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NO. COA12-317
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  2 October  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                            Mecklenburg County
                                                                              No.  07 CRS  213312
KEVIN ANDREW POWELL
Appeal  by  Defendant  from  judgment  entered  29  August  2011  by
Judge  Timothy  S.  Kincaid  in  Mecklenburg  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  12 September  2012.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Special  Deputy  Attorney
General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.
Jones  McVay  Law  Firm  PLLC,  by  Dianne  Jones  McVay,  and
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Procedural History and Evidence
Following  his  indictment  on  one  charge  of  murder,  Defendant
Kevin  Andrew  Powell  pled  not  guilty  to  the  charge  and  was  tried
before   a   jury   in   Mecklenburg   County   Superior   Court.             The
evidence  presented  at  trial  tended  to  show  the  following:    On  10
March                                                                         2007,   Latarshia  Grant,  the  girlfriend  of  the  victim,
Jamarr  Linell  Flowers,  dropped  Flowers  off  at  his  home  around




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9:00  p.m.     Grant  returned  to  Flowers’s  home  between                  10:30  and
11:00  p.m.  and  noticed  that                                               “the  wood  off  the  door  was  gone.”
When  she  pushed  through  the  door,  Grant  saw  Flowers  lying  dead
on the floor.    Grant immediately called  911.
When  law  enforcement  officers  arrived,  they  observed  that
Flowers  had  been  shot  six  times  at  close  range.    Law  enforcement
officers  also  found  a  mobile  phone  on  the  floor  next  to  Flowers
that  did  not  belong  to  him.    Through  their  investigation  of  the
murder,   law   enforcement   officers   determined   that   the   phone
belonged  to  Defendant’s  employer  and  that  the  employer  had  given
the   phone   to   Defendant.                                                 Law   enforcement   officers   later
determined  that  Defendant  received  a  call  from  his  girlfriend  at
10:40  p.m.  and  that  the  call  was  transmitted  to  Defendant’s
phone  by  a  cell  phone  tower  located  less  than  one  mile  from
Flowers’s home.
Thereafter,  Defendant  was  interviewed  by  law  enforcement
officers  and  admitted  that  the  phone  was  his,  but  denied  that  he
had  been  at  the  crime  scene.    After  his  interview,  Defendant  was
arrested.     At  trial,  State’s  witness  Etoyi  Blount  testified
that,  while  sharing  a  jail  cell  with  Defendant  and  several  other
men  following  Defendant’s  arrest,  Blount  heard  one  of  the  men




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ask  Defendant  how  police  had                                              “caught”  Defendant  for  Flowers’s
murder:
And  [Defendant] had told him that  -
[Defendant] told him that the police had
found his phone, or either he wouldn’t be in
jail if the police hadn’t found his phone.
And then the guy asked  [Defendant], Well,
how did the police get your phone?    And
[Defendant] said, I must have dropped it
after I killed him.
Following  the  presentation  of  evidence,  the  trial  court
instructed  the  jury  on  both  first-  and  second-degree  murder.
Thereafter,  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  of  guilty  of  second-
degree  murder,  and  the  trial  court  sentenced  Defendant,  as  a
Level  II  offender,  to  189  —  236  months  imprisonment.    Defendant
appeals.
Discussion
On  appeal,  Defendant  makes  four  arguments:    that  the  trial
court  erred  in  (1)  sentencing  him  as  a  Record  Level  II  offender;
(2)  allowing  a  law  enforcement  officer  to  testify  as  an  expert
in  Jamaican  patois;                                                         (3)   denying  his  motion  to  dismiss  for
insufficiency  of  the  evidence;  and                                        (4)  allowing  the  prosecutor
to  vouch  for  the  credibility  of  a  State’s  witness.    As  discussed
herein, we find no error.
I. Prior Record Level




