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NO. COA10-213
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  7 December  2010
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                          Johnston County
Nos.  09 CRS  50863
NOBBIE LEE DUBOSE, III                                                      09 CRS  01802
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgments  entered  27  July  2009  by
Judge Thomas H. Lock in Johnston County Superior Court.    Heard in
the Court of Appeals  29 September  2010.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
John G. Barnwell, for the State.
Glenn,  Mills,  Fisher  &  Mahoney,  P.A.,  by  Carlos  E.  Mahoney,
for defendant-appellant.
American  Civil  Liberties  Union  of  North  Carolina  Legal
Foundation, by Andrew Lee Farris and Katherine Lewis Parker;
Legal  Aid  of  North  Carolina                                             -  Advocates  for  Children’s
Services,  by  Lewis  Pitts;  North  Carolina  Advocates  for
Justice, by Burton Craige; and North Carolina Prisoner Legal
Services, Inc., by Mary S. Pollard, amici curiae.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Where the State presented substantial evidence of an agreement
for defendant to discharge a firearm at an individual standing in
front  of  the  doors  to  an  occupied  gymnasium  and  there  was  a
substantial likelihood that the bullets would enter or strike the
building, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion
to  dismiss  the  charge  of  conspiracy  to  discharge  a  firearm  into
occupied  property.    Where  the  trial  court  made  a  determination
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-50.25 that the offenses involved




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criminal street gang activity outside of defendant’s presence and
without giving him an opportunity to be heard, the judgments must
be vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
I.    Factual and Procedural Background
On 27 January 2009, Nobbie Dubose, III (defendant), Raasheive
Ray  (Ray),  Caprecia  Johnson  (Johnson),  and  Keona  Phelps  (Phelps)
attended a basketball game at Clayton High School.    Defendant and
Phelps  were  members  of  a  gang  called  Nine  Trey  Scarface.    During
the game, defendant spotted Anthony Hinton (Hinton), a member of a
rival gang, the 85/95 Bloods, standing next to the gymnasium doors
with other members of the 85/95 gang.   Defendant, Ray, Johnson, and
Phelps decided to leave because of the presence of the  85/95 gang
members.     When  defendant  walked  past  Hinton,  he  said,                “What’s
popping?”   Hinton replied, “You already know.”   Defendant walked to
the  parking  lot  and  stated  that                                          “he  was  about  to  roll.”  1  When
defendant  reached  Johnson’s  vehicle,  a  gun  was  retrieved  from
underneath  the  driver’s  seat.  2  Johnson  allowed  Ray  to  drive  her
vehicle  because  “evidently,  [Ray  and  defendant]  were  about  to  do
something.”   Ray entered the vehicle and sat in the driver’s seat,
defendant sat in the front passenger’s seat, and Phelps and Johnson
sat in the back seat.    Ray and defendant then argued over who was
1
Phelps  testified  that  defendant’s  statement  meant  that  he
was about to kill someone.
2
Conflicting evidence was presented as to who retrieved the
gun  from  underneath  the  driver’s  seat.  Phelps  testified  that  Ray
retrieved  the  gun.  Ray  testified  that  it  was  defendant  who
retrieved the gun. Johnson stated that Phelps retrieved the gun and
handed it to defendant.




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going to fire the gun.   It was decided that defendant was going to
fire  the  gun,  and  he  told  Johnson  and  Phelps  to  duck  down  in  the
back seat.    Ray then drove past the gymnasium and defendant fired
the gun twice.    The group then sped away.
Defendant  fired  the  gun  in  the  direction  of  Hinton,  who  was
standing in front of the gymnasium with two of his friends.   No one
was  injured.    The  bullets  struck  a  brick  column  that  was  located
directly  in  front  of  the  gymnasium  doors  and  was  part  of  the
structure.    After  the  shooting  occurred,  Ray  drove  defendant  to
Benson, where he ran into the woods and hid the gun.
On                                                                              2  March                   2009,  defendant  was  indicted  for  discharging  a
firearm  on  educational  property  and  discharging  a  firearm  into
occupied property.    On  30 March  2009, defendant was also indicted
for conspiracy to discharge a firearm on educational property and
conspiracy   to   discharge   a   firearm   into   occupied   property.
Defendant  pled  not  guilty  to  each  of  these  charges.    On  16  July
2009,  the  State  gave  notice  of  its  intent  to  seek  a  jury
determination of two aggravating factors:                                       (1) that the offense was
committed for the benefit of, or at the direction of, any criminal
street  gang,  with  the  specific  intent  to  promote,  further,  or
assist  in  any  criminal  conduct  by  gang  members  pursuant  to  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1340.16(d)(2a);  and  (2)  that  defendant  had  been
found to be in willful violation of the conditions of his probation
during the ten-year period prior to the commission of the offenses
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1340.16(d)(12a).




