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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA06-1092
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          4 September  2007
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Cleveland County
Nos.  05 CRS  5419
TIMOTHY DOUGLAS DAVENPORT                                                                       05 CRS  54035
05 CRS  54036
Appeal  by  Defendant  from  judgment  entered  23  April  2006  by
Judge  Nathaniel  J.  Poovey  in  Cleveland  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  21 May  2007.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Barry H. Bloch, for the State.
William D. Auman for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
On                                                                                              21  April                                                        2006,  a  jury  found  Timothy  Douglas  Davenport
(“Defendant”) guilty of selling or delivering cocaine, possession
with  intent  to  sell  or  deliver  cocaine,  and  being  an  habitual
felon.    The  Honorable  Nathaniel  J.  Poovey  entered  judgment  on  23
April 2006 and sentenced Defendant to a minimum term of 120 months
and a maximum term of  153 months in prison.   Defendant appealed in
open court upon entry of the judgment.
                                                                                                At  trial,  the  State’s  evidence  tended  to  show  that  on   19
January                                                                                         2005,  Officer  Chris  Howington  and  other  Shelby  Police




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Department                                                                   (“S.P.D.”)   narcotics   detectives   were   conducting
controlled  narcotics  buys  with  the  aid  of  a  confidential  and
reliable  informant,  Winnifred  Pettis                                      (“Pettis”).     Before  each
controlled buy, the officers searched Pettis’s car and body, gave
him money for the buy, and then wired him with an audio and video
camera.    The  audio  was  real  time,  allowing  the  officers  to  hear
what  was  being  said  as  the  buy  occurred.    The  video  was  viewed
later.     The  officers  directed  Pettis  where  to  go  to  make  the
narcotics purchases.
On  19 January  2005, Defendant was not the intended target of
the  undercover  purchase.    However,  the  targeted  seller  was  not
home, and Pettis was not able to make the purchase as directed by
the  S.P.D.  officers.    As  Pettis  was  about  to  leave  the  intended
target’s  home,  Defendant                                                   “flagg[ed]                                                      [Pettis]  down”  and  entered
Pettis’s car.   Defendant and Pettis knew each other from the local
community  college.    Pettis  informed  Defendant  that  he  wanted  to
purchase                                                                     $20.00  worth  of  crack  cocaine.     Pettis  and  Defendant
returned to Defendant’s house.    At the house, Defendant went into
a  back  room  to  retrieve  the  cocaine,  and  upon  exiting  the  back
room, the men completed the drug sale.
While   Defendant’s   attorney   was  cross-examining  Officer
Howington, the following exchange occurred:
Defendant’s counsel:                                                         .  .  How many days
                                                                             prior   to   that   had
                                                                             you been involved in
                                                                             this operation?
Officer Howington:                                                           W e  d o  c o n t r o l l e d
                                                                             buys.                                                           We  just  go
                                                                             out                                                             and                             make
                                                                             buys  .  .  .                                                                                   .  We  had




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made   previous   buys
from Mr. Davenport  -
Defendant’s counsel:                                                         Objection.    Move  to
strike  and  move  for
a mistrial.
The Court:                                                                   Objection overruled.
Motion    to    strike
denied.    Motion  for
a mistrial denied.
Officer  Howington’s  testimony  continued,  and  when  his  testimony
concluded,  Defendant’s  attorney  renewed  his  objection  and  motion
for  mistrial  based  on  the  reference  to  previous  buys  made  from
Defendant.  1  In  opposition  to  the  motion  for  mistrial,  the  State
argued,  out  of  the  presence  of  the  jury,  that  mistrial  was  not
appropriate because nothing was mentioned about Defendant’s prior
convictions or criminal record, and Officer Howington  “thought he
was making a genuine response to [the] question.”   After reviewing
the  transcript,  the  trial  court  ruled  that  Officer  Howington’s
reply was not responsive to the question.   The court then sustained
Defendant’s  objection.    However,  Defendant’s  attorney  refused  a
limiting instruction offered by Judge Poovey directing the jury to
disregard  the  comment.     Judge  Poovey  again  denied  Defendant’s
motion for a mistrial, concluding the error was not “so prejudicial
that it would require a mistrial at this time.”
1
In his brief to this Court, Defendant’s attorney repeatedly
asserts that Officer Howington proffered this testimony while the
State was examining him.    However, upon review of the transcript,
it is clear that Defendant’s attorney was cross-examining Officer
Howington when the officer mentioned previous buys.    Furthermore,
upon   reconsideration,   the   trial   court   sustained   Defendant’s
objection to this testimony, a fact not acknowledged by Defendant’s
attorney  in  his  brief.    We  caution  counsel  to  be  careful  when
preparing an appellate brief, so as not to mislead the Court or to
make inaccurate assertions.




