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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA08-1365
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  15 September  2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Brunswick County
                                                                                                No.  06 CRS  50026
GREGORY S. GROSHOLZ
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 29 February 2008 by
Judge Thomas H. Lock in Brunswick County Superior Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  6 May  2009.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Joan M. Cunningham, for the State.
Russell J. Hollers, III, for Defendant.
BEASLEY, Judge.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered on his conviction of
first-degree murder.    We find no error.
In 2005 Defendant and Lenka Grosholz (Lenka) were married and
living  in  the  Rose  Hill  area  of  Duplin  County,  North  Carolina.
Defendant received disability assistance, and Lenka worked at Dell
Laboratories,  in  Rocky  Point,  North  Carolina.    In  December  2005,
Lenka  moved  out  of  the  marital  home  and  rented  an  apartment  in
Leland, North Carolina.   On  29 December 2005 Lenka was killed by a




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fatal  stab  wound  to  her  chest.    On  1  January  2006  Defendant  was
arrested and charged with first-degree murder of Lenka.
On                                                                            30  November                                                    2005  around   5:00  a.m.,  Trooper  Rich   (then
Deputy Rich) responded to a domestic violence call from Defendant’s
house.     Defendant  told  Rich  that  Lenka  had  assaulted  him,  and
showed the officer faint facial scratches.   Lenka seemed afraid to
speak  with  him,  so  Rich  interviewed  the  two  separately.    When  he
spoke with Lenka, she informed him that she came home from work and
Defendant accused her of an extramarital relationship.   They fought
and Defendant held her down on the floor.    Lenka had red marks on
her   arms,   chest   area,   and   shoulders,   consistent   with   her
description of being held down.   After speaking with both Defendant
and  Lenka,  Rich  arrested  Defendant  for  assault  on  a  female.
Shortly  after  the  altercation,  Lenka  moved  into  an  apartment  in
Leland, North Carolina, and obtained a domestic violence protective
order    against Defendant.
Two  Dell  employees  testified  that  Lenka  told  them  that  the
Defendant  had  been  physically  abusive,  that  she  had  a  domestic
violence protective order against Defendant, and that even with the
protective  order,  she  was  afraid  of  Defendant.    In  late  November
2005  Lenka  applied  for  a  concealed  handgun  permit.    However,  she
was killed before receiving the concealed weapon permit.
Two  other  Dell  employees  testified  for  the  State.     James
Schupp, Dell’s director of human resources, testified that in late
November                                                                      2005  he  received  a  phone  call  from  a  man  identifying
himself as Gregory Grosholz.    The caller said that Lenka had lied




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on  her  resume  and  had  stolen  from  the  company.    In  December  2005
Schupp  received  two  letters  following  up  on  these  accusations.
Schupp testified that Lenka had passed a background check and that
he did not agree with Defendant’s characterization of her resume as
false.     Lenka  was  killed  before  the  company  could  pursue  an
investigation  into  whether  she  had  stolen  items  from  Dell.
Kristina Guthrie, a Dell human resources employee who processed the
employees’ life insurance policies, testified that Lenka had three
life insurance policies through the company.    On  13 December  2005
she removed Defendant as the beneficiary of the three policies and
replaced him with her mother.   She told Guthrie that she was doing
this because they were divorcing and because she was frightened for
her safety.
Several  witnesses  testified  that  Defendant  talked  about
killing Lenka.   Defendant had said that if he could not have Lenka,
then  nobody  else  could.     On  another  occasion,  shortly  after
Christmas day, Defendant came to Mark Davis’ house and asked Davis
to  loan  him  $5000  so  that  he  could  hire  a  gunman  to  kill  Lenka.
Davis refused to take part in the plan.   Davis also testified that,
when  he  came  to  borrow  money,  Defendant  seemed  vengeful,  rather
than crying or emotional.
Alfred Amoroso testified that he lived in Baltimore, Maryland,
and that he was Defendant’s half-brother.   Defendant called Amoroso
between  12:00 and  1:00 p.m. on December  28 or  29,  2005, and asked
if Amoroso knew anyone who Defendant could hire for  $5000 to kill
Lenka.    Amoroso  told  Defendant  that  he  did  not  know  anyone  like