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Defendant   first   argues   that   the   trial   court   erred   in
sentencing  him  as  a  prior  Record  Level  II  offender  where  the
State  failed  to  produce  sufficient  evidence  of  his  criminal
history.                                                                     Specifically,   Defendant   argues   that   his   trial
counsel’s  oral  stipulation  to  the  existence  of  a  prior  out-of-
state  felony  conviction,  combined  with  the  State’s  submission  of
a  prior  record  level  worksheet,  were  not  sufficient  because
neither  Defendant  nor  his  counsel  had  signed  the  worksheet.    We
disagree.
Although  the  relevant  statute  is  clear  and  specific  about
the  process  for  determining  how  a  defendant’s  prior  record  level
is  calculated  for  sentencing  purposes,  conflation  of  the  steps
involved  and  imprecise  language  in  some  of  our  case  law  has  led
to  occasional  confusion  on  this  issue.     For  this  reason,  we
think  it  useful  to  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  process
before addressing Defendant’s specific argument.
For   purposes   of   sentencing,   a   trial   court   must                 (1)
ascertain   the   type   and   number   of   the   defendant’s   prior
convictions,                                                                 (2)  calculate  the  sum  of  the  points  assigned  for
each   conviction,   and                                                     (3)   based   upon   the   defendant’s   total
points,  determine  the  defendant’s  prior  record  level.    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  15A-1340.14  (2011).    The  existence  of  a  prior  conviction




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under  the  first  step  of  this  process  requires  a  factual  finding.
See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1340.14(a)  (“The  prior  record  level  of
a  felony  offender  is  determined  by  calculating  the  sum  of  the
points  assigned  to  each  of  the  offender’s  prior  convictions  that
the  court                                                                   .  finds  to  have  been  proved  in  accordance  with
this  section.”)  (emphasis  added).    Accordingly,  the  existence  of
a   prior   conviction   may   be   established   by,   inter   alia,
“[s]tipulation   of   the   parties.”                                        N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                §                                                                           15A-
1340.14(f)(1).    Specifically,                                              “[a]  sentencing  worksheet  coupled
with  statements  by  counsel  may  constitute  a  stipulation  to  the
existence  of  the  prior  convictions  listed  therein.”     State  v.
Hinton,  196 N.C. App.  750,  751,  675 S.E.2d  672,  673  (2011).
The  trial  court  next  determines  the  points  assigned  for
each  prior  conviction,  as  provided  in  subsection  b.    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  15A-1340.14(b).    Subsection  b  specifies  the  points  to  be
assigned  based  on  the  class  of  felony  or  misdemeanor  underlying
each  prior  conviction.     Id.     For  example,  a  single  Class  I
felony  conviction  results  in  an  assignment  of  two  points.    N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                  §                                                                                                                                              15A-1340.14(b)(4).     For  a  prior  conviction  from
                                                                                                                                                other  jurisdictions,  the  default  classification  is  “as  a  Class  I
                                                                                                                                                felony   if   the   jurisdiction   in   which   the   offense   occurred
                                                                             classifies  the  offense  as  a  felony[.]”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                        §   15A-




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1340.14(e)                                                                     (also  noting  that  the  State  or  a  defendant   may
attempt  to  show  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  an  out-
of-state  conviction  is  substantially  similar  to  a  different
class of offense in this State).
While                                                                          “the  question  of  whether  a  conviction  under  an  out-
of-state  statute  is  substantially  similar  to  an  offense  under
North  Carolina  statutes  is  a  question  of  law  to  be  resolved  by
the  trial  court[,]”  State  v.  Hanton,  175  N.C.  App.  250,  255,  623
S.E.2d  600,  604                                                              (2006),  whether  a  prior  out-of-state  conviction
exists  and  whether  it  is  a  felony  are  questions  of  fact.    See
State  v.  Bohler,  198  N.C.  App.  631,  636-37,  681  S.E.2d  801,  805-
06                                                                             (2009),  disc.  review  denied,                               __  N.C.   __,   691  S.E.2d   414
(2010).    Accordingly,
while   the   trial   court   may   not   accept   a
stipulation  to  the  effect  that  a  particular
out-of-state   conviction   is                                                 “substantially
similar”   to   a   particular   North   Carolina
felony   or   misdemeanor,   it   may   accept   a
stipulation  that  the  defendant  in  question
has  been  convicted  of  a  particular  out-of-
state   offense   and   that   this   offense   is
either  a  felony  or  a  misdemeanor  under  the
law of that jurisdiction.
Id. at  637-38,  681 S.E.2d at  806.
Under  the  third  step  of  the  process  provided  in  section
15A-1340.14,  the  trial  court  uses  its  calculation  from  step  two
to  assign  the  defendant  a  prior  record  level.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §




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15A-1340.14(a).    For  example,  if  the  defendant  has  from  one  to
four  points,  he  shall  be  determined  to  have  a  prior  record  level
of   II.                                                                                                                                                                                             See   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                               §         15A-1340.14(c).         This
                                                                                                                                                                                                     determination  is  a  question  of  law.    State  v.  Wingate,                                           __  N.C.
App.                                                                          __,                                                               __,                                    713  S.E.2d   188,                                                              189   (2011).   “Stipulations  as  to
questions  of  law  are  generally  held  invalid  and  ineffective,  and
not  binding  upon  the  courts,  either  trial  or  appellate.”     Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted)
Accordingly,  we  review  the  ultimate  determination  of  a
defendant’s  prior  record  level  de  novo.    Id.  at                       __,                                                               713  S.E.2d
at  190.                                                                      “As a  result,  the  issue before  the  Court  [on  appeal]  is
simply  whether  the  competent  evidence  in  the  record  adequately
supports  the  trial  court’s  decision  [about  how  many  total  points
to  award  a  defendant  and  what  his  resulting  prior  record  level
is].”    Bohler,  198 N.C. App. at  633,  681 S.E.2d at  804.
Here,   the   record   reveals   the   following   colloquy   at
sentencing:
[The State]:    Your  Honor,  the  State  would
contend  that  the  defendant  is  a  prior  record
level  [II].    He  has  a  felony  drug  conviction
from  New  York  that  he  was  convicted  [of]  on
March                                                                         8th   of                                                          2004.     If  I  may  approach  with
the worksheet.
The Court:                                                                    Very                                                              well.                                  [Defense
counsel],  does  the  defendant  stipulate  to  a
record level  [II] based on that conviction?




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[Defense counsel]:   Yes,    we    will,    Your
Honor.
(Emphasis  added).     The  prior  record  level  worksheet  introduced
during   sentencing   shows   Defendant   had   one   prior   felony
conviction   from   New   York,   which   pursuant   to   the   statutory
default  provision  was  labeled  a  Class  I  felony  and  assigned  two
points, resulting in a suggested prior record level of II.
On  appeal,  Defendant  does  not  dispute  the  existence  of  his
prior  felony  conviction  in  New  York.    Rather,  he  contends  that
his  counsel’s  oral  stipulation  was  ineffective  because,  since
neither  Defendant  nor  his  counsel  had  signed  the  worksheet,  “it
is  unknown  from  the  record  what  defense  counsel  was  stipulating
to.”    We  are  not  persuaded  and  conclude  that,  taken  in  context,
the  court’s  question,                                                      “does       [D]efendant  stipulate  to  a  record
level  [II]  based  on  that  conviction[,]”  can  only  be  fairly  read
as  asking  whether  Defendant  stipulated  to  the  existence  of  the
out-of-state  felony  conviction,  as  well  as  to  his  ultimate  prior
record level resulting therefrom.1    Cf. State v. Powell,  254 N.C.
1Despite voluminous case law from this Court and from our Supreme
Court  and  the  plain  language  of  section  15A-1340.14(a)  that  the
ultimate  determination  of  a  defendant’s  prior  record  level  is  a
question  of  law  based  upon  questions  of  law  and  fact,  to  wit,
the  existence  and  type  of  a  defendant’s  prior  convictions  and
the   calculation   of   points   based   thereupon,   in   State   v.
Alexander,                                                                   359  N.C.   824,                                    616  S.E.2d   914   (2005),  our  Supreme