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Upon the court’s denial of the motion for mistrial, under Rule
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, the State offered
further testimony from Officer Howington and other witnesses about
another  controlled  buy  made  from  Defendant  on                            13  January                                                        2005.2
Unlike the buy on 19 January, where Defendant sought out Pettis on
the street, on  13 January Pettis suggested to the S.P.D. officers
that  he  should  go  to  Defendant’s  home  to  attempt  to  make  a  drug
purchase.    Pettis  knocked  at  Defendant’s  door  and  told  Defendant
that  he  wanted  to  buy  $40.00  worth  of  crack  cocaine.    Defendant
went  into  his  bedroom,  shut  the  door,  and  soon  came  out  with  the
cocaine.    Upon  his  return,  the  men  completed  the  narcotics  sale.
To guard against prejudice to Defendant, the trial judge instructed
the jury that evidence of the previous drug buy was admitted solely
for the purpose of showing that Defendant had the intent and common
plan  to  commit  the  crime  with  which  he  was  charged.    The  judge
specifically instructed that the evidence was not offered to show
that Defendant had a general propensity to commit the crime.
Officer  Scott  Champion,  who  was  the  officer  responsible  for
wiring  Pettis  with  the  audio  and  video  equipment  during  the           19
January                                                                        2005  buy,  also  testified.    He  stated  that  while  it  was
possible for Pettis to manipulate the equipment, Pettis did not do
so.    Pettis  testified  about  the  events  on                               19  January                                                        2005  and
denied   manipulating   the   audio   and   video   equipment.                                                                                    On
cross-examination,  Pettis  admitted  using  drugs  until  he  received
2
The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing before ruling
that the  404(b) evidence was admissible.




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treatment  in                                                                 2004.     He  denied  using  drugs  while  working  as  an
informant.    He also admitted previous convictions for misdemeanor
breaking and entering and possession of stolen goods.
At  the  close  of  the  evidence,  Defendant’s  attorney  made  a
motion  to  dismiss  based  on  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence.    The
trial judge denied this motion.   The jury found Defendant guilty of
possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and selling or
delivering cocaine.    The jury then heard testimony from Assistant
Clerk of Court Brenda Day, who recounted Defendant’s prior felony
convictions  from  26  September  1995,  3  December  1999,  and  26  June
2000.    Defendant  thereupon  moved  to  dismiss  the  habitual  felon
charge,  and  Judge  Poovey  denied  the  motion.    Defendant  was  then
found guilty of being an habitual felon.   From the judgment entered
upon these convictions, Defendant appeals.   For the reasons stated
herein,  we  hold  that  Defendant  received  a  fair  trial,  free  of
error.
APPELLATE RULE VIOLATIONS
As  a  threshold  matter,  we  must  address  the  State’s  argument
that Defendant’s appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply
with  Rules  28(b)(5)  and  28(b)(6)  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of
Appellate   Procedure.                                                        Specifically,   the   State   asserts   that
Defendant’s  brief  fails  to  comply  with  the  mandates  of  the  Rules
because Defendant provided an incomplete and misleading statement
of the facts and because Defendant failed to provide the applicable
standard of review for two of the three questions presented.




