Preview:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CHRISTOPHER STITT, Defendant.
NO. COA09-90
(Filed  8 December  2009)
1.                                                                     Indictment   and   Information                                   -   short-form   indictment           -
sufficient
A  short-form  indictment  notified  defendant  that  he  was
being  charged  with  first-degree  murder  and  set  out  the
requisite    elements    pursuant    to    N.C.G.S.                    §                                                                15-144.
Specifically  alleging  premeditation  and  deliberation  is  not
required.
2.                                                                     Appeal  and  Error                                               -  admission  of  evidence            -  no  findings  at
                                                                       suppression hearing  - review de novo
The  trial  court’s  legal  determination  that  telephone
records  were  admissible was reviewed  de  novo  on  appeal  where
neither party presented evidence pertaining to the suppression
motion, no findings  of  fact were made, and defendant did not
assign error to the trial court’s failure to make findings.
3.                                                                     Constitutional   Law                                             -   Fourth   Amendment   standing     -   mere
possession of property
A first-degree murder defendant did not have standing to
assert   Fourth   Amendment   violations   in   the   admission   of
cellular  telephone  records  where  the  telephones  found  in
defendant’s  possession  were  owned  by  one  of  the  victims.
Neither  ownership  nor  a  possessory  interest  will  be  assumed
from mere possession.
4.                                                                     Evidence - telephone records - federal violations in obtaining
- no suppression remedy
Even   if   the   State   violated   the   federal   Stored
Communications Act in obtaining telephone records in a first-
degree  murder  prosecution,  there  is  no  suppression  remedy
under federal law.
5.                                                                     Appeal  and  Error                                               -  argument  not  raised  at  trial   -  not
considered
An  argument  concerning  the  necessity  of  a  subpoena  to
secure telephone records was not considered on appeal where it




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was not raised at trial.
6.                                                                     Evidence  - photographs of crime scene  - admissible
Four  photographs  of  first-degree  murder  victims  at  the
crime  scene  were  properly  admitted  where  the  photos  showed
different   perspectives   on   the   crime   scene,   focused   on
different  pieces  of  evidence,  twenty-three  other  photographs
were admitted without objection, and the photos were used for
illustrative purposes only and not to inflame the jury.
7.                                                                     Homicide                                               -  second-degree  murder              -  deadly  weapon              -  heat  of
passion
The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion
to dismiss second-degree murder charge where defendant used a
deadly weapon but there was some evidence of heat of passion.
That evidence converts the presumption of malice raised by the
use of a deadly weapon to a permissible inference and does not
mean  that  the  State  failed  to  present  sufficient  evidence of
second-degree murder.
8.                                                                     Homicide                                               -  premeditation  and  deliberation   -  sufficiency  of
                                                                       evidence
There   was   sufficient   evidence   of   premeditation   and
deliberation,  and  the  court  correctly  denied  defendant’s
motion  to  dismiss  a  first-degree  murder  charge,  where  the
evidence  showed  a  time  for  reflection  during which  defendant
decided  to  return to the victims’ home, and that this victim
was shot twice at close range, which required multiple trigger
pulls.
9.                                                                     Homicide                                               -   first-degree   murder             -   voluntary   manslaughter
instruction  - not given
The trial court did not err by refusing to instruct  the
jury  on  voluntary  manslaughter  in  a  first-degree  murder
prosecution  where     defendant  relied  on  precedent  involving
provocation and a disposition that did not cool.    Here, there
was a time lapse between defendant’s argument with the victims
and  the  shootings  and  testimony  that  defendant  shot  this
victim because she was screaming and not because of the prior
altercation.




