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NO. COA12-922
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                 2 April  2013
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                     Gaston County
                                                                       No.  08 CRS  4847
JOEY HADDEN,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered                            13  March                                 2012  by
Judge  H.  William  Constangy  in  Gaston  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  29 January  2013.
Roy   Cooper,   Attorney   General,   by   Peter   A.   Regulski,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Ryan McKaig for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Defendant  Joey  Hadden                                                (“defendant”)  appeals  from  an  order
requiring  him  to  enroll  in  satellite-based  monitoring            (“SBM”).
After  careful  review,  we  vacate  the  trial  court’s  order  and
remand the matter for reconsideration.
Factual Background
On                                                                     13   November                             2006,   defendant   pled   guilty   to   taking
                                                                       indecent  liberties  with  a  child.      The  trial  court  entered
judgment  on  defendant’s  guilty  plea  and  sentenced  him  to  a




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presumptive  range  term  of                                                  13  to        16  months  imprisonment.     The
court   then   suspended   the   sentence   and   placed   defendant   on
supervised probation for a period of  60 months.
On                                                                            28  October   2008,  defendant  was  brought  back  into  court
for  a  determination  as  to  whether  he  should  be  required  to
enroll  in  SBM.     The  trial  court,  finding  that  defendant  had
committed  an  offense  involving  the  physical,  mental,  or  sexual
abuse  of  a  minor  and  that  he  required  the  highest  possible  level
of  supervision,  ordered  defendant  to  submit  to  monitoring  for  a
period  of  five  years.    However,  by  consent  order  entered  5  March
2009,  the  trial  court  subsequently  vacated  the                          28  October   2008
order  and  terminated  defendant’s  monitoring  pending  a  new  SBM
hearing.
On                                                                            7  October    2009,  defendant’s  probation  officer  filed  a
report  alleging  that  defendant  had  violated  the  terms  of  his
probation  by  failing  to  complete  court-ordered  sex  offender
treatment  and  by  possessing  adult  pornography  and  children’s
toys.    After  conducting  a  hearing  on  the  alleged  violations,  the
trial  court  revoked  defendant’s  probation  and  activated  his
sentence.
                                                                                            Defendant’s  SBM  hearing,  which  had  been  continued  by  virtue
of  the                                                                       5  March      2009  order,  was  reconvened  on                                     29  February   2012.




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The  trial  court,  after  hearing  the  evidence  and  arguments  of
counsel,  entered  a  form  order  (“First  Order”),  in  which  it  found
that   defendant                                                              “does   not   fall   into   any   of   the   categories
requiring   satellite-based   monitoring   under   G.S.                       14-208.40.”
Nevertheless,  the  trial  court  ordered  defendant  to                      “enroll  in
satellite-based  monitoring  under  Article                                   27A  of  Chapter                                          14  of
the  General  Statutes  for  .  .  .  30  years.”    The  First  Order  was
signed  and  dated  by  the  trial  court  on  29  February  2012  and  was
file stamped by the clerk of court on  13 March  2012.
The  trial  court  also  signed  a  second  form  order  dated                29
February                                                                      2012                                                                  (“Second  Order”),  finding  that                                                                                                                                                                                        (1)  defendant  had
                                                                                                                                                                                        been  convicted  of  an  offense  involving  the  physical,  mental,  or
sexual  abuse  of  a  minor;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               (2)  the  offense  was  not  an  aggravated
                                                                              offense  or  a  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           §   14-27.2A  or  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                   §                                                         14-27.4A;                                                                                                                                                                          (3)  defendant  was  not  a  recidivist  or
predator;   and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    (4)   defendant,   based   on   the   Department   of
Correction’s   risk   assessment,   required   the   highest   possible
level  of  supervision  and  monitoring.    Based  on  these  findings,
the  court  ordered  defendant  to  enroll  in  SBM  for  a  period  of  30
years.    The  Second  Order,  while  signed  and  dated  by  the  trial
court,  bears  no  indication  that  it  was  ever  filed  with  the  clerk
of court.