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On                                                                            21  July   2009,  defendant’s  case  was  called  for  trial.
During the course of the trial, the State dismissed the charge of
discharging a firearm into occupied property.   On 24 July 2009, the
jury  found  defendant  guilty  of  the  three  remaining  charges.
Following the jury verdict, the State informed the trial court that
it  would  not  pursue  the  gang-related  aggravating  factor                (2a)
because defendant had been convicted of conspiracy.   Defendant pled
no contest to the aggravating factor that he had a prior probation
violation  (12a)  as  to  each  of  the  three  charges  of  which  he  was
found guilty.
The trial court found defendant to be a prior record level II
for  felony  sentencing  purposes  and  sentenced  defendant  from  the
aggravated  range  to  consecutive  sentences  of                             22  to     27  months
imprisonment  on  the  convictions  of  discharging  a  firearm  on
educational  property  and  conspiracy  to  discharge  a  firearm  on
occupied property.   The trial court arrested judgment on the other
conspiracy conviction.   On 27 July 2009, the trial court filed two
written judgments.   On each of the judgments, the trial court found
that the “designated offense(s) involved criminal street activity”
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-50.25.    Defendant appeals.
II.    Motion to Dismiss  - Conspiracy
In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to
discharge   a   firearm   into   occupied   property   based   upon   the
sufficiency of the evidence.    We disagree.
A.    Standard of Review




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“Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the
Court  is  whether  there  is  substantial  evidence                          (1)  of  each
essential  element  of  the  offense  charged,  or  of  a  lesser  offense
included therein, and  (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of
such  offense.  If  so,  the  motion  is  properly  denied.”    State  v.
Powell,                                                                       299  N.C.                                       95,                                                          98,   261  S.E.2d   114,   117   (1980)   (citations
omitted).    Substantial  evidence  is  defined  as  “relevant  evidence
that  a  reasonable  mind  might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a
conclusion.”    State  v.  Olson,  330  N.C.  557,  564,  411  S.E.2d  592,
595                                                                           (1992)                                          (citation  omitted).     The  appellate  court  views  the
evidence  “in the light most favorable to the State, and the State
is  entitled  to  every  reasonable  inference  to  be  drawn  from  the
evidence.    Contradictions  and  discrepancies  must  be  resolved  in
favor of the State  .  .  .                                                   .”    State v. Bullard,  312 N.C.  129,  160,
322 S.E.2d  370,  387-88  (1984)  (internal citations omitted).
B.    Analysis
In order for a defendant to be found guilty of the substantive
crime of conspiracy, the State must prove there was an agreement to
perform every element of the underlying offense.    State v. Suggs,
117 N.C. App.  654,  661,  453 S.E.2d  211,  215  (1995).    The elements
of discharging a firearm into occupied property are “(1) willfully
and wantonly discharging (2) a firearm (3) into property (4) while
it is occupied.”    State v. Rambert,  341 N.C.  173,  175,  459 S.E.2d
510,  512  (1995) (citation omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §  14-
34.1                                                                          (2009).                                         Therefore,  the  State  had  the  burden  of  showing