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10.   Robbery  -    murder  - continuous transaction
Two  killings  and  a  robbery  occurred  in  one  continuous
transaction,  and  the  trial  court  did  not  err  by  denying
defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  robbery  with  a
dangerous  weapon,  where  there  was  substantial  evidence  that
defendant  used  a  deadly  weapon  to  kill  the  victims  and  took
their property not  as  an afterthought but with the intent of
utilizing and selling it.
11.                                                                     Robbery  - taking of property  - no intent to return
There  was  sufficient  evidence  in  a  robbery  and  murder
prosecution  to  show  that  defendant  took  an  automobile  and
other property out of state with no intent of returning them.
12.   Criminal Law  - flight  - evidence sufficient
There  was  sufficient  evidence  for  an  instruction  on
flight after two murders and robberies where defendant claimed
that  traveling  to  New  York  was  his  standard  practice  but  he
varied  his  normal  behavior  in  this  case.  Other  reasonable
explanations   for   defendant’s   conduct   do   not   render   the
instruction improper; flight is merely evidence of guilt, not
a presumption.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 May 2008 by Judge
Gregory A. Weeks in Cumberland County Superior Court.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  14 September  2009.
Attorney  General  Roy  A.  Cooper,  III,  by  Assistant  Solicitor
General John F. Maddrey, for the State.
William D. Spence for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
On  or  about                                                           5  February                                            2005,  Jenna  Bologna   (“Bologna”)  and




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George  Katsigiannis                                                           (“Katsigiannis”)  were  fatally  shot  with  a
handgun  in  Cumberland  County,  North  Carolina.    On  13  June             2005,
James  Christopher  Stitt  (“defendant”)  was  indicted  on  charges  of
robbery  with  a  dangerous  weapon  and  two  counts  of  first  degree
murder  in  connection  with  the deaths  of  Bologna  and  Katsigiannis.
On  8  May  2008,  defendant  was  convicted  by  a  jury  of  first  degree
murder of Bologna, second degree murder of Katsigiannis, and robbery
with a dangerous weapon.    After careful review, we find no error.
Background
A. Fayetteville, North Carolina
The  State  presented  evidence  at  trial  tending  to  show  that
defendant lived with Bologna and Katsigiannis in Fayetteville, North
Carolina  at  the  time  of  their  deaths.     On                             4  February                                            2005,  at
approximately                                                                  9:00   p.m.,   defendant,   Katsigiannis,   Bologna,
Alexandria  Hosborough  (“Alexandria”),  and  Samantha  Callahan,  went
to the home of Nina Hosborough  (“Nina”) to look at a set of custom
wheels for sale.   They left Nina’s house at approximately 11:00 p.m.
The   following   day,                                                         5   February                                           2005,   defendant   drove
Katsigiannis’ car to Alexandria’s house to return books she left in
the car the previous night.    Defendant told Alexandria that he was
going to Virginia and requested directions to Interstate 95.   Later
that  day,  defendant  called  Alexandria  from  Katsigiannis’  cellular
telephone.    He  called  her again from that telephone the following




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night  from  New  York.    Defendant  also  used  Katsigiannis’  telephone
to call his girlfriend, Bonnie Tam (“Tam”) to inform her that he was
on his way to New York.
On  7  February  2005,  Katsigiannis  did  not  report  to  physical
training  at Fort Bragg where he was stationed with the U.S. Army.
Adam Altimus  (“Altimus”) and Jacob Cymbala  (“Cymbala”), members of
Katsigiannis’  military  unit,  were  concerned  and  went  to  his  house
to check on him.    Altimus also called Katsigiannis’ telephone, but
did  not  get  an  answer.    Altimus  and  Cymbala  then  left  the  house
without ever entering the home or making contact with Katsigiannis.
Joseph Bishop (“Bishop”) also visited Katsigiannis’ house that same
day and did not receive an answer when he knocked on the front door.
The  next  day,  Katsigiannis  still  did  not  report  for  physical
training.   Bishop called Katsigiannis’ cellular telephone twice that
morning and defendant answered on the second attempt.   Bishop asked
defendant  if  he  knew  where  Katsigiannis  was,  and  defendant  told
Bishop  that  Katsigiannis  was  at  home  in  Fayetteville,  and  that
defendant was in New York.
Thereafter,   Altimus,   Bishop,   and   Cymbala   went   back   to
Katsigiannis’  house.     They  peered  into  a  window  and  saw  what
appeared to be  a foot on the floor.    The men immediately notified
their superiors, Sergeant Bruce and Chief Davis, of what they saw.
Upon arriving and looking through the window, Sergeant Bruce opened