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that and told Defendant to call back later.   Defendant called again
between  3:00  and  4:00  p.m.  the  same  day.    This  time  he  asked  if
Amoroso  would  be  willing  to  leave  his  phone  off  the  hook  for  an
hour.    Amoroso  testified  that,  in  the  context  of  their  earlier
conversation, Defendant appeared to be “looking for an alibi for an
hour.”
Defendant did not present any evidence.    On  29 February  2008
the jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder.   The court
sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole.   Defendant
appeals from this conviction and judgment.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in failing
to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  lesser  included  offense  of  second-
degree murder.    We disagree.
Defendant argues on appeal that, during the charge conference,
defense counsel “argued that the evidence supported the submission
of second degree murder[.]”   Our review of the transcript suggests
otherwise.    At  the  beginning  of  the  charge  conference,  the  State
requested that the court submit two possible verdicts to the jury,
first-degree  murder  or  not  guilty.    Defense  counsel  responded  by
informing  the  trial  court  that                                             “upon  the  instruction  of  the
Defendant, he agrees with the [S]tate.   First degree murder or not
guilty.”
The  trial  court  explained  to  defense  counsel  that  it  was
“required   to   submit   second   degree,   regardless   of   counsel’s
feelings”  if  the  evidence  warranted  it,  and  asked  Defendant’s




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attorney to present his “analyses, not just what your client wants
you to do.”   Defense counsel opined that “the law would provide for
an  instruction”  on  second-degree  murder  on  the  basis  that  his
previous motion for dismissal of the charge against Defendant had
“encompassed  within  it”  a  challenge  to  the  State’s  evidence  of
premeditation  and  deliberation.    Defense  counsel  also  noted  that
the  instruction  on  second-degree  murder  “almost  always  is  given”
and that counsel  “believe[d] that the law dictates that the court
shall  give  a  second  degree  murder  instruction  in  a  first  degree
murder case.”   However, defense counsel did not identify any trial
evidence that might support such an instruction.
In  response  to  defense  counsel’s  remarks,  the  trial  court
clarified that:
The  court  should  submit  second  degree  murder
only  if  the  evidence  tends  to  show  a  lack  of
premeditation and deliberation or would permit
a jury to rationally find the Defendant guilty
of the lesser offense of second degree murder,
acquitting  him  of  first.     Now,  as  you’ve
analyzed the evidence, sir, what do you say as
to  the  submission  of  second  degree  murder,
under the evidence of this case?
Defense counsel then stated that:
.  I  don’t  know  that  the  evidence  does
warrant   the   submission   of   second   degree.
There’s  has  been                                                          [sic]  voluminous  evidence
presented as to solicitation for the crime of
murder.   Well, I mean, in light of Strickland,
let me have a moment to rethink that.
While defense counsel was “rethinking” the issue, the State argued
that there was no evidence to warrant submission of second-degree
murder  as  a  possible  verdict.     The  trial  court  then  asked  the
Defendant  if  he  had                                                      “anything  else”  to  say  and  defense  counsel




