Preview:

An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA09-280
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          17 November  2009
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                              Wake County
                                                                                                No.  08 CRS  005029
SHAWN LEDERER-HUGHES
Appeal by defendant from judgment and order entered 18 August
2008 by Judge Ripley E. Rand in Wake County Superior Court.   Heard
in the Court of Appeals  3 September  2009.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Peter A. Regulski, for the State.
Appellate  Defender  Staples  Hughes,  by  Assistant  Appellate
Defender Kristen L. Todd, for defendant appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
On                                                                                              18  August            2008,  Shawn  Lederer-Hughes   (“defendant”)  was
convicted  by  a  jury  of  first-degree  rape  of  his  six-year-old
adopted  daughter,  and  sentenced  by  Judge  Ripley  E.  Rand  to  a
minimum of  300 and a maximum of  369 months in prison with lifetime
satellite-based monitoring (“SBM”) thereafter.     Defendant appeals
his judgment arguing that two expert witnesses improperly “vouched”
for  his  daughter’s  veracity,  and  that  he  received  inadequate
representation due to the failure of his trial counsel to raise an




-2-
ex  post  facto  argument  to  the  SBM  order.    We  find  no  error  and
affirm.
Facts
Defendant’s  daughter,  H.L.H.  (“Katie”), 1first  claimed  that
her father had inappropriately touched her at about 8:15 p.m. on  5
January 2008; Katie was six years old at the time.     Katie told her
mother, Deborah, who promptly called defendant, her husband of  13
and  a  half  years,  at  work  after  putting  Katie  back  into  bed.
Defendant  and  Deborah  conferred  over  the  phone  about  Katie’s
accusation,  and  afterward  Deborah  woke  Katie  and  asked  her  where
defendant  had  touched  her.    Katie  responded  that  defendant  had
touched  her  “[i]n  [her]  private”  when  she  was  in  kindergarten  or
first grade.  2
Defendant came home from work after Deborah informed him over
the phone that Katie had reiterated her prior statement.      After a
brief conversation, defendant and Deborah decided to ask Katie some
questions together, and brought their daughter downstairs from her
bed.   Katie repeated that defendant had touched her in her private
or “girl area.”   During the exchange, defendant tried to explain to
Katie that he “would never do this,” which caused Katie to respond,
“Daddy, you know what I’m talking about.”
Deborah  took  Katie  to  the  Cary  branch  of  Wake  County  Child
Protective Services on 8 January 2008 to meet with Danielle Doyle,
1
This pseudonym will be used to refer to the minor child.
2
The charges at trial later identified this time period as  9
June  2006 to  7 January  2008; Katie was between five and six years
old during this time.




-3-
an investigator with the agency.   Ms. Doyle took Katie, along with
her  grandmother  and  Katie’s  sister,  to  an  interview  room  where
Katie told Ms. Doyle that  “she was upset because she had told her
mom a secret  .  .  . that her dad had touched her in  .  .  . her girl
area.”     After  Katie  made  this  particular  statement,  Ms.  Doyle
ceased  asking  Katie  about  the  alleged  abuse,  and  ended  the
interview shortly thereafter.   Ms. Doyle then obtained consent from
Deborah for Katie to have a child medical exam  (“CME”).
The  CME  was  conducted  on                                                 11  January   2008  by  Dr.  Desmond
Runyan,  Professor  of   Pediatrics  and  Social  Medicine  at  the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   At trial, Dr. Runyan
was accepted as an expert in pediatrics and child abuse pediatrics.
Dr. Runyan explained that the CME was a “nose to toes” check, which
included both a general and genital exam.    While examining Katie,
Dr.  Runyan  found  no  abnormalities  during  either  the  general  or
genital exam, and he testified at trial that:  (1) Katie’s genital
area contained no infections, tears, bruises, or discharge; and (2)
Katie  had  a  “normal  hymen  with  normal  structures”  with  no  scars,
tears,   or   bruises.   Toward   the   end   of   Dr.   Runyan’s   direct
examination  at  trial,  the  State  asked  him  whether  he  made           “a
recommendation  for  further  evaluation”  of  Katie  after  conferring
with Scott Snider, Katie’s social worker and Clinical Coordinator
at  Duke  Child  Abuse  and  Neglect  Medical  Evaluation  Clinic.    Dr.
Runyan  stated  over  defendant’s  objection  that  he  and  Mr.  Snider
“recommended that [Katie] be referred to a mental health therapist
with expertise in trauma treatment.”