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the  back  door  to  the  residence  with  a  credit  card  so  they  could
search the house for Katsigiannis.   Bologna’s body was found in the
master bedroom, and Katsigiannis’ body was found lying on the floor
of the master bathroom.
At the scene, detectives found three fired shell casings from
a  .45 caliber handgun in the master bedroom.    One was found on the
floor,  another was found behind the bed’s headboard, and the last
shell  casing  was  found  on  the  bed.    The  detectives  also  found  a
fired bullet inside the pillow where it was believed Bologna’s head
had been resting.   Later investigations indicated that Katsigiannis
bought a  .45 caliber handgun from a pawn shop in Cumberland County
on  1 February  2005.
While  at  the  scene  of  the  crime  on  8  February  2005,  a  local
Fayetteville law enforcement officer called Katsigiannis’ cellular
telephone.    Defendant  answered  the  telephone  and  told  the  police
that  he  was  in  Brooklyn,  near  a  park  at  the  intersection  of  79th
Street  and  Shore  Road.    After  inquiring  about  Katsigiannis’  car,
defendant  told  the  police  that  Katsigiannis  allowed  him  to borrow
his car and cellular telephone.
B. Brooklyn, New York
Defendant arrived at Tam’s house in Brooklyn, New York around
9:00 p.m. on  5 February  2005.    Tam was the only  person to testify
at trial regarding the events leading up to the murders, which she




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claimed were told to her by defendant.   Tam testified that once she
and  defendant  were  together  in  New  York,  defendant  told  her  that
“George and Jenna [were] dead.”   Defendant explained to Tam that he
and Bologna began arguing because she was bothering him while he was
watching  television.    Defendant  said  that  Bologna  began  smacking
him, so he hit her, knocking out a tooth.   Katsigiannis observed the
incident, then left the room.   Defendant suspected that he was going
to  get  his  gun,  so  defendant  ran  out  of  the  back  door.    By  this
time,  Katsigiannis  was  already  shooting  at  him  but  stopped  once
defendant reached the woods at the rear of the house.   Katsigiannis
then  dropped  the  gun  and  went  back  inside  the  house.    Defendant
claimed that he retrieved the gun from the  ground and entered the
house with it.    Defendant told Tam that he shot Katsigiannis first
in  the  chest  and  then  proceeded  to  shoot  Bologna  in  the  head  and
chest because she was screaming.
While in New York, defendant and Tam drove to Owls Park.   When
they  arrived  at  the  park,  defendant  showed  Tam  a  box  with  a  gun
inside and stated, “[t]his was the gun.”   Tam and defendant laid the
box containing the gun under a tree and covered it with an article
of clothing and a pillow they found in the park.
On                                                                              9  February   2005,  a  Brooklyn  detective  contacted  Tam
regarding the murder investigation, and she gave a statement at the
police station.   Tam also led police to Owls Park where the gun was




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located.    Tam  later  testified  that  defendant  had  DVDs  in  the  car
with him when he arrived in New York.   Subsequently, when defendant
was  arrested,  officers  found  the  cellular  telephone  belonging  to
Katsigiannis on defendant’s person.
Telephone  records  confirmed  time  and  place  testimonies  by
various  witnesses.    An  expert  in  toolmarks  and  firearms  testified
that all three of the cartridge casings found at Katsigiannis’ home,
as well as the bullet retrieved from Bologna’s body, were fired from
Katsigiannis’ gun.
No  evidence  was  offered  by  defendant.    Defendant  was  found
guilty of  first  degree murder of Bologna, second degree murder of
Katsigiannis, and robbery with a firearm.    Defendant was sentenced
to  life  imprisonment  without  parole  for  the  first  degree  murder
conviction,  189  months  to  236  months  imprisonment  for  the  second
degree murder conviction, and 77 to 100 months imprisonment for the
robbery with a firearm conviction.
Analysis
I. Short-Form Indictment
[1]  Defendant  first  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
refusing to dismiss the short-form indictment because the indictment
did  not  include  the  requisite  elements  of  premeditation  and
deliberation  to  charge  him  with  first  degree  murder,  nor  did  it




