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NO. COA02-1477
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       4 November  2003
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOHN FRED GAITHER
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered  18  March  2002  by
Judge  Thomas  D.  Haigwood  in  New  Hanover  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  27 August  2003.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Tina A. Krasner, for the State.
MCCOTTER, ASHTON & SMITH, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III and
Terri W. Sharp, attorneys for defendant-appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
John  Fred  Gaither                                                          (“defendant”)  appeals  his  convictions  of
armed  robbery  and  possession  of  a  firearm  by  a  convicted  felon.
For  the  reasons  stated  herein,  we  hold  that  defendant  received  a
trial free of prejudicial error.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following:
On                                                                           16  January                                    2002  at  approximately   3:30  p.m.,  Belk  department
store  security  officer  Tina  Holt                                         (“Holt”)  and  regional  loss
prevention manager Brian Phillips  (“Phillips”) observed defendant
on the second floor of the store in Wilmington, North Carolina via
a  security  camera.    Defendant  drew  the  two  employees’  attention
because he was wearing a large, heavy coat with a drawstring pulled
tightly  around  the  waist.    Defendant  also  appeared  to  nervously
look  around  the  store.     Holt  and  Phillips  observed  defendant




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conceal  inside  his  coat  nine  Polo  shirts  from  the  boys’  clothing
department.
After  concealing  the  shirts,  defendant  zipped  his  coat  and
proceeded  out  of  the  boys’  department  to  the  escalator.     As
defendant  rode  the  escalator  to  the  first  floor,  Holt  called  for
assistance from mall security officers, James Allen  (“Allen”) and
Jeffrey Reece (“Reece”), while Phillips called 911.   Belk security
officer Caroline Short (“Short”) was called to the loss prevention
office to monitor the situation via security camera while Phillips
communicated with the 911 operator.   Short eventually took over the
communication with the  911 officer from Phillips.
Holt,  Allen  and  Reece  attempted  to  stop  defendant  at  the
bottom  of  the  escalator.                                                   As  they  approached  defendant,  he
immediately put his hands in his pockets.   Allen asked defendant to
remove  his  hands  from  his  pockets  several  times,  but  defendant
refused  to  do  so.    Holt,  Allen  and  Reece  instructed  defendant  to
accompany  them  to  the  loss  prevention  office,  but  defendant
continued  to  walk  toward  the  store  exit.    Allen  and  Reece  placed
themselves in front of the exit to prevent defendant from leaving.
As   Reece   stood   in   front   of   defendant,   he   focused   on
defendant’s hands.   Defendant removed his hand from his pocket, and
Reece  saw  the  barrel  of  a  small  handgun  with  defendant’s  right
index finger on the trigger of the gun.   Defendant said, “You don’t
-  you  don’t  want  to  do  that.”     Reece  immediately  moved  from
defendant’s path, and said,  “Gun.    He’s got a gun.”




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Defendant  then  exited  Belk,  walked  down  the  sidewalk  for
approximately thirty feet and then proceeded into the parking lot,
running  between  cars.     Allen  and  Reece  pursued  defendant,  but
remained  a  distance  of  twenty  feet  away  out  of  concern  for  their
safety.   Defendant’s hands remained in his pockets the entire time
he was running.    Defendant ran toward Independence Boulevard.
Sergeant Brian Pettuce of the Wilmington Police Department was
in the vicinity when the  911 dispatch reported that a shoplifting
involving a weapon had occurred.    He responded to the call and as
he drove on Independence Boulevard he observed defendant run into
the  adjacent  woods.    The  sergeant  exited  his  vehicle,  drew  his
weapon, and ordered defendant to come out of the woods and show his
hands.    Defendant  complied  with  the  order  and  was  searched  for  a
weapon.   The search revealed no weapon but several Polo shirts were
found  stuffed  inside  defendant’s  coat.    He  then  called  for  a  K-9
unit to respond to the scene to conduct an article search.   The K-9
unit  recovered  a  loaded  .22-caliber  handgun  from  the  woods.    The
recovery of the handgun was filmed by a local news crew which had
responded to police reports of an armed robbery.
As an initial matter, we note that defendant’s brief contains
arguments supporting only five of the original seven assignments of
error on appeal.    The two omitted assignments of error are deemed
abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. R. 28(b)(5) (2002).   We therefore




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limit our review to those assignments of error properly preserved
by defendant for appeal.
The  issues  presented  for  appeal  are  whether  the  trial  court
erred  by  (1)  denying  defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  charge  of
armed robbery, or in the alternative, refusing to instruct the jury
on the lesser-included offense of common law robbery; (2) admitting
an  audiotape  of  the                                                        911  call  into  evidence;   (3)  admitting  a
videotaped news report of the gun recovery into evidence; and  (4)
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying
his  motion  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  armed  robbery.     Defendant
asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the charges.   We
disagree.
In  ruling  on  a  motion  to  dismiss  based  on  insufficiency  of
evidence,   the   trial   court   must   determine   whether   there   is
substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged.    See
State  v.  Bullard,  312  N.C.  129,  160,  322  S.E.2d  370,  387  (1984).
“Substantial  evidence  is  such  relevant  evidence  as  a  reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”    State v.
Smith,                                                                        300  N.C.                    71,                 78-79,   265  S.E.2d   164,   169   (1980).   When
reviewing  the  evidence,  the  trial  court  must  consider  even
incompetent   evidence   in   the   light   most   favorable   to   the
prosecution,  granting  the  State  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable
inference.   See State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566,  313 S.E.2d  585,




