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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KORTNEY J. MADDOX
NO. COA02-1489
Filed:  15 July  2003
1.                                                                                                   Witnesses-hostile-refusal to respond
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to treat an assault victim
as a hostile witness and ask leading questions where the record showed that the witness refused
to answer questions and was evasive when he did respond.
2.                                                                                                   Evidence-hearsay-statement to police-admission not prejudicial-other evidence
The admission of a hostile witness’s statement to police in an assault prosecution was
harmless, even if defendant’s general objection was sufficient, because other evidence revealed
that defendant shot at the witness a number of times with a handgun as the witness ran behind a
tree. There is no possibility that the jury would have reached a different result.
3.                                                                                                   Assault-with a deadly weapon with intent to kill-sufficiency of evidence
There was sufficient evidence of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill where
defendant shot at the victim five times with a nine-millimeter handgun as the victim attempted to
flee, and the victim was spared serious injury or death only by jumping behind a tree.
4.                                                                                                   Assault-multiple shots-single assault
The trial court erred by not dismissing four of five assault charges as part of a single
assault where the shots were fired in a single place in rapid succession and were not separate
events requiring defendant to employ his thought processes each time he fired the gun.
5.                                                                                                   Sentencing-offense committed during probation-evidence
The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant for assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill by finding that the offense was committed while he was on probation and adding a
point to his prior record level. Although the State did not move to admit the record check, it was
handed up to the trial court and was sufficient to support the finding.
Appeal by defendant from judgments dated 22 May 2002 by Judge
Mark E. Klass in Iredell County Superior Court.   Heard in the Court
of Appeals  12 June  2003.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Joan M. Cunningham, for the State.
Duncan B. McCormick for defendant-appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.




Kortney J. Maddox (defendant) appeals from judgments dated 22
May  2002 entered consistent with jury verdicts finding him guilty
on five separate counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill.
At  trial,  the  State  presented  testimony  from  the  alleged
victim  David  McLean,  Jr.                                                   (McLean).     McLean  testified  that  he
“barely” remembered the incident in question, he and defendant had
“made up,” and were now “friends.”   McLean further asserted that he
did not remember his conversation with the prosecutor the previous
day and that he preferred “not to answer no questions, sir.”   After
continuing  to  evade  the  State’s  questions,  McLean  stated  he
remembered  telling  the  prosecutor  the  previous  day  that  the
incident  began  at  the                                                      “liquor  house”  on                         21  October   2000  after
McLean thought defendant had made a comment about his girlfriend.
The  prosecutor  asked  if  he  was  referring  to  Tate’s  Liquor  House.
McLean responded,  “Yes, that’s where I shot at  [defendant] first,
and then [defendant] shot back at me.”   McLean could not recall how
much  time  elapsed  between  the  time  he  shot  at  defendant  and  when
defendant shot at him, except that it was a short time later, and
refused to state where that shooting occurred.    Following further
evasive answers and his reluctance or inability to remember events,
the State requested that McLean be declared a hostile witness.
After arguments by counsel, the trial court allowed the State
“wide   latitude”   to   ask   McLean   leading   questions   on   direct
examination.    When  questioning  resumed,  McLean  admitted  giving  a
statement  to  the  police  approximately  thirty  minutes  after  the
shooting and reviewing that statement with the prosecutor the day




before  trial.     The  State  moved  to  admit  the  statement  into
evidence,  and  defendant  entered  only  a  general  objection.    The
trial court overruled the objection and admitted the statement into
evidence without any limiting instruction.
McLean specifically recalled telling the police officer that
he  was  at  the  intersection  of  Bell  and  Harrison  Streets  in
Statesville,  North  Carolina  on                                             21  October                                                     2000  and  observed
defendant pointing a Tech-9 pistol.   He remembered stating that he
ran  and  defendant  chased  him  firing  a  number  of  shots.    McLean
testified directly that he heard numerous shots fired at him from
behind as he ran away and had jumped behind a tree to escape.    He
denied  showing  the  officer  the  tree  he  ran  behind  or  to  pointing
out the spot from where the shots had been fired.
Officer David Onley testified he was a police officer with the
Statesville Police Department.   On 21 October 2000, he responded to
a  call  of                                                                   “shots  fired”  on  Harrison  Street.    He  arrived  on  the
scene  less  than  a  minute  later  and  was  approached  by  McLean,  who
came running up to the patrol car.    McLean was sweating profusely
and  out  of  breath,  and  he  told  Officer  Onley  that  defendant  was
trying  to  kill  him.    After  securing  the  scene  and  unsuccessfully
attempting  to  interview  other  witnesses,  Officer  Onley  took
defendant’s statement.   The next day, Officer Onley returned to the
scene and, based on McLean’s description of the incident, located
five  spent  nine-millimeter  shell  casings  in  the  road.    Officer
Onley  knew  that  a  Tech-9  pistol  was  a  nine-millimeter  handgun.
McLean  pointed  out  to  Onley  the  tree  behind  which  he  had  fled.
Upon inspection of the tree, Officer Onley located five holes in it