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allege  the  elements  of  felony  murder.     Consequently,  defendant
claims that the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction.
North Carolina Courts have  “consistently held that the short-
form  first-degree  murder  indictment  serves  to  give  a  defendant
sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the charges against him
or her.”    State v. Squires,  357 N.C.  529,  537,  591 S.E.2d  837,  842
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1088, 159 L. Ed. 2d 252 (2004).   N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  15-144  (2007) expressly states,  “it is sufficient in
describing  murder  to  allege  that  the  accused  person  feloniously,
willfully,  and  of  his  malice  aforethought,  did  kill  and  murder
(naming  the  person  killed),  and  concluding  as  is  now  required  by
law[.]”   Specifically alleging premeditation and deliberation is not
required by the statute.    Id.
The indictment at issue  stated that  “on or about the  5th day
of  February,  2005,  in  the  County  named  above  the  defendant  named
above   unlawfully,   willfully   and   feloniously   did   of   malice
aforethought kill and murder George Daniel Katsigiannis.    This act
was in violation of North Carolina General Statues Section  14-17.”
Here,  the  indictment  notified  defendant that  he  was  being  charged
with first degree murder and set out the requisite elements pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15-144.
Defendant acknowledges that this issue has been decided against
him.    State  v.  Avery,  315  N.C.  1,  14,  337  S.E.2d  786,  793  (1985)




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(holding, “[t]he indictment in question complies with the short form
indictment authorized by [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15-144 and is therefore
sufficient  to  charge  first  degree  murder  without  specifically
alleging  premeditation  and  deliberation  or  felony  murder”);  State
v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 175, 531 S.E.2d 428, 438 (2000); State v.
Smith, 152 N.C. App. 29, 34, 566 S.E.2d 793, 797, cert. denied, 356
N.C.  311,  571 S.E.2d  208  (2002).
Nevertheless,  defendant  asks us  to  reexamine  the  issue.                “As
we are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as those
already decided by other panels of this Court, we refuse to do so.
Accordingly, we overrule th[is] assignment[] of error.”   Smith, 152
N.C. App. at  34,  566 S.E.2d at  797  (citations omitted).
II. Suppression of Telephone Records
[2]  Defendant  also  appeals  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  his
motion  to  suppress  the  cellular  telephone  records  obtained  by  the
State.  1 Defendant presents three arguments on appeal: (1) the trial
court erred in determining that defendant did not have standing to
assert  a  violation  of  his  Fourth  Amendment  rights;  (2)  the  State
failed to comply with federal law when it sought a court order to
1
The  record  indicates  that  defendant  was  in  possession  of  two
telephones registered in Katsigiannis’ name.




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obtain  the  records;  and                                                  (3)  the  State  violated  state  law  in
obtaining the records without a subpoena.2
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress,
we first determine whether the trial court’s  findings of fact are
supported  by  competent evidence.”    State v. Bowden,  177 N.C. App.
718,                                                                        721,                                        630  S.E.2d   208,   210   (2006).   Here,  the  trial  court
received  a  written  motion  to  suppress  from  defendant  and  heard
arguments  from  the  parties  prior  to  opening  statements  at  trial;
however, the trial court made no findings of fact.
When   the   trial   court   conducts   an
evidentiary hearing regarding the competency of
the  evidence,  the  trial  court  is  required  to
make findings of fact if there is a conflict in
the  evidence.     When,  however,  there  is  no
conflict  in  the  evidence,  findings  are  not
required,  although  it  is  preferable  for  the
trial court to make them.
Id.  (citations  and  quotation  marks  omitted).    Defendant  does  not
assign error to the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact.
In fact, no evidence was presented by either party pertaining to the
motion;  however,  defendant  submitted  an affidavit  attached  to  his
written  motion  in  which  he  claimed  a                                  “possessory  and  privacy
interest in the information sought” by the State and further alleged
a violation of federal law.    Since no findings of fact were made,
we  will only review de novo the trial court’s legal determination
2
The court order is not provided in the record on appeal.




