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NO. COA11-619
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                     7 February  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                         Davidson County
                                                                           Nos.  10 CRS  1557
                                                                           10 CRS  1558
                                                                           10 CRS  1559
                                                                           10 CRS  1560
BETTY BARR
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered  22  December  2010
by  Judge  Kevin  M.  Bridges  in  Davidson  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  10 November  2011.
Ellis  &  Winters  LLP,  by  Paul  K.  Sun,  Jr.,  and  Jeremy  M.
Falcone  and  Clifford,  Clendenin  &  O’Hale,  by   Locke  T.
Clifford, for Defendant.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  Assistant  Attorney  General
Robert K. Smith, for the State.
THIGPEN, Judge.
Betty   Barr                                                               (“Defendant”)   was   charged   and   convicted   of
illegally  accessing  and  aiding  and  abetting  in  the  access  of  a
government  computer  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.   Stat.                §                                                        14-
454.1(a)(2)  and                                                           (b).    On  appeal,  we  must  determine  whether  the
trial  court  erred  in  denying  Defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss,
whether  an  indictment  was  fatally  defective,  and  whether  the




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trial  court  erred  in  its  instructions  to  the  jury.    We  conclude
there  was  no  prejudicial  error  in  the  judgments  convicting
Defendant  in  Case  Nos.                                                      10  CRS                 1557,   10  CRS   1558,  and   10  CRS
1559.    However,  the  portion  of  the  judgment  convicting  Defendant
in Case No.  10 CRS  1560 for a violation of  N.C.  Gen. Stat.  §  14-
454.1(b) must be arrested.
I:    Factual and Procedural History
The   evidence   of   record   tends   to   show   the   following:
Defendant  was  the  owner  and  operator  of  Lexington  License  Plate
Agency  No.  29  (“Lexington  Agency”).    When  a  car  dealer  completes
a  vehicle  sale,  he  must  transfer  title  of  the  vehicle  to  the  new
owner,  which  entails  delivering  relevant  paperwork,  such  as  the
bill  of  sale  and  application  for  new  title,  to  a  license  plate
agency   such   as   the   Lexington   Agency.                                 Defendant   underwent
training  at  the  North  Carolina  Department  of  Motor  Vehicles
(“DMV”)  in  order  to  operate  the  Lexington  Agency,  and  Defendant
applied  for  and  was  granted  a  contract  from  DMV  as  the  operator
of  the  Lexington  Agency.     Defendant  was  also  a  licensed  RAC-F
Title  Clerk  (“title  clerk”).    When  a  car  dealer  requests  that  a
license  plate  agency  transfer  title  of  a  vehicle,  a  title  clerk
checks  the  paperwork  for  accuracy  and  accesses  a  computer  system
called  State  Title  and  Registration  System  (“STARS”)  by  entering




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the  title  clerk’s  unique  number  called  an  RACF  number,  which  is
issued  to  the  title  clerk  by  DMV;  the  title  clerk  also  enters  a
private  entry  code  number  that  the  title  clerk  creates  as  her
password.    STARS  allows  the  title  clerk  to  process  the  transfer
of  title,  but  only  after  the  title  clerk  enters  the  relevant
information  for  the  transfer  into  STARS,  including  the  car
dealer’s  identification  number.    All  North  Carolina  vehicles  are
titled and registered through STARS.
Defendant   worked   with   four   other   title   clerks   at   the
                                                                              Lexington    Agency,    Bettina    Granados                                                                                         (“Granados”),    Arlene
Cornatzer                                                                     (“Cornatzer”),  Mary  Byerly                                                                                                        (“Byerly”),  and  Miranda
                                                                                                                            Stokes  (“Stokes”).    On  average,  the  Lexington  Agency  handled  700
to                                                                            800  vehicle  title  transfers  and                                                                                       200  to   300  telephone  calls
per day.
The  Lexington  Agency  had  a  policy  for  occasions  when  title
transfer  issues  or  questions  arose.     First,  the  title  clerk
would  consult  the  DMV  manual.    If  the  title  clerk  did  not  find
the  answer  in  the  DMV  manual,  the  title  clerk  would  next  ask
other  title  clerks  for  guidance.    If  other  title  clerks  had  not
encountered  that  particular  issue  before,  the  title  clerk  would
then  call  a  DMV  help  desk  in  Raleigh,  North  Carolina.    The  help




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desk,  staffed  with  DMV  personnel,  would  provide  an  answer  and
instruct title clerks on the proper resolution to the issue.
Randall  K.  Lanier                                                         (“Lanier”)  was  a  car  dealer  who  owned
Lanier  Motor  Company.    For  more  than  thirty-five  years,  Lanier
had  bought  salvaged  vehicles,  repaired  them,  and  sold  them  at
Lanier  Motor  Company.     In                                                                                                                        2007,  due  to   “tremendous  financial
                                                                            losses”   affecting   Lanier’s   credit,   Lanier’s   bonding   company
                                                                            refused  to  renew  the  company’s  bonds  for                                             2008-2009.     On            12
August                                                                      2008,   Lanier’s   license,   Lic.                                                         #7736,   was   terminated.
Lanier, however, continued to sell vehicles without a license.
It  is  undisputed  that  the  Lexington  Agency  transferred
title  for  sixteen  of  Lanier  Motor  Company’s  vehicle  sales  while
Lanier   Motor   Company   was   unlicensed.                                However,   there   is
conflicting evidence regarding the details of the transfers.
According   to   several   title   clerks   and   Defendant,   the
following  transpired:    On  25  September  2008,  Lanier  went  to  the
Lexington  Agency  to  transfer  title  for  two  recent  vehicle  sales.
Defendant  was  not  present.    Lanier  gave  the  relevant  paperwork
to  the  title  clerk,  Stokes.     Stokes  entered  Lanier’s  dealer
identification  number  into  STARS,  and  the  computer  responded,
“invalid  dealer  number.”    Stokes  asked  Granados  how  to  resolve
the  issue.    Granados  typed                                              “OS”  for  the  dealer  number  and  told