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587  (1984).    Any  contradictions  or  discrepancies  in  the  evidence
should be resolved by the jury.    See id.
In the present case, defendant was convicted of armed robbery.
By definition armed robbery is committed when “[a]ny person... who,
having in possession or with the... threatened use of any firearms
or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of
a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts
to take personal property from... any place of business....”   N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                     §                                                            14-87(a).    Absent  the  firearm  or  dangerous  weapon
                                                                                element,  the  offense  constitutes  common  law  robbery.                                                              “The  mere
possession of a firearm during the course of taking property is not
a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a); the firearm must be used
to endanger or threaten the life of a person as that element is the
essence of armed robbery.” State v. Thomas, 85 N.C. App. 319, 321,
354 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1987).                                                     “Proof of armed robbery requires that
the  victim  reasonably  believed  that  the  defendant  possessed,  or
used  or  threatened  to  use  a  firearm  in  the  perpetration  of  the
crime.”   State v. Lee,  128 N.C. App.  506, 510,  495 S.E.2d  373,  376
(1998).  “The State need only prove that the defendant represented
that  he  had  a  firearm  and  that  circumstances  led  the  victim
reasonably  to  believe  that  the  defendant  had  a  firearm  and  might
use  it.”    Id.    A  defendant’s  threatened  use  of  his  gun  is  deemed
concomitant with and inseparable from his robbery attempt where the
evidence  shows  that                                                           (1)  the  gun  was  used  to  facilitate  the
defendant’s escape, and (2) the taking of property coupled with the
escape   constitutes   one   continuous   transaction.                          State   v.




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Cunningham,                                                                  97  N.C.  App.                           631,   634,   389  S.E.2d   286,   288   (1990).
This standard applies even if there is no evidence that defendant
used force or intimidation before the taking of property.    Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a jury
could find that defendant’s actions fulfilled all of the elements
of armed robbery.   First, there was an unlawful taking of the Polo
shirts  from  the  store  premises.     Second,  defendant  showed  the
security officers that he possessed a gun.   Third, Holt, Allen and
Reece testified that they believed defendant might use the gun, and
thus were threatened.
The  evidence  also  supports  a  finding  that  while  defendant’s
use  of  intimidation  occurred  after  the  taking  of  property,
defendant’s effort to avoid apprehension by store and mall security
officers  is  an  action  continuous  with  the  taking  and  therefore
constitutes  a  part  of  the  robbery  attempt.    First,  the  evidence
tends  to  show  that  while  in  the  store  defendant  removed  several
shirts  from  a  display,  concealed  them  within  his  coat,  and  began
walking  toward  the  first  floor  store  exits.    Then  when  defendant
was  approached  by  three  security  guards  who  physically  blocked
defendant’s exit to the street, defendant presented a gun and made
a threatening statement.                                                     The defendant did not testify, nor did
he present any witnesses to contradict this evidence.   Thus, all of
the   evidence   presented   permits   a   reasonable   inference   of
defendant’s  guilt  sufficient  to  defeat  a  motion  to  dismiss.  The
fact  that  only  one  witness  to  the  incident  actually  observed  the




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gun in defendant’s possession goes to the weight of the evidence.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court is not permitted
to  weigh  the  evidence.    Thus,  we  conclude  that  in  the  light  most
favorable to the state there was sufficient evidence from which the
jury could find that defendant committed armed robbery.   Therefore,
the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  denying  defendant’s  motion  to
dismiss the charge of armed robbery.
Next,  we  address  defendant’s  argument  that  the  trial  court
erred  in  refusing  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  lesser-included
offense  of  common  law  robbery.    The  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court
has held that:
where   the   uncontroverted   evidence   is   positive   and
unequivocal  as  to  each  and  every  element  of  armed
robbery, and there is no evidence supporting defendant’s
guilt of a lesser offense, the trial court does not err
in  failing  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  lesser  included
offense of common law robbery.
State  v.  Peacock,  313  N.C.  554,  562,  330  S.E.2d  190,  195  (1985).
“The sole factor determining the judge’s obligation to give such an
instruction  is  the  presence,  or  absence,  of  any  evidence  in  the
record which might convince a rational trier of fact to convict the
defendant of a less grievous offense.”    State v. Wright,  304 N.C.
349,  351,  283 S.E.2d  502,  503  (1981).
As stated supra, there was no evidence presented to support an
instruction of the lesser-included offense of common law robbery.
The trial court therefore did not err by not instructing the jury
on the lesser-included offense of common law robbery.