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that the records were admissible.   State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382,
434,  683 S.E.2d  174,  205  (2009).
[3]  First,  we  address  defendant’s  claim  that  he  had  standing
to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.   Defendant argued before the
trial  court  that  his  possession  of  the  cellular  telephones  was
sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
records.    Upon hearing arguments by defense counsel and the State,
the  trial  court  stated:                                                   “[A]  defendant  making  a  motion  like  the
motion now  before the Court bears the burden of establishing that
he,  separate  and  apart  from  any  affidavit,  gained possession  from
the  owner  or  someone  with  authority  to  grant  possession[.]”    The
trial  court  ultimately  concluded  that  defendant  did  not  have
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.    We agree.
“In  order  to  challenge  the  reasonableness  of  a  search  or
seizure,  defendant  must  have  standing.    Standing  requires  both an
ownership  or  possessory  interest  and  a  reasonable  expectation  of
privacy.”    State v. Swift,  105 N.C. App.  550,  556,  414 S.E.2d  65,
68-69  (1992)  (emphasis  added);  accord  State  v.  McKinney,  361  N.C.
53,  56,  637  S.E.2d.  868,  871  (2006)  (“A defendant has standing to
contest  a  search  if  he  or  she  has  a  reasonable  expectation  of
privacy in the property to be searched.”).
To be entitled to the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, defendant ‘must demonstrate that any
rights  alleged  to  have  been  violated  were  his




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rights,  not  someone  else’s.’     Generally,  a
defendant  may  not  object  to  the  search  and
seizure  of  the  property  of  another.                                    ‘The
burden of showing this ownership or possessory
interest  is  on  the  person  who  claims  that  his
rights have been infringed.’
State  v.  Boyd,                                                            169  N.C.  App.                                    204,   206-07,                 609  S.E.2d           785,   787
(2005)  (quoting State v. Mlo,  335 N.C.  353,  377-78,  440 S.E.2d  98,
110-11, cert. denied,  512 U.S.  1224,  129 L. Ed.  2d  841  (1994)).
Here, defendant offered no evidence at the suppression hearing,
and  points  to  none  on  appeal,  to  demonstrate  that  he  had  an
ownership interest in the cellular telephones or had been  given  a
possessory interest by the legal owner.    Defendant only maintained
that  he  had  possession  of  the  telephones  and  consequently  an
expectation of privacy in the records related to those telephones.
Defendant did not go so far as to claim that Katsigiannis lent him
the  telephones.                                                            Our  Courts  will  not  assume  ownership  or  a
possessory interest in property based on mere possession.    Id.  at
207,                                                                        609  S.E.2d  at                                    787    (recognizing  that  a   “temporary  use  of
property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in
that  property”).    In  sum,  defendant  did  not  meet  his  burden  of
establishing an ownership or possessory interest in the telephones.




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Accordingly,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  determining  that
defendant lacked standing to claim a Fourth Amendment violation.3
[4]  Second,  we  address  defendant’s  claim  that  the  State
violated  federal  law  in  obtaining  the  records.    Defendant  asserts
that  when  the  Cumberland  County  Sheriff’s  Office  sought  court
authorization to obtain the records, they did not fully comply with
18 U.S.C.  §  2703(d)  (2006) of the Stored Communications Act, which
governs disclosure of customer communications or records and states
in pertinent part:
A  court  order  for  disclosure  under  subsection
(b) or  (c) may be issued by any court  that is
a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  and  shall
issue  only  if  the  governmental  entity  offers
specific  and  articulable  facts  showing  that
there  are  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that
the   contents   of   a   wire   or   electronic
communication,   or   the   records   or   other
information  sought,  are  relevant  and  material
to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Specifically, defendant argues that when the State obtained the
court order requiring Nextel to release the telephone records, the
State  failed  to  establish  that  the  records  were  relevant  and
material  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation.    Defendant  claims
that  the  trial  court  failed  to  reach  the  issue  of  whether  the
3
Having  found  that  defendant  did  not  have  standing  to  assert  a
Fourth  Amendment  violation  due  to  a  lack  ownership  or  possessory
interest  in  the  telephones,  we  need  not  address  whether  any
expectation  of  privacy  was  in  fact  reasonable,  or  whether  that
expectation was violated.