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Stokes  to  continue.                                                          “OS”  was  an  abbreviation  for  out-of-state.
When  Stokes  asked  Granados  why  she  had  entered  “OS[,]”  Granados
explained  that  Lanier  “was  in  the  process  of  combining  two  lots
or  moving  a  lot  to  make  his  dealer  number  present.    It  was  in
the  stage  of  being  perfected  by  Raleigh,  and  that’s  what  we  were
told  to  do.”    Stokes  understood  that  Granados  had  called  the  DMV
help  desk  to  confirm  that  entering  “OS”  was  the  proper  procedure
for  Lanier  Motor  Company.    Entering  “OS”  for  Lanier’s  transfers
of   title   became   the   recognized   procedure   for   the   office.
Several  days  after                                                           25  September                                     2008,  Lanier  again  came  to  the
Lexington   Agency   to   transfer   title   for   another   vehicle.
Defendant  entered  Lanier’s  dealer  number  into  STARS,  and  the
system  indicated  Lanier  was  an  inactive  dealer,  which  means  the
car  dealer  has  not  renewed  his  dealer  license.    Granados  again
told  Defendant,  “I  called  [the  help  desk]  and  they  told  me  that
you  could  enter  those  .  .  .  because  he’s  just  in  the  process  of
getting  his  bonds  together.”    Granados  explained  that  Defendant
should enter  “OS[.]”
However,  according  to  Granados,  she  never  called  the  DMV
help  desk,  and,  in  fact,  Defendant  had  instructed  her  to  enter
“OS” for Lanier Motor Company’s transfers.




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Defendant  was  directly  involved  in  only  three  transfers.
In  total,  Defendant  earned                                                 $59  in  fees  for  the  sixteen  title
transfers.
On  5  April  2010,  Defendant  was  indicted  on  three  counts  of
accessing  a  government  computer  and  two  counts  of  aiding  and
abetting  accessing  a  government  computer  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                         §                                                       14-454.1(a)   and                         (b).    The   indictments   charging
violations  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-454.1(a)  were  based  on  title
transfers  personally  made  by  Defendant  on  30  September  2008,  23
October                                                                       2008,  and                                              3  November                               2008.   The  indictment  charging
violations  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-454.1(a)  and  (b)  was  based  on
a  title  transfer  by  Mary  Byerly  on                                      30  January                                             2009,  which
Defendant  allegedly  aided  and  abetted.    The  matter  came  on  for
trial   at   the                                                              13   December                                           2010   session   of   Davidson   County
Superior  Court.    Defendant  moved  to  dismiss  the  charges  at  the
close  of  the  State’s  evidence  and  renewed  the  motion  at  the
close  of  all  evidence.                                                     The  jury   entered  verdicts  finding
Defendant  guilty  of  three  counts  of  unlawfully  accessing  a
government  computer  for  a  fraudulent  purpose,  and  two  counts  of
aiding   and   abetting   the   unlawful   access   of   a   government
computer.                                                                     The  trial  court  entered  a  consolidated  judgment
sentencing    Defendant    to    thirteen    to    sixteen    months




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incarceration;  however,  the  trial  court  suspended  the  sentence
and   placed   Defendant   on   supervised   probation   for   eighteen
months.    Defendant  was  also  fined  $59.20.    From  these  judgments,
Defendant appeals.
II:    Motion to Dismiss
Defendant  first  argues  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying  her
motion  to  dismiss  because  there  was  no  substantial  evidence  that
(1)  she  accessed  a  government  computer  to  obtain  services  by
fraud;  (2)  or  that  she  acted  willfully.    We  disagree  and  address
each argument in turn.
When  reviewing  a  challenge  to  the  denial  of  a  defendant’s
motion  to  dismiss  a  charge  on  the  basis  of  insufficiency  of  the
evidence,  this  Court  determines                                            “whether  the  State  presented
substantial  evidence  in  support  of  each  element  of  the  charged
offense.”    State  v.  Chapman,  359  N.C.  328,  374,  611  S.E.2d  794,
827                                                                           (2005)                                                                   (quotation   omitted).                                                         “Substantial   evidence   is
                                                                                                                                                       relevant  evidence  that  a  reasonable  person  might  accept  as
                                                                                                                                                       adequate,  or  would  consider  necessary  to  support  a  particular
                                                                                                                conclusion.”     State  v.  Abshire,   363  N.C.                                                               322,   328,                           677  S.E.2d
444,                                                                          449                               (2009)                                 (quotation  omitted).                                                          “In  this  determination,
all  evidence  is  considered  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the
State,  and  the  State  receives  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable




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inference  supported  by  that  evidence.”    Id.  (quotation  omitted).
                                                                             Additionally,   a                                                                                  “substantial   evidence   inquiry   examines   the
                                                                                                                                                                                sufficiency  of  the  evidence  presented  but  not  its  weight,”  which
                                                                                                                                                                                remains  a  matter  for  the  jury.    State  v.  McNeil,  359  N.C.  800,
804,                                                                         617  S.E.2d         271,                                          274                              (2005)                                                                       (quotation  omitted).     Thus,
                                                                                                 “[i]f   there   is   substantial   evidence                                                                                                                 -   whether   direct,
circumstantial,  or  both  -  to  support  a  finding  that  the  offense
charged  has  been  committed  and  that  the  defendant  committed  it,
the  case  is  for  the  jury  and  the  motion  to  dismiss  should  be
denied.”    Id.  (quotation omitted).
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                   14-454.1(a)(2)  provides  the  following:
“It  is  unlawful  to  willfully,  directly  or  indirectly,  access  or
cause  to  be  accessed  any  government  computer  for  the  purpose  of
[o]btaining  property  or  services  by  means  of  false  or
fraudulent  pretenses,  representations,  or  promises.”    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                        §                   14-454.1(b)  provides  that                   “[a]ny  person  who  willfully
and  without  authorization,  directly  or  indirectly,  accesses  or
causes  to  be  accessed  any  government  computer  for  any  purpose
other  than  those  set  forth  in  subsection  (a)  of  this  section  is
guilty of a Class H felony.”
A:    Obtaining Services




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In  Defendant’s  first  argument  on  appeal,  she  contends  the
State  did  not  present  substantial  evidence  that  she  accessed  a
government  computer                                                      “for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  services[.]”
We disagree.
                                                                          N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          §                                                                                                               14-454.1(a)(2)  provides,  in  part,  that
“[i]t  is  unlawful  to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .  access  or  cause  to  be  accessed  any
                                                                                                                            government   computer   for   the   purpose   of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 [o]btaining
property  or  services[.]”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         (emphasis  added).     The  indictments
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     charging  Defendant  with  violations  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      §   14-
                                                                          454.1(a)(2)   stated   that   Defendant                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            “did   access   a   government
computer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       .   for   the   purpose   of   obtaining   services.”
(emphasis added).
                                                                          N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          §   14-453(4a)  defines                                                                                                                                                                                                                  “[c]omputer  services”
as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               “computer   time   or   services,   including   data   processing
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    services,    Internet    services,    electronic    mail    services,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    electronic  message  services,  or  information  or  data  stored  in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    connection  with  any  of  these  services.”     Moreover,  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                                                                       §                                                  14-453(9)  defines                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      “[s]ervices”  as  including                                                                                                                                                                                         “computer
                                                                                                                                                                               time, data processing and storage functions.”
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 The  following  evidence  of  record  supports  that  Defendant
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    accessed  a  government  computer  for  the  purpose  of  “obtaining  .  .
                                                                                                                                                                               .   services”   pursuant   to   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     §   14-454.1(a)(2).




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Assistant  Supervisor  Danny  Barlow  (“Supervisor  Barlow”)  from  the
DMV  testified  that  during  the  course  of  his  investigation,  he
discovered  that  transfers  were  made  by  the  Lexington  Agency
using   the                                                                  “OS”   code   for   Lanier   Motor   Company.   Defendant
admitted  on  cross-examination  that  she  personally  accessed  STARS
and  made  the  “transfer  on  September  30th,  2008,  for  Lanier  Motor
Company[.]”     Defendant  also  admitted  she  accessed  STARS  and
personally  made  the  transfers  for  Lanier  Motor  Company  on            23
October  2008  and  3  November  2008.    Likewise,  Defendant  admitted
that  on                                                                     30  January                                     2009,  Defendant  told               “Mary  Byerly                                                   .  to
run  a  Lanier  Motor  Company  title  through  as  out  of  state
dealer[.]”     For  the  foregoing  transfers,  Defendant  admits  that
she was  “paid  $59.20[.]”
We  believe  the  foregoing  evidence  is  substantial  evidence
to  support  the  element  of  “[o]btaining  .  .  .  services”  pursuant
to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                             §                                                                                                                               14-454.1(a)(2),  as  defined  by  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                        §                                               14-453(4a)  and  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                  §   14-453(9).    Defendant
had                                                                                                                                                                                                                               “computer   time”   on   STARS;   Defendant   also   accessed
                                                                                                                                                                  “information  or  data  stored  in  connection  with”  STARS.                                                                                                                                                We
therefore  conclude  the  trial  court  did  not  err  by  denying
Defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  on  the  basis  that  there  was  not




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substantial   evidence   that   Defendant                                    “[o]btain[ed]
services[.]”
B:    Willfulness
In  Defendant’s  second  argument  on  appeal,  she  contends  the
trial  court  erred  by  denying  her  motion  to  dismiss  because  the
State  did  not  present  substantial  evidence  that  Defendant  acted
willfully  as  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                               §                                                                        14-454.1(a)(2).    We
disagree.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                                                                        14-454.1(a)(2)  provides,  in  part,  that
                                                                             “[i]t  is  unlawful  to  willfully,  directly  or  indirectly,  access
                                                                             or  cause  to  be  accessed  any  government  computer[.]”                                                            (emphasis
added).
“Ordinarily,                                                                 [w]ilful  as  used  in  criminal  statutes  means
the  wrongful  doing  of  an  act  without  justification  or  excuse,  or
the  commission  of  an  act  purposely  and  deliberately  in  violation
of  law.”    State  v.  Williams,                                            284  N.C.                                                                67,                                          72,         199  S.E.2d   409,
412  (1973)  (quotation omitted).
The  word  wilful,  used  in  a  statute  creating
a   criminal   offense,   means   something   more
than  an  intention  to  do  a  thing.    It  implies
the                                                                          doing                                                                    the                                          act         purposely     and
deliberately,  indicating  a  purpose  to  do  it
without  authority                                                           -  careless  whether  he  has
the  right  or  not  -  in  violation  of  law,  and
it  is  this  which  makes  the  criminal  intent
without  which  one  cannot  be  brought  within
the meaning of a criminal statute.