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Defendant  gave  notice  of  appeal  to  this  Court.    The  State
subsequently   filed   a   motion   to   dismiss   defendant’s   appeal,
arguing  that  this  Court  lacked  jurisdiction  to  consider  the
appeal  due  to  defects  in  the  notice  of  appeal.     In  response,
defendant  filed  a  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari,  requesting
review  of  the  trial  court’s  First  Order.    We  denied  the  State’s
motion  by  order  entered  7  November  2012  and  now  deny  defendant’s
petition as moot.
Analysis
Defendant’s  principal  argument  on  appeal  is  that  the  trial
court  failed  to  make  sufficient  findings  supporting  a  conclusion
that  he  should  be  required  to  enroll  in  SBM.    While  we  note  that
the  State  concedes  error  by  the  trial  court  on  this  issue,  this
Court  is  not  bound  by  such  a  concession.    Accordingly,  we  must
review  the  record  to  determine  whether  the  trial  court  did,  in
fact, commit error.
On  appeal  from  an  SBM  order,  this  Court                                  “’review[s]  the
trial  court's  findings  of  fact  to  determine  whether  they  are
supported  by  competent  record  evidence,  and  we  review  the  trial
court's  conclusions  of  law  for  legal  accuracy  and  to  ensure  that
those  conclusions  reflect  a  correct  application  of  law  to  the
facts  found.’”     State  v.  Kilby,                                           198  N.C.  App.    363,   367,   679




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S.E.2d                                                                        430,                                                                432                                                                      (2009)                                   (quoting  State  v.  Garcia,   358  N.C.                382,
391,                                                                          597  S.E.2d                                                                                                                                  724,                               733   (2004),  cert.  denied,        543  U.S.                1156,
161 L.Ed.2d  122  (2005)).
As  an  initial  matter,  we  note  that  the  trial  court’s  Second
Order  is  not  before  this  Court  for  consideration  as  that  order
was  never  entered  and,  as  such,  is  a  nullity.     See  State  v.
Gary,  132  N.C.  App.  40,  42,  510  S.E.2d  387,  388  (“’Entry’  of  an
order  occurs  when  it  is  reduced  to  writing,  signed  by  the  trial
court,  and  filed  with  the  clerk  of  court.”),  cert.  denied,           350
N.C.                                                                          312,                                                                535  S.E.2d                                                              35                                       (1999);  West  v.  Marko,      130  N.C.  App.
751,                                                                          755,                                                                504   S.E.2d                                                             571,                               573   (1998)                         (“A  judgment  is  not
enforceable   between   the   parties   until   it   is   entered.”).
Accordingly,  our  analysis  relates  solely  to  the  trial  court’s
First Order.
Here,  the  trial  court  used  a  form  order                                (AOC-CR-616,  Rev.
12/09)  provided  by  North  Carolina’s  Administrative  Office  of  the
Courts,  labeled                                                              “Judicial  Findings  and  Order  as  to  Satellite-
Based  Monitoring  When  There  Has  Been  No  Prior  Determination.”
The                                                                           “Findings”  section  of  the  form  order  contains  a  box  that
sets  out  two  alternative  findings:                                                                                                                                                                                     (a)  that  the  defendant  falls
                                                                                                                                                  within  at  least  one  of  the  enumerated  categories  of  offenders
                                                                              requiring  SBM  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                 §     14-208.40;  or                 (b)




