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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 380PA11
FILED 14 DECEMBER 2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
NICHOLAS BRADY HEIEN
On  discretionary  review  pursuant  to  N.C.G.S.  '  7A-31  of  a  unanimous
decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,                                                         ___  N.C.  App.   ___,   714  S.E.2d  827  (2011),
reversing an order signed on 25 March 2010 by Judge Vance Bradford Long and
vacating judgments entered on 26 May 2010 by Judge A. Moses Massey, both in
Superior Court, Surry County.   Heard in the Supreme Court on 7 May 2012.
Roy  Cooper,  Attorney  General,  by  Derrick  C.  Mertz,  Assistant  Attorney
General, for the State-appellant.
Michele Goldman for defendant-appellee.
NEWBY, Justice.
In this case we must decide whether there was reasonable suspicion for the
stop  that  led  to  defendant‟s  convictions  for  attempting  to  traffic  in  cocaine  by
transportation and possession.   After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude  that  there  was  an  objectively  reasonable  basis  to  suspect  that  illegal
activity was taking place.    Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to that court for additional proceedings.




STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
On the morning of 29 April 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse of the Surry County
Sheriff‟s  Department  performed  a  routine  traffic  stop  of  a  vehicle  in  which
defendant was a passenger.   Sergeant Darisse was observing traffic on Interstate 77
when he noticed a Ford Escort approach a slower moving vehicle, forcing the driver
of the Escort  to  apply  the car‟s brakes.    When the driver engaged the brakes,
Sergeant Darisse saw that the right rear brake light failed to illuminate.    As a
result, Sergeant Darisse decided to stop the Escort.   As the Escort rolled to a stop,
Sergeant Darisse noticed the right rear brake light “flickered on.”   Sergeant Darisse
informed the driver, Maynor Javier Vasquez, that he stopped the car “for a non-
functioning brake light.”   After a few moments of conversation Sergeant Darisse
informed Vasquez that he would issue a warning citation for the brake light if
Vasquez‟s  drivers‟  license  and  registration  were  valid.    After  learning  that  his
drivers‟ license and registration checked out, Sergeant Darisse returned Vasquez‟s
documents and gave him a warning ticket for the brake light.
During  the  stop  Sergeant  Darisse  apparently  began  to  suspect  that  the
Escort might contain contraband.   During conversation Vasquez informed Sergeant
Darisse  that  defendant  and  he  were  travelling  to  West  Virginia.    Defendant,
however, offered differing information regarding their ultimate destination.    He
stated that the duo were headed to Kentucky to pick up a friend.   Based in part on
this conflicting information, Sergeant Darisse decided to ask Vasquez if he could
search the vehicle.    Vasquez had no objection, but explained it was defendant‟s
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
Escort so Sergeant Darisse should ask defendant.   Sergeant Darisse then received
defendant‟s permission to search the vehicle.
A search of the vehicle revealed, among other things, cocaine.   According to
Sergeant Darisse, he found “a cellophane wrapper with a white powder residue” in
the door panel on the driver‟s side and  “burnt marijuana seeds in the ashtray.”
Sergeant Darisse then searched a blue duffle bag in the “back hatch” area of the
Escort.   In “one of the side compartments” of the bag, Sergeant Darisse located “a
white plastic grocery bag” containing “a sandwich bag wrapped in a paper towel.”
He discovered inside “the sandwich bag . . . a white powder[ed] substance . . . [that]
appeared to be . . . cocaine.”   A field test of the white, powdered substance indicated
that it was, in fact, cocaine.   Both the driver and defendant were then arrested and
charged with trafficking in cocaine.
Defendant sought to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the
Escort,  alleging  that the stop was an illegal  seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 19 and 20 of Article I of
the North Carolina Constitution.   Apparently, defendant argued that our General
Statutes require a vehicle neither to have all brake lights in good working order nor
to be equipped with more than one brake light, and, as a result, a traffic stop for the
reason asserted here should be unconstitutional.
When  the  traffic  stop  at  issue  in  this  case  occurred,  Chapter  20  of  our
General  Statutes,  which  addresses  motor  vehicles,  contained  several  sections
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
regulating vehicle brake lights.   First, section 20-129 required that “[e]very motor
vehicle  .  .                                                                               .  have  all  originally  equipped  rear  lamps  or  the  equivalent  in  good
working order, which lamps shall exhibit a red light plainly visible under normal
atmospheric conditions from a distance of  500 feet to the rear of such vehicle.”
N.C.G.S.  §  20-129(d)  (2009).    That section also mandated, in language perhaps
familiar when the provision was first enacted more than a half century ago, that
“[n]o person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State any motor vehicle . . .
unless it shall be equipped with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle.   The stop
lamp . . . shall be actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake.   The stop
lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.”   Id. § 20-
129(g) (2009).   Second, section 20-129.1 provided that “[b]rake lights (and/or brake
reflectors) on the rear of a motor vehicle shall have red lenses so that the light
displayed is red.”   Id. § 20-129.1(9) (2009).   Finally, section 20-183.3 also dictated
that  a  motor  vehicle  safety  inspection  include  a  determination  that  the  lights
required  by  sections                                                                      20-129  or                                                                       20-129.1  are  present  and  in  a  safe  operating
condition.   Id. § 20-183.3(a)(2) (2009).