that seemed to be fresh.   A photograph of the tree showing the five
holes  was  admitted  into  evidence.     Officer  Onley’s  report  was
admitted into evidence with an instruction to the jury that it was
to be considered as only corroborating or impeachment evidence and
not  as  substantive  evidence.    In  its  final  instructions  to  the
jury,   the   trial   court   generally   instructed   that   any   prior
out-of-court statements could be used to weigh only the credibility
of the witnesses by corroborating or contradicting trial testimony
and could not be considered as substantive evidence.
At sentencing, defendant stipulated to four prior misdemeanor
convictions.    The  State  further  argued  that  defendant  should  be
assessed  an  additional  prior  record  point  as  the  assault  was
committed  while  defendant  was  on  probation.     The  State  then
tendered  a  prior  record  level  worksheet  to  opposing  counsel  and
handed it to the trial court in support of the prior convictions.
The State also handed up a criminal record check showing defendant
was on probation at the time of the present offense, although the
record check was not admitted into evidence.   The trial court found
defendant  was  on  probation  at  the  time  of  the  offense,  which
resulted  in  defendant  having  five  prior  record  points  and  being
sentenced at Prior Record Level III.
The issues are whether: (I) the trial court erred by allowing
the State to use leading questions to examine McLean and admitting
McLean’s  prior  statement;                                                 (II)  there  was  sufficient  evidence  of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill;  (III) defendant
was  properly  convicted  of  five  counts  of  assault  arising  from  a




single assault; and (IV) the trial court erred in finding defendant
was on probation at the time of the offense.
I
Defendant first contends the trial court erred by allowing the
State  to  treat  McLean  as  a  hostile  witness  by  using  leading
questions  to  examine  him  and,  further,  that  the  admission  of
McLean’s prior statement into evidence during this examination was
improper.
A. Hostile Witness
[1]  Rule                                                                       611(c)  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence
provides:                                                                       “Leading  questions  should  not  be  used  on  the  direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his
testimony.”                                                                     N.C.G.S.                                                      §   8C-1,  Rule   611(c)   (2001).   Leading
questions may be used during direct examination when a party calls
a hostile or unwilling   witness.   Id.                                         “Whether to allow a leading
question on direct examination clearly falls within the discretion
of  the  trial  court.”    State  v.  York,  347  N.C.  79,  90,  489  S.E.2d
380,  386-87  (1997).    Thus,  a  trial  court’s  decision  to  allow  or
disallow leading questions will be upheld absent an abuse of that
discretion.    See  id.  at  90,  489  S.E.2d  at  387;  State  v.  Riddick,
315 N.C.  749,  756,  340 S.E.2d  55,  59  (1986).
In this case, the record shows McLean refused to answer some
questions and was evasive in his answers when he did respond.    He
asserted  that  defendant  and  he  were  friends,  they  had  “made  up”
following  the  shooting,  and  he  preferred  not  to  answer  any
questions.    Based  on  this  record,  the  trial  court  was  within  its
discretion to allow the State to treat McLean as a hostile witness




by asking leading questions.
B. Prior Statement
[2] Defendant further contends that the admission of McLean’s
prior   statement   to   police   following   the   shooting   was   an
impermissible  use  of  impeachment  evidence  as  a  subterfuge  to
present to the jury inadmissible hearsay testimony as substantive
evidence.   Defendant, however, entered only a general objection to
the  admission  of  the  prior  statement  without  stating  specific
grounds and, further, did not request a limiting instruction on the
extent  to  which  the  jury  could  consider  the  statement.    As  such,
defendant  has  waived  appellate  review  of  this  issue.    See  N.C.R.
App.  P.                                                                      10(b)(2).   Assuming  without  deciding,  however,  that
defendant properly preserved his objection and the prior statement
constituted inadmissible hearsay, the admission of this statement
was  not  prejudicial  error  as  we  determine  there  was  sufficient
evidence  upon  which  the  jury  could  convict  defendant  of  assault
with  a  deadly  weapon  with  intent  to  kill.    The  evidence  reveals,
even without the prior statement, that defendant shot at McLean a
number  of  times  with  a  nine-millimeter  handgun  in  response  to  an
earlier confrontation as McLean ran behind a tree.    Officer Onley
found five nine-millimeter shell casings and observed five holes in
the tree behind which McLean indicated he had fled.   Based on this
uncontradicted  and  substantial  evidence  of  all  the  elements  of
assault  with  a  deadly  weapon  with  intent  to  kill,  there  is  no
reasonable  possibility  that  the  jury  in  this  case  would  have
reached  a  different  result.    See  N.C.G.S.  §  15A-1443(a)  (2001).
Thus, admission of the prior statements was at most harmless error.