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that  the  defendant                                                          “does  not  fall  into  any  of  the  categories
requiring   satellite-based   monitoring   under   G.S.                       14-208.40.”
(Emphasis added.)
The                                                                           “Order”  section  of  the  form  then  directs  the  trial
court  -  if  it has  found  that  the defendant  does fall  into  one  of
the  statutorily  designated  categories  of  offenders  requiring
monitoring  -  to  check  the  box  indicating  that  it  is  ordering  the
defendant  to  “enroll  in  satellite-based  monitoring  under  Article
27A  of  Chapter                                                              14  of  the  General  Statutes”  for  either                       “the
remainder  of  the  defendant’s  natural  life”  or  for  a  specified
period  of  time.    Conversely,  if  the  trial  court  finds  that  the
defendant  does  not  fall  within  one  of  the  categories  requiring
monitoring,  the  form  directs  the  court  to  check  the  box  ordering
that                                                                          “[t]he  defendant  is  not  required  to  enroll  in  satellite-
based  monitoring  under  Article  27A  of  Chapter  14  of  the  General
Statutes.”                                                                    (Emphasis added.)
Here,  the  trial  court,  in  the  Findings  section  of  the  form
order,  determined  that  defendant  “does  not  fall  into  any  of  the
categories  requiring  satellite-based  monitoring  under  G.S.               14-
208.40.”    The  court  nonetheless  ordered  defendant  to  enroll  in
the  SBM  program  for                                                        30  years,  presumably  based  on  its  finding,
written  in  by  hand  on  the  order,  that  defendant’s  “probation  was




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revoked   and   he   has   failed   to   complete   his                      [sex   offender]
treatment.”
The   transcript   from   the                                                29   February      2012   SBM   hearing
suggests  that  the  trial  court  believed  that,  in  determining
whether  an  offender  qualifies  for  enrollment  in  the  SBM  program,
it   possessed   the   discretion   to   consider   other   factors   in
addition  to  those  expressly  set  out  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.              §                  14-
208.40,  and,  in  turn,  listed  on  the  form  order.    Based  on  this
interpretation  of  the  SBM  statutes,  the  court  stated  from  the
bench   that   defendant’s   probation   revocation   and   failure   to
complete  his  sex  offender  treatment  constituted                         “other  factors”
sufficient  to  warrant  an  order  requiring  defendant  to  enroll  in
SBM:
The  Court  will  find  that  the  defendant
does  not  fall  into  any  of  the  categories
requiring   satellite   monitoring.                                          However,
the  Court  will  find  that  the  defendant’s
probation  was  revoked  and  that  he  has  failed
to  complete  his  treatment.     In  the  Court’s
discretion,  the  Court  will  order  that  the
defendant  shall  be  enrolled  in  satellite-
based monitoring for  30 years.
We  believe  that  the  trial  court  misconstrued  the  statutory
scheme    established    by    our    General    Assembly    regarding
qualification   for   enrollment   in   the   SBM   program.                                    The
proceedings  in  this  case  are  governed  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.            §                  14-




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208.40B  due  to  the  fact  that  an  SBM  determination  was  not  made
when  defendant  was  initially  sentenced.    Kilby,  198  N.C.  App.  at
367,                                                                         679  S.E.2d  at                                       432-33.     As  this  Court  has  explained,  SBM
                                                                             proceedings  generally  involve  two  phases:     a   “qualification”
phase,  followed  by  a                                                                                                            “risk  assessment”  phase.     Id.  at              367-68,
679  S.E.2d  at                                                              433.                                                  This  case  concerns  only  the  qualification
stage.
In  the  qualification  phase,  where  -  as  here  -  the  defendant
was  convicted  of  a  reportable  offense  as  defined  by  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  14-208.6(4), then
the  district  attorney  shall  present  to  the
court  any  evidence  that  (i)  the  offender  has
been   classified   as   a   sexually   violent
predator  pursuant  to  G.S.                                                 14-208.20,                                            (ii)
the   offender   is   a   recidivist,                                        (iii)   the
conviction    offense    was    an    aggravated
offense,                                                                     (iv)  the  conviction  offense  was  a
violation  of  G.S.  14-27.2A  or  G.S.  14-27.4A,
or                                                                           (v)  the  offense  involved  the  physical,
mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                  §                                                   14-208.40A(a)   (2011).    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §
                                                                             14-208.40B(c)  (2011).
Upon   receipt   of   the   evidence   from   the   State   and   any
contrary  evidence  from  the  offender,  the  trial  court  is  then
required  to  determine                                                      “whether  the  offender's  conviction  places
the offender” in one of the five categories and to




