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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA02-239
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  31 December  2002
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Alleghany County
No.  99 CRS  759
MICHAEL PIERCE CONKLIN
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered  9  October  2001  by
Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Alleghany County Superior Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  31 October  2002.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Melissa L. Trippe, for the State.
Hall  &  Hall,  Attorneys  at  Law,  P.C.,  by  Susan  P.  Hall,  for
defendant-appellant.
WALKER, Judge.
On 9 October 2001, defendant was convicted of taking indecent
liberties  with  a  child.    The  trial  court  found  defendant  had  one
prior felony Class H or I conviction and seven prior Class A1 or  1
misdemeanor convictions.   As a result, defendant was classified as
a  Level  IV  felon  and  sentenced  within  the  presumptive  range  to  a
minimum of  24 months and a maximum of  29 months in prison.
Through the victim’s testimony, the State’s evidence tended to
show:    The  victim,  whose  date  of  birth  is  12  November  1988,  was
living with her father on  17 July  1999, the date of the incident.
On that evening, the victim, her brother, defendant and two other




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men were sitting on the victim’s front porch.    Defendant sat next
to  the  victim  and  began  to  rub  her  legs  and  genital  area.    The
victim’s uncle was present and told defendant to stop.   The victim
then traded places with her brother so that he was between her and
defendant.   However, defendant reached around the victim’s brother
and  continued  touching  the  victim’s  genital  area.     Defendant
stopped fondling the victim only when he was threatened by one of
the other men present.    Subsequently, defendant passed out in the
victim’s father’s yard.
The  victim’s  testimony  was  corroborated  by  her  brother.
Additionally, the responding police officer, Sergeant Ricky Royall,
and  Dr.  Jack  Chan,  an  expert  in  family  medicine  specializing  in
child abuse, testified the victim’s prior accounts of the incident
were consistent with her testimony.
First,  defendant  contends  the  trial  court  erred  in  barring
evidence  that  the  victim  subsequently  made  similar  allegations
against  another  person.     Specifically,  he  asserts  the  victim
alleged in December 2000 that her uncle attempted to sexually abuse
her.    Detective Wayne Crouse, who investigated the charge against
the victim’s uncle, testified on voir dire that he did not believe
the  victim  made  false  accusations  even  though  she  was  unable  to
remember  many  of  the  details  concerning  the  incident  when  she
testified in that case.
The  trial  court  ruled  this  evidence  was  inadmissible  under
Rule  412.    See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  8C-1, Rule  412  (2001).    Rule  412
excludes evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior but does not




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                                                                              apply  to  false  accusations  or  inconsistent  statements.                                            §  8C-1,
Rule                                                                          412;  see  State  v.  Younger,                                   306  N.C.         692,   295  S.E.2d   453
(1982);  State  v.  Thompson,                                                                                                                  139  N.C.  App.   299,   533  S.E.2d   834
(2000).
The cases cited by defendant in support of his argument that
the  victim’s  allegations  against  her  uncle  are  admissible  are
inapplicable.   They involve conduct where the alleged victim either
made inconsistent statements, Younger, 306 N.C. at 697, 295 S.E.2d
at  456,  or  withdrew  her  allegations,  State  v.  Ginyard,  122  N.C.
App. 25, 34, 468 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1996).   Here, although according
to  Detective  Crouse  the  victim  could  not  remember  all  of  the
details concerning the alleged incident with her uncle, there is no
evidence that the victim made inconsistent statements or withdrew
her  allegations.    Rather,  the  present  case  is  more  analogous  to
State  v.  Anthony,  89  N.C.  App.  93,  365  S.E.2d  195  (1988),  where
this Court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the
victim’s  previous  accusations  of  sexual  abuse  against  her  father
and stepfather.   Although the charges were dismissed in that case,
this Court reasoned that the dismissal of the charges did not show
that the victim’s allegations were false.   Id. at 97, 365 S.E.2d at
197.                                                                          Just  as  there  was  no  evidence  of  false  allegations  in
Anthony, here, there is no evidence that the victim’s allegations
were  false.    Therefore,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  excluding
evidence of the victim’s prior allegation of sexual abuse.




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Next,  defendant  contends  the  State  could  not  prove  he  acted
willfully because he was so highly intoxicated at the time of the
alleged acts that he was not conscious.
Defendant  did  not  request  an  instruction  on  intent  or
involuntary  intoxication.    A  defendant  must  object  in  order  to
preserve  errors  relating  to  jury  instructions  or  the  failure  to
give requested instructions.   State v. Connell, 127 N.C. App. 685,
691,  493 S.E.2d  292,  296  (1997).    Here, defendant did not request
an instruction regarding diminished capacity, but now asserts plain
error  in  failing  to  so  instruct.     To  show  plain  error,  the
defendant  must  establish  that,  but  for  the  error,  the  jury  would
likely  have  reached  a  different  conclusion.    State  v.  Odom,  307
N.C.  655,  661,  300 S.E.2d  375,  379  (1983).
During   defendant’s   evidence,   he   was   asked   on   direct
examination if he had been drinking.   He stated, “I’d been drinking
a  good  bit,  but  the  thing  about  it  is,  you  know,  when  you’re
alcoholic like me, it takes a lot go [sic] get you drunk, you know,
you can set [sic] there and drink all day, and you won’t get drunk,
you’d just still be sober....”    Defendant also admitted on cross-
examination  that  he  was  not  so  drunk  that  he  didn’t  recall  the
events  leading  up  to  his  arrest  and  that  he  was  not  so  impaired
that he  “lost  [his] sense of what was right and wrong....”   As the
burden  was  on  the  defendant  to  establish  the  defense  of  lack  of
intent  or  diminished  capacity  by  reason  of  intoxication,  we  find
the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct
the jury on intent and voluntary intoxication.




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Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss because the State did not prove that he acted for
the purpose of gratifying a sexual desire, an essential element to
the charge.    See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-202.1  (2001).    Although the
State  bears  the  burden  of  proving  every  element  of  the  crime
charged, “in ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court must
view  all  the  evidence,  whether  competent  or  incompetent,  in  the
light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of
every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its
favor.”    State  v.  Cross,  345  N.C.  713,  717,  483  S.E.2d  432,  434
(1997).   Furthermore, a defendant’s purpose in committing indecent
liberties   is                                                                “seldom   provable   by   direct   evidence   and   must
ordinarily be proven by inference.”    State v. Jones,  89 N.C. App.
584, 598, 367 S.E.2d 139, 147 (1988), quoting State v. Campbell, 51
N.C. App.  418,  421,  276 S.E.2d  726,  729  (1981).
Taking the evidence presented in the record in the light most
favorable to the State, defendant repeatedly touched the victim in
her  genital  area  and  changed  positions  so  that  he  could  reach
around the victim’s brother to continue touching her.    He stopped
touching  her  only  when  threatened.    From  this  evidence,  the  jury
could have reasonably inferred that defendant’s repeated touching
of the victim in her genital area was for the purpose of gratifying
his sexual desires.
We  find  defendant’s  remaining  assignments  of  error  to  be
without merit; therefore, they are overruled.
No error.




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Judges McCULLOUGH and CAMPBELL concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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