II
[3]  Defendant  next  contends  the  trial  court  erred  by  not
dismissing the charges of assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to  kill  because  there  was  insufficient  evidence  that  defendant
intended to kill McLean.    We disagree.
A motion to dismiss should be denied if “there is substantial
evidence  (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and
(2)  that  defendant  is  the  perpetrator  of  the  offense.”    State  v.
Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990).                         “Substantial
evidence  is  that  relevant  evidence  which  a  reasonable  mind  would
find sufficient to support a conclusion.”   State v. Carr, 122 N.C.
App.  369,  372,  470  S.E.2d  70,  72  (1996).    In  determining  whether
there  is  evidence  sufficient  for  a  case  to  go  to  the  jury,  the
trial   court   must   consider   the   evidence,   both   direct   and
circumstantial,  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State,  giving
the   State   the   benefit   of   every   reasonable   inference   drawn
therefrom.    Id.                                                             “An  intent  to  kill  is  a  mental  attitude,  and
ordinarily it must be proved, if proven at all, by circumstantial
evidence, that is, by proving facts from which the fact sought to
be proven may be reasonably inferred.”   State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C.
454,  457,  526 S.E.2d  460,  462  (2000)  (citation omitted)  (internal
quotations  omitted).                                                         “The  nature  of  the  assault,  the  manner  in
which  it  was  made,  the  weapon,  if  any,  used,  and  the  surrounding
circumstances are all matters from which an intent to kill may be
inferred.”    Id.  (citation omitted)  (internal quotations omitted).
“Moreover,  an  assailant  must  be  held  to  intend  the  natural
consequences  of  his  deliberate  act.”     Id.                              (citation  omitted)




(internal quotations omitted).
The  evidence  in  this  case  reveals  that  defendant  shot  at
McLean five times with a Tech-9 nine-millimeter handgun as McLean
attempted to flee.    McLean was only spared from serious injury or
death  by  jumping  behind  a  tree.    The  nature  and  manner  of  this
assault and the weapon used is substantial evidence that defendant
intended  to  kill  McLean.    Thus,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in
dismissing  the  charges  based  upon  the  insufficiency  of  the
evidence.
III
[4]  Defendant  also  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  not
dismissing four of the five assault charges on the ground that the
five  gunshots  actually  constituted  only  a  single  assault.     We
agree.
In order for a defendant to be charged with multiple counts of
assault,  there  must  be  multiple  assaults.    State  v.  Brooks,  138
N.C.  App.                                                                    185,                                                     189,   530  S.E.2d   849,   852   (2000).    This  requires
evidence  of                                                                  “a  distinct  interruption  in  the  original  assault
followed  by  a  second  assault.”    Id.    In  State  v.  Dilldine,  this
Court  noted  that  it  was  improper  to  have  two  indictments  and  two
offenses arising out of a single episode simply because the victim
was shot three times in the front and twice in the back.   Dilldine,
22 N.C. App.  229,  231,  206 S.E.2d  364,  366  (1974).   The Court went
on to state that to conclude otherwise would make it reasonable to
charge the defendant with five assaults simply because five shots
had been fired.    Id.
The  scenario  cautioned  against  in  Dilldine  is  exactly  the




scenario  presented  in  the  case  sub  judice.    There  is  no  evidence
that  the  five  shots  fired  by  defendant  at  McLean  were  separate
assaults: the State presented no evidence of the time between each
shot  and  what  evidence  does  exist  indicates  that  all  five  shots
were fired in rapid succession at approximately the same target, as
indicated by the bullet holes in the tree.   The State’s attempts to
analogize  this  case  to  State  v.  Nobles,  350  N.C.  483,  515  S.E.2d
885                                                                           (1999)  and  State  v.  Rambert,   341  N.C.   173,                                     459  S.E.2d   510
                                                                              (1995)   are   unpersuasive.                   First   of   all,   both   cases   are
distinguishable  in  that  neither  involved  charges  of  assault  but
instead  multiple  charges  of  discharging  a  weapon  into  occupied
property.    See  Nobles,  350  N.C.  at  504-05,  515  S.E.2d  at  898-99;
Rambert, 341 N.C. at 175-77, 459 S.E.2d at 512-13.   The evidence in
Rambert revealed that the victim’s vehicle was parked in a parking
lot when the defendant pulled up next to him.   Rambert, 341 N.C. at
176,  459  S.E.2d  at  512-13.    The  defendant  produced  a  handgun  and
the  victim  ducked.    Id.    The  defendant  fired  a  single  shot  that
entered  through  the  front  of  the  victim’s  windshield.    Id.    The
victim then attempted to escape by driving forward; defendant shot
a second time hitting the passenger side door.   Id.   Defendant than
began  pursuing  the  victim  and  fired  a  third  shot  into  the  rear
bumper  of  the  victim’s  vehicle.    Id.    In  Nobles,  the  evidence
revealed  a  total  of  seven  bullets  had  been  fired  into  a  vehicle:
two  in  the  windshield;  one  below  the  windshield;  one  near  a
headlight; one near the top of the truck bed; one in the truck bed;
and one that had shattered the driver’s side door window.   Nobles,
350 N.C. at  505,  515 S.E.2d at  898-99.