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Rule                                                                        28(b)(5)  requires  that  an  appellant’s  brief  contain  a
“full and complete  .  .  . summary of all material facts underlying
the  matter  in  controversy  which  are  necessary  to  understand  all
questions presented for review, supported by references to pages in
the transcript of proceedings, the record on appeal, or exhibits,
as the case may be.”   N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5).   The State contends
that Defendant’s brief does not comply with Rule  28(b)(5) because
the statement of the facts fails to indicate that certain testimony
at  issue  on  appeal  was  elicited  on  cross-examination  and  because
Defendant neglected to address the curative instruction offered by
the trial court.   We disagree.   Although Defendant’s brief does not
provide an exhaustive statement of the facts, and although we are
troubled   by   Defendant’s   inaccurate   representation   concerning
Officer Howington’s testimony and omission of the offered curative
instruction,  we  hold  that  Defendant’s  brief  contains  minimally
sufficient  information  from  which  this  Court  can  “understand  all
questions  presented  for  review[.]”    Therefore,  Defendant’s  brief
complies with Rule 28(b)(5), and Defendant’s appeal is not subject
to dismissal on this basis.
The State next argues that two of Defendant’s arguments should
be  dismissed  because  Defendant  failed  to  address  the  standard  of
review, in violation of Rule  28(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules
of  Appellate  Procedure.     While  we  agree  with  the  State  that
Defendant’s brief does not comply with Rule  28(b)(6), we conclude
that this violation does not warrant dismissal.
Rule  28(b)(6) states in pertinent part that




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[t]he   argument   shall   contain   a   concise
statement  of  the  applicable  standard(s)  of
review  for  each  question  presented,  which
shall  appear  either  at  the  beginning  of  the
discussion of each question presented or under
a separate heading placed before the beginning
of   the   discussion   of   all   the   questions
presented.
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).   In State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 311, 644
S.E.2d 201, 202 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted), our
Supreme Court recognized that “[i]t is well settled that the Rules
of Appellate Procedure are mandatory and not directory.”   However,
the   Court   concluded   that   not                                         “every   violation   of   the
rules                                                                        .  require[s]  dismissal  of  the  appeal  or  the  issue,
although some other sanction may be appropriate, pursuant to Rule
25(b) or Rule  34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”    Id.    Rule
34(b)(3)  allows  a  Court  of  the  appellate  division  to  impose  “any
other  sanction  deemed  just  and  proper”  when  there  has  been  a
violation of the appellate rules.    N.C. R. App. P.  34(b)(3).
In his first argument, Defendant contends that the standard of
review when this Court examines a trial court’s decision to deny a
motion  for  a  mistrial  is  an  abuse  of  discretion.     However,
Defendant  fails  to  define                                                 “abuse  of  discretion.”     Even  more
concerning  is  Defendant’s  treatment  of  his  next  argument  through
which  he  attacks  the  propriety  of  the  trial  court’s  decision  to
admit in evidence, under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the North Carolina
Evidence  Code,  testimony  regarding  Defendant’s  prior  drug  sale.
While Defendant cites case law that has interpreted each Rule and
provides analogous cases that purportedly support his position, he
never states the standard under which this Court reviews a decision