-15-
records were unlawfully obtained under federal statute and instead
concentrated  on  the  Constitutional  standing of  defendant  to  raise
the Fourth Amendment claim.   Defendant is correct in that the trial
court  did  not  make  any  conclusions  of  law  specifically  pertaining
to this portion of defendant’s claim; however, we review de novo the
legal determination to deny the motion.
There  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  regarding  the  State’s
conduct  in  this  matter.    Nevertheless,  assuming  arguendo  that  the
State  did  not  fully  comply  with                                          18  U.S.C.                       2703(d),  there  is  no
suppression remedy under federal law.                                         18  U.S.C.  §  2707(a)  (2006)
provides  that  a  party  “aggrieved”  by  a  violation  of  the  Act  may
pursue a civil remedy against “the person or entity, other than the
United States, which engaged in that violation  .  .  .                       .”                               18 U.S.C.
§  2708  (2006)  states,  “[t]he  remedies  and  sanctions  described  in
this  chapter  are  the  only  judicial  remedies  and  sanctions  for
nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
analyzed the same issue presently before this  Court  and held that
even if the State does not comply with the provisions of the Stored
Communications Act, “the statute does not provide for a suppression
remedy.”    United States v. Ferguson,  508 F.Supp.  2d.  7,  10  (D.D.C.
2007);  see  also  United  States  v.  Smith,  155  F.3d  1051,  1056  (9th
Cir.  1998)  (holding  that  “the  Stored  Communications  Act  does  not




-16-
provide an exclusion remedy.   It allows for civil damages . . . and
criminal punishment  .  .  . but nothing  more”), superseded on other
grounds, Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,  236 F.3d  1035  (9th Cir.
2001).  4 Upon review of the Act and relevant case law, we hold that
the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  suppressing  the  telephone  records
despite an alleged violation of  18 U.S.C.  §  2703(d).
[5] Finally, defendant asserts that N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-298
(2007)  requires  a  subpoena  to  secure  telephone  records,  and  since
no subpoena was issued in this case, the evidence should have been
suppressed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974(2) (2007) (stating
that evidence must be suppressed if “[i]t [was] obtained as a result
of  a  substantial  violation  of  the  provisions  of                         [Chapter   15]”).
Defendant  did  not raise this argument before the trial court, and
we will not consider it on appeal.    N.C. R.  App.  P.  10(b)(1); see
also  State  v.  Barnard,  184  N.C.  App.  25,  33,  645  S.E.2d  780,  785
(2007), aff’d,  362 N.C.  244,  658 S.E.2d  643  (2008).
III. Introduction of Photographs
[6]  Next,  defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
allowing  the  State  to  introduce  into  evidence  four  photographs of
the deceased victims at the crime scene.    Defendant filed a motion
4
In his criminal law treatise, Professor Robert Farb notes that
“[a]  violation  of  federal  law  does  not  require  the  exclusion  of
evidence at a criminal trial.”   Robert L. Farb, Arrest, Search, and
Investigation in North Carolina,  106 n.  129  (3rd ed.  2003).




-17-
in limine claiming that the photographs were unnecessarily gruesome
and  carried  no  probative  value.    The  trial  court  considered  the
matter at trial.   The State selected thirty crime scene photographs,
from  over  one  hundred  taken,  to  present  to  the  jury.    Defendant
objected to seven of the proffered photographs, and upon review of
the photographs and the State’s arguments concerning each one, the
trial court excluded three of the photographs but allowed the State
to introduce the other four.   The State claims that the photographs
were relevant to illustrate testimony concerning the location of a
fired cartridge case in relation to Bologna’s body, the hole in the
pillow   where   Bologna’s   head   was   resting,   the   position   of
Katsigiannis’ body on the bathroom floor, and to provide a different
angle  so  that  the  jury  could  clearly  see  what  Katsigiannis  was
wearing at the time of his death.
“In  determining  whether  to  admit  photographic  evidence,  the
trial  court  must  weigh  the  probative  value  of  the  photographs
against  the  danger  of  unfair  prejudice  to  defendant  [pursuant  to
Rule                                                                           403  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence].”     State  v.
Blakeney,  352 N.C.  287,  309,  531 S.E.2d  799,  816  (2000).    Rule  403
provides,                                                                      “[a]lthough  relevant,  evidence  may  be  excluded  if  its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading  the jury, or by
considerations   of   undue   delay,   waste   of   time,   or   needless