-4-
Scott  Snider  conducted  a  taped  interview  of  Katie  on                 17
January  2008.    Mr. Snider was accepted without objection at trial
as  an  expert  in  the  field  of                                           “[c]linical  social  work[]          [and]
diagnostic interviewing . . . of children[.]”   The taped interview
of Katie lasted for about an hour, and the interview was published
to  the  jury  at  trial.     During  this  interview,  Katie  disclosed
details   about   the   sexual   abuse,   and   Mr.   Snider   had   Katie
demonstrate interactions between her and defendant with dolls.
After  conducting  the  taped  interview,  Mr.  Snider  met  with  a
team  of  medical  staff  to  evaluate  Katie’s  case,  which  included  a
review of the CME done by Dr. Runyan.    Over defendant’s objection
at  trial,  the  following  exchange  took  place  regarding  a  medical
course of action for Katie:
[THE STATE:] Mr. Snider, . . . during the
team    staff    meeting,    did    you    either
individually   or   together   with   the   team
recommend  that                                                              [Katie]  be  referred  for  any
more in-depth interviews?
A.    Not -- no, ma’am, not interviews for
the purpose of finding out or clarifying what
may have occurred.
Q.    And what was your recommendation[?]
A.    We                                                                     .  recommended  that  she  be
referred    for    mental    health    treatment,
specifically                                                                 .   with   a   clinician
experienced in trauma treatment.
Mr. Snider explained that Katie was not recommended by the team for
another  more                                                                “in-depth”  evaluation  after  the   17  January   2008
interview, because a team recommendation for a more comprehensive
evaluation is generally made only in  “cases where the allegations
.  .  . may not be clear.”




-5-
A  grand  jury  returned  true  bills  of  indictment  against
defendant on 12 February 2008 for: one count of first-degree rape,
three counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense, three counts
of indecent liberties with a child, and one count of disseminating
harmful  materials  to  a  minor.  The  indictments  stated  that  the
alleged offenses occurred between  9 June  2006 and  7 January  2008.
Defendant  testified  at  trial,  and  denied  each  allegation  of
sexual  contact  alleged  by  the  State.  Katie  also  testified,  and
repeated  her  prior  statements  to  the  jury  while  using  anatomical
dolls for illustrative purposes.   At the close of the State’s case-
in-chief,  the  trial  court  dismissed  the  charge  of  disseminating
harmful materials to a minor.
On  18  August  2008,  the  jury  found  defendant  guilty  of  three
counts  of  first-degree  sex  offense  and  one  count  of  first-degree
rape.    Judgment was arrested on all three of the first-degree sex
offense  verdicts,  because  the  trial  court  concluded  that  the
indictments  were  void  based  on  State  v.  Scott,  237  N.C.  432,  75
S.E.2d  154  (1953)  (judgment arrested where indictment referred to
alleged  victim  as  both                                                    “George  Rogers”  and   “George  Sanders”).
Based on the sole charge and conviction of first-degree rape, the
trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of  300 months’ and a
maximum of 369 months’ imprisonment with SBM for life post-release.
Defendant properly gave oral notice of appeal.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal:  (I) whether the trial
court  erred  in  allowing  Dr.  Runyan  and  Mr.  Snider  to  testify
concerning their treatment recommendations for Katie, because their




-6-
expert opinions that further evaluation was not necessary and that
Katie  should  be  referred  for  mental  health  treatment                    “with  a
clinician experienced in trauma treatment” effectively vouched for
Katie’s   credibility;   and                                                   (II)   whether   defendant   received
ineffective assistance of counsel, because defense counsel failed
to  raise  an  ex  post  facto  argument  to  the  SBM  order  where  the
conduct alleged could have occurred prior to the enactment of the
SBM statutes in North Carolina.
I.
Under our standard of review, the trial court is vested with
broad discretion when admitting or excluding expert testimony, and
will  only  be  reversed  upon  a  showing  that  this  discretion  was
abused.    State  v.  Washington,  141  N.C.  App.  354,  362,  540  S.E.2d
388, 395 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 396, 547 S.E.2d 427
(2001),  disc.  review  denied,                                                610  S.E.2d                                            716   (2005).     Abuse  of
discretion arises where the trial court’s decision is  “manifestly
unsupported  by  reason  or  is  so  arbitrary  that  it  could  not  have
been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C.
279,  285,  372 S.E.2d  523,  527  (1988)  (citing State v. Parker,  315
N.C.  249,  258,  337 S.E.2d  497,  503  (1985)).
The  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence  provide  that  expert
opinion  is  admissible  where  it  helps  the  trial  court  “understand
the  evidence”  or                                                             “determine  a  fact  in  issue[.]”     N.C.R.  Evid.
702(a)  (2009).    To determine if expert testimony should have been
admitted at trial, we must examine whether the expert’s opinion is
based  on  his  or  her  “special  expertise[,]  .  .  .  that  is,  whether




-7-
the  witness  because  of  his  expertise  is  in  a  better  position  to
have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact.”    State
v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568-69, 247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978).   As
to the relevance of expert evidence at trial,  “[e]xpert testimony
on  character  or  a  trait  of  character  is  not  admissible  as
circumstantial evidence of behavior.”   N.C.R. Evid. 405(a) (2009).
In   particular,   a   witness’s   character   for   truthfulness   or
untruthfulness may not be attacked or supported by expert opinion.
N.C.R. Evid.  608(a)  (2009); see State v. Heath,  316 N.C.  337,  341
S.E.2d 565 (1986) (new trial awarded where expert opinion admitted
as to witness’s propensity to lie).
Within the framework of these rules, it follows in the context
of  sexual  offense  cases  with  child  victims  that  “the  trial  court
should  not  admit  expert  opinion  that  sexual  abuse  has  in  fact
occurred because, absent physical evidence supporting a diagnosis
of  sexual  abuse,  such  testimony  is  an  impermissible  opinion
regarding  the  victim’s  credibility.”    State  v.  Stancil,  355  N.C.
266,  266-67,  559  S.E.2d  788,  789  (2002)  (per  curiam).    However,
Stancil does not preclude an expert from testifying, upon a proper
foundation,  “as  to  the  profiles  of  sexually  abused  children  and
whether  a  particular  complainant  has  symptoms  or  characteristics
consistent therewith.”   Id. at 267, 559 S.E.2d at 789; see State v.
Kennedy,                                                                     320  N.C.   20,   32,   357  S.E.2d   359,   366   (1987)   (expert
opinion properly admitted showing  “that the symptoms exhibited by
the victim were consistent with sexual or physical abuse”).




-8-
Defendant  attempts  to  analogize  this  case  to  State  v.  Hall,
330 N.C.  808,  412 S.E.2d  883  (1992) and State v. Holloway,  82 N.C.
App.                                                                            586,                                                           347  S.E.2d   72                (1986),  in  which  the  defendants  were
granted new trials based on improperly admitted expert testimony.
However, both cases are readily distinguishable.
In State v. Holloway, a pediatrician and a child psychologist
testified                                                                       “that   in   their   opinion   the   child   had   testified
truthfully”  in  alleging  that  a  sexual  offense  had  occurred.
Holloway,                                                                       82  N.C.  App.  at                                             587,          347  S.E.2d  at   73.                                         This  Court
concluded that such testimony clearly violated Rules 405 and 608 of
the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.    Id.
Our Supreme Court in State v. Hall held that “evidence that a
prosecuting  witness  has  suffered  a  conversion  reaction  may  be
admitted for corroborative purposes to the same extent as evidence
that she has suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome.”     Hall,
330  N.C.  at  823,  412  S.E.2d  at  891.    The  Hall  Court  then  awarded
the defendant a new trial, and concluded that the expert opinions
admitted at trial were improper absent a limiting instruction.
Dr.   Sinal’s   testimony   relating   to   M.M.’s
treatment and condition largely addressed her
conversion  reaction  to  the  alleged  sexual
abuse   by   her   stepfather.   Similarly,   Dr.
Haberkern’s   testimony   indicated   that   M.M.
suffered  a  conversion  disorder,  as  evidenced
by  her  paralysis,  and  from  post-traumatic
stress   syndrome.   The   testimony   of   both
witnesses,  taken  over  defendant’s  repeated
objections, was not limited by the trial court
to any particular purpose. It was admitted for
the  substantive  purpose  of  allowing  the  jury
to  infer  that  M.M.  had  in  fact  been  raped.
Because  this  evidence  was  not  limited  by  the
trial court to corroborating M.M.’s version of




-9-
the  events  that  transpired  on                                           13  February
1988, we find error in its admission.
Id. at  823,  412 S.E.2d at  891-92.
In  this  appeal,  we  are  not  presented  with  a  diagnosis  as  in
Hall  or  an  unlimited  affirmation  of  Katie’s  veracity  as  in
Holloway.    Rather, defendant argues the treatment recommendations
by Mr. Snider and Dr. Runyan created an inference for the jury that
Katie was being truthful, which in turn created an inference to the
jury that Katie had actually been sexually abused.    This argument
overlooks  the  ambiguity  inherent  in  the  experts’  testimony.
Referral  to  a  trauma  specialist  does  not  confirm  the  guilt  of
defendant--it  only  shows  that  a  child  has  suffered  some  kind  of
trauma needing psychological counseling.   The veracity of the child
is not implicated in a clinical referral, because whether fantasy
or  true,  a  child  reporting  to  adults  the  occurrences  reported
herein is in need of mental health counseling.
In   addition,   Mr.   Snider   testified   at   length   prior   to
defendant’s  objection  concerning  the  treatment  recommendation  of
the team:
Q.  And  what  would  be  some  reasons  that
you  would  refer  a  child  for  a  more  in-depth
[interview]?
A.                                                                          [T]hose  cases  where  the  allegations
.  .  . may not be clear.  .  .
[Like  a]  child  who  might  have  disclosed
something                                                                   .  not  terribly  clear  to  a
professional . . . but then maybe . . . taking
things back.    And maybe family dynamics where
there may be pressure on the child to not say
something  happened.    Or  I  think,  in  general,
complex cases where there may be more than one