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make    a    finding    of    fact    of    that
determination,   specifying   whether                                        (i)   the
offender  has  been  classified  as  a  sexually
violent  predator  pursuant  to  G.S.  14-208.20,
(ii)  the  offender  is  a  recidivist,  (iii)  the
conviction    offense    was    an    aggravated
offense,                                                                     (iv)  the  conviction  offense  was  a
violation  of  G.S.  14-27.2A  or  G.S.  14-27.4A,
or                                                                           (v)  the  offense  involved  the  physical,
mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                                                14-208.40A(a).     See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §             14-
208.40B(c).
These   statutory   provisions   establish   that,   during   the
qualification  phase:                                                        (1)  the  evidence  must  relate  to  whether
the  defendant  falls  within  one  of  the  five  specified  categories
of  offenders  the  program  was  designed  to  monitor;  (2)  the  trial
court  must  determine  whether  the  defendant  falls  within  one  of
these  categories;  and                                                      (3)   the   trial   court,  if   it  does   so
determine,   is   required   to   specify   into   which   category   the
defendant  falls.    State  v.  Causby,                                      200  N.C.  App.                                  113,                                        115,          683
S.E.2d  262,  263  (2009);  Kilby,  198  N.C.  App.  at  368,  679  S.E.2d
at  433.
It  is  clear  from  these  statutes  that  the  five  categories  of
offenders   referenced   therein   constitute   the   only   types   of
offenders  that  the  Generally  Assembly  has  made  eligible  for
enrollment  in  the  SBM  program.     See  State  v.  Stokes,               __  N.C.
App.                                                                         __,                                              __,                                         718  S.E.2d   174,   181   (2011)   (explaining  that   “the




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determination  as  to  whether  SBM  is  required  is  to  be  based  upon
the   relevant   statutory   language,”   rather   than   factors   not
explicitly  provided  for  in  the  statute);  see  also  Evans  v.  Diaz,
333  N.C.                                                                     774,                                                779-80,                                                        430  S.E.2d                                                           244,          247   (1993)   (“Under  the
doctrine   of   expressio   unius   est   exclusio   alterius,   when   a
statute  lists  the  situations  to  which  it  applies,  it  implies  the
exclusion   of   situations   not   contained   in   the   list.”).
Consequently,  a  trial  court,  in  determining  whether  a  defendant
qualifies  for  SBM,  may  not  consider  grounds  outside  of  those
enumerated in the SBM statutes.
The  trial  court  in  this  case  expressly  found  that  defendant
did  not  fall  within  any  of  the  statutorily  enumerated  categories
of   offenders   requiring   monitoring,   but   nonetheless   ordered
defendant  to  enroll  in  the  SBM  program  due  to  its  finding  that
his  probation  had  been  revoked  and  he  had  failed  to  complete  his
sex  offender  treatment.     Where,  as  here,                               “[t]he  trial  court
clearly  heard  the  evidence  and  found  the  facts  against  [a  party]
under  a  misapprehension  of  the  controlling  law,”  the  court’s
findings  should  be                                                          “set  aside  on  the  theory  that  the  evidence
                                                                                                                                  should   be   considered   in   its   true   legal   light.”                                                                                                      African
                                                                                                                                                                                                 Methodist  Episcopal  Zion  Church  v.  Union  Chapel  A.M.E.  Zion
Church,                                                                       64  N.C.  App.                                      391,                                                           411-12,                                                               308  S.E.2d   73,   85       (1983).




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Accordingly,  we  vacate  the  trial  court’s  First  Order  and  remand
the matter to the trial court for reconsideration.1
Conclusion
For  the  reasons  stated  above,  we  vacate  the  trial  court’s
13 March  2012 order and remand the case for reconsideration.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Judges HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.
1Because  we  are  remanding  this  matter,  we  need  not  address
defendant’s remaining contentions.

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