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replied “No, Your Honor.”   We conclude that defense counsel did not
request  the  trial  court  to  instruct  on  second-  degree  murder  and
did not argue to the court that any particular evidence warranted
submission of second-degree murder.
A  trial  court  is  required  to  instruct  on  a
lesser  included  offense  only  when  there  is
evidence  to  support  a  verdict  finding  the
defendant guilty of the lesser offense.                                       “The
sole factor determining the judge’s obligation
to  give  such  an  instruction  is  the  presence,
or  absence,  of  any  evidence  in  the  record
which might convince a rational trier of fact
to  convict  the  defendant  of  a  less  grievous
offense.”
State  v.  Gibbs,                                                             335  N.C.                                                   1,   52-53,   436  S.E.2d   321,   350   (1993)
(quoting State v. Peacock,  313 N.C.  554,  558,  330 S.E.2d  190,  193
(1985)  and  citing  State  v.  Tucker,  329  N.C.  709,  721,  407  S.E.2d
805,  812  (1991))  (internal quotation omitted).
At the end of the charge conference, the trial court asked for
additions or corrections, and Defendant had none.
In  sum,  the  Defendant  neither  requested  an  instruction  on
second-degree murder, nor objected to the court’s omission of this
instruction.                                                                  “[W]e  note  that  defendant  did  not  request  such  an
instruction at trial and therefore is entitled to review only for
plain error.   N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).”   State v. Thomas, 350 N.C.
315,  348,  514 S.E.2d  486,  506  (1999)  (citations omitted).
“Although  in  his  assignment  of  error  he                                 ‘specifically  and
distinctly  contended’  pursuant  to  Rule  10(c)(4)  of  the  Rules  of
Appellate  Procedure  that  the  error  amounted  to  plain  error,
defendant  failed  to  argue  in  his  brief  that  the  trial  court’s
instruction  amounted  to  plain  error.    See  N.C.  R.  App.  P.  28(a),




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(b)(5).   Accordingly, defendant has waived appellate review of this
assignment of error.”    State v. Nobles,  350 N.C.  483,  514-15,  515
S.E.2d  885,  904  (1999)  (citing  See  State  v.  King,  342  N.C.  357,
364,  464 S.E.2d  288,  293  (1995)).
Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to instruct the jury on
a  lesser  included  offense                                                 “a  defendant  may  not  decline  an
opportunity for instructions on a lesser included offense and then
claim  on  appeal  that  failure  to  instruct  on  the  lesser  included
offense  was  error.”  State  v.  Gay,  334  N.C.  467,  489,  434  S.E.2d
840,  852  (1993).  “A Defendant is not prejudiced by the granting of
relief  which  he  has  sought  or  by  error  resulting  from  his  own
conduct.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1443(c)(2007).
In  State  v.  Sierra,  335  N.C.  753,  760,  440  S.E.2d  791,  795
(1994), the defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and
argued   on   appeal   that   the   evidence   of   premeditation   and
deliberation  was  equivocal  and  that  the  jury  should  have  been
instructed on the charge of murder in the second-degree.   Id.   The
Court held:
“A defendant is not prejudiced  .  .  . by error
resulting  from  his  own  conduct.”    N.C.G.S.  §
15A-1443(c)                                                                  [(2007)].                              Here,    defendant
foreclosed any inclination of the trial court
to instruct on the lesser-included offense of
second-degree   murder.                                                      The   trial   court
specifically asked defendant if he desired an
instruction   on   a   lesser-included   offense.
Defendant  stated  a  total  of  three  times  that
he  did  not  want  such  an  instruction[.]  .  .  .
We conclude that defendant is not entitled to
any  relief  and  will  not  be  heard  to  complain
on appeal.
Id.




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We  conclude  that  Defendant  waived  appellate  review  of  this
issue  by  failing  to  object  at  trial,  and  failing  to  argue  plain
error on appeal.   Moreover, out of an abundance of caution we have
reviewed the evidence and conclude that Defendant was not entitled
to  an  instruction  on  second-degree  murder.    This  assignment  of
error is overruled.
The State offered testimony from several of Lenka’s co-workers
at Dell Laboratories.   In addition to their testimony about events
surrounding   Lenka’s   murder,   these   witnesses   also   testified
generally that Lenka was a good worker and a kind person, and that
she  was  a  good  supervisor  who  had  good  relations  with  her  fellow
employees.     Defendant  did  not  object  to  any  of  this  evidence.
However, he argues on appeal that the trial court committed plain
error by allowing this evidence of Lenka’s performance at work and
her relationship to co-workers.    We disagree.
Because Defendant did not object at trial, we review only for
plain error.   State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378
(1983).
In the present case, the State presented overwhelming evidence
of  Defendant’s  commission  of  premeditated  and  deliberate  first-
degree murder, including the following:
Donnie  Long’s  testimony  that,  shortly  before
Lenka  was  murdered,  he  was  at  Defendant’s
house  and  heard  Defendant  discussing  killing
her,  or  paying  someone  else                                               $5000  to  shoot
her;