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substantial  evidence  of  an  agreement  to  perform  each  of  the
elements of discharging a firearm into occupied property.
“In  order  to  prove  conspiracy,  the  State  need  not  prove  an
express  agreement;  evidence  tending  to  show  a  mutual,  implied
understanding will suffice.   Nor is it necessary that the unlawful
act be completed.”   State v. Morgan,  329 N.C. 654,  658, 406 S.E.2d
833,  835  (1991)  (internal citations omitted).    The existence of a
conspiracy  may  be  established  through  direct  or  circumstantial
evidence.   State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 616, 220 S.E.2d 521, 526
(1975).                                                                       “Direct proof of the charge is not essential, for such is
rarely obtainable.    It may be, and generally is, established by a
number  of  indefinite  acts,  each  of  which,  standing  alone,  might
have little weight, but, taken collectively, they point unerringly
to  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy.”    State  v.  Whiteside,  204  N.C.
710,  712,  169 S.E.  711,  712  (1933)  (citation omitted).
In  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State,  the  evidence
presented at trial showed that defendant, Ray, Johnson, and Phelps
decided to leave the Clayton High School basketball game because of
the presence of members of the  85/95 gang.    As they walked to the
parking lot, defendant stated that he was about to “roll,” meaning
he  was  going  to  kill  someone.    Once  the  group  reached  Johnson’s
vehicle,  a  gun  was  retrieved  from  underneath  the  driver’s  side
seat.     Johnson  agreed  to  allow  Ray  to  drive  her  vehicle  and
defendant to sit in the front passenger’s seat because “evidently,
[Ray and defendant] were about to do something.”   While inside the
vehicle,  Ray  and  defendant  argued  over  who  was  going  to  fire  the




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gun  at  Hinton.     Once  it  was  decided,  Ray  drove  slowly  by  the
gymnasium  while  defendant  fired  the  gun  twice  at  Hinton,  who  was
standing by a column located in front of the gymnasium doors.
Defendant argues that the State’s evidence failed to prove an
agreement to discharge the firearm into occupied property because
Hinton was standing outside the building.   In State v. Canady, the
defendant discharged a firearm and the bullet struck the exterior
wall of an apartment.                                                          191 N.C. App.  680,  684, 664 S.E.2d 380,  382
(2008), disc. review denied,  363 N.C.  132,  673 S.E.2d  662  (2009).
On   appeal,   the   defendant   argued   that   the   State   presented
insufficient  evidence  to  show  he  had  shot  “into”  the  apartment.
Id.  at  686,  664  S.E.2d  at                                                 384.    The  defendant  contended  that  in
order  to  satisfy  the  element  of  “into  property,”  the  bullet  must
have penetrated an interior wall of the apartment, or entered the
apartment.    Id.  at  687,  664  S.E.2d  at  384.    This  Court  disagreed
and held:
the plain meaning of “into” includes “against”
as  in                                                                         “crashed  into  a  tree.”  This  sentence
does   not   mean                                                              “crashed   through   a   tree.”
Similarly,  discharging  a  firearm                                                                                             “into”  an
enclosure does not have to mean  “through” the
wall of the enclosure. . .                                                     . The exterior wall
is  nonetheless  a  wall,  which  the  bullet  was
fired    against,    thereby    fulfilling    the
requirement   of   being   fired                                               “into”   the
enclosure.
Id.  (internal citation omitted).
In  the  instant  case,  the  evidence  presented  showed  that
defendant,  Ray,  Johnson,  and  Phelps  all  understood  and  impliedly
agreed  that  defendant  would  shoot  at  Hinton  as  the  group  slowly
drove  by  the  occupied  gymnasium.    Hinton  was  standing  by  a  brick




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column  in  front  of  the  gymnasium  doors.    There  was  a  substantial
likelihood  that  the  bullets  shot  would  enter  or  strike  the
building.   We hold that the State presented substantial evidence of
an agreement for defendant to discharge a firearm into an occupied
building.     The  trial  court  did  not  err  by  denying  defendant’s
motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to discharge a firearm
into an occupied building.
This argument is without merit.
III.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-50.25
In  his  second  argument,  defendant  contends  that  the  trial
court erred by finding in each judgment that the offenses involved
criminal street gang activity without defendant having notice or an
opportunity to be heard on that issue.    We agree.
In the instant case, the trial court entered findings pursuant
to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-50.25  of  the  North  Carolina  Street  Gang
Suppression Act, which provides:
When  a  defendant  is  found  guilty  of  a
criminal offense, other than an offense under
G.S.                                                                          14-50.16   through   G.S.   14-50.20,   the
presiding  judge  shall  determine  whether  the
offense    involved    criminal    street    gang
activity. If the judge so determines, then the
judge  shall  indicate  on  the  form  reflecting
the   judgment   that   the   offense   involved
criminal  street  gang  activity.  The  clerk  of
court shall ensure that the official record of
the defendant’s conviction includes a notation
of the court’s determination.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-50.25  (2009).    However, in the instant case,
the trial court made these findings without notice to defendant and
outside  of  his  presence.    Following  the  jury  verdict,  the  State
informed  defendant  and  the  court  that  it  would  not  pursue  the