The trial court denied defendant‟s motion to suppress.   The trial court found,
among other things, that
Darisse observed the right brake light of the vehicle not to
function as the left brake light of the vehicle came on as
the  subject  vehicle  slowed.    Darisse  upon  making  this
observation, activated his blue light and instigated a stop
of the subject vehicle.
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
The subject vehicle‟s right brake light was not functioning
at the time of the instigation of the stop by observation of
the video, taken from Darisse‟s patrol car, which began at
the time of the instigation of the stop.
Immediately  prior  to  the  vehicle  coming  to  a  complete
stop on the shoulder the right brake light flickered on.
Based on its findings the trial court concluded, inter alia, that Sergeant Darisse had
a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the subject vehicle and the driver were
violating the laws of this State by operating a motor vehicle without a properly
functioning brake light” and “that the seizure . . . was constitutionally valid.”
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court‟s determination that all
vehicular brake lights must function properly.   State v. Heien, ___ N.C. App. ___,
___, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829-31 (2011).   The Court of Appeals, addressing a novel issue
of statutory interpretation, employed a long statutory analysis and then held that
Chapter 20 requires a motor vehicle to have only one brake light.   Id. at ___, 714
S.E.2d at  829-31.    That court explained that section  20-129 requires only  “  „a‟  ”
brake light.   Id. at ___, 714 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 20-129(g) (emphasis
added)).   The court observed that the brake light “ „may be incorporated into a unit
with one or more other rear lamps.‟ ”   Id. at ___, 714 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting N.C.G.S.
§ 20-129(g) (emphasis added)).   Given the “use of the articles „a‟ and „the‟ before the
singular” term “stop lamp,” which is used to describe a brake light throughout the
statutes, the Court of Appeals reasoned that subsection 20-129(g) requires only one
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
brake light.   Id. at ___, 714 S.E.2d at 829.   Further, the court determined that the
mandate of section 20-129 that vehicles “ „have all originally equipped rear lamps or
the equivalent in good working order‟ ” does not apply to brake lights because brake
lights are distinct from rear lamps.   Id. at ___, 714 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting N.C.G.S.
§ 20-129(d)).   Finally, the Court of Appeals explained that the vehicle inspection
statute does not alter the number of brake lights required by section 20-129.   Id. at
___, 714 S.E.2d at 831.
Then, relying on its decision in State v. McLamb,  186 N.C. App.  124,  649
S.E.2d 902 (2007), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 368, 663 S.E.2d 433 (2008), the Court
of Appeals held that the traffic stop was unconstitutional.   Heien, ___ N.C. App. at
___, 714 S.E.2d at 829-31.   The court explained that at the time of the stop “there
was no violation of N.C.G.S.  §  20-129(g), N.C.G.S.  § 20-129(d), or N.C.G.S.  § 20-
183.3.”   Id. at ___, 714 S.E.2d at 831.   As a result, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause
the initial stop was based upon Sergeant Darisse‟s observation that the right brake
light of the vehicle malfunctioned,  the justification for the stop was objectively
unreasonable, and the stop violated [d]efendant‟s Fourth Amendment rights.”   Id. at
___, 714 S.E.2d at 831 (citing McLamb, 186 N.C. App. at 127-28, 649 S.E.2d at 904).
Essentially,  the  court  held  that  a  police  officer‟s  mistaken  belief  about  the
requirements of the substantive traffic law is per se objectively unreasonable.   And,
when the factual circumstances fail to indicate a violation of the substantive law as
interpreted by a reviewing court, the stop of an individual is unconstitutional.
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
We allowed the State of North Carolina‟s Petition for Discretionary Review.
State v. Heien, ___ N.C. ___, 720 S.E.2d 389 (2012).   It is important to note at the
outset that the State of North Carolina has chosen not to seek review of the Court of
Appeals‟ statutory interpretation.   Accordingly, how many brake lights are required
by our General Statutes and whether they must be in good working order are issues
not presented to this Court; for purposes of our decision, we assume that the Court
of Appeals correctly held that our General Statutes require only one brake light and
that not all originally equipped brake lights must function properly.   It is also worth
noting  that,  were  driving  with  an  improperly  functioning  brake  light  a  traffic
violation  then,  without  question,  Sergeant  Darisse  would  have  had,  at  least,
reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.   E.g., State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 417,
665  S.E.2d                                                                                 438,   441  (2008)   (“Officer  Jones‟  observation  of  defendant‟s  traffic
violation gave him the required reasonable suspicion to stop defendant‟s vehicle.”).
Indeed, a routine traffic stop by an officer who observes an individual commit a
traffic violation is supported by probable cause.   E.g., Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 819, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 101 (1996).   The question
remains, however, whether an officer‟s mistake of law may nonetheless give rise to
reasonable suspicion to conduct a routine traffic stop.
