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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA02-626
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  31 December  2002
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Mecklenburg County
                                                                                                No.  00 CRS  030098
DAVID VINCENT GARRETTE
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  dated  10  October  2001  by
Judge  Timothy  S.  Kincaid  in  Mecklenburg  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  30 December  2002.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Bertha L. Fields, for the State.
Gilda C. Rodriguez for defendant appellant.
GREENE, Judge.
David  Vincent  Garrette  (Defendant)  appeals  from  a  “Judgment
and Commitment upon Revocation of Probation” dated 10 October 2001.
Defendant  pled  guilty  to  common  law  robbery,  and  the  trial
court   suspended   his   active   term   of   ten-to-twelve   months
imprisonment.    As a result, the trial court also placed Defendant
on supervised probation for thirty-six months, with the first six
months  of  his  probationary  period  to  be  spent  in  an  intensive
supervision  program.    On  or  about  10  September  2001,  Defendant’s
probation  officer,  Carl  R.  Sparks                                                           (Sparks),  filed  a  violation




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report,  alleging  Defendant  had  violated  the  following  terms  and
conditions of probation:                                                      (1) Defendant tested positive for cocaine
on  13 March,  24 April, and  28 May  2001 and admitted to cocaine use
on  10  June  2001,  in  violation  of  special  condition  of  probation
#13;                                                                          (2)  Defendant  failed  to  report  to  Sparks  on   20  March,   17
April,  19 June, 10 July,  24 July, and 21 August  2001, in violation
of regular condition of probation #6; (3) Defendant violated curfew
on  11 March,  19 March,  14 June, 5 July,  12 July,  16 July,  26 July,
8 August, and 13 September 2001, in violation of special condition
of probation #3(h); and (4) Defendant was $585.00 in arrears on his
monetary  obligation  to  the  trial  court,  in  violation  of  the
monetary condition of probation.
This  matter  was  heard  in  the  superior  court  on                        10  October
2001.   Defendant admitted to testing positive to cocaine as alleged
in  the  probation  violation  report.    Defendant  also  admitted  he
failed  to  report  to  Sparks  but  denied  his  failure  was  willful.
Defendant denied the allegations of the report as to his failure to
abide  by  curfew  as  to  the  11  March,  19  March,  and  14  June  2001
violations and moved to dismiss the remaining curfew violations as
being  beyond  the  scope  of  his  intensive  probation.                     Finally,
Defendant admitted to being in arrears on his monetary obligation
but denied willfulness.
At the outset, the trial court allowed Defendant’s motion to
dismiss  the  allegations  in  the  violation  report  with  regard  to
violations  of  the  terms  of  intensive  probation  that  would  have
occurred after the six-month probationary period expired.    Sparks




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testified  he  met  with  Defendant  on  or  about                            2  January   2001,  at
which time he explained the terms and conditions of his probation.
Sparks told Defendant he was to report to his office every Tuesday
from                                                                          12:30  to    2:00  p.m.    Defendant  subsequently  missed  several
scheduled appointments and failed to contact Sparks’ office prior
to  the  missed  appointments.    Sparks  testified  Defendant  had  told
him  he  missed  his                                                          17  April    2001  scheduled  meeting  because  he
overslept.    Defendant’s stated reason for missing his  19 June and
24 July  2001 appointments was he was at the hospital.   Sparks also
testified  that  Defendant  told  him  on  11  July  2001,  he  had  missed
his 10 July 2001 appointment because he had been robbed.   Finally,
Sparks testified though Defendant paid  $150.00 during the time he
was on probation, he was still some  $585.00 in arrears.
At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court allowed
Defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  those  allegations  in  the  probation
violation  report  as  to  Defendant’s  violation  of  curfew  set  by
Sparks  due  to  the  State’s  failure  to  proffer  any  evidence  in
support thereof.   Defendant then presented evidence which tended to
show he did indeed fail to meet with Sparks on several occasions.
Defendant, however, testified he missed the appointment because he
either  overslept  or  was  at  the  veteran’s  hospital.     Defendant
explained he was disabled and taking prescription medication which
caused drowsiness and lack of coordination.   In addition, Defendant
explained he missed another appointment after being beaten during
a robbery that occurred just days before the scheduled appointment.
With regard to his monetary obligations, Defendant testified he was




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unable  to  make  all  of  his  payments  because  of  personal  living
expenses, and college and personal loans.
At  the  close  of  all  of  the  evidence,  the  trial  court  found
Defendant  had  willfully  violated  the  terms  and  conditions  of
probation as listed in the remaining allegations of the September
2001  probation  violation  report.    As  a  result,  the  trial  court
revoked Defendant’s probation and activated his suspended sentence.
The  sole  issue  before  this  Court  is  whether  there  was
sufficient  evidence  to  show  Defendant  had  violated  a  valid
condition of his probation, and that the violation was willful and
without lawful excuse.
After a thorough review of the record, we determine there was
plenary  evidence  before  the  trial  court  to  support  the  trial
court’s findings in this regard.   While the minimum requirements of
due  process  require  the  State  to  present  evidence  to  show  the
willful violation of probation, such a requirement may be waived by
a defendant’s “in-court admission of the willful or without lawful
excuse violation as contained in the written notice (or report) of
violation.”   State v. Williamson, 61 N.C. App. 531, 533, 301 S.E.2d
423,  425  (1983).    It  is  well  settled  that  “[a]ny  violation  of  a
valid   condition   of   probation   is   sufficient   to   revoke            [a]
defendant’s probation.”   State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521, 353
S.E.2d  250,  253  (1987).
In  this  case,  Defendant  admitted  unequivocally  to  testing
positive for cocaine use.   Significantly, Defendant did not present




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any evidence this violation of probation was not willful or without
lawful  excuse.     While  Defendant  rests  his  argument  upon  the
sufficiency of the evidence as to violating other conditions of his
probation,   Defendant’s   admission,   without   lawful   excuse,   he
violated  the  condition  of  probation  requiring  him  to  not  use  or
possess illegal drugs was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s  revocation  of  his  probation.     In  addition,  there  was
sufficient evidence Defendant willfully failed to attend scheduled
appointments  with  his  probation  officer  and  to  meet  his  monetary
conditions  of  probation.    Although  Defendant  presented  numerous
excuses for his failure to comply with those terms and conditions
of  probation,  the  trial  court  was  not  required  to  accept  his
evidence as true.    Williamson,  61 N.C. App. at  535,  301 S.E.2d at
426.    Hence,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  revoking  Defendant’s
probation and activating his suspended sentence.
The judgment of the trial court therefore is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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