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231,  234,  118  S.E.2d  617,  619  (1961)  (“While  a  stipulation  need
not  follow  any  particular  form,  its  terms  must  be  definite  and
certain  in  order  to  afford  a  basis  for  judicial  decision,  and  it
is  essential  that  they  be  assented  to  by  the  parties  or  those
representing  them.”)                                                          (quotation  marks  and  citations  omitted),
superseded  on  other  grounds  by  statute,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                §                                                        20-
179(a)  (2009)  (as  recognized  in  State  v.  Denning,  316  N.C.  523,
525-26,                                                                        342   S.E.2d                                             855,   857   (1986)).   Defendant   cites   no
authority  for  the  proposition  that  a  defendant’s  explicit  oral
stipulation   to   the   existence   of   an   out-of-state   felony
conviction  is  ineffective  if  he  has  not  signed  the  prior  record
level worksheet, and we know of none.
Because    the    worksheet    and    Defendant’s    stipulation
constituted                                                                    “competent   evidence   in   the   record   adequately
support[ing]  the  trial  court’s  decision                                    [about  how  many  total
points  to  award  a  defendant  and  what  his  resulting  prior  record
level  is,]”    Bohler,  198  N.C.  App.  at  633,  681 S.E.2d  at  804,  we
overrule Defendant’s argument.
Court  found  that  the                                                        “defendant  stipulated  to  his  prior  record
level  pursuant  to  [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.]  §  15A-1340.14(f)(1)[.]”    Id.
at  828,  616  S.E.2d  at  917.    We  need  not  revisit this  issue  here,
as  even  were  Defendant’s  stipulation  to  his  prior  record  level
ineffective  as  being  to  a  question  of  law,  his  stipulation  to
the  existence  of  a  prior  out-of-state  felony  would  remain  and
would   suffice   to   support   the   court’s   prior   record   level
determination.




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II. Testimony Interpreting  “Patois”
Defendant   next   argues   that   the   trial   court   erred   in
allowing  a  law  enforcement  officer  to  testify  as  an  expert  in
Jamaican patois.    We disagree.
This  Court  reviews  a  trial  court’s  determination  of  whether
a  lay  witness  may  testify  to  an  opinion  for  abuse  of  discretion.
State  v.  Ziglar,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  705  S.E.2d  417,  419,  disc.
review  denied,                                                                365  N.C.                                  200,   710  S.E.2d   30   (2011).   We  also
review  a  trial  court’s  determination  whether  to  allow  expert
testimony  for  abuse  of  discretion.    State  v.  Brockett,  185  N.C.
App.  18,  28,  647  S.E.2d  628,  636,  disc.  review  denied,  361  N.C.
697,  654  S.E.2d  483  (2007).                                                “A  trial  court  may  be  reversed  for
abuse  of  discretion  only  upon  a  showing  that  its  ruling  was
manifestly  unsupported  by  reason  and  could  not  have  been  the
result  of  a  reasoned  decision.”    Id.  at  21-22,  647  S.E.2d  at  632
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
“If  scientific,  technical  or  other  specialized  knowledge
will  assist  the  trier  of  fact  to  understand  the  evidence  or  to
determine  a  fact  in  issue,  a  witness  qualified  as  an  expert  by
knowledge,   skill,   experience,   training,   or   education,   may
testify  thereto  in  the  form  of  an  opinion[.]”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
8C-1, Rule  702(a)  (2011).




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Expert  testimony  is  properly  admissible  when
it  can  assist  the  jury  in  drawing  certain
inferences   from   facts   and   the   expert   is
better  qualified  than  the  jury  to  draw  such
inferences.                                                                  While   a   trial   court   should
avoid  unduly  influencing  the  jury’s  ability
to  draw  its  own  inferences,  expert  testimony
is  proper  in  most  facets  of  human  knowledge
or experience.
Brockett,  185  N.C.  App.  at  28,  647  S.E.2d  at  636  (citations  and
quotation marks omitted).
Because  we  find  it  instructive  and  factually  on  point,  we
believe  a  more  detailed  examination  of  the  facts  of  Brockett  is
warranted  here.    In  Brockett,  a  police  detective  was  permitted
to                                                                           “interpret[]”  recorded  conversations  between  the  defendant
and   his   brother   which   included   numerous   gang-related   slang
terms.    Id.  at                                                            29,  647  S.E.2d  at  636.    The  defendant  objected,
noting  there  was  no                                                       “clearly  defined  dictionary  of  street  gang
lingo,  and  I  think  that  if  some  of  these  words  are  open  to
interpretation,  then  the  wrong  interpretation  would  be  extremely
damaging  [to  the  defendant.]”    Id.  at  28-29,  647  S.E.2d  at  636.
The  trial  court  stated  that  it  would  not  let  the  State  qualify
the   detective   as   an   expert,   but   overruled   the   defendant’s
objection   and   permitted   the   detective   to   testify   to   his
interpretations.    Id.