The issue presented in this case is one of first impression for this Court;
however, considering a related question in State v. Barnard,  362 N.C.  244,  658
S.E.2d 643, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 129 S. Ct. 264, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008), we
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
held that an officer‟s mistake of law will not invalidate a stop otherwise supported
by reasonable suspicion to believe an actual law was being violated.   In Barnard a
police officer observed an individual, who was operating a vehicle that had stopped
for a red light, and then remained stopped for approximately thirty seconds after
the light turned green before making a legal left turn.   Id. at 245, 658 S.E.2d at 644.
The  officer  decided  to  stop  the  vehicle  based  in  part  on  “a  perceived,  though
apparently non-existent, statutory violation of impeding traffic.”    Id. at  248,  658
S.E.2d at 645.   At the suppression hearing the officer testified also that remaining
stopped for thirty seconds after a light turns green “definitely would be an indicator
of impairment.”   Id. at 247, 658 S.E.2d at 645.   This Court, citing Whren and State
v. McClendon,  350 N.C.  630,  517 S.E.2d  128  (1999), for the proposition that the
“constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not the officer‟s
subjective motivation,” concluded that because the circumstances present in the
case “gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant may have been
driving while impaired, the stop of defendant‟s vehicle was constitutional.”                 362
N.C. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 645-46.   As a result, the rule in this state is that an
officer‟s subjective mistake of law will not cause the traffic stop to be unreasonable
when the totality of the circumstances indicates that there is reasonable suspicion
that the person stopped is violating some other, actual law.    Id.    The question
presented today is whether a stop is likewise permissible when an officer witnesses
what he reasonably, though mistakenly, believes to be a traffic violation but, this
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
time, the conduct fails simultaneously to indicate another law is being violated.   In
other words, does the former still hold when the latter is absent?
Various  federal  and  state  courts  have  provided  different  answers  to  this
question.   Some courts hold that a police officer‟s mistaken interpretation of the
applicable substantive law cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion to support a
traffic stop.   E.g., United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2006)
(stating that an officer‟s decision to stop a vehicle “based on a subjective belief that
a  law  has  been  broken,  when  no  violation  actually  occurred,  is  not  objectively
reasonable”); State v. Anderson,  683 N.W.2d  818,  823-24  (Minn.  2004)  (en banc)
(holding  “that an officer‟s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the
particularized  and  objective  basis  for  suspecting  criminal  activity  necessary  to
justify a traffic stop”).   Other courts have held that an officer‟s mistake of law can
form  the  reasonable  suspicion  required  to  justify  a  traffic  stop,  so  long  as  the
mistake is objectively reasonable.   E.g., United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913
& n.3 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding a traffic stop was constitutional when the officer
reasonably believed the individual was violating the traffic law, even though the
officer‟s  belief  about  the  law‟s  requirements  may  have  been  incorrect);  State  v.
Rheinlander, 286 Ga. App. 625, 626, 649 S.E.2d 828, 829-30 (2007) (“ „If the officer
acting in good faith believes that an unlawful act has been committed, his actions
are  not  rendered  improper  by  a  later  legal  determination  that  the  defendant‟s
actions were not a crime according to a technical legal definition or distinction
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
determined to exist in the penal statute.   The question to be decided is whether the
officer‟s motives and actions at the time and under all the circumstances, including
the nature of the officer‟s mistake, if any, were reasonable and not arbitrary or
harassing.‟ ” (citation omitted)); Moore v. State, 2005-CT-02063-SCT (¶21), 986 So.
2d 928, 935  (Miss.  2008) (en banc) (“In other words, based on the totality of the
circumstances  with  which  Officer  Moulds  was  confronted,  including  a  valid,
reasonable belief that  [the defendant] was violating a traffic law, Officer Moulds
had sufficient probable cause to pull [the defendant] over, although, as it turns out,
Officer Moulds based his belief of a traffic violation on a mistake of law.”).
Two cases from the federal circuit courts of appeals illustrate the varying
approaches.   In United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confronted a situation similar to the
one presently at bar.   In Martin an officer observed that a vehicle‟s right brake light
failed properly to illuminate when the vehicle‟s brakes were engaged.   Id. at 1000.
Believing that he was witnessing a violation of a traffic law, the officer stopped the
vehicle and subsequently arrested the driver for a different, more serious crime.   Id.
As  it  turns  out,  the  applicable  statute  appeared  to  require  only  one  properly
functioning brake light.                                                                    411 F.3d at 1001.   The court, however, reasoned that the
“determinative question is not whether Martin actually violated the Motor Vehicle
Code  by  operating  a  vehicle  with  one  defective  brake  light,  but  whether  an
objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
Martin was committing a code violation.”    Id.    Then, pointing out that it was  “
„common knowledge‟  ” in the region that multiple brake lights are required, and
that the language of the applicable statute was “counterintuitive and confusing,”
the court determined that the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe
he  had  witnessed  a  traffic  violation  and  that  the  stop  was  constitutionally
permissible.                                                                              411  F.3d  at  1001-02.    On  the  other  hand,  in  United  States  v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop a
vehicle for lacking an inside rearview mirror because the city ordinance the officer
believed had been violated did not actually require such an inside mirror.   Id. at
1278-80.   The court found that the officer‟s mistaken belief regarding the statute‟s
requirements was reasonable because (1) his training instructed that such a mirror
was  required;  (2)  a  magistrate  had  informed  him  that  an  inside  mirror  was
necessary; and (3) he had “written more than 100 tickets for lack of an inside rear-
view mirror.”   Id. at 1279.   The court explained, however, that “a mistake of law, no
matter how reasonable or understandable, . . . cannot provide reasonable suspicion .
