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NO. COA11-1232
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  3 April  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                          Henderson County
                                                                            Nos.  09 CRS  56050,  10 CRS  448
TONYA BRIGETT JUSTICE
Appeal  by  Defendant  from  judgment  dated                                16  May                                                     2011  by
Judge  James  U.  Downs  in  Henderson  County  Superior  Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  20 February  2012.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Deputy  Director  Caroline
Farmer, for the State.
Appellate  Defender  Staples  Hughes,  by  Assistant  Appellate
Defender David W. Andrews, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Defendant  Tonya  Justice  appeals  from  judgment  entered  upon
her  conviction  of  larceny  from  a  merchant  by  removal  of  anti-
theft  device.    For  the  reasons  which  follow,  we  arrest  judgment
in part, and reverse and remand in part.
At  trial,  the  evidence  tended  to  show  the  following:     In
December                                                                    2009,  Defendant  and  a  male  friend  went  to  a  Belk
department   store.                                                         Defendant   took   several   garments   into   a




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fitting  room.     She  then  handed  some  items  out  of  the  fitting
room  to  her  friend,  who  put  the  clothes  back  on  hangers.    The
store’s  loss  prevention  manager,  who  recognized  Defendant  from  a
prior   shoplifting   incident,   observed   that   the   sensors   were
removed  from  several  shirts  that  had  been  returned  to  hangers.
The  store’s  assistant  manager  called  the  police.    As  Defendant
left  the  fitting  room  and  walked  toward  the  exit,  the  loss
prevention  manager  stopped  her  and  asked  her  to  remove  the
merchandise  she  had  under  her  clothes.    Defendant  admitted  that
she  had  removed  the  sensors  from  the  clothing  because  she  had  a
drug problem.
Defendant  was  indicted  for  larceny  from  a  merchant  by
removal  of  anti-theft  device  and  for  having  attained  the  status
of  habitual  felon.    A  jury  found  Defendant  guilty  of  the  larceny
offense  and  Defendant  pled  guilty  to  the  habitual  felon  charge.
Defendant appeals.
Discussion
Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court                                    (1)  lacked  subject
matter   jurisdiction   because   the   indictment   for   the   larceny
charge  was  fatally  flawed,                                                 (2)  erred  by  allowing  the  State  to
amend  the  larceny  indictment  because  the  amendment  involved  a
substantial  alteration  to  the  charge,  and  (3)  erred  by  entering




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judgment  on  a  fatally  defective  verdict  for  the  larceny  charge.
Because  we  agree  that  the  indictment  was  fatally  flawed,  we
arrest   the   judgment   entered   upon   Defendant’s   conviction   of
larceny from a merchant.
This  Court  reviews  the  sufficiency  of  an  indictment  de
                                                                                                                novo.     State  v.  Marshall,           188  N.C.  App.   744,                                                                      748,   656  S.E.2d
709,                                                                          712                               (2008).                                                    “Under  a  de  novo  review,  the  court  considers
the  matter  anew  and  freely  substitutes  its  own  judgment  for  that
of  the  lower  tribunal.”    State  v.  Biber,  365  N.C.  162,  168,  712
S.E.2d  874,  878  (2011)  (citations  omitted).    If  an  indictment  is
fatally  defective,  then  the  superior  court  lacks  subject  matter
jurisdiction  over  the  case.  See  State  v.  Bell,  121  N.C.  App  700,
702,                                                                          468  S.E.2d                       484,                                     486               (1996).                                                                          An  indictment  is  fatally
                                                                                                                                                                           defective  when  it  fails  to  charge  an  essential  element  of  the
                                                                              offense.    State  v.  Bartley,                                                              156  N.C.  App                                                            490,   499,                          577  S.E.2d
                                                                                                                319,  324  (2003)  (citation omitted).
Defendant  was  indicted  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                            §                                 14-72.11
which  makes  larceny  from  a  merchant  a  felony  when  the  offense
occurs  under  certain  specific  circumstances,  including                   “[b]y
removing,   destroying,   or   deactivating   a   component   of   an
antishoplifting   or   inventory   control   device   to   prevent   the
activation  of  any  antishoplifting  or  inventory  control  device.”




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                                                                              N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                    §                                 14-72.11(2)                                                                  (2011).                                                                                       “The  essential  elements
                                                                                                                                   of  larceny  are  that            [the]  defendant                                                                                                                                                           (1)  took  the  property  of
                                                                              another;                                             (2)  carried  it  away;                                                                                                                                               (3)  without  the  owner’s  consent;
                                                                                                                                                                     and  (4)  with  the  intent  to  permanently  deprive  the  owner  of  the
                                                                                                                                   property.”    State  v.  Coats,                                                                                74  N.C.  App.                                         110,                                   112,                           327  S.E.2d
298,                                                                          300                                                  (1985)                                                                                                         (citation  omitted).    Thus,  an  indictment  under
section  14-72.11(2)  must  allege  the  four  elements  of  larceny  and
also removal of an antishoplifting or inventory control device.
In  addition,  our  case  law  on  larceny  indictments  makes
clear  that  the  property  alleged  to  have  been  taken  must  be
identified  “with  certainty  sufficient  to  enable  the  jury  to  say
that  the  article  proved  to  be  stolen  is  the  same,  and  to  enable
the  court  to  see  that  it  is  the  subject  of  larceny  and  also  to
protect  the  defendant                                                       .  in  the  event  of  future  prosecution
for the offense.  .  .                                                        .”    State  v. Ingram,  271 N.C.  538,  542,  157
S.E.2d                                                                        119,                                                 122                               (1967)                                                                       (quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted).
                                                                                                                                                                     In   Ingram,   the   Supreme   Court   held   that   an   indictment’s
                                                                                                                                                                     description  of  the  property  taken  as                                                                                           “merchandise,  chattels,
                                                                                                                                                                     money,  valuable  securities  and  other  personal  property”  was  too
                                                                                                                                                                     general  and  therefore  insufficient.    Id.  at                                                                                   543,                                   157  S.E.2d  at
                                                                                                                                   123;  compare  State  v.  Monk,   36  N.C.  App.                                                               337,                                                   340,                                   244  S.E.2d
186,                                                                          188-89                                               (1978)                            (holding  that                                                                                                                      “assorted  items  of  clothing,




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having  a  value  of                                                          $504.99  the  property  of  Payne’s,  Inc.”  was  a
sufficiently  particular  description  of  the  property  taken  to
support a larceny charge).
Here, the indictment states:
The  jurors  for  the  State  upon  their  oath
present  that  on  or  about  the  date  of  offense
shown  and  in  Henderson  County  the  defendant
named    above    unlawfully,    willfully    and
feloniously  did  remove  a  component  of  an
anti-theft  or  inventory  control  device  to
prevent  the  activation  of  the  anti-theft  or
inventory   control   device.   This   act   was
committed  in  an  effort  to  steal  merchandise
from Belks  [sic] of Hendersonville, NC.
(Emphasis  added).     As  in  Ingram,  the  description                      “merchandise”
is  too  general  to  identify  the  property  allegedly  taken  by
Defendant.     As  such,  the  indictment  is  fatally  defective,  and
deprives  the  superior  court  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over
the case.    Bell,  121 N.C. App at  702,  468 S.E.2d at  486.
While   the   insufficient   description   of   the   property
allegedly  taken,  standing  alone,  dooms  the  indictment  here,  we
note  that  the  indictment  is  also  fatally  flawed  in  that  it
alleges  only  an  attempted  rather  than  a  completed  larceny.    See
State  v.  Chandler,  342  N.C.  742,  753,  467  S.E.2d  636,  642  (1996)
(“The  offense  of  attempted  larceny  is  complete  where  there  is  a
general  intent  to  steal  and  an  act  in  furtherance  thereof[.]”).
The   indictment   here   alleges   that   Defendant                          “did   remove   a




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component  of  an  anti-theft  or  inventory  control  device
in an effort to steal” property.
We  reject  the  State’s  contentions  that  the  indictment’s
mention  of  Defendant’s  removal  of  an  antishoplifting  device  or
the  use  of  the  phrase                                                      “effort  to  steal”  allege  a  completed
larceny.    As  to  the  former,  as  stated  supra,  an  indictment  under
section                                                                        14-72.11(2)    must    allege    the    removal    of    an
antishoplifting  or  inventory  control  device  in  addition  to  the
four   elements   of   larceny.                                                Thus,   the   removal   of   an
antishoplifting  device  is  a  separate  and  distinct  element  from
the  taking  and  carrying  away  of  the  property  in  question.    As  to
the  State’s  second  contention,  the  word                                   “steal”  is  defined  as,
inter  alia,                                                                   “[t]o  take                                                   (personal  property)  illegally  with  the
intent  to  keep  it  unlawfully[,]”  while                                    “attempt”  is  defined  as
“[t]he  act  or  an  instance  of  making  an  effort  to  accomplish
something[.]”    Black’s  Law  Dictionary  1453,  137  (8th  ed.  2004).
Thus,  the  phrase                                                             “an  effort  to  steal”  plainly  alleges  only  an
attempted  larceny  and  is  insufficient  to  charge  Defendant  with
an offense under section  14-72.11(2).
Conclusion
“Judgment  must  be  arrested  when  the  indictment  fails  to
charge  a  criminal  offense  or  fails  to  charge  an  essential




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                                                                                                                                                        element  of  the  offense.”     State  v.  McGaha,   306  N.C.              699,              702,
295  S.E.2d                                                                    449,                                                            451      (1982)                                               (citation  omitted).   “When  judgment
is  arrested  because  of  a  fatal  flaw  which  appears  on  the  face  of
the  record,  such  as  a  substantive  error  on  the  indictment,  the
verdict  itself  is  vacated  and  the                                         [S]tate  must  seek  a  new
indictment  if  it  elects  to  proceed  again  against  the  defendant.”
State  v.  Pakulski,  326  N.C.  434,  439,  390  S.E.2d  129,  132  (1990)
(citation   omitted).                                                          The   indictment   against   Defendant   for
larceny  from  a  merchant  is  fatally  flawed,  and  accordingly,  we
arrest  the  judgment,  which  serves  to  vacate  the  verdict  entered
against  Defendant.    As  a  result,  we  do  not  address  Defendant’s
remaining arguments.
Further,   we   must   reverse   the   judgment   entered   upon
Defendant’s  guilty  plea  to  the  habitual  felon  charge  against
her.                                                                           “[B]eing  an  habitual  felon  is  not  a  crime  and  cannot
support,  standing  alone,  a  criminal  sentence.    Rather,  being  an
habitual  felon  is  a  status  justifying  an  increased  punishment
for  the  principal  felony.”    State  v.  Priddy,  115  N.C.  App.  547,
549,  445  S.E.2d  610,  612,  disc.  review  denied,  337  N.C.  805,  449
S.E.2d                                                                         751                                                             (1994)   (citation  omitted).     Therefore,  where           “there
[i]s  no  pending  felony  prosecution  to  which  the  habitual  felon
proceeding  could  attach  as  an  ancillary  proceeding,”  judgment




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entered   upon   Defendant’s   habitual   felon   conviction   must   be
“reversed  and  the  case  remanded  to  th[e  trial]  court  for  entry
of  an  order  that  the  [habitual  felon]  indictment  be  dismissed.”
State  v.  Allen,                                                          292  N.C.   431,   436,   233  S.E.2d   585,   589   (1977).
Accordingly,  we  reverse  the  habitual  felon  judgment,  and  remand
for dismissal of the habitual felon indictment.
JUDGMENT ARRESTED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, ROBERT C., concur.

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