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On  appeal,  this  Court  rejected  the  defendant’s  argument
that  the  trial  court  had  erred  in  allowing  the  detective   to
offer opinion testimony:
Although                                                            [the  trial  court]  ruled  that                      [it]
                                                                    would  not  allow  the  prosecutor  to  qualify
                                                                    [the   detective]   as   an   expert   before   the
jury,                                                               [the   court]’s   statement   that                    [the
detective]   has                                                    “training   and   skills   that
                                                                    will   aid   the   jury   in   interpreting   this
stuff[,]”   and   the   fact   that                                                                                       [the   court]
allowed                                                             [the   detective]   to   offer   opinion
testimony,   demonstrate   that                                                                                           [the   court]
concluded  that  [the  detective]  was  qualified
to  offer  expert  opinions  on  the  meaning  of
slang  terms.                                                       [The  court]’s  statement  that
[it]   would   not   allow   the   prosecutor   to
“qualify                                                            [the   detective]   as   an   expert”
indicates  only  that,  to  avoid  any  improper
judicial  influence  on  the  weight  to  be  given
[the  detective]’s  testimony,  [the  court]  did
                                                                                                                                                            not   want   the   jury   to   hear   that                                                [the
                                                                                                                                                            detective] was testifying as an expert.
Id.  at                                                                                                                   30,             647  S.E.2d  at   637                                          (citing  State  v.  Wise,                                326    N.C.
421,                                                                431,                                                  390  S.E.2d     142,                                                           148,  cert.  denied,                         498  U.S.   853,   112
L.  Ed.                                                             2d                                                    113             (1990)).                                                       In  Wise,  our  Supreme  Court  held  that
where a
defendant  interposed  only  general  objections
to  the  testimony  which  is  the  subject  of
[the  appeal  and]  never  requested  a  specific
finding   by   the   trial   court   as   to   the
witness’  qualifications  as  an  expert  .  .  .  a
finding  that  the  witness  is  qualified  as  an
expert   is   implicit   in   the   trial   court’s
ruling admitting the opinion testimony.
Id.




-13-
Here,   at   trial,   Officer   Christopher   Wilson   of   the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg    County    Police    Department    provided
“translations”  of  phone  calls  Defendant  made  from  the  county
jail  after  his  arrest.    During  these  calls,  Defendant  and  other
parties  spoke  in  Jamaican  patois.    According  to  Wilson,  patois
is  a  form  of  “broken  English”  not  taught  in  Jamaican  schools  but
rather just  “pick[ed] up as you go.”2
The  State  did  not  explicitly  offer  Wilson  as  an  expert
witness.    However,  near  the  start  of  Wilson’s  testimony,  defense
counsel  stated,                                                              “I’d  object  if  this  witness  is  going  to  be
tendered  as  an  expert  witness[,]”  an  objection  which  the  trial
court                                                                         “[o]verruled  at  this  point.”     During  Wilson’s  testimony,
the  State  sought  to  introduce  several  transcripts  of  calls  as
State’s  exhibits                                                             44                                                                 —   46.   Defense  counsel  stated,   “And,  Your
Honor,  I  do  have  a  content  objection  on  Number  44  before  that’s
introduced  into  evidence.”     The  court  responded,                       “All  right.
Let’s  go  ahead  and  proceed.”     After  eliciting  testimony  from
Wilson  describing  the  transcripts  as  pages  with  two  columns,  the
left  being  the  actual  content  of  the  phone  calls  in  patois  and
the  right  being  Wilson’s                                                   “translation”  thereof  into  standard
2“Patois”  is  defined,  inter  alia,  as                                     “a  dialect  other  than  the
standard  or  literary  dialect”  and                                         “illiterate  or  provincial
speech[.]”     Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary               1655
(2002).




-14-
English,  the  State  moved  to  introduce  them.     Defense  counsel
stated,  “I  would  note  my  objection  partially  to  44,  Your  Honor.”
Copies  of  exhibits  44-46  were  then  published  to  the  jury,  and  a
recording  of  the  phone  call  in  State’s  exhibit  45  was  played  for
the jury.
Our  review  of  this  portion  of  the  transcript  reveals  that,
while  Defendant  objected  to  any  tender  of  Wilson  as  an  expert
witness  in  patois,  Defendant  did  not  object  to  admission  of
State’s  exhibits                                                             45  or                                                        46   (the  transcripts  containing  Wilson’s
                                                                              translations)   at   all,   and   made   only   a   partial                                                  “content
objection” to the remaining transcript.
During  Wilson’s  brief  testimony  about  the  first  recording
played  for  the  jury,  Defendant  made  several  general  objections,
none  mentioning  the  accuracy  of  the  transcripts  and  all  of  which
the  court  overruled.    Defense  counsel  then  cross-examined  Wilson
about   his   knowledge   of   Jamaican   patois.                             The   State   asked
additional   questions   on   this   point   on   re-direct.                  Wilson
testified  that  he  was  born  in  Jamaica,  lived  there  for  22  years,
was  married  to  a  Jamaican  woman,  and  spoke  Jamaican  patois  every
day  at  home  with  his  wife  and  in  regular  phone  calls  to  his
parents.




-15-
The  day  after  Wilson  began  his  testimony,  defense  counsel
informed the court:
I   met   with   my   client   after   we   closed
yesterday,  and  he  felt  that  the  translations
weren’t  accurate  on  these  transcripts.    And,
so,  that’s  why  I  objected  to  having  someone
who  is  not  a  certified  translator  basically
act  as  a  certified  translator.     My  client
told  me  that  he  thought  especially  a  lot  of
the  pronouns  in  the  translations  were  done
incorrectly.    I  called  the  interpreter  from
the  public  defender’s  office  this  morning,
and  he  referred  me  to  the  person  who  handles
it  for  the  courts.    I  think  there’s  a  good
chance  we  can  get  someone  to  look  at  this
stuff  over  the  weekend.    But  my  client  was
adamant    that    he    thinks    there’s    major
mistakes in some of these transcripts.
This  comment  cannot  fairly  be  viewed  as  an  objection,  either  to
Wilson’s  testimony  or  to  the  transcripts  previously  admitted.
Rather,  it  appears  that  the  defense  was  considering  whether  to
call its own expert in patois.    The trial court responded:
That  matter  is  up  for  counsel  to
attack   the                                                                .   witness’s   training   or
qualification   or   skills.                                                The   fact   that
anybody  deems  it  to  be  inaccurate  does  not
affect                                                                      its                                 admissibility,   only   its
credibility.    The  witness  can  still  testify.
His  testimony  is  admissible.     Now,  whether
or  not  it’s  believable  or  not  because  of
that  is  a  matter  for  counsel  to  address
either   through   cross-examination   or   other
witnesses.                                                                  But   it   doesn’t   affect   its
admissibility.




-16-
On  re-cross,  defense  counsel  asked  Wilson  additional  questions
about  his  use  of  patois,  and  Wilson  again  confirmed  that  he
spoke the dialect every day with his wife and family.
In  sum,  the  record  reveals  that:                                         (1)   as  in   Brockett,
Defendant  “never  requested  a  specific  finding  by  the  trial  court
as   to                                                                       [Wilson’s]   qualifications   as   an   expert[,]”   and   (2)
accordingly,  “a  finding  that  [Wilson  was]  qualified  as  an  expert
is  implicit  in  the  trial  court’s  ruling  admitting                      [Wilson’s]
opinion  testimony[.]”    Brockett,  185  N.C.  App.  at  30,  647  S.E.2d
at                                                                            637                                                        (citation  and  quotation  marks  omitted).     However,   (3)
while  Defendant  objected    to  Wilson  being  tendered  as  an  expert
witness  initially,  (4)  he  never  objected  on  grounds  of  accuracy
to    admission    of    the    transcripts    containing    Wilson’s
translations,  such  that                                                     (5)   the  content  of  Wilson’s  expert
translations  ultimately  came  in  without  objection.    It  is  well-
established  that,                                                            “[w]here  evidence  is  admitted  over  objection
and  the  same  evidence  has  been  previously  admitted  or  is  later
admitted  without  objection,  the  benefit  of  the  objection  is
lost.”    State  v.  Alford,  339  N.C.  562,  570,  453  S.E.2d  512,  516
(1995).    Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
III. Motion to Dismiss