. . to justify a traffic stop.”   Id.
Each court offered persuasive justifications for its decision.    The Eleventh
Circuit explained that its rule is consistent with the principle that any ambiguity or
vagueness in a statute should not be used against a defendant.   Chanthasouxat, 342
F.3d at  1278-79.    That reasoning is consistent with rationale from other courts,
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
discussed approvingly by the Eleventh Circuit, indicating that to be permissible
under the Fourth Amendment a stop must be objectively grounded in the actual,
governing law.   Id. at 1277-78 (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101
(9th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, reasoned that its view is in keeping with the
foundational principle that an officer‟s actions must be “objectively reasonable in
the  circumstances.”    Martin,                                                              411  F.3d  at  1001  (citation  and  quotation  marks
omitted).    Moreover,  the  court  observed  that  courts  “  „should  not  expect  state
highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a
criminal defense attorney,‟ ” id. (quoting Sanders, 196 F.3d at 913), or “a federal
judge,” id.   That observation is perhaps somewhat supported by an earlier decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States on a different, but related, issue.   See
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-40, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2632-33, 61 L. Ed. 2d
343,  349-51  (1979)  (holding that the arrest of an individual for violating a city
ordinance later found to be unconstitutional nonetheless complied with the Fourth
Amendment,  in part  because the Court reasoned that  the  “enactment  of a law
forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—with
the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any
person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws” and based on that
reasoning, believed that “[a] prudent officer . . . should not have been required to
anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional”).
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
We find the Eighth Circuit‟s reasoning to be more compelling.   To begin, that
rationale seems to us, as it did to the Eighth Circuit, to be consistent with the
primary command of the Fourth Amendment—that law enforcement agents act
reasonably.   See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59
L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979) (noting that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to
impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government
officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions” (footnote call number, citations,
and internal quotation marks omitted)).   An officer may make a mistake, including
a mistake of law, yet still act reasonably under the circumstances.   As stated above,
when an officer acts reasonably under the circumstances, he is not violating the
Fourth  Amendment.     So  long  as  the  officer‟s  mistake  of  law  is  objectively
reasonable,  then,  the  Fourth  Amendment  would  seem  not  to  be  violated.
Accordingly, requiring an officer to be more than reasonable, mandating that he be
perfect,  would  impose  a  greater  burden  than  that  required  under  the  Fourth
Amendment.
Moreover,  the  reasonable  suspicion  standard  does  not  require  an  officer
actually to witness a violation of the law before making a stop.   See, e.g., Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880-81, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 907 (1968) (holding
that an officer can constitutionally make a stop after witnessing “a series of acts,
each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warrant[ ] further
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STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
investigation”).   That rule generally applies regardless of the particular substantive
law at issue, Styles, 362 N.C. at 414-16, 665 S.E.2d at 439-41, and results in part
because Terry stops are conducted not only to investigate past crime but also to halt
potentially  ongoing  crime,  to  thwart  contemplated  future  crime,  and,  most
importantly in these circumstances, to protect the public from potentially dangerous
activity.   See  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 9.1(e), at 281 (4th ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, because we are particularly concerned for maintaining safe roadways,
we do not want to discourage our police officers from conducting stops for perceived
traffic  violations.    A  routine  traffic  stop,  based  on  what  an  officer  reasonably
perceives  to  be  a  violation,  is  not  a  substantial  interference  with  the  detained
individual and is a minimal invasion of privacy.   In fact, it seems to us that most
motorists would actually prefer to learn that a safety device on their vehicle is not
functioning properly.   And particularly when judged against society‟s countervailing
interest in keeping its roads safe, we think it prudent to endorse the reasonable
interpretation of our traffic safety laws.   It would, at a minimum, work at cross-
purposes if we were to require our law enforcement officers to narrowly interpret
our traffic safety statutes when deciding whether to conduct a stop for fear that a
possible subsequent prosecution for the violation could be imperiled.   That approach
would undermine our officers‟ important efforts in keeping our roads safe.    And
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Opinion of the Court
because we do not perceive such a Fourth Amendment requirement, we decline to
create one.
For  that  reason  we  find  the  Eleventh  Circuit‟s  justifications  inapposite.