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by the trial court to admit evidence under Rule 403 or Rule 404(b).
Therefore,  Defendant’s  brief  violates  Rule  28(b)(6)  of  the  North
Carolina  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure  and  Defendant’s  counsel  is
subject to sanctions.   See McKinley Bldg. Corp. v. Alvis, ___ N.C.
App.  ___,  645 S.E.2d  219  (2007)  (holding that a party was subject
to sanctions due in part to the party’s failure to state or define
the appropriate standard of review in violation of Rule 28(b)(6)).
However, although the State requests dismissal, we choose to impose
another  sanction  because,  as  the  Court  in  McKinley  Bldg.  Corp.
stated, to dismiss the appeal “would be a step backward rather than
the  step  forward  that  Hart  asks  us  to  take  in  applying  the  full
range of sanctions available under the Appellate Rules rather than
summarily dismissing many appeals.”   Id. at ___, 645 S.E.2d at 222.
Therefore,   in   accordance   with   Rule                                    34(b)(3),   we   reprimand
Defendant’s counsel and caution him to be more diligent in stating
the standard of review when preparing a brief for this Court.
ADMISSION OF RULE  404(b) EVIDENCE
Defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing the State
to  offer  evidence  under  Rule  404(b)  of  a  previous  narcotics  sale
made  by  Defendant.    Defendant  contends  the  prejudicial  effect  of
such evidence outweighed any probative value it had.
Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Evidence Code provides that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not  admissible  to  prove  the  character  of  a
person  in  order  to  show  that  he  acted  in
conformity  therewith.     It  may,  however,  be
admissible  for  other  purposes,  such  as  proof
of  motive,  opportunity,  intent,  preparation,
plan,   knowledge,   identity,   or   absence   of
mistake, entrapment or accident.




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N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  8C-1,  Rule  404(b)  (2005).    Evidence  under  Rule
404(b) is admissible if it is “‘relevant to any fact or issue other
than  the  character  of  the  accused.’”    State  v.  Coffey,  326  N.C.
268,  278,  389  S.E.2d  48,  54  (1990)  (quoting  State  v.  Weaver,  318
N.C. 400, 403, 348 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1986)).   Moreover, contrary to
Defendant’s  assertion  to  this  Court,  Rule                                404(b)  is  a                                                 “rule  of
inclusion,”  with  the  sole  exception  that  evidence  should  be
excluded  when  its  singular  value  is  to  show  that  the  accused  has
the  propensity  to  commit  the  crime  charged.    Coffey,  326  N.C.  at
278,                                                                          348  S.E.2d  at                                               54.    Our  Courts  have  held  that   “[w]hen  the
[prior]  incidents  are  offered  for  a  proper  purpose,  the  ultimate
test  of  admissibility  is  ‘whether  the  incidents  are  sufficiently
similar  and  not  so  remote  in  time  as  to  be  more  probative  than
prejudicial  under  the  balancing  test  of  N.C.G.S.                        §                                                             8C-1,  Rule
403.’” State v. Pruitt,  94 N.C. App.  261,  266, 380 S.E.2d 383,  385
(quoting  State  v.  Boyd,                                                    321  N.C.                                                     574,                                   577,           364  S.E.2d   118,   119
(1988)), disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 435, 384 S.E.2d 545 (1989).
Rule  403 of the North Carolina Evidence Code provides, inter
alia,  that                                                                   “evidence  may  be  excluded  if  its  probative  value  is
substantially  outweighed  by  the  danger  of  unfair  prejudice”  to  a
party.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  8C-1, Rule  403  (2005).    A trial court’s
decision  to  admit  evidence  under  Rule                                    404(b)  and  Rule                                             403  is
reviewed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion.    State  v.  Summers,  177  N.C.
App. 691, 629 S.E.2d 902, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied,
360 N.C. 653, 637 S.E.2d 192 (2006).   An abuse of discretion occurs
“where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is