In  both  of  these  cases  the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court
concluded  the  evidence  was  sufficient  to  support  the  multiple
charges of discharging a weapon into occupied property as it showed
each defendant had been required to “‘employ his thought processes
each  time  he  fired  the  weapon’”  and  that  each  shot  was  an  “‘act
.  distinct  in  time,  and  each  bullet  hit  the  vehicle  in  a
different place.’”    Id.  (quoting Rambert,  341 N.C. at  176-77,  459
S.E.2d  at                                                                    513).   Both  of  these  cases  relied  on  evidence  that
defendant had not used an automatic weapon and that the shots fired
into  the  property  were  located  in  numerous  places  around  the
respective vehicles.    Id.
In this case, the evidence shows five bullets struck a single
tree all in close proximity to each other, and there is no evidence
to suggest anything other than that the shots were fired in rapid
succession.    Furthermore,  the  evidence  indicates,  and  the  State
asserts, that the weapon used was a semi-automatic handgun.    When
a semi-automatic weapon is fired “it will fire the round that is in
the chamber, eject the spent casing and move another round from the
magazine  into  the  firing  chamber.    Such  a  pistol  automatically
cocks itself for the second round.”   State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278,
293,  406  S.E.2d  876,  884-85  (1991).    Our  Courts  have  recognized
that a semi-automatic weapon “may be used normally to fire several
bullets  .  .  .  in  rapid  succession.”    State  v.  Antoine,  117  N.C.
App. 549, 551, 451 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) (quoting State v. Carver,
319 N.C. 665, 667-68, 356 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1987)).   Therefore, the
evidence in this case, as distinct from both Nobles and Rambert, is
that the shots were fired at a single place in rapid succession and




were not separate events requiring defendant to employ his thought
processes  each  time  he  fired  the  gun.     This  case  is  instead
analogous  to  Dilldine  and  Brooks  where,  in  each  case,  multiple
gunshots constituted only a single assault.    Thus, there was only
evidence  sufficient  to  support  a  single  charge  of  assault  with  a
deadly weapon with intent to kill, and the trial court should have
arrested judgment on the remaining four counts.
IV
[5] Defendant finally contends that the trial court erred in
finding  that  the  offense  was  committed  while  he  was  on  probation
and   adding   an   additional   point   to   his   prior   record   level
determination  for  a  total  of  five  points,  which  resulted  in
defendant being sentenced at Prior Record Level III.   See N.C.G.S.
§                                                                             15A-1340.14(b)(7)                                        (2001)   (providing  for  an  additional  prior
record point where the offense was committed while defendant was on
probation, parole, post-release supervision, while serving a term
of imprisonment, or while on escape).
The record in this case reveals that, although the State did
not move to admit the record check, it was handed up to the trial
court.  1  Our  review  of  the  record  check  considered  by  the  trial
court  reveals  that  defendant  was  sentenced  to  twenty-four  months
probation  on                                                                 26  January                                              2000.    The  offense  in  this  case  was
committed  on                                                                 21  October                                                       2000,  less  than  nine  months  later.    We
1
On  27  May                                                                   2003,  this  Court  allowed  the  State’s  motions  to
amend  the  record  to  include  the  record  check  handed  to  the  trial
court.   The State concedes this record check was not admitted into
evidence but states it was handed to the trial court.    Defendant,
although asserting the record check was not admitted into evidence,
does  not  contest  the  State’s  assertion  that  it  was  handed  to  the
trial court.




conclude the record check in this case is sufficient to support a
finding  that  defendant  was  on  probation  at  the  time  he  committed
the offense.   Thus, we conclude defendant is not entitled to a new
sentencing hearing.
Accordingly, we uphold defendant’s conviction and sentence on
a single count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
but reverse and dismiss four of the five convictions.   See N.C.G.S.
§  15A-1447  (2001)  (relief available on criminal appeal).
Case No.  00 CRS  56703: No error.
Case Nos.  01 CRS  1087-90: Reversed and Dismissed.
Judges McGEE and GEER concur.

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