Police officers should be entitled to interpret our motor vehicle laws reasonably
when conducting routine traffic stops.   Of course, we are mindful that statutes may
not be unconstitutionally vague and agree that it may be unreasonable to conduct a
stop if the substantive statute is too vague.   Cf. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38, 99 S. Ct.
at  2632,  61 L. Ed.  2d at  350  (“The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by
enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality—with the possible exception of
a  law  so  grossly  and  flagrantly  unconstitutional  that  any  person  of  reasonable
prudence  would  be  bound  to  see  its  flaws.”).    But  concerns  about  the  rules  of
construction regarding the substantive statutes at issue seem to us to be more
applicable to the subsequent judicial interpretation of a statute and not to a routine
traffic stop that needs to be based only on reasonable suspicion.   A post hoc judicial
interpretation of a substantive traffic law does not determine the reasonableness of
a previous traffic stop within the meaning of the state and federal constitutions.
Such  a  post  hoc  determination  resolves  whether  the  conduct  that  previously
occurred  is  actually  within  the  contours  of  the  substantive  statute.    But  that
determination does not resolve whether the totality of the circumstances present at
the time the conduct transpired supports a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the  statute  was  being  violated.    It  is  the  latter  inquiry  that  is  the  focus  of  a
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constitutionality determination, not the former.   Respectfully disagreeing with the
Eleventh Circuit, we think the Fourth Amendment‟s reasonable suspicion standard
is not offended by an officer‟s objectively reasonable mistake of law.
Furthermore, we note that a decision to the contrary would be inconsistent
with  the  rationale  underlying  the  reasonable  suspicion  doctrine.                    “[R]easonable
suspicion”  is  a                                                                          “commonsense,  nontechnical  conception[  ]  that  deal[s]  with  the
factual  and  practical  considerations  of  everyday  life  on  which  reasonable  and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”   Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
695, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661,  134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918 (1996) (citations and internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    And  while  “reasonable  suspicion”  is  more  than  “an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity,” Illinois v.
Wardlow,  528 U.S.  119,  124,  120 S. Ct. 673,  676,  145 L. Ed.  2d  570,  576  (2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), “ „some minimal level of objective
justification‟ ” is all that is demanded, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109
S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
217,  104 S. Ct.  1758,  1763,  80 L. Ed.  2d  247,  255  (1984)).    To require our law
enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a reviewing court will interpret the
substantive  law  at  issue  would  transform  this                                        “commonsense,  nontechnical
conception” into something that requires much more than “some minimal level of
objective justification.”    We would no longer merely require that our officers be
-16-




STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
reasonable, we would mandate that they be omniscient.   This seems to us to be both
unwise and unwarranted.
Our approach also preserves the historical nature of the inquiry into whether
an officer‟s conduct  satisfies the Fourth Amendment.    The question of whether
reasonable  suspicion  exists  has  historically  been  answered  by  considering  the
totality of the circumstances present in each individual case rather than on the
basis of bright-line rules.   As the Supreme Court of the United States has observed,
“The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not „readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.‟ ”   Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S. Ct. at
1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 10 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2329, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983)).   It follows then that if we were to treat an
officer‟s  reasonable  mistake  of  law  differently  from  other  circumstances  in  the
reasonable suspicion analysis,  we would be declaring essentially  that any legal
mistake by police resulting in a traffic stop could violate our federal and state
constitutions regardless of how objectively reasonable the police conduct.   Such a
rule would insert rigidity into a fluid concept, which we think inappropriate.
Endorsing  disparate  treatment  of  police  mistakes  of  law  would  not  only
create a bright-line rule, but also alter the analysis courts employ to determine
whether reasonable suspicion is present.   The traditional constitutional inquiry is to
determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under all the circumstances.   United
States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1358 (D.C. Cir.) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at
-17-




STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
810, 116 S. Ct. at 1772-73, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 95-96), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 965, 128 S.
Ct. 414, 169 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007).   If one circumstance, such as whether the officer
made an objectively reasonable mistake of law, proved to be dispositive, then the
reasonable  suspicion  analysis  would  change.    A  new  threshold  question  would
develop—whether the police had correctly forecast how the reviewing court would
interpret the applicable law.   If, and only if, this question were answered in the
affirmative would the traditional totality of the circumstances analysis follow.   This
framework would seem to be a departure from the traditional reasonable suspicion
analysis.
Finally, our approach allows reviewing courts to treat all police mistakes the
same.   The Supreme Court of the United States does not demand factual accuracy
from our police when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.   Illinois v.
Rodriguez,  497 U.S.  177,  185-86,  110 S. Ct.  2793,  2800,  111 L. Ed.  2d  148,  159
(1990)                                                                                     (“[I]n  order  to  satisfy  the                                        „reasonableness‟  requirement  of  the  Fourth
Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that
must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not that they always be
correct, but that they always be reasonable.”).   Neither do the federal circuit courts
of  appeals.    See,  e.g.,  Chanthasouxat,                                                342  F.3d  at  1276  (collecting  cases  and
observing  that  a                                                                         “traffic  stop  based  on  an  officer‟s  incorrect  but  reasonable
assessment  of  facts  does  not  violate  the  Fourth  Amendment”).                       Instead,
reasonableness is all that is required.   E.g., id. at 1276-77.   Of course, the federal
-18-




STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
circuits are divided on whether officers are permitted to make reasonable mistakes
of law.    We, however, find no constitutional requirement to distinguish between
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law in this context.   And, in part also because it is
not always clear whether a mistake is one of fact or of law, e.g., United States v.