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so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.”   State v. Campbell,  359 N.C. 644,  673, 617 S.E.2d 1,  19
(2005)  (quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted),  cert.  denied,  ___
U.S.  ___,  164 L. Ed.  2d  523  (2006).
Here,  the  evidence  of  Defendant’s  prior  narcotics  sale  was
admissible  to  show  intent  and  common  scheme  or  plan  under  Rule
404(b).   The two incidents occurred less than a week apart and both
were similar in nature.    During the prior narcotics sale, as well
as the sale for which Defendant was criminally charged, Defendant
sold a small amount of crack cocaine, the transaction took place at
Defendant’s home, and prior to the sale, he retrieved the narcotics
from a room in the back of his house while he left the purchaser to
wait outside the room.
Defendant  relies  on  State  v.  Al-Bayyinah,  356  N.C.  150,  567
S.E.2d 120 (2002), to support his position that the evidence of the
prior  drug  sale  was  not  admissible  under  Rule                          404(b).        In
Al-Bayyinah,  our  Supreme  Court  determined  that  evidence  of  prior
crimes was not admissible under Rule 404(b) because the details of
the crimes were dissimilar.   In that case, during prior robberies,
the  assailant  committed  the  crimes  using  a  gun,                        “wore  dark,
nondescript clothing that obscured his face; . . . demanded money;
and  fled  upon  receiving  it,”  while  during  the  commission  of  the
crime with which the defendant was currently charged,  “the robber
took  nothing  of  substantial  value[;]”  surprised  the  victim  from
behind;  hit  the  victim  in  the  back  of  the  head;  and  stabbed  the
victim.    Id. at  155,  567 S.E.2d at  123.    Here, on the other hand,




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Defendant  committed  the  previous  act  and  the  crime  with  which  he
was  charged  in  this  case  in  the  same  manner.    Defendant  left  the
buyer,  retrieved  the  narcotics  from  a  room  at  the  back  of  his
house,  and  upon  exiting  the  room,  concluded  a  sale  for  a  small
amount of crack cocaine.   Accordingly, Al-Bayyinah does not control
the outcome of this case.
Defendant  also  relies  on  State  v.  Jones,  322  N.C.  585,  369
S.E.2d                                                                         822                 (1988).    In  Jones,  our  Supreme  Court  held  the  trial
court  erred  in  admitting  evidence  under  Rule                             404(b)  when  the
evidence established that although the acts committed were similar,
there was a seven-year gap between the previous acts and the crimes
with which the defendant was charged.    In this case, however, the
prior incident occurred just six days prior to the act which led to
Defendant’s criminal charges.   Accordingly, Jones does not control.
Since both of these cases are distinguishable, Defendant’s reliance
on  them  is  misplaced.    We  conclude  that  the  trial  court  properly
determined the evidence regarding the narcotics sale that Defendant
made to Pettis on 13 January 2005 was admissible under Rule 404(b).
Additionally, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its  discretion  in  determining  that  the  evidence  was  admissible
under Rule 403 because it was more probative than prejudicial.   At
trial,  before  determining  the  ultimate  admissibility  of  the
evidence, Judge Poovey heard testimony on voir dire and considered
arguments   from   the   State   and   from   Defendant’s   counsel.
Furthermore, Judge Poovey gave a limiting instruction to the jury
in order to minimize the likelihood that the jury would rely on the




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evidence of the other sale for any improper purpose.   Specifically,
the trial court instructed the jury that
[t]he evidence that you’re about to hear  [is]
regarding   another   incident   that   allegedly
occurred on January  13,  2005, some  [six] days
before  the  alleged  crime  that  the  defendant
stands  trial  for  on  January                                              19th  2005.    You
must not consider this evidence  .  .  . for the
purpose   of   proving   the   character   of   the
defendant, or for the purpose of proving that
the  defendant  acted  in  conformity  with  what
this  evidence  seems  to  show                                              .     This
evidence should be considered by you only for
the purpose of showing that the defendant had
the  intent,                                                                 .  a  common  plan,  scheme,
system  or  design  involving  the  crime  charged
in this case.
We hold that because Defendant’s prior sale of narcotics was
conducted  in  a  similar  manner  and  occurred  in  close  temporal
proximity  to  the  sale  for  which  he  was  charged  in  this  case,
evidence  of  the  prior  sale  was  admissible  under  Rule                 404(b).
Furthermore,  because  the  trial  judge  carefully  considered  the
impact the evidence could have on Defendant’s case and because he
gave  the  jury  a  proper  limiting  instruction  to  help  reduce  the
likelihood  of  an  improper  application,  the  trial  court  did  not
abuse   its   discretion   in   determining   that   the   evidence   was
admissible under Rule 403.   This assignment of error is overruled.
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
Defendant  also  contends  the  trial  court  erred  in  failing  to
grant his motion for a mistrial after Officer Howington was allowed
to  testify  regarding  the  previous  narcotics  sale.    In  support  of
this  assignment  of  error,  Defendant  reiterates  his  argument  that
Officer Howington’s testimony violated the North Carolina Rules of




