation of his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
This argument lacks merit.    Our Supreme Court in Tirado,  358 N.C.
at  579,  599 S.E.2d at  534, held that:
[A]ssault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury requires proof
of  the  use  of  a  deadly  weapon,  as  well  as
proof of serious injury, neither of which are
elements of attempted first-degree murder. See
N.C.G.S.                                                                   §§                                14-17,   -32(a).   Similarly,
attempted    first-degree    murder    includes
premeditation and deliberation, which are not
elements of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent  to  kill  inflicting  serious  injury.
Because  each  offense  contains  at  least  one
element not included in the other, defendants
have not been subjected to double jeopardy.
Therefore,  because  Jordan’s  double  jeopardy  protections  were  not
violated by being sentenced for both assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and attempted murder,
this assignment of error is overruled.
Finally,  Jordan  contends  that  his  indictment  for  attempted
murder was insufficient because it did not include the elements of
premeditation and deliberation.   In State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158,
175,  531 S.E.2d  428,  438  (2000), our Supreme Court concluded that




-22-
“premeditation and deliberation need not be separately alleged in
the   short-form   indictment”   for   first   degree   murder.     This
assignment of error is overruled.
We conclude defendants’ remaining arguments are without merit.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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