Preview:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOEL MATIAS
No.  307A01
(Filed  18 December  2001)
Drugs-constructive possession-cocaine in car seat
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss a cocaine possession charge where defendant had been in a
car where    drugs were found for about twenty minutes; there was
an odor of marijuana in the car and marijuana seeds and rolling
papers were found in the car, so that a    juror could reasonably
conclude that defendant knew there were drugs in the car; a juror
could reasonably conclude that the drugs came from a package
hidden in the seat under defendant; and an officer testified that
defendant was the only person who could have shoved the package
containing the cocaine into the crease in the seat.
Justice BUTTERFIELD dissenting.
Justice ORR joins in this dissenting opinion.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S.  §  7A-30(2) from the decision of
a divided panel of the Court of Appeals,  143 N.C. App.  445,  550
S.E.2d  1  (2001), finding no error in a judgment entered
14 September  1999 by Spencer, J., in Superior Court, Alamance
County.    Heard in the Supreme Court  16 October  2001.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Clinton C. Hicks, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.
Craig T. Thompson for defendant-appellant.
WAINWRIGHT, Justice.
On  19 April  1999, Joel Matias  (defendant) was indicted for
possession of cocaine.    On  14 September  1999, a jury found
defendant guilty of this charge.    The trial court sentenced
defendant to a term of four to five months imprisonment,
suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on supervised
probation for eighteen months.    The majority of the panel in the




Court of Appeals concluded defendant received a trial free from
error.    State v. Matias,  143 N.C. App.  445,  550 S.E.2d  1  (2001).
Judge Hunter dissented.    We affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The evidence presented at trial tends to show as follows:
On  28 March  1999, Burlington Police Officers Jesse Qualls and Sam
Epps were working as off-duty security guards at the Creekside
Apartments.    The officers’ duties at the apartments include
“maintain[ing] the peace.”    Around  9:00 p.m. on  28 March, the
officers, who were in a patrol car, saw a car with a Tennessee
license plate driving through the parking lot at approximately
five miles per hour.    After the car passed the officers, Qualls
detected an odor of marijuana.    When the car turned right into a
parking space, the officers pulled in behind the car and
initiated a stop.
When the officers approached the car, Epps also smelled
marijuana.    The officers questioned the occupants and determined
the driver did not have an operator’s license.    The officers
removed the driver from the car, conducted a pat-down search,
arrested the driver, and instructed the other three occupants to
exit the car one at a time.    Defendant exited last from the right
rear seat of the car.
During a search of the car incident to arrest, the officers
found  “a small clear plastic  [bag] with a green leafy substance,
vegetable material, and a small piece of tin foil that was kind
of balled up inside of that.”    The green, leafy substance was
identified as marijuana.    The plastic bag was located between the




seat pad and back pad in the back right seat where defendant had
been sitting.    A white, powdery substance, later identified by
the State Bureau of Investigation as cocaine, was found inside
the tin foil.    According to Officer Epps, defendant was the only
person who could have placed the plastic bag in the space between
the seat pads.    The officers also observed marijuana seeds in the
car’s carpet and found rolling papers, an unopened beer can, and
a cigar inside the car.
Defendant’s father testified defendant left home that
evening around  8:40 p.m. when a car blew the horn.    Defendant
testified he left home to go to a dance and rode in the back
right seat of the car.    Defendant’s father did not recall any
discussion about his son going to a dance that evening.
The sole issue defendant presents to this Court is whether
the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss at the
close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the
evidence.
“When considering a motion to dismiss,  ‘[i]f the trial court
determines that a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt
may be drawn from the evidence, it must deny the defendant’s
motion and send the case to the jury even though the evidence may
also support reasonable inferences of the defendant’s
innocence.’”    State v. Alexander,  337 N.C.  182,  187,  446 S.E.2d
83,  86  (1994)  (quoting State v. Smith,  40 N.C. App.  72,  79,  252
S.E.2d  535,  540  (1979)), quoted in State v. Grigsby,  351 N.C.
454,  456-57,  526 S.E.2d  460,  462  (2000).    In analyzing a motion
to dismiss, the trial court must consider the evidence in the




light most favorable to the State.    State v. Davis,  325 N.C.  693,
696,  386 S.E.2d  187,  189  (1989).    Moreover, the State is given
every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.    Id.
If substantial evidence exists, whether direct, circumstantial,
or both, supporting a finding that the offense charged was
committed by the defendant, the case must be left for the jury.
Id. at  696-97,  386 S.E.2d at  189.                                      “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.”    State v. Brown,  310 N.C.  563,  566,  313
S.E.2d  585,  587  (1984).
“[I]n a prosecution for possession of contraband materials,
the prosecution is not required to prove actual physical
possession of the materials.”    State v. Perry,  316 N.C.  87,  96,
340 S.E.2d  450,  456  (1986).    Proof of nonexclusive, constructive
possession is sufficient.    Id.    Constructive possession exists
when the defendant,  “while not having actual possession,  .  .  .
has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion
over” the narcotics.    State v. Beaver,  317 N.C.  643,  648,  346
S.E.2d  476,  480  (1986).                                                “Where such materials are found on the
premises under the control of an accused, this fact, in and of
itself, gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession
which may be sufficient to carry the case to the jury on a charge
of unlawful possession.”    State v. Harvey,  281 N.C.  1,  12,  187
S.E.2d  706,  714  (1972).                                                “However, unless the person has
exclusive possession of the place where the narcotics are found,
the State must show other incriminating circumstances before
constructive possession may be inferred.”    Davis,  325 N.C. at