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aggravating  factor  of  criminal  street  gang  activity                      (2a)  at
sentencing.    The trial court then pronounced its judgment in open
court.    The  trial  court  made  no  mention  that  it  was  finding  that
defendant’s  convictions  involved  criminal  street  gang  activity
pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-50.25.    Rather,  these  findings
first appeared in the trial court’s written judgments.    Defendant
was not given an opportunity to be heard regarding these findings
nor to object to the trial court entering such findings to create
an adequate record for appellate court review.
It is well-established that a criminal defendant has a right
to be present when his sentence is imposed.   State v. Crumbley, 135
N.C. App. 59, 66, 519 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1999); see also State v. Pope,
257  N.C.  326,  330,  126  S.E.2d  126,  129  (1962)  (“The  right  to  be
present at the time sentence or judgment is pronounced is a common
law right, separate and apart from the constitutional or statutory
right  to  be  present  at  the  trial.”                                       (citation  omitted)).     In
Crumbley,  the  trial  court  rendered  judgment  in  open  court  and
imposed multiple sentences upon the defendant, but did not indicate
whether those sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.
135  N.C.  App.  at                                                            61,                            519  S.E.2d  at   96.   The  trial  court
subsequently entered the written judgment, which provided that the
sentences  would  run  consecutively.     Id.     This  Court  held  that
“[the] substantive change in the sentence could only be made in the
Defendant’s  presence,  where  he  and/or  his  attorney  would  have  an
opportunity  to  be  heard,”  and  rejected  the  State’s  argument  that
there was no error because the defendant was present in open court




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at the time the sentence was originally rendered.    Id. at  67,  519
S.E.2d at  99.   We concluded that “[b]ecause there is no indication
in this record that Defendant was present at the time the written
judgment was entered, the sentence must be vacated and this matter
remanded for the entry of a new sentencing judgment.”    Id. at  66,
519 S.E.2d at  99.
Although the trial court did not alter defendant’s sentence in
its  written  judgments,  it  did  make  a  specific  finding  that
defendant had engaged in criminal street gang activity pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-50.25.   Such a finding could be used in future
criminal prosecutions or civil proceedings.   N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-
50.16,  -50.26  (2009).   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-50.16 provides that it
is  unlawful  to  conduct  or  participate  in  a  pattern  of  criminal
street gang activity.   N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 14-50.16(a)(1) (2009).   A
“pattern of criminal street gang activity” is defined as having a
conviction for at least two prior incidents of criminal street gang
activity.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-50.16(d)  (2009).    A  violation  of
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-50.16  is  generally  classified  as  a  Class  H
felony.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-50.16(a).    In  addition,  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                         §   14-50.26  provides  that   “[a]  conviction  of  an  offense
defined as criminal gang activity shall preclude the defendant from
contesting   any   factual   matters   determined   in   the   criminal
proceeding  in  any  subsequent  civil  action  or  proceeding  based  on
the same conduct.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-50.26.
We hold that making a finding of criminal street gang activity
was a “substantive change” in the judgments that was required to be




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made in defendant’s presence where he would have had an opportunity
to  be  heard.    The  judgments  in  this  matter  are  vacated  and  the
cases remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Defendant and the amici curiae brief request that this Court
invalidate  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-50.25  on  constitutional  grounds.
However,  it  is  well-established  that  an  appellate  court  will  not
decide a constitutional question when the disposition of the case
may  be  resolved  on  other  grounds.    State  v.  Blackwell,  246  N.C.
642,  644,  99 S.E.2d  867,  869  (1957)  (“[A] constitutional question
will not be passed on even when properly presented if there is also
present  some  other  ground  upon  which  the  case  may  be  decided.”
(citations omitted)); State v. Muse,  219 N.C.  226,  227,  13 S.E.2d
229,                                                                         229   (1941)   (an   appellate   court   will   not   decide   a
constitutional question “when the appeal may be properly determined
on a question of less moment.”  (citation omitted)).
NO ERROR IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Judges BRYANT and ERVIN concur.

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