-17-
Defendant  also  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying
his   motion   to   dismiss   for   insufficiency   of   the   evidence.
Specifically,  Defendant  contends  that  there  was  insufficient
evidence  that  Defendant  was  the  perpetrator  of  the  murder.    We
disagree.
This  Court  reviews  the  denial  of  a  motion  to
dismiss  for  insufficient  evidence  de  novo.
In   considering   a   motion   to   dismiss,   the
trial  court  must  analyze  the  evidence  in  the
light  most  favorable  to  the  State  and  give
the  State  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable
inference   from   the   evidence.                                          The   trial
court  must  also  resolve  any  contradictions
in  the  evidence  in  the  State’s  favor.     The
trial  court  does  not  weigh  the  evidence,
consider  evidence  unfavorable  to  the  State,
or determine any witness’ credibility.
In    order    for    evidence    to    sustain    a
conviction  it  must  be  substantial.    Evidence
is   substantial   if   it   is   relevant   and
adequate  to  convince  a  reasonable  mind  to
accept a conclusion.
State  v.  Trogdon,                                                         __  N.C.  App.   __,                                                                            __,   715  S.E.2d   635,   641-42
(2011)                                                                                       (citations   and   quotation   marks   omitted).                                                                   “What
                                                                                             constitutes  substantial  evidence  is  a  question  of  law  for  the
                                                                                             court.    What  the  evidence  proves  or  fails  to  prove  is  a  question
of  fact  for  the  jury.”     State  v.  Miller,                                                                                                                                 289  N.C.     1,     4,       220
S.E.2d  572,  574  (1975).
Here,    the    uncontradicted    evidence    established    that
Defendant’s  cell  phone  was  found  next  to  the  victim,  cell  phone




-18-
records  showed  that  Defendant’s  cell  phone  was  located  within
one  mile  of  the  murder  scene  at  the  approximate  time  of  the
murder,   Defendant   gave   inconsistent   statements   about   his
whereabouts  at  the  time  of  the  murder,  and  a  witness  testified
that  after  his  arrest  Defendant  stated,  “I  must  have  dropped  [my
phone]  after  I  killed  him.”    Taken  in  the  light  most  favorable
to  the  State,  giving  the  State  the  benefit  of  all  reasonable
inferences,  and  leaving  for  the  jury  any  questions  of  witness
credibility,   this   evidence   was                                          “adequate   to   convince   a
reasonable  mind  to  accept  a  conclusion”  that  Defendant  killed
Flowers  and  thereafter  dropped  his  cell  phone  at  the  scene.    See
Trogdon,                                                                      __  N.C.  App.  at              __,               715  S.E.2d  at   642.                Whether  the
evidence  proved  Defendant  was  the  perpetrator  was  a  question  for
the   jury.                                                                   Miller,                         289   N.C.   at   4,                220   S.E.2d   at   574.
Accordingly,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  denying  Defendant’s
motion  to  dismiss  for  insufficiency  of  the  evidence.                   This
argument is overruled.
IV. Statements of the Prosecutor
Finally,  Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  committed
plain   error   in   allowing   the   prosecutor   to   vouch   for   the
credibility of State’s witness Blount.    We disagree.