-18-
presentation of cumulative evidence.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule
403                                                                           (2007).                                 “We  review  a  trial  court’s  decision  to   [admit  or]
exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion.”   State v.
Whaley,  362 N.C.  156,  160,  655 S.E.2d  388,  390  (2008).                 “An abuse
of  discretion  results  when                                                 ‘the  court’s  ruling  is  manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been
the  result  of  a  reasoned  decision.’”     Id.                             (quoting  State  v.
Peterson,  361 N.C.  587,  602-03,  652 S.E.2d  216,  227  (2007)).
It  is  well  established  that                                               “‘[p]hotographs  of  a  homicide
victim may be introduced even if they are gory, gruesome, horrible
or revolting, so long as they are used for illustrative purposes and
so long as their excessive or repetitious  use  is not aimed solely
at arousing the passions of the jury.’”   Blakeney, 352 N.C. at 309-
10,  531 S.E.2d at  816  (quoting State v. Hennis,  323 N.C.  279,  284,
372 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1988)); see also State v. Porth, 269 N.C. 329,
337,  153  S.E.  2d  10,  16  (1967); State v. Curtis,  7 N.C. App.  707,
709,  173 S.E.2d  613,  615  (1970); State v. McCain,  6 N.C. App.  558,
562,  170 S.E.2d  531,  533  (1969).
“‘A  photograph  of  the  scene  of  a  crime  may  be  admitted  into
evidence  if  it  is  identified  as  portraying  the  locale  with
sufficient  accuracy.’”    State  v.  Haselden,                               357  N.C.                               1,                                             14,           577
S.E.2d 594, 603 (quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 75, 265 S.E.2d
164,  167  (1980)),  cert.  denied,  540  U.S.  988,  157  L.  Ed.  2d  382




-19-
(2003).                                                                      “Even where a body is in advanced stages of decomposition
and   the   cause   of   death   and   identity   of   the   victim   are
uncontroverted, photographs may be exhibited showing the condition
of the body and its location when found.”   State v. Wynne, 329 N.C.
507,  517,  406 S.E.2d  812,  816-17  (1991).
The case of State v. Bowman, 183 N.C. App. 631, 644 S.E.2d 596,
cert. denied,  361 N.C.  570,  650 S.E.2d  816  (2007), is analogous in
many respects to the present case.   There, the State presented more
than  thirty  photographs  of  the  victim’s  body  without  objection by
defendant.   Id. at 634, 644 S.E.2d at 598.   Defendant only objected
to six photographs, which showed the victim in a different position
than in the other photographs.    Id.    This Court  found no abuse of
discretion  and  reasoned  that:                                             (1)  defendant  failed  to  object  to
numerous  other  photographs  of  the  crime  scene;  (2)  the  challenged
photographs  showed  a  different  perspective  of  the  scene  and
different  pieces  of  evidence  than  the  other  photographs  admitted;
and  (3) the  photographs were meant to illustrate the testimony of
the investigating officer.    Id. at  634,  644 S.E.2d at  599.
Here,  defendant  did  not  object  to  the  other  twenty-three
photographs  of  the  crime  scene,  and  the  four  he  did  object  to
depicted  different  perspectives of  the  crime  scene and focused on
different pieces of evidence.   Moreover, we find that the State made
use   of   the   photographs   in   conjunction   with   testimony   for




-20-
illustrative  purposes  only  and that  the  photographs  were  not  used
to inflame the jury’s passions.    Accordingly, we find no error in
the admission of the four photographs to which defendant objected.
IV. Sufficient Evidence to Establish Murder of Katsigiannis
[7] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the charge of second degree murder of Katsigiannis
at the close of the State’s evidence (being all the evidence) on the
grounds  that  the  evidence  was  insufficient  to  establish  every
element  of  the  crime.    The  trial  court  submitted  to  the  jury  the
charges of first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence
to  withstand  a  motