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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA03-1636
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 December  2004
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.                                                                                              Edgecombe County
                                                                                                No.  00 CRS  52529
BARRY TYRONE PITTS,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 7 May 2003 by Judge
Milton F. Fitch, Jr., in Edgecombe County Superior Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  1 September  2004.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Diane A. Reeves, for the State.
Appellate  Defender  Staples  Hughes,  by  Assistant  Appellate
Defender Charlesena Elliot Walker, for defendant-appellant.
THORNBURG, Judge.
Defendant was indicted on one charge of murder.   A jury found
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.    Defendant appeals.
Sometime  after  midnight  on                                                                   21  December         2000,  William  Henry
Jones was shot in the chest outside of 104 Townhouse Court in Rocky
Mount,  North  Carolina.     That  address  was  the  home  of  Jones’s
sister,  Tamara  Jones.    Tamara  arrived  home  from  work  that  night
sometime around 9:30 p.m., to find her boyfriend, Walter Lyons, her
children, and her sister, Monique Jones, in the home.   Tamara asked
Monique and Walter where her other siblings, Stephanie, Demetrice,




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and  William  Jones,  were,  as  Tamara  had  spoken  with  them  by  phone
earlier  that  night  while  they  were  at  her  home.    Monique  told
Tamara that they had gone across the street to the “Liquor House.”
After Tamara had been home for an hour to an hour and a half,
Stephanie  arrived  and  was  very  upset  and  crying.    Stephanie  told
Tamara that she and defendant had been arguing at the Liquor House.
Demetrice  returned  from  the  Liquor  House  shortly  thereafter  and
urged  Stephanie  to  go  outside  and  speak  with  defendant.    Tamara
also  urged  Stephanie  to  speak  with  defendant  so  as  to  avoid  any
trouble.    After  Stephanie  had  been  outside  for  several  minutes,
Tamara heard defendant yelling obscenities at Stephanie.
As  Stephanie  and  defendant  were  arguing,  William  left  the
Liquor House and joined Stephanie and defendant in Tamara’s front
yard.    William attempted to intervene in the fight on Stephanie’s
behalf.   This angered defendant, who began shouting obscenities at
William as well.   Defendant then pulled out a gun and shot William
in the chest.    After shooting William, defendant fled the area.
Officer  C.D.  Joyner,  of  the  Rocky  Mount  Police  Department,
arrived at 104 Townhouse Court at approximately 12:45 a.m. and was
the first officer on the scene.    At some point after his arrival,
Joyner spoke with Tamara about the events of the night.   Tamara was
also interviewed by Detective Mike Lewis on the day following the
shooting, during which she gave a written statement of the events
of the previous night.
Defendant  claimed  that  he  shot  William  in  self-defense.
Defendant  testified  that  on  the  day  that  William  died,  defendant




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had been drinking and smoking a combination of tobacco and cocaine
all day.   Defendant remembered William joining him and Stephanie in
the yard, but claimed that William started the argument.   Defendant
testified  that  William,  who  was  a  larger  man  than  defendant,
started  to  advance  toward  him  and  backed  defendant  into  a  wall.
Defendant then attempted to push William away.    Defendant claimed
that William began advancing toward him again and defendant saw him
reach with his right hand for what defendant thought was a weapon.
At that point, defendant shot William.
Defendant  was  convicted  by  a  jury  of  second-degree  murder.
Defendant  appeals  and  argues:  (1)  that  the  trial  court  committed
plain  error  in  admitting  parts  of  Tamara’s  prior  statement  to
Officer Joyner as it was inadmissible hearsay;  (2) that the trial
court committed plain error in admitting parts of Tamara’s written
statement  as  it  was  inadmissible  hearsay;  and  (3)  that  the  trial
court  erred  when  it  ordered  restitution  where  the  trial  court
failed to consider defendant’s ability to pay such restitution and
the State failed to present evidence to support the amount of the
award.
The plain error standard is limited in its application to only
two categories of trial error: errors involving evidentiary rulings
and errors involving jury instructions.    State v. Black,  308 N.C.
736, 739-41, 303 S.E.2d 804, 806-07 (1983) (standard applicable to
evidentiary  rulings  by  the  trial  court);  State  v.  Odom,  307  N.C.
655,  660,  300 S.E.2d  375,  378  (1983)  (standard applicable to jury




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instructions).     The  Supreme  Court,  in  speaking  of  when  it  is
appropriate to find plain error, stated:
[The   standard]   is   always   to   be   applied
cautiously  and  only  in  the  exceptional  case
where,  after  reviewing  the  entire  record,  it
can   be   said   the   claimed   error   is   a
“fundamental  error,  something  so  basic,  so
prejudicial,  so  lacking  in  its  elements  that
justice cannot have been done,” or “where [the
error]  is  grave  error  which  amounts  to  a
denial of a fundamental right of the accused,”
or  the  error  has  “‘resulted  in  a  miscarriage
of justice or in the denial to appellant of a
fair trial’” or where the error is such as to
“seriously  affect  the  fairness,  integrity  or
public reputation of judicial proceedings” or
where it can be fairly said “the instructional
mistake  had  a  probable  impact  on  the  jury's
finding that the defendant was guilty.”
Black,  308  N.C.  at  740-41,  303  S.E.2d  at  806-07,(quoting  United
States  v.  McCaskill,                                                       676  F.2d              995,   1002   (4th  Cir.   1982),  cert.
denied,  459 U.S.  1018,  74 L. Ed.  2d  513  (1982)).    Before deciding
that  an  error  by  the  trial  court  amounts  to                          “plain  error,”  the
appellate  court  must  be  convinced  that  absent  the  error  the  jury
probably would have reached a different verdict.   Odom, 307 N.C. at
661,  300  S.E.2d  at  378-79.    In  other  words,  the  appellate  court
must determine that the error in question  “tilted the scales” and
caused  the  jury  to  reach  its  verdict  convicting  the  defendant.
Black,  308 N.C. at  741,  303 S.E.2d at  807.
Defendant contends that it was plain error for the trial court
to admit two prior statements made by Tamara.   Shortly after police
arrived  on  the  scene,  Tamara  gave  a  statement  to  Officer  Joyner.
Tamara also provided police with a written statement of the night’s
events  the  following  day.    Joyner  testified  that  Tamara  told  him




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that  “Stephanie  Jones,  and  Barry  Tyrone  Pitts,  the  suspect,  had
been arguing and that Pitts had pulled a gun on her.”   Tamara read
her  written  statement  into  the  record,  in  which  she  stated:
“Stephanie stated that Barry Pitts had been giving her a bad time
and  had  showed  her  a  gun.”    Defendant  argues  that  Tamara  did  not
testify  that  Stephanie  told  her  defendant  showed  her  a  gun  and
thus,  that  these  two  statements  go  beyond  corroborating  Tamara’s
trial  testimony  and  should  not  have  been  admitted.     Further,
defendant  argues  that  the  statements  were  prejudicial  because
defendant  was  claiming  self-defense  and  the  statements  portray
defendant as aggressive.    We disagree.
Out of court statements which are offered for the truth of the
matter asserted therein are allowed into evidence for the purpose
of  corroborating  the  witness’s  trial  testimony.    State  v.  Ramey,
318 N.C.  457,  349 S.E.2d  566  (1986).    Our courts allow variation,
or new information, in prior consistent statements, so long as the
narration of events is substantially similar to the witness’s in-
court  testimony  and  trial  courts  have  wide  latitude  in  deciding
when a prior consistent statement can be admitted for corroborative
nonhearsay purposes.   State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 104, 552 S.E.2d
596,  617  (2001).    It  is  true,  as  defendant  contends,  that  Tamara
did  not  specifically  say  that  defendant  showed  Stephanie  his  gun
during  her  first  narration  of  the  events  during  her  testimony.
However, even assuming arguendo that Tamara’s prior statements were
improperly  admitted,  we  do  not  conclude  that  defendant  has  shown
plain error.




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Defendant’s argument for prejudice is predicated upon the fact
that  he  presented  the  defense  of  self-defense  at  trial.    Self-
defense  excuses  a  killing  completely  if  the  following  four
necessary elements of perfect self-defense exist at the time of the
killing:
(1)  it  appeared  to  defendant  and  he  believed
it  to  be  necessary  to  kill  the  deceased  in
order  to  save  himself  from  death  or  great
bodily harm; and
(2) defendant's belief was reasonable in that
the  circumstances  as  they  appeared  to  him  at
that  time  were  sufficient  to  create  such  a
belief  in  the  mind  of  a  person  of  ordinary
firmness; and
(3)   defendant   was   not   the   aggressor   in
bringing  on  the  affray,  i.e.,  he  did  not
aggressively  and  willingly  enter  into  the
fight without legal excuse or provocation; and
(4)  defendant  did  not  use  excessive  force,
i.e.,   did   not   use   more   force   than   was
necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be
necessary  under  the  circumstances  to  protect
himself from death or great bodily harm.
State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 585, 588, 461 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1995)
(quoting  State  v.  McAvoy,  331  N.C.  583,  595,  417  S.E.2d  489,  497
(1992)).    However,  “[u]nder the law of imperfect self-defense, if
the  first  two  elements  existed  at  the  time  of  the  killing,  but
defendant, although without murderous intent, was the aggressor in
bringing on the affray or used excessive force, defendant is guilty
at least of voluntary manslaughter.”   Richardson, 341 N.C. at 588,
461 S.E.2d at  726-27  (quoting McAvoy,  331 N.C. at  596,  417 S.E.2d
at  497.




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Any impact of Tamara’s statements that defendant either pulled
or  showed  a  gun  to  Stephanie  was  negligible  in  light  of  all  the
evidence.   Several people testified that defendant had been yelling
and cursing at Stephanie for most of the evening and that William
sought to intervene on her behalf.   Defendant admitted that on the
day in question he had been drinking alcohol and using drugs, that
he  had  a  gun  with  him,  that  he  had  it  with  him  all  day,  that  he
never saw William with a weapon, that he and William were arguing
and that he shot William.    Defendant’s only claim of prejudice is
based on the supposition of what the jury might have thought about
him as an aggressor upon hearing that defendant showed Stephanie a
gun.    When  considered  with  all  the  other  evidence  presented  at
trial,  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  admittance  of  Tamara’s  prior
statements  concerning  whether  defendant  showed  Stephanie  a  gun
caused the jury to convict defendant.    Defendant’s assignments of
error fail.
Defendant  also  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  not
considering  defendant’s  ability  to  pay  the  amount  ordered  as
restitution and in ordering a set amount of restitution based only
upon  the  restitution  worksheet  submitted  by  the  State.    In  the
judgment, the trial court ordered that defendant pay, as condition
of post release supervision, restitution in the amount of  $7,500.
These issues were addressed in State v. Wilson, 340 N.C. 720,
459  S.E.2d  192  (1995).    In  deciding  whether  the  trial  court  must
consider a defendant’s ability to pay restitution, the Court found
that any “trial court’s order of restitution as a condition of work




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release or parole constitutes a recommendation to the Secretary of
the  Department  of  Correction  and  the  Parole  Commission,  not  an
order binding defendant to pay restitution in this amount upon the
entry of judgment in this action.”   Wilson, 340 N.C. at 725-26, 459
S.E.2d  at  195  (emphasis  in  original).    The  Court  then  went  on  to
conclude:
“There  is  no  statutory  requirement  for  a
sentencing judge to inquire into a defendant's
ability  to  pay  restitution  when  the  judge
merely  recommends  restitution  as  a  condition
of  parole  or  work  release.”     We  conclude,
therefore, that the trial court did not err in
failing to consider defendant’s ability to pay
restitution,   as   the   potentially   binding
determination   at   a   later   date   requiring
defendant to pay restitution as a condition of
work   release   or   parole   by   either   the
Department   of   Correction   or   the   Parole
Commission    will    by    necessity    require
sufficient evidence of defendant’s ability to
pay at that time.
Id.  at                                                                        726,   459  S.E.2d  at                                                                           195-96   (internal  citation  omitted).
                                                                                                        Thus,  it  was  not  error  for  the  trial  court  to  not  consider
                                                                                                        defendant’s  ability  to  pay  restitution.     Defendant’s  argument
fails.
However,   the   Wilson   court   went   on   to   conclude   that
“[r]egardless of whether restitution is ordered or recommended by
the  trial  court,  the  amount  must  be  supported  by  the  evidence.”
Id. at  726,  459 S.E.2d at  196  (quoting State v. Daye,  78 N.C. App.
753,                                                                           757,   338  S.E.2d       557,                                                                    560      (1986)).                         In  Wilson,  the  only
evidence supporting the amount of restitution was the prosecutor’s
unsworn  statement.    Wilson,  340  N.C.  at  727,  459  S.E.2d  at  196.
The  court  concluded  that  the  prosecutor’s  unsworn  statement  was




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insufficient to support the amount of restitution recommended and
vacated  that  portion  of  the  judgment.    Id.    In  the  instant  case,
the only evidence to support the amount of restitution recommended
that we find in the record is the prosecutor’s unsworn statement to
the trial court and the unverified restitution worksheet, which is
not itself in the record but is mentioned in the transcript.   This
evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  support  the  amount  of  restitution
recommended.     Thus,  because  the                                           $7,500  amount  of  recommended
restitution  is  not  supported  by  the  evidence  adduced  at  trial  or
sentencing,  we  vacate  that  portion  of  the  judgment  recommending
restitution in the amount of  $7,500.
No error in part; vacated in part.
Judges GEER and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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