-19-
Because   Defendant   did   not   object   to   the   testimony   in
question  at  trial,  we  review  only  for  plain  error.    Our  Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed that
the  plain  error  standard  of  review  applies
on  appeal  to  unpreserved  instructional  or
evidentiary  error.    For  error  to  constitute
plain  error,  a  defendant  must  demonstrate
that  a  fundamental  error  occurred  at  trial.
To  show  that  an  error  was  fundamental,  a
defendant  must  establish  prejudice                                        —  that,
after  examination  of  the  entire  record,  the
error  had  a  probable  impact  on  the  jury's
finding   that   the   defendant   was   guilty.
Moreover,   because   plain   error   is   to   be
applied    cautiously    and    only    in    the
exceptional  case,  the  error  will  often  be
one   that   seriously   affects   the   fairness,
integrity  or  public  reputation  of  judicial
proceedings.
State  v.  Lawrence,                                                         __  N.C.         __,                                                             __,           723  S.E.2d   326,   334                             (2012)
                                                                                              (citations,   quotation   marks,   and   brackets   omitted).                                                                      “Our
Supreme   Court   has   recognized   that   while   counsel   may   not
personally  vouch  for  the  credibility  of  the  State’s  witnesses  or
for  his  own  credibility,  counsel  may  give  the  jurors  reasons  why
they  should  believe  the  State’s  evidence.”    State  v.  Jordan,  186
N.C.  App.                                                                   576,             586,                                                            651  S.E.2d   917,          923    (2007),  disc.  review
denied,                                                                      362  N.C.        241,                                                            660  S.E.2d   492                  (2008).     In  Jordan,  this
Court  held  that  the  following  statement  by  a  prosecutor  did  not
constitute  vouching  for  a  witness’s  credibility:                        “[W]e  contend
that  the  Sheriff  is  an  honest  man  and  he  has  told  you  what




-20-
happened.     He’s  not  trying  to  convict  somebody  for  something
they didn’t do.    He wouldn’t want to do that.    He is the elected
Sheriff of this county.”    Id.
Here,   after   establishing   that,   at   the   time   of   his
testimony,  Blount  was  serving  a  federal  prison  sentence  in
Georgia  on  a  drug  charge,  the  prosecutor  and  Blount  engaged  in
the following exchange:
Q[.] Prior  to  you  speaking  to  the  detective
or  the  Assistant  DA,  were  any  promises  made
to you?
A[.] No, they weren’t.
Q[.] Were  any  statements  made  to  you  that
this  is  what  will  happen  in  your  case  if  you
tell us what you heard about Kevin Powell?
A[.] No.
Q[.] And  from                                                             2007  to                                              2011,  has  anything
                                                                           been   done   regarding   your   sentence   as   it
relates to this case?
A[.] No.
Q[.] Now,    you’ve    said    you’ve    been    at
Mecklenburg   County   Jail   for   about   three
weeks.  About  three  weeks  ago,  did  you  and  I
meet at the police station?
A[.] Yeah.
Q[.] Was  a  detective  inside  that  room  with
us?
A[.] Yes, there was.




-21-
Q[.] And   when   we   met,   did   I   make   any
promises  to  you  as  to  what  would  happen
regarding your case?
A[.] You  told  me  that  you  couldn’t  make  any
promises.
Q[.] I  told  you  that  I  couldn’t  make  any
promises?
A[.] Yes.
Q[.] And  was  that  because  I  work  in  state
court   and                                                                  —   well,   do   you   recall   that
conversation   was   about   I   work   in   state
court;  I  have  no  influence  or  no  control
over what happens in the federal court?
A[.] Yeah.
Our  review  of  this  colloquy  reveals  that  the  prosecutor  did  not
vouch  for  Blount’s  credibility,  but  merely  elicited  testimony
suggesting   reasons   why   the   jury   should   believe   Blount’s
testimony,  to  wit,  that  Blount  was  not  receiving  any  leniency  or
favorable   treatment   in   exchange   for   his   testimony   against
Defendant.     We  find  the  exchange  quite  routine  in  this  regard
and  certainly  far  less  explicit  than  a  statement  that  a  witness
was                                                                          “an  honest  man”  who                 “wouldn’t  want  to  do  that   [lie  on  the
stand].”    See  Jordan,  186  N.C.  App.  at  586,                          651  S.E.2d  at  923.
Accordingly,  Defendant  has  failed  to  show  any  error  by  the  trial
court  in  allowing  this  testimony,  let  alone  plain  error.    This
argument is overruled.




-22-
NO ERROR.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.

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