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Evidence and resulted in substantial and irreparable prejudice to
Defendant.    Therefore,  Defendant  argues,  the  trial  court  should
have granted a mistrial.    We disagree.
Section  15A-1061 of the Criminal Procedure Act requires that
“[t]he judge must declare a mistrial upon the defendant’s motion if
there  occurs  during  the  trial  an  error  or  legal  defect  in  the
proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, resulting
in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case.”
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                           §                   15A-1061   (2005).   Our  Supreme  Court  has
instructed  that  a  mistrial  should  be  granted  only  when  the
improprieties  “make  it  impossible  for  the  defendant  to  receive  a
fair and impartial verdict.”    State v. Warren,  327 N.C.  364,  376,
395   S.E.2d                                                                116,                123        (1990)    (quotations  marks  and  citations
omitted).
It  is  well  settled  that  the  decision  of
whether to grant a mistrial rests in the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be
disturbed  on  appeal  absent  a  showing  of  an
abuse  of  discretion.  .  .                                                [A]  trial  court
may  be  reversed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion
only  upon  a  showing  that  its  ruling  was  so
arbitrary  that  it  could  not  have  been  the
result of a reasoned decision.
State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 453-54, 421 S.E.2d 577, 585 (1992)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
As  discussed  supra,  the  evidence  at  issue  here  was  elicited
when  Defendant’s  attorney  was  cross-examining  Officer  Howington,
and specifically asked the officer how long he had been “involved”
in  the  particular  controlled  buy  operation  that  led  to  the         19
January 2005 purchase.   In response, Officer Howington stated that




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the  department  had  made  previous  controlled  buys  from  Defendant.
Defendant’s attorney immediately objected and moved for a mistrial.
The  trial  judge  first  denied  both  the  objection  and  motion  for  a
mistrial.   However, upon further consideration, the judge sustained
the  objection,  and  again  denied  the  motion  for  mistrial.    Judge
Poovey then told Defendant’s attorney that he
would  be  glad  to  tell  the  jury  that  the
objection  that  you  made  to  the  officer’s
testimony that he had conducted previous buys
from  this  defendant  is  sustained  and  the
motion  to  strike  that  testimony  is  allowed;
they   are   not   to   consider   that   testimony
whatsoever  in  any  manner  during  their  jury
deliberations.    Now,  whether  or  not  you  ask
for  that  is  up  to  you.    I’ll  be  glad  to  give
it to them if you so request.
Defendant’s  attorney  declined  the  curative  instruction  from  the
trial court.
A  review  of  the  transcript  reveals  that  before  ruling  on
defense  counsel’s  renewed  motion  for  a  mistrial,  outside  the
presence of the jury, Judge Poovey heard argument from counsel and
asked  if  the  State  was  planning  to  offer  similar  evidence  under
Rule 404(b).   In response, the prosecutor informed the trial court
that “[w]e had [previously] discussed it and thought we would wait
to  see  how  things  were  going.    In  light  of  [Officer  Howington’s]
statement,  we  may  do  so.”    Clearly,  similar  evidence,  if  offered
and  admissible  under  Rule                                                  404(b),  would  serve  to  limit  any
prejudicial  effect  Officer  Howington’s  statement  may  have  had  on
Defendant’s  case.     The  consideration  Judge  Poovey  gave  to  the
State’s  intention  to  offer  Rule                                           404(b)  evidence  and  to  the
arguments  of  counsel  establishes  that  his  decision  was  not




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arbitrary.    Rather,  Judge  Poovey  considered  the  evidence  and  its
potential impact on Defendant’s trial, and made a reasoned decision
to  deny  the  motion  for  mistrial.    Furthermore,  because  similar
evidence  of  other  controlled  narcotics  sales  that  Defendant  made
was later properly admitted under Rule 404(b), Defendant’s argument
that  his  case  was  substantially  and  irreparably  prejudiced  by
Officer Howington’s statement is not persuasive.    This assignment
of error is overruled.
MOTION TO DISMISS
By his final assignment of error, Defendant argues the trial
court  erred  by  failing  to  dismiss  the  charges  of  possession  with
intent  to  sell  or  deliver  cocaine,  and  selling  or  delivering
cocaine,  due  to  insufficiency  of  the  evidence.     Specifically,
Defendant asserts that because the video evidence does not depict
the   narcotics   changing   hands   and   because   Pettis,   the   only
testifying  eyewitness,  was  not  credible,  the  State  failed  to
present  substantial  evidence  of  the  crime  being  committed  by
Defendant.    This argument lacks merit.
To  survive  a  motion  to  dismiss,  the  State  must  present
substantial  evidence  of  each  essential  element  of  the  offense
charged and evidence that the accused was the perpetrator.    State
v.  Powell,                                                                   299  N.C.   95,   261  S.E.2d   114   (1980).   Substantial
evidence is evidence that is  “existing and real, not just seeming
or  imaginary.”    Id.  at  99,  261  S.E.2d  at  117  (citation  omitted).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court views the evidence  “in
the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to




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every  reasonable  intendment  and  every  reasonable  inference  to  be
drawn therefrom.”    State v. Thomas,  296 N.C.  236,  244,  250 S.E.2d
204,  208  (1978)  (citation omitted).
“If there is substantial evidence  .  .  . to support a finding
that  the  offense  charged  has  been  committed  and  that  defendant
committed  it,  a  case  for  the  jury  is  made  and  nonsuit  should  be
denied.”   Id. at 244, 250 S.E.2d at 208-09 (citation omitted).   The
trial  judge  does  not                                                       “weigh  the  evidence,  consider  evidence
unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness’ credibility.”
State  v.  Robinson,                                                          355  N.C.                                           320,   336,   561  S.E.2d   245,   256
(quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted),  cert.  denied,                   537  U.S.
1006,  154 L. Ed.  2d  404  (2002).                                           “‘Credibility and weight are for
determination  by  the  jury  unassisted  by  the  judge.’”    State  v.
Hester,                                                                       330  N.C.                                           547,   553,   411  S.E.2d   610,   613   (1992)   (quoting
State v. Walker,  266 N.C.  269,  273,  145 S.E.2d  833,  836  (1966)).
At the heart of Defendant’s position is his argument that the
motion  to  dismiss  should  have  been  granted  because,  although
“[o]fficers heard voices on the recording made by Pettis,  . .  . no
specific identification of [Defendant] occurred.   No money was seen
changing  hands,  no  controlled  substances  were  shown,  and  no
evidence  of  any  drug  transaction  was  depicted.”     Therefore,
Defendant  argues,  “[t]he  state’s  case  must  rise  and  fall  on  the
testimony  of                                                                 .  Pettis,  a  drug  addict  with  a  significant
criminal  history.”    The  trial  judge,  however,  does  not  weigh  and
determine  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses;  that  is  the  jury’s
task, as well-settled case law establishes.    Further, because the




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State is entitled to every favorable inference from the evidence,
the evidence presented through the testimony of S.P.D. officers and
Pettis was sufficient to submit the case to the jury.   Defendant’s
argument  that  the  State’s  evidence  was  not  credible  is  for  the
jury, not for a Court of the appellate division.    This assignment
of error is overruled.
For the reasons stated, we conclude Defendant received a fair
trial, free of error.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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