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In  re  Adoption  of  Hoose,  243  N.C.  589,  594,  91  S.E.2d  555,  558
(1956)  (quotation omitted).
Defendant  argues  on  appeal  that  there  is  no  evidence  of
willfulness  because  evidence  showed  that  Defendant  believed  the
DMV  help  desk  had  instructed  the  Lexington  Agency  to  enter
Lanier  Motor  Company  transfers  as                                        “OS.”                                                        Although  there  is
evidence  to  support  the  foregoing  assertions  by  Defendant             -  in
particular,  the  testimony  of  Stokes  and  Defendant                      -  there  is
also  evidence  to  the  contrary                                            -  Granados’  testimony.                                     When
asked,                                                                       “did  you  ever  call  the  Department  of  Motor  Vehicle
Division  in  Raleigh  to  receive  any  information  or  assistance
regarding  that  particular  issue?”  Granados  responded,  “No,  sir.”
Granados also gave the following testimony at trial:
Q.                                                                           Bringing   your   attention   back   to
September  or  October  of                                                   2008  regarding  some
of  those  dealer  packets  that  you  picked  up
that  belonged  to  Lanier  Motor  Company,  can
you  tell  the  jury  whether  or  not  anything
unusual   happened   when   you   attempted   to
process them?
A.     I  went  to  open  up  the  dealer  folder
under  Lanier  Motors  and  when  I  went  in  to
start  processing  a  piece  of  work  I  already
entered  the  customer[’]s  identification.  I
entered  the  title  number  and  went  over  to
mileage.    I  done  (sic)  the  mileage.    When  it
came  to  the  screen  to  enter  what  was  on  the
bill of sale, it said  “inactive dealer”.




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Q.                                                        What   did   that   mean   to   you   as   an
individual  that  worked  as  a  title  clerk  for
a license plate agency?
A.    That  means  he  didn’t  renew  his  dealer’s
license.
Q.    As  an  employee  with  the  experience  that
you  had,  were  you  at  that  point  in  time
allowed  to  transfer  that  title  through  the
STAR System?
A. No, sir.
Q.    As  long  as  the  dealer  number  was  in  the
STAR  computer  and  it  showed  inactive,  would
the computer allow that transfer?
A.    No, sir.
Q.    At that point in time what did you do?
A.    I  brought  it  to  Betty  Barr’s  attention,
it was not active.
Q.    And  how  did  you  do  that?  Tell  the  jury
what  contact  or  interaction  you  had  with
Betty Barr at that time.
A.    I  took  the  pieces  of  work  and  I  went  and
told  her  that  Mr.  Lanier  Motors[’]  dealer
number  had  been  expired,  it  would  not  let  me
process  it.  And  at  that  time  she  said  she
would handle it, contacting him.
Q.    What did Betty Barr say?
A.    She would handle contacting him.
A.                                                        .     About  two  or  three  days  later
[Lanier] came back into the office.




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Q.     At  that  point  in  time  did  you  see  any
interaction  between  Mr.  Randall  Lanier  and
Betty Barr?
A.     They  went  to  the  back  and  spoke,  sir.
They didn’t speak out front.
Q.                                                       Can  you  indicate  to  the  ladies  and
gentlemen  of  the  jury  how  long  a  time  that
you   observed   or   found   that   Mr.   Lanier,
Randall   Lanier,   and   the   defendant,   Betty
Barr, remained in that back area?
A.    Around  10 to  15 minutes.
Q.                                                       What,  if  anything,  did  you  see  Mr.
Randall  Lanier  do  when  he  returned  several
days   after   he   had   received   those   title
packets, if anything?
A.    Well,  at  the  time  when  he  came  back  with
them  he  didn’t  enter  the  office.     They  had
had a conversation outside.
Q.  .  .                                                 .    Now,  from  the  time  that  you  first
learned   that   Lanier   Motor   Company   dealer
number  was  invalid,  did  you  ever  contact  any
governmental   official   at   the   Division   of
Motor  Vehicles,  Department  of  Transportation
orally  that  would  relate  to  license  plate
agency operation?
A.    No, sir.