Miguel,                                                                                            368  F.3d  1150,  1153-54  (9th  Cir.  2004),  we  decline  to  create  such  a
distinction in this state.   We believe the correct rule is that so long as an officer‟s
mistake is reasonable, it may give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Applying this rule to the facts of this case, we observe that the following
objective circumstances were present at the time of the stop.   Our General Statutes
mandated that each “motor vehicle . . . have all originally equipped rear lamps or
the  equivalent  in  good  working  order.”    N.C.G.S.  §  20-129(d).    Our  legislature
permitted a vehicle‟s brake lighting system to be “incorporated into a unit with one
or more other rear lamps.”    Id.  §  20-129(g).    It is reasonable to read these two
provisions of section 20-129 to say that, because it may be “incorporated into a unit
with  .  .  .  other  rear  lamps,”  id.,  a  brake  light  is  a  rear  lamp  which,  like  all
“originally equipped rear lamps,” must be kept “in good working order,” N.C.G.S. §
20-129(d).   Such a reading is particularly reasonable in light of both the federal
requirement that a passenger vehicle maintain two red brake lights on the rear of
the vehicle “at the same height, symmetrically about the vertical centerline, as far
apart as practicable,” 49 C.F.R.  § 571.108, at S7.3.1 & Table I-a  (2011), and the
reference in N.C.G.S.  §  20-129.1 to the required color of the lenses of multiple
-19-




STATE V. HEIEN
Opinion of the Court
“brake lights,” N.C.G.S. § 20-129.1(9) (emphasis added).   When the stop at issue in
this case occurred, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals had ever interpreted
our motor vehicle laws to require only one properly functioning brake light.   Given
these  circumstances,  Sergeant  Darisse  could  have  reasonably  believed  that  he
witnessed a violation of our motor vehicle laws when he observed that the Escort
had an improperly functioning brake light.
After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there
was reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop of the Escort in this
case.   We are not persuaded that, because Sergeant Darisse was mistaken about the
requirements  of  our  motor  vehicle  laws,  the  traffic  stop  was  necessarily
unconstitutional.   After all, reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical
conception[ ] . . . on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,”
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 116 S. Ct. at 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 918 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted), and the Court of Appeals analyzed our General
Statutes at length before reaching its conclusion that the officer‟s interpretation of
the relevant motor vehicle laws was erroneous.   After considering the totality of the
circumstances,  we  hold  that  Sergeant  Darisse‟s  mistake  of  law  was  objectively
reasonable  and  that  he  had  reasonable  suspicion  to  stop  the  vehicle  in  which
defendant was a passenger.   Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to that court for additional proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
-20-




Justice HUDSON dissenting.
Because  the  majority‟s  opinion  here  significantly,  and  in  my  view
unnecessarily,  alters  our  Fourth  Amendment  jurisprudence  by  introducing
subjectivity and vagueness into our Fourth Amendment analysis and effectively
overruling this Court‟s prior precedent, I respectfully dissent.
As a starting point, there is no doubt in my mind that, when he stopped
defendant‟s vehicle, Sergeant Darisse acted upon a reasonable belief that defendant
violated the law by operating a vehicle with one malfunctioning brake light.   It is
my guess that, before the COA‟s surprising decision below, most citizens of this
state believed that a malfunctioning brake light represented legal grounds for a
traffic stop and a citation.   This belief was the only reason given for the stop; there
was otherwise nothing to indicate that the vehicle, which was not being driven by
defendant, was being operated improperly.   The trial court‟s findings on denying
defendant‟s motion to suppress remain unchallenged and are therefore binding on
appeal.    They include the finding that Sergeant Darisse activated his blue light
upon observing “the right brake light of the vehicle not to function.”   The trial court
then concluded that the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle
and driver were violating laws by having a brake light that was not functioning
properly.    The Court of Appeals held that there was no violation of any of the
applicable statutes, N.C.G.S. §§ 20-129(d), 20-129(g), and 20-183.3, and therefore no
legal or constitutional basis for the stop.




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
In the Court of Appeals the State argued that the trooper “actually observed
a violation of N.C.[G.S.] § 20-129(d)” and that “[d]efendant‟s reliance on „mistaken
belief‟ cases . . . is therefore misplaced.”   Defendant argued, and the Court agreed,
that there was no violation of the statutes.   It was neither argued nor held that the
trooper had a “reasonable if mistaken belief,” just whether there was or was not a
violation of the statutes.
Instead of bringing to this Court the issue of statutory interpretation, the
State presented its single issue to be reviewed as:                                            “Did the Court of Appeals err in
holding that a stop based on a mistaken belief is not objectively reasonable and
cannot support reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle?”   This Court allowed review
of an issue not decided by the Court of Appeals and has now opened a Pandora‟s box
by approving of the use of evidence obtained solely because of a traffic stop based
upon an officer‟s mistake of law.   I must respectfully dissent.