-10-
offender, more than one person doing something
to a child.
So   those   types   of   evaluations   are
typically for very complex cases where  -- you
know,   a   child   may   be   sort   of   clearly
uncomfortable   in   an   interview,   would   be
another  example.    A  child  who  .  .  .  clearly
shows  signs                                                                [that]                                          .  he  or  she  may  be
scared to talk in the interview.
No  part  of  the  record  indicates  that  Katie  fit  any  of  these
examples warranting a further evaluation of her claims.   Katie gave
four interviews prior to meeting Mr. Snider and Dr. Runyan, and in
each  one  she  detailed  the  same  story  of  abuse  at  the  hands  of
defendant  without  any  evident  reservation.    Given  this  evidence,
Mr. Snider and Dr. Runyan were clearly justified in (1) determining
that the statements made by Katie  “were consistent with sexual or
physical  abuse[,]”  and                                                    (2)  referring  her  to  receive  appropriate
treatment.    Kennedy,  320 N.C. at  32,  357 S.E.2d at  366.
Defendant admits on appeal that Dr. Runyan did not elaborate
at  trial  as  to  his  reasons  for  recommending  trauma  therapy.
Instead, it was Mr. Snider who testified at length about why Katie
was  not  referred  for  a  more  in-depth  interview.     Prior  to  Mr.
Snider’s  testimony  on  this  issue,  the  trial  court  gave  the
following limiting instruction:
Members  of  the  jury,  as  I  instructed  you
earlier in the trial, this testimony is being
presented  only  to  corroborate  the  previous
testimony given by  [Katie].    This evidence is
not substantive evidence of the crimes charged
in this case, and you are to consider it only
to the degree you find that it corroborates or
does  not  corroborate  the  previous  testimony
given by  [Katie].




-11-
Looking at the above instruction, even if we assume that the
treatment recommendations were a de facto medical diagnosis through
inferences reached by the jury, the trial court properly gave the
jury  a  limiting  instruction,  which  our  Supreme  Court  explicitly
approved  in  Hall,  330  N.C.  at  823,  412  S.E.2d  at  891-92.    Thus,
since the totality of the doctors’ testimony related only to their
recommendations after observing Katie’s symptoms at length, their
testimony  was  admissible  and  relevant  to                                 “determine  a  fact  in
issue[.]”   Kennedy, 320 N.C. at 32, 357 S.E.2d at 366; Stancil, 355
N.C. at  266-67,  559 S.E.2d at  789; N.C.R. Evid.  702(a).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting  the  expert  opinions  of  Mr.  Snider  and  Dr.  Runyan  as  to
Katie’s treatment.    This assignment of error is overruled.
II.
To  prove  an  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  claim,  a
defendant  must  demonstrate:  (1)  “that  counsel’s  performance  fell
below  an  objective  standard  of  reasonableness”;  and  (2)  assuming
that  the  first  prong  is  proven,  “that  the  error  committed  was  so
serious that a reasonable probability exists that the trial result
would have been different.”   State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 112, 558
S.E.2d  463,  488  (2002), cert. denied,  537 U.S.  896,  154 L. Ed.  2d
165 (2002) (citing State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d
241,  248  (1985)).
In State v. Bare, __ N.C. App. __, 677 S.E.2d 518 (2009), this
Court  recently  held  that  this  State’s  SBM  statutes  are  civil  in
nature,  and  that  even  a                                                   “retroactive  application  of  the  SBM




-12-
provisions  do  not  violate  the  ex  post  facto  clause[s]”  of  either
the United States or North Carolina Constitutions.    Bare,  __ N.C.
App.  at                                                                     __,    677  S.E.2d  at   531.     As  such,  even  if  some  of  the
incidents perpetrated by defendant in this case occurred prior to
the enactment of the SBM statutes now challenged, the SBM order in
this  case  fails  to  run  afoul  of  the  ex  post  facto  clauses  as
interpreted by this Court.
State  v.  Bare  shows  that  a  different  result  would  not  have
been reached at trial had an ex post facto argument been presented
by defendant’s trial counsel, and as a result, defendant’s argument
that trial counsel was ineffective is without merit.    Gainey,  355
N.C.  at                                                                     112,   558  S.E.2d  at   488.                                          This  assignment  of  error  is
overruled.
No error.
Judges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

Download 09-280-5.pdf

South Carolina Law