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Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly allowed
the  state  to  introduce  an  audiotape  of  the  telephone  call  by
Phillips and Short to  911 emergency services.      We disagree.
Defendant argues that the tape was not properly authenticated
and  therefore  should  not  have  been  admitted  into  evidence.
Defendant assigned error to the failure of the trial court to apply
the  foundational  standard  for  the  admission  of  tape  recorded
evidence as set out in State v. Lynch,  279 N.C.  1,  181 S.E.2d  561
(1971).
The seven-prong test established in Lynch has been superceded
by  North  Carolina  Rule  of  Evidence  901,  which  states  that  “[t]he
requirement  of  authentication  or  identification  as  a  condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. §  8C-1, Art.  9.   The Rule further states
that a voice may be identified “whether heard firsthand or through
mechanical  or  electronic  transmission  or  recording,  by  opinion
based  upon  hearing  the  voice  at  any  time  under  circumstances
connecting it with the alleged speaker.”   Id.   See State v. Stager,
329  N.C.                                                                    278,                  315-17,   406  S.E.2d   876,   897-98   (1991);  State  v.
Martinez,  149 N.C. App.  553,  559-60,  561 S.E.2d  528,  532  (2002).
In  State  v.  Rourke,  this  Court  concluded  that  where  two  of  the
parties to a 911 call identified their own voices and the voices of
two  additional  parties  to  the  call  on  an  audiotape,  there  was
sufficient evidence to authenticate the tape as a recording of the
911 call made during the incident in question.                               143 N.C. App.  672,




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676,  548 S.E.2d 188,  191  (2001).   Thus, we hold that the audiotape
presented in this case was properly authenticated by the testimony
of Phillips and Short, both of whom were able to identify their own
voice  and  the  voices  of  each  other  on  the  tape.    The  trial  court
therefore  did  not  err  in  overruling  defendant’s  objection  to  the
admission of the tape into evidence on grounds of authentication.
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly allowed
the  State  to  introduce  a  video  news  report  of  the  K-9  unit
recovering  a  gun  from  the  scene  where  defendant  was  apprehended.
The  evidence  presented  tends  to  show  that  a  television  news  crew
arrived  at  the  scene  after  the  suspect  was  apprehended  and  while
the K-9 unit search for the weapon was in progress.
Videotapes are admissible under North Carolina law for both
illustrative  and  substantive  purposes.    Campbell  v.  Pitt  County
Memorial Hosp.,  84 N.C. App.  314,  352 S.E.2d  902, aff’d,  321 N.C.
260,  362 S.E.2d  273  (1987), overruled on other grounds by Johnson
v. Ruark Obstetrics & Assoc.,  327 N.C.  283,  395 S.E.2d  85  (1990).
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that “[a]ny party may
introduce a... video tape... as substantive evidence upon laying a
proper   foundation   and   meeting   other   applicable   evidentiary
requirements.   This   section   does   not   prohibit   a   party   from
introducing a photograph or other pictorial representation solely
for the purpose of illustrating the testimony of a witness.”   N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  8-97.
In  the  present  case,  the  trial  transcript  reflects  that  the
State  offered  the  videotape  for  the  sole  purpose  of  illustrating




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the  testimony  of  the  K-9  officer.    Additionally,  the  trial  judge
properly instructed the jury that the “videotape was being received
into   evidence   for   the   limited   purpose   of   illustrating   the
witnesses’s testimony...”    Therefore, the trial court did not err
in admitting the videotape into evidence.
Defendant’s  final  argument  is  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
admitting  evidence  of  defendant’s  previous  conviction  without
properly authenticating the document.    We disagree.
The  evidence  admitted  was  a                                              ”Judgment  and  Commitment”  of
defendant’s  prior  conviction  for  conspiracy  to  sell  and  deliver
cocaine.     State’s  witness,  Detective  Brad  Overman                     (“Overman”)
testified  that  the  document  was  an  exact  copy  of  the  original
commitment order, that he observed the original document as it was
pulled  from  the  Sampson  County  records,  and  witnessed  the  copy
produced and certified by the Clerk of Court.
North  Carolina  Rule  of  Evidence                                          1005  states  that                “[t]he
contents of an official record... if otherwise admissible, may be
proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or
testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the
original.     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                              §8C-1,  Art.                      10.      The  Judgment  and
Committment constitutes a certified official record of defendant’s
prior conviction per the seal and signature of the Deputy Clerk of
Superior  Court.     The  trial  record  tends  to  show  that  Overman
testified that the Judgment and Commitment was correct.   Therefore,
we conclude that the document was properly authenticated.




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Defendant also argues that because the possession of a firearm
occurred more than five years after the previous felony conviction,
this  Court’s  ruling  in  State  v.  Alston  precludes  a  conviction  on
this charge.                                                                 131 N.C. App.  514,  518,  508 S.E.2d  315,  318  (1998).
We disagree.   Alston is superceded by the current language of N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  14-415.1 which contains no time bar for this charge.
We therefore overrule defendant’s final assignment of error.
For the reasons contained herein, we hold that the trial court
did not err.
No error.
Judges Hunter and Elmore concur.

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