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Long’s testimony that Defendant told him that
he had been following Lenka and knew where she
lived;
Mark  Davis’s  testimony  about  the  incident  at
Defendant’s  house  and  about  another  occasion
when Defendant had tried to borrow  $5000 from
Davis in order to hire someone to kill Lenka;
Alfred Amoroso’s testimony that Defendant had
called him on either the day of the murder or
the   day   before,   asking   Amoroso   for   help
finding a hired killer to murder Lenka;
Amoroso’s testimony that, after he refused to
help  Defendant  hire  a  gunman  to  kill  Lenka,
Defendant  called  back  and  asked  Amoroso  to
leave his phone off the hook for an hour;
Officer Rich’s testimony that he had responded
to  a  domestic  violence  call  at  Defendant’s
house and, after speaking privately with both
Defendant  and  Lenka,  had  decided  to  arrest
Defendant for assault on a female;
Schupp’s testimony that, after Lenka moved out
of  the  marital  home,  Defendant  tried  to  have
her fired from her job;
Guthrie’s  testimony  that,  two  weeks  before
Lenka’s death, Lenka had removed Defendant as
the   beneficiary   of   her   life   insurance
policies,  in  part  because  she  was  afraid  for
her safety;
Deputy  Ward’s  testimony  that,  shortly  before
her  death,  Lenka  had  applied  for  a  concealed
weapon permit;
Ainsley Drayton’s testimony that at around the
time of Lenka’s murder, she heard noises from
Lenka’s  apartment  and  observed  someone  open
and close the apartment door quickly;
Officer Hall’s testimony that Lenka was found
lying  on  the  hall  floor  of  her  apartment  and
that her keys and wallet had not been stolen;
SBI   Agent   Clifton’s   testimony   about   the
condition  of  Lenka’s  apartment  after  she  was
killed;




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Dr. Kelly’s testimony that Lenka was killed by
a fatal stab wound from a large sharp object;
Detective   Foss’s   testimony   that,   when   he
interviewed  Defendant  the  night  after  Lenka
was murdered, Defendant had a band-aid on his
left hand and held a towel over gouges on his
left cheek, and;
SBI    Forensic    Biologist    Sharon    Hinton’s
testimony  that  DNA  analysis  revealed  that
Lenka  had  Defendant’s  DNA  under  her  right
fingernails  and  that  Defendant’s  DNA  matched
that  of  blood  found  on  a  paper  tissue  at  the
apartment shortly after Lenka was killed.
To summarize, the evidence showed that Defendant had threatened or
assaulted Lenka in November and December  2005; that Defendant was
planning to kill Lenka for several weeks before her death; that he
solicited others to help him murder her; that his DNA was found on
Lenka’s  right  hand,  and  Defendant  had  gouges  on  his  left  cheek,
and;  that  Defendant’s  DNA  was  found  on  a  piece  of  paper  at  the
scene of the murder.
The challenged evidence consists of generalized testimony from
Lenka’s co-workers attesting to her congeniality and competence in
the workplace.   Defendant has failed to show that this affected the
outcome  of  the  trial,  given  the  quantity  and  quality  of  evidence
against  the  Defendant.    We  conclude  that  even  assuming,  arguendo
that the admission of this evidence was error, it does not rise to
the level of plain error.    This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant’s  next  argument  is  that  the  trial  court  “erred  in
allowing State’s witnesses to testify about what  [Lenka] had told