-15-
Q.    At  any  time  during  your  employment  and
after   you   learned   of   the   dealer   number
invalidation,  did  you  ever  tell  Betty              -  I’m
sorry                                                   -  Mary  Byerly  that  you  had  called  a
governmental agency orally?
A.    No, sir.
Q.     Are  you  familiar  with  the  key  code  on
the  STAR  System,  O  S,  do  you  know  what  that
is?
A.    Yes. It is out of state.
Q.                                                      Based   upon   your   training   and   the
protocols  that  you  were  to  follow  as  a  title
clerk, when would you use the key code O S?
A.    When it was an out of state dealer.
Q.    Did  you  ever  key  into  the  computer  that
Miranda  Stokes  used  in  any  of  the  transfers
for  Lanier  Motor  Company  out  of  state?  Did
you  ever  key  that  in  on  her  computer  at  any
time  when  she  was  addressing  a  Lanier  Motor
Company transaction?
A.    No, sir.
Q.    Did  you  ever  tell  Miss  Cornatzer  to  use
the  key  code  out  of  state  dealer  in  any
transfers   that   she   did   for   Lanier   Motor
Company  after  you  learned  that  that  company
had an invalid dealer number?
A.    No, sir.
Q.    Ma’am,  I  want  to  bring  your  attention  to
the  date  January                                      6,                                           2009.   Did  you  have




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occasion  to  again  process  titles  for  Lanier
Motor Company on that date?
A.    Yes, sir.
Q.     Could  you  indicate  to  the  ladies  and
gentlemen  of  the  jury  how  that  came  about
and what, if anything, unusual took place?
A.    I  picked  up  the  dealer  packet  out  of  the
back room again.
Q.    What  did  you  do  with  that  Lanier  Motor
packet  on  January  6th,  2009,  what  did  you  do
with it?
A.    I brought it to my work station.
Q.    What took place at that location?
A.                                                       I   opened   up   the   dealer   packet   and
proceeded  to  see  if  I  could  do  the  work  and
it still said the dealer was inactive.
Q.    Was  the  defendant  Betty  Barr  present  in
the office on that date and time?
A.    Yes, sir.
Q.    What  conversation,  if  any,  did  you  have
with  Betty  Barr  regarding  the  finding  that
you  just  learned  on  your  computer  as  it
relates    to    the    Lanier    Motor    Company
transfer?
A.     I  told  her  that  the  dealer  number  was
inactive.   And   she   said   to   go   ahead   and
process  it  as  an  O  S  and  that  when  Raleigh
received   it   they   would   see   that   he   had
applied  for  his  dealer  number  or  had  his
dealer  stuff  in  trying  to  get  it  passed  and
they would go ahead and send it through.




-17-
Q.  Based  upon  your  training  and  education
and  experience  as  a  title  clerk  for  the
license   plate   agency,   was   that   a   proper
protocol    that    you    have    learned    or
experienced as a clerk?
A.    No, sir.
Q.     How  many  transfers  did  you  make  for
Lanier  Motor  Company  on  January                     6,   2009,  if
any?
A.    I recall about three pieces.
Q     Indicate  to  the  ladies  and  gentlemen  of
the  jury  how  you  did  those  three  transfers,
what    key    code    did    you    utilize    in
transferring   each   of   those   three   motor
vehicle titles?
A.    O S for out of state dealer.
Q.     Why  did  you  use  the  O  S,  out  of  state
dealer  key  code,  to  make  those  transfers  on
January  6,  2009?
A.     My  supervisor,  Betty  Barr,  told  me  to
process it.
Q.     Did  any  person  ever  tell  you  from  the
Department   of   Motor   Vehicles   Division   of
Transportation  that  that  was  a  proper  method
to  transfer  a  dealer’s  motor  vehicle  that
was invalid?
A.    No, sir.
Q  In  regard  to  Mr.  Randall  Lanier,  was  that
different  or  the  same  as  she  dealt  with




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other dealers?
[A]: Yes, sir, it was different.
Q.    How was it different?
A.     He  was  running  for  a  political  thing
there  and  they  carried  on  a  conversation
about that.
Q.    What  do  you  mean  when  you  say  him,  who
are you referring to?
A.    Mr. Lanier.
Q.    What  political  thing  was  he  running  for
if you are aware of it?
A.    I  don’t  know.  I  just  heard  him  talking
that  he  was  running  for  a  thing  and  her
mother is over the Board of Election.
“It  is  elementary  that  the  jury  may  believe  all,                     none,  or
only  part  of  a  witness’  testimony[.]”    State  v.  Miller,  26  N.C.
App.                                                                         440,        443,                         216  S.E.2d                                        160,                                                                          162,  aff’d,                              289  N.C.   1,                   220
                                                                                                                                                                         S.E.2d  572  (1975).    Therefore,  it  was  within  the  province  of  the
                                                                                                                                                                         jury  to  disbelieve  the  testimony  of  Defendant  and  several  title
                                                                                                                      clerks,   but   believe   Granados’   testimony.                                                                                                                                       Taking   Granados’
                                                                                                                                                                         testimony  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State,  we  believe
                                                                                                                                                                         there  was  substantial  evidence  of  Defendant’s  willfulness  to
                                                                                         violate  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                                                                                                                14-454.1(a)(2).    Granados’  testimony




-19-
is  substantial  evidence  that  Defendant                                     “[did]  the  act  purposely
and   deliberately,   indicating   a   purpose   to   do   it   without
authority                                                                      -  careless  whether  he  has  the  right  or  not                 -  in
violation  of  law[.]”    In  re  Adoption  of  Hoose,  243  N.C.  at  594,
91  S.E.2d  at                                                                 558.     Therefore,  we  conclude  the  trial  court  did
not  err  by  denying  Defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  for  lack  of
substantial evidence of willfulness.
III:    Indictment
                                                                                                                                                  In  Defendant’s  next  argument,  she  contends  she  cannot  be
                                                                               convicted   of   a   violation   of   both   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                                               §                     14-
                                                                                                                                                  454.1(a)(2)  and  (b)  for  the  same  “purpose”  and  transaction.    We
agree.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §                                                                  14-454.1(a)(2)  provides  that                                              “[i]t  is
unlawful  to  willfully,  directly  or  indirectly,  access  or  cause
to  be  accessed  any  government  computer  for  the  purpose  of:  .  .  .
Obtaining  property  or  services  by  means  of  false  or  fraudulent
pretenses,  representations,  or  promises.”    Id.  (emphasis  added).
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §                                                                  14-454.1(b)  provides  that                                                 “[a]ny  person  who
willfully  and  without  authorization,  directly  or  indirectly,
accesses  or  causes  to  be  accessed  any  government  computer  for
any  purpose  other  than  those  set  forth  in  subsection  (a)  of  this
section is guilty of a Class H felony.”    Id.  (emphasis added).




-20-
The  indictment  alleging  violations  on  30  January  2009  sets
forth  two  counts,  one  for  a  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-
454.1(a),  alleging  Defendant  aided  and  abetted  the  access  of  a
government  computer  “for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  services  .  .  .
.  by  processing  the  transfer  of  a  motor  vehicle  title[,]”  and
the  second  for  a  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                          §                                              14-454.1(b),
alleging  Defendant  aided  and  abetted  the  access  of  a  government
computer  for  the  purpose  of  “improperly  processing  the  transfer
of a motor vehicle title[.]”
The   plain   language   of   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                              §                                              14-454.1(b)
requires  that  the  purpose  for  accessing  a  government  computer
must  be  one  “other  than  those  set  forth”  in  subsection  (a).    Id.
As  both  the  count  charging  Defendant  with  a  violation  of  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  14-454.1(a)  and  the  count  charging  Defendant  with  a
violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-454.1(b)  allege  that  Defendant
aided  and  abetted  the  access  of  a  government  computer  for  the
purpose  of  “processing  the  transfer  of  a  motor  vehicle  title[,]”
the  second  count  fails  to  state  a  purpose  “other  than  those  set
forth”  in  subsection                                                         (a),  and  the  portion  of  the  indictment
                                                                                                                                             charging  a  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                              §                              14-454.1(b)  is,
                                                                                                                                                                                             therefore,  fatally  defective.    See  State  v.  Patterson,  194  N.C.
App.                                                                           608,                                           612,           671  S.E.2d                                     357,                                                                       360,  disc.  review  denied,   363




-21-
N.C.                                                                         587,                             683  S.E.2d   383                                            (2009)                              (“A  defect  in  an  indictment  is
                                                                                                                            considered   fatal   if   it   wholly  fails                                       .   to   state   some
essential  and  necessary  element  of  the  offense  of  which  the
defendant  is  found  guilty[;]  [w]hen  such  a  defect  is  present,  it
is  well  established  that  a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  may  be
made  at  any  time  in  any  court  having  jurisdiction  over  the
matter,  even  if  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal”)  (internal
quotations  omitted);  see  also  State  v.  Martin,  47  N.C.  App.  223,
231,                                                                         267  S.E.2d                      35,           40,  disc.  review  denied,                    301  N.C.                           238,                                  283
S.E.2d                                                                       134-35                           (1980)        (stating,                                      “if  the  facts  alleged  in  one
indictment,  if  given  in  evidence,  would  sustain  a  conviction
under  a  second  indictment,  or  if  the  same  evidence  would  support
a  conviction  in  each  case,  a  defendant  may  not  be  tried,
convicted  and  punished  for  both  offenses[;]  .  .  .  [i]f,  however,
a  single  act  constitutes  an  offense  against  two  statutes  and
each  statute  requires  proof  of  an  additional  fact  which  the
other  does  not, the  offenses  are not  the  same in  law  and  in fact
and   a   defendant   may   be   convicted   and   punished   for   both”)
(internal   citations   omitted).                                            We   conclude   the   judgment
convicting  Defendant  of  aiding  and  abetting  the  access  of  a




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government  computer  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                 §                                                       14-
454.1(b) must be arrested.1
IV:    Jury Instruction
In  Defendant’s  next  argument,  she  contends  the  trial  court
erred   by   denying   Defendant’s   written   request   for   a   jury
instruction   on   the   defense   of   governmental   authority.          We
disagree.
The   standard   of   review   for   appeals   regarding   jury
instructions  to  which  Defendant  has  properly  lodged  an  objection
at trial is the following:
This  Court  reviews  jury  instructions
contextually   and   in   its   entirety.                                  The
charge  will  be  held  to  be  sufficient  if  it
presents  the  law  of  the  case  in  such  manner
as  to  leave  no  reasonable  cause  to  believe
the  jury  was  misled  or  misinformed[.]  .  .  .
Under  such  a  standard  of  review,  it  is  not
enough  for  the  appealing  party  to  show  that
error   occurred   in   the   jury   instructions;
rather,  it  must  be  demonstrated  that  such
error  was  likely,  in  light  of  the  entire
charge, to mislead the jury.
1Because  we  arrest  judgment  on  Defendant’s  conviction  of
aiding  and  abetting  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                §                                                       14-
454.1(b),  we  need  not  address  Defendant’s  remaining  arguments
pertaining   to   this   conviction,   specifically   that                 (1)   the
indictment  was  fatally  defective  because  it  did  not  plead  that
Defendant  was                                                             “without  authorization”  to  access  the  government
computer  as  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                              §                                                       14-454.1(b),  and                    (2)
that  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying  Defendant’s  motion  to
dismiss  the  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                            §                                                       14-454.1(b)  aiding  and  abetting
charge,  because  the  State  did  not  present  substantial  evidence
that Defendant acted  “without authorization[.]”