697,  386 S.E.2d at  190; see also Brown,  310 N.C. at  569,  313
S.E.2d at  588-89.
In the present case, since defendant did not have exclusive
possession of the car in which the cocaine was found, the
critical issue is whether the evidence discloses other
incriminating circumstances sufficient for the jury to find
defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine.    See Davis,
325 N.C. at  697,  386 S.E.2d at  190.    When the evidence is
examined in the light most favorable to the State, we find such
additional incriminating circumstances do exist and the trial
court therefore properly denied defendant’s motions to dismiss.
See id. at  697-99,  386 S.E.2d at  190-91; see also Brown,  310 N.C.
at  569-70,  313 S.E.2d at  589.
At the time of his arrest, defendant had been in the car
approximately twenty minutes.    According to both officers, there
was an odor of marijuana in the car.    The officers also found
marijuana seeds and rolling papers inside the car.    Accordingly,
a juror could reasonably determine defendant knew drugs were in
the car.    A juror could also reasonably conclude the drugs came
from the package hidden in the car seat under defendant.
Finally, Officer Epps testified defendant was the only person in
the car who could have shoved the package containing the cocaine
into the crease of the car seat.
We hold this evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, supports the charge of possession of
cocaine.    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in submitting
that charge to the jury.    The decision of the Court of Appeals is




affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Justice Butterfield dissenting.
The majority’s holding sets a troubling precedent that mere
proximity to hidden narcotics is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.    I take issue with such a precedent.    The majority
correctly found that the vehicle in which defendant was riding
was not in the exclusive possession of defendant.    As such,
additional incriminating circumstances must exist for the trial
court to properly deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.    The
majority asserts that there were additional incriminating
circumstances.    However, my review of the record leads me to the
conclusion that there were no additional incriminating
circumstances sufficient to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority found the following:
At the time of his arrest, defendant had been in
the car approximately twenty minutes.    According to
both officers, there was an odor of marijuana in the
car.    The officers also found marijuana seeds and
rolling papers inside the car.    Accordingly, a juror
could reasonably determine defendant knew drugs were in
the car.
(Emphasis added.)    I am not persuaded by the majority’s
reasoning.    Defendant was convicted of the offense of possession
of cocaine.    I do not believe that one can reasonably infer that
defendant should have known of the existence of cocaine in the
vehicle because he could have smelled the odor of marijuana and
seen marijuana seeds and rolling papers.    The evidence in this




case could lead to a reasonable inference that there was
marijuana in the vehicle, but not that there was an odorless
substance such as cocaine in the vehicle.    The majority stated
that defendant must have known that there were  “drugs” in the
vehicle.    The State’s burden was to specifically prove that
defendant knew of the presence of cocaine, not  “drugs,” in the
vehicle.
I find it particularly difficult to accept any reasonable
inference that defendant should have known of the existence of
cocaine from the marijuana smell.    One of the arresting officers
testified that he did not believe this inference was possible.
The prosecutor had the following colloquy with Officer Epps:
Q.    And could you tell the jury why only Mr. Matias
[defendant] was charged with  [possession of cocaine]?
A.    The location that I found the baggy of marijuana
was under Mr. Matias’ seat along with the tinfoil.    In
my opinion I felt that, with the odor that Officer
Qualls indicated to me that he detected and the odor
that I detected and also seeing the baggy which I
believed to be marijuana, I felt like everyone in the
car had knowledge that there was marijuana in the car
or being used in the car.    The cocaine, however, to my
knowledge, does not give off an odor that is
detectable.    So Mr. Matias was charged with  [possession
of] cocaine due to the fact of it being under the seat
that he was sitting in.
Q. So in other words, Officer, based on the smell and
other items that would lead you to believe that
everybody else knew about the marijuana, they were thus
charged with  [possession of] marijuana?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you had no other evidence that anybody else
would have known or knew about the cocaine?
A. That’s correct.
Clearly, since the officer did not believe the other




occupants  “would have known or knew about the cocaine,” the smell
of marijuana and the presence of rolling paper could not have
been the basis for his arrest of defendant.    This testimony
reveals that the officer’s only basis for charging defendant was
his proximity to the bag of marijuana and cocaine that was hidden
in the seat.    When asked if either he or the other officer
noticed anything unusual or any kind of surreptitious movements,
Officer Epps responded,  “No, sir, I would have remembered that if
it had taken place.”    This testimony satisfies me that there were
no incriminating circumstances attributable to defendant.    The
officers found cocaine and simply charged the person sitting
closest to it.
I do not believe the State is entitled to such an
unreasonable inference as the majority has drawn from these
facts.    I believe that the trial court erred in failing to grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss.    Therefore, I vote to reverse the
opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Justice ORR joins in this dissenting opinion.

Download 307a01-9.pdf

South Carolina Law