There  are  many  problems  with  the  majority‟s  decision—it  introduces
subjectivity into what was previously a well-settled objective inquiry and creates an
interpretive role regarding state statutes for police officers and police departments.
The danger in adopting a new constitutional rule here is that this particular case
seems so innocuous:   Of course it is reasonable that an officer would pull over a
vehicle for a malfunctioning brake light.   But this new constitutional rule will also
apply  in  the  next  case,  when  the  officer  acts  based  on  a  misreading  of  a  less
innocuous  statute,  or  an  incorrect  memo  or  training  program  from  the  police
-22-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
department, or his or her previous law enforcement experience in a different state,
or his or her belief in a nonexistent law.
There is ample precedent for the decision the majority could have made here,
both in this state and in federal courts.   This Court has repeatedly and recently
stated that what an officer believes is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis—
only the objective facts and the actual law matter.   In State v. Barnard we stated
that it was “irrelevant” that the officer stopped the car for a perceived, but actually
nonexistent, statutory violation, saying that “[t]he constitutionality of a traffic stop
depends on the objective facts, not the officer‟s subjective motivation.”                    362 N.C.
244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645-46, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 129 S. Ct. 264 (2008).
In State v. Ivey we invalidated a stop when the objective facts showed that there
was no actual statutory violation.   360 N.C. 562, 565, 633 S.E.2d 459, 461-62 (2006),
abrogated on other grounds, State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415 n.1, 665 S.E.2d 438,
440 n.1 (2008).   The majority implicitly overrules both of these cases today.
While the majority quotes the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in
Ornelas v.  United States  as if that  decision  supports its position, the Court in
Ornelas actually said the precise opposite a few sentences after the quote in the
majority opinion:   When evaluating a stop based on reasonable suspicion, “the issue
is whether the facts satisfy the . . . statutory . . . standard, or to put it another way,
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”   517
U.S.  690,  696-97,  116  S.  Ct.  1657,  1662  (1996)  (emphasis  added)  (citation  and
-23-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
quotation marks omitted).   There is no room for reasonable mistakes of law under
the Ornelas articulation of the rule; either the law was violated and the stop is
reasonable, or the law was not violated and the stop is not reasonable.   Under our
law and the law according to the United States Supreme Court, it does not matter
what  the  officer  subjectively  thinks  the  law  is.    What  matters  is  whether  the
objective facts show an actual violation of the law.
Further, the majority supports its reasoning with case law from the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, see United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th
Cir. 2005), and contrasts that decision with the reasoning in the Eleventh Circuit‟s
decision  in  United  States  v.  Chanthasouxat,  342  F.3d  1271,  1278-79  (11th  Cir.
2003).   Though the majority does not acknowledge so, it should be emphasized that
the Eighth Circuit stands alone among the federal circuits on this issue.   The First,
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all apply some
form of the rule that an officer‟s mistake of law cannot be the basis for reasonable
suspicion,  though  many  allow  that  a  stop  based  on  a  mistake  of  law  may  be
constitutional if it can be justified objectively notwithstanding the mistake of law.
See United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1237, 127 S. Ct. 1320 (2007); United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 260 n.16 (3d
Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998); United States
v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th
-24-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
Cir. 2005); Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279; cf. United States v. Debruhl, 38 A.3d
293, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that court‟s refusal to “lead this jurisdiction toward
acceptance of the discredited „mistake of law‟ justification for Fourth Amendment
violations”).1   The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits appear not to have decided
the  issue  explicitly  yet,  though  district  courts  in  the  Second  Circuit  apply  the
majority rule.   See United States v. Williams, No. 11 Cr. 228, 2011 WL 5843475, at
*5  (S.D.N.Y.  Nov.  21,                                                                            2011)  (stating  that   “[a]  mistake  of  law  cannot  provide
objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion”); see also United States v. McHugh,
349  F. App‟x  824,  828  n.3  (4th Cir.  2009)  (per curiam)  (“[W]e assume, without
deciding, that an officer‟s reasonable mistake of law may not provide the objective
grounds for reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.”); United States v. Jones,
479 F. App‟x 705, 712 (6th Cir. 2012) (“This court has not yet answered whether an
officer‟s objectively reasonable mistake of law can establish reasonable suspicion for
a search or seizure.”).   While using an imprecise tool like circuit-counting to justify a
position should be done with care, the overwhelming acceptance of the position
directly opposite that taken by the majority today should give us all pause.
1 Of note, a middle-of-the-road approach would alleviate the majority‟s concerns
about a per se rule while preserving traditional Fourth Amendment protections.   We could
easily adopt a principle like that expressed in United States v. Booker:   “Stops premised on
a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be
unconstitutional.   A stop is lawful despite a mistake of law, however, if an objectively valid
basis for the stop nonetheless exists.”   496 F.3d 717, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated on other
grounds, 556 U.S. 1218, 129 S. Ct. 2155 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).   In
fact, this Court applied this exact reasoning, if less explicitly, in State v. Barnard.   See 362
N.C. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 645-46.
-25-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
Most troubling is that this decision imports into our jurisprudence a concept
we have expressly rejected.    Allowing an officer‟s  “reasonable mistake of law” to
support a warrantless stop is the functional equivalent of a “good faith exception”
for stops conducted in contravention of the law—as long as the officer acted in good
faith, that is, he is reasonably unaware that his actions are inconsistent with the
law, the illegality of the stop will not require suppression of the obtained evidence.
In State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 720-24, 370 S.E.2d 553, 560-62 (1988), this Court
discussed at length the value of the exclusionary rule and the reason for this Court‟s
rejection of a good faith exception to that rule.2   One of those reasons is that “the
exclusionary rule is responsible for the systematic, in-depth training of police forces
in the law of search and seizure.   It can be no part of our constitutional duties to
signal a retreat from these salutary advances in constitutional compliance which
have guided police practice in this state since 1937.”                                         322 N.C. at 721, 370 S.E.2d at
560 (footnote call number omitted).   Yet such a retreat is exactly what the Court
embraces today.3
2 In 2011 the General Assembly created a statutory “good faith exception” in
N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 and explicitly requested that this Court revisit Carter.   Act of Mar. 8
2011, ch. 6, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 10.   This statute was enacted after this defendant‟s
charges were filed; however, even in the statute, the exception requires that the good faith
belief be “objectively reasonable.”   N.C.G.S. § 15A-974(a)(2) (2011).
3 The same concern prompted the Ninth Circuit to reject exactly this argument in
United States v. Lopez-Soto:   “To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they
properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.”   205 F.3d at
1106.
-26-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
The majority‟s concern that we would be asking omniscience of our police if
we invalidated this stop is overblown.   We would merely be asking that our police be
diligent in studying the law and remaining current on changes to the law, as I am
certain  they  already  are.    While  the  majority  claims  that  “we  do  not  want  to
discourage our police officers from conducting stops for perceived traffic violations,”
it is entirely unclear to me how a rule invalidating stops not based on the law would
chill  traffic  stops  generally,  and  the  majority  does  not  elaborate  other  than  to
mention  the                                                                                     “fear  that  a  subsequent  prosecution  for  the  violation  would  be
imperiled.”   Other decisions by this Court that have upheld traffic stops based on
observations amounting to  “reasonable suspicion” illustrate how little it takes to
satisfy this standard.   See, e.g., State v. Otto, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 726 S.E.2d 824, 828
(2012).    Because  officers  (rightfully) face no punishment for  a  stop based on a
mistake of law, and because there would be no prosecution at all absent the stop,
this  alleged  “fear”  is  not  very  compelling.    Our  police  forces  consist  of  trained
professionals who carefully apply the law as laid down by the General Assembly
and who are fully capable of adapting to changes in the law.
By  adopting  the  majority‟s  rule,  we  are  not  only  potentially  excusing
mistakes of law in the exceedingly rare case when the Court of Appeals divines a
novel interpretation of a statute, but also those mistakes of law that arise from
simple  misreadings  of  statutes,  improper  trainings,  or  ignorance  of  recent
legislative changes.   There is simply no reason to go to such lengths here, especially
-27-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
when the General Assembly has recently spoken to clarify this issue, which will
undoubtedly come before us in due course.   This decision is not merely unnecessary
here; it is premature in light of the recent amendment to N.C.G.S. § 15A-974.
The flaws in the majority‟s opinion are perhaps most apparent in its single
statement that  “[p]olice officers should be entitled to interpret our motor vehicle
laws  reasonably  when  conducting  routine  traffic  stops.”    Separation  of  powers
doctrine dictates otherwise:    It is the legislature‟s job to write the law and the
judiciary‟s job to interpret the law.   The job of the police is to enforce the law as it
has  been  written  by  the  legislature  and  interpreted  by  the  courts.     Proper
enforcement of the law requires accurate knowledge of the law; as the Eleventh
Circuit cogently noted in United States v. Chanthasouxat, to decide otherwise is to
endorse “the fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to the traditional rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse while allowing those entrusted to enforce the law
to be ignorant of it.”                                                                      342  F.3d at  1280  (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Had the State petitioned for review on the issues of statutory interpretation
addressed by the Court of Appeals, we could have based our decision on such an
interpretation.   In my view, that would have been the more appropriate course, and
one by which we could stand firm on the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Then  the  General  Assembly,  should  it  so  desire,  could  rewrite  the  brake  light
statute to clearly require that all brake lights operate properly, which it could do
-28-




STATE V. HEIEN
HUDSON, J., dissenting
with alacrity.   Then our police officers could continue the long-standing practice of
stopping  cars  with  malfunctioning  brake  lights;  stops  like  this  one  would  be
constitutional; and we would have avoided eviscerating the “objectively reasonable”
standard of the Fourth Amendment, and of our own amended N.C.G.S. § 15A-974.
Because the majority has taken this unnecessary route, I respectfully dissent.
CHIEF JUSTICE PARKER and JUSTICE TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this
dissenting opinion.
-29-

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