-23-
State  v.  Glynn,                                                             178  N.C.  App.                    689,   693,                                         632  S.E.2d   551,                                                                          554,
appeal  dismissed,  disc.  review  denied,  360  N.C.  651,  637  S.E.2d
180-81  (2006)  (quotation  omitted).                                         “If  a  party  requests  a  jury
instruction  which  is  a  correct  statement  of  the  law  and  which  is
supported   by   the   evidence,   the   trial   judge   must   give   the
instruction  at  least  in  substance.”     State  v.  Ligon,                 332  N.C.
224,  242,  420 S.E.2d  136,  146  (1992)  (citation omitted).
In   this   case,   Defendant   argues   the   law   and   evidence
supported   a   jury   instruction   on   entrapment   by   estoppel   or
governmental  authority.     Our  United  States  Supreme  Court  has
explained  the  doctrine  of  entrapment  by  estoppel  as  follows:
“[C]itizens  may  not  be  punished  for  actions  undertaken  in  good
faith  reliance  upon  authoritative  assurance  that  punishment  will
                                                                                                                        not  attach.”    United  States  v.  Laub,                                                                                                                                                                385  U.S.    475,   487,                     87  S.
Ct.                                                                           574,                               581,   17  L.  Ed.                                  2d            526,                                                                          534                                                              (1967).             A  jury  may  not
convict                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          “a  citizen  for  exercising  a  privilege  which  the  State
                                                                                                                                                                                   clearly  had  told  him  was  available  to  him.”    Raley  v.  Ohio,  360
U.S.                                                                          423,                               438,   79  S.  Ct.                                                1257,                                                                         1266,                                                            3  L.  Ed.   2d     1344,                    1355
(1959).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 This  Court  recently  addressed  entrapment  by  estoppel  in
                                                                                                                                                                                   State  v.  Pope,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  713  S.E.2d  537,  541,  disc.
                                                                              review  denied,                           __  N.C.                                     __,           __  S.E.2d                                                                                                                                     __                  (2011),  stating  that




-24-
“[a]  criminal  defendant  may  assert  an  entrapment-by-estoppel
defense   when   the   government   affirmatively   assures   him   that
certain  conduct  is  lawful,  the  defendant  thereafter  engages  in
the  conduct  in  reasonable  reliance  on  those  assurances,  and  a
criminal   prosecution   based   upon   the   conduct   ensues.”2            Id.
(quotation  omitted).                                                        “In  order  to  assert  an  entrapment-by-
estoppel  defense,  [the  defendant]  must  do  more  than  merely  show
that  the  government  made  vague  or  even  contradictory  statements.
Rather,  he  must  demonstrate  that  there  was  active  misleading  in
the   sense   that   the   government   actually   told   him   that   the
proscribed conduct was permissible.”    Id.  (quotation omitted).
In   this   case,   Defendant   requested   the   following   jury
instruction    pertaining    to    entrapment    by    estoppel    and
governmental authority:
If   you   find   by   a   preponderance   of   the
evidence:
1.)   That  defendant  Betty  Barr,  acting  on
her  own  or  through  her  agents  and  employees
who   were   authorized   Division   of   Motor
Vehicles  RAC-F  title  clerks  at  her  License
Plate  Agency,  was  told  by  Bettina  Granados
2We  note  this  opinion  was  handed  down  on                              12  January                                  2011,
which  was  after  the  trial  in  this  case.                               The  trial  court
correctly  applied  the  law  existing  at  the  time  of  trial,  which
consisted  only  of  federal  opinions.    This  notwithstanding,  Pope
is  not  inconsistent  with  the  law  applied  by  the  trial  court  in
determining  whether  to  give  the  requested  jury  instruction  in
this case.




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in  her  official  capacity  as  an  authorized
RAC-F  title  clerk,  that  she,  Ms.  Granados,
had   called   the   DMV   help   desk,   and   had
explained   that   a   well-known   longtime   car
dealer  in  Lexington,  NC  had  a  problem  with
trying  to  consolidate  his  two  car  lots  under
one bond, and
2.)   That  Ms.  Granados  said  to  Betty  Barr
and   the   other   title   clerks,   that   she
received   an   authorization   to   process   the
Lanier  Motor  Company  vehicle  title  transfers
as  though  the  Lanier  Motor  Company  was  an
out of state dealer, and
3.)   That   Ms.   Granados   had   the   real   or
apparent    authority    to    make    such    a
representation, and
4.)   That  Betty  Barr,  in  reasonable  reliance
upon   that   representation   by   Ms.   Granados
entered  and  allowed  her  clerks  to  enter  “OS”
for  out  of  state  dealer  in  the                                        16  Lanier
Motor   Company   vehicle   title   transfers   in
question,
Then  you  should  return  a  verdict  of                                   “not
guilty”  as  to  each  of  the  counts  in  the
indictment.
The                                                                         pertinent  question  on  appeal  is  whether  Granados,   “an
authorized  RAC-F  title  clerk[,]”  was  a  government  official           for
purposes  of  entrapment  by  estoppel.    Among  the  numerous  examples
of  government  officials  in  the  context  of  entrapment  by  estoppel
in  the  law  of  this  State  and  federal  courts  are                    “officials”  of
the                                                                         “Town  of  Coats[,]”  Pope,                                                                                              __  N.C.  App.   __,   __,   713  S.E.2d
537,                                                                                                                                  542,  the  Un-American  Activities  Commission,  which  told




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witnesses  they  had  a  right  to  rely  on  the  privilege  against
self-incrimination,  Ohio,  360  U.S.  423,  79  S.  Ct.  1257,  3  L.  Ed.
2d                                                                            1344,  and  a  Police  Chief  and  Sheriff,  Cox  v.  Louisiana,   379
U.S.  559,  85 S. Ct.  476,  13 L. Ed.  2d  487  (1965).
In  Defendant’s  request  for  the  jury  instruction,  she  relied
on  United  States  v.  Tallmadge,                                            829  F.2d                                                          767,   774   (9th  Cir.
1987),   in   which   the   majority   opinion   held   the   government
official  was  “a  federally  licensed  gun  dealer[,]”  who  the  Court
described  as  “a  licensee  of  the  federal  government[.]”    However,
we   find   the   dissenting   opinion   in   Tallmadge   to   be   more
persuasive.                                                                   The   dissent   in   Tallmadge   disagreed   with   the
majority’s  conclusion  that  the  federally  licensed  gun  dealer  was
a  governmental  official,  stating,                                          “I  believe  the  panel  errs  in
allowing  Tallmadge  to  rely  on  statements  purportedly  made  by  the
gun  dealer,  who  is  not  even  a  federal  employee,  much  less  an
official   authorized   to   bind   the   government.”                        Id.   at                                                           776
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
In  this  case,  Defendant  contends  that  Granados,  a  licensed
and  “authorized  RAC-F  title  clerk[,]”  was  a  government  official
for  purposes  of  the  entrapment  by  estoppel  defense  and  jury
instruction.    Granados  was  an  employee  of  the  Lexington  Agency,
not  the  State  of  North  Carolina,  and  the  Lexington  Agency  was  a




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private  contractor.     We  agree  with  the  federal  line  of  cases
aligned  with  the  Tallmadge  dissenting  opinion,  which  reason  that
“a  federal  license                                                           .  does  not  transform  private  licensees
into  government  officials[,]”  United  States  v.  Billue,  994  F.2d
1562,                                                                          1569                                                     (11th  Cir.   1993),  and                                                 “[because]    [w]e  do  not  have
before  us  the  situation  where  a  government  official,  such  as  a
judge,  a  prosecuting  attorney,  an  ATF  official,  or  a  probation
officer,  [made  a  representation][,]  .  .  .  we  cannot  agree  that  .
.  .  [a]  license  .  .  .  is  sufficient  to  transform  [the  licensee]
into  government  officials[.]”    United  States  v.  Austin,  915  F.2d
363,                                                                           367                                                      (8th  Cir.    1990).3     We  do  not  believe  that  Granados’
capacity  as  a  licensed  RAC-F  title  clerk  was  sufficient  to
establish  that  Granados  was  a  government  official.    We  therefore
conclude   that   Granados   was   not   a   government   official   for
purposes   of   the   application   of   the   entrapment   by   estoppel
defense,   and   resultantly,   the   trial   court   did   not   err   by
3This  Court  is  not  bound  by  the  decisions  of  the  Ninth
Circuit,  and  is  free  to  adopt  the  rule  of  the  dissenting  opinion
                                                                                                                                                      in  Tallmadge  and  the  Eighth  and  Eleventh  Circuits.                                                In  re
Truesdell,                                                                     313  N.C.                                                421,          428-29,                                                     329  S.E.2d   630,                  634-35   (1985)
(stating  that                                                                 “[a]lthough  we  recognize  that  this  Court  is  not
bound   by   the   decision   from   the   Federal   court,   we   are
nevertheless  mindful  of  the  legal  maxim,  ratio  est  legis  amina,
reason  is  the  soul  of  the  law”);  Brown  v.  Centex  Homes,  171  N.C.
App.                                                                           741,                                                     744,          615  S.E.2d                                                 86,           88                    (2005)   (“Although  we  are  not
bound  by  federal  case  law,  we  may  find  their  analysis  and
holdings persuasive”).




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concluding  that  the  evidence  did  not  support  an  instruction  on
entrapment by estoppel.
V:    Plain Error
In  Defendant’s  final  argument  on  appeal,  she  contends  the
trial  court  committed  plain  error  by  failing  to  instruct  the
jury  on  each  element  of  each  charge,  and  Defendant  is  therefore
entitled to a new trial.    We disagree.
Defendant  did  not  properly  preserve  this  issue  for  appeal
because  she  failed  to  lodge  an  objection  at  trial.     Defendant
                                                                                        requests  that  the  Court  review  for  plain  error.                                                                                                                                                     “Plain  error
                                                                                                                                                 analysis  applies  to  evidentiary  matters  and  jury  instructions.”
State  v.  Garcell,                                                                     363  N.C.                                                10,                                                                         35,    678  S.E.2d                                          618,      634             (2009)
(citation  omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                                                “A  prerequisite  to  our  engaging  in  a  ‘plain
                                                                                                                                    

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