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them and that  [Defendant] was a controlling, threatening, violent
man.”    We disagree.
Defendant  argues  on  appeal  that  the  trial  court  erred  by
admitting the following evidence:
Josephine  Rivenbark’s  testimony  that  Lenka
said  Defendant  was  controlling  and                                      “played
mind  games”;  that  he  carried  a  gun  in  his
truck; that Lenka had taken out a restraining
order  against  Defendant;  and  that  Defendant
had threatened to kill Lenka.
Joseph Heller’s testimony that Lenka told him
she had taken out a restraining order against
Defendant  and  that  there  had  been  occasions
when Defendant hit her and she fought back.
Deputy   Rich’s   testimony   that,   when   he
responded to Defendant’s domestic violence 911
call,  Lenka  told  him  that  she  and  Defendant
had  argued  about  Lenka’s  boyfriend  and  that
Defendant had held her down on the floor.
Former Deputy Ward’s testimony that Lenka had
applied for a concealed weapon permit and had
said  “she was going through a bad divorce.”
Amoroso’s testimony that he was uncomfortable
when  Defendant  and  Lenka  argued  in  front  of
his  family,  and  that  Defendant  was  in  charge
of  his  household  and  was                                                “very  stern”  about
it.
On appeal, Defendant generally asserts error in the admission
of  these  statements,  and  makes  broad-brush  arguments  that  the
challenged testimony is inadmissible, either as hearsay, character
evidence, or evidence of prior bad acts.    However, Defendant does
not  associate  any  specific  statement  or  testimony  with  any  given
argument.    For  example,  he  asserts  that  the  court                   “allowed  the
state to elicit evidence that the defendant had committed violent
acts for which he was not on trial” in violation of North Carolina




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Rules of Evidence 404(b), but does not identify specific testimony
to  which  this  analysis  applies.     Defendant’s                          “non-specific  and
general argument amounts to no more than a request for this court
to wade through the record to determine if the assignment of error
has merit.”    State v. Marshall,  92 N.C. App.  398,  411,  374 S.E.2d
874,  881  (1988)  (citations omitted).
Moreover, Defendant failed to raise these arguments at trial.
Appellate  courts  ordinarily  do  not  review
matters  which  were  not  first  considered  and
ruled  on  by  the  trial  court.                                            “The  law  does
not require trial judges to be clairvoyant and
omniscient.    Neither  does  it  permit  defense
counsel to play hide and seek with objections.
The trial court, upon inquiry, is entitled to
know  the  ground  upon  which  an  objection  is
interposed;   and   if   counsel   specifies   one
ground, he cannot be heard to urge a different
ground on appeal.”
Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 17 n.2, 361 S.E.2d 734, 744 n.2 (1987)
(quoting State v. Cumber,  280 N.C.  127,  131,  185 S.E.  2d  141,  144
(1971)).
Nonetheless, we have assessed the admission of the challenged
testimony and conclude that the trial court committed neither error
nor plain error.   Further, as discussed above, the state presented
voluminous evidence of Defendant’s guilt.   Even assuming, arguendo,
error  in  the  admission  of  the  challenged  testimony,  we  conclude
that  such  error  would  be  harmless.    This  assignment  of  error  is
overruled.
Finally,  Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
denying  Defendant’s  motions  to  dismiss  the  short-form  murder




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indictment.   Defendant’s argument has been rejected by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina.   See State v. Braxton,  352 N.C.  158,  174,
531  S.E.2d  428,  437  (2000)  (“[T]his  Court  has  consistently  held
that  indictments  for  murder  based  on  the  short-form  indictment
statute are in compliance with both the North Carolina and United
States Constitutions.”).                                                   “This Court is bound by precedent of the
North Carolina Supreme Court.”   State v. Gillis,  158 N.C. App. 48,
53,  580 S.E.2d  32,  36  (2003)  (citation omitted).    This assignment
of error is overruled.
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  conclude  that  Defendant  had  a
fair trial, free of reversible error.
No error.
Judges MCGEE and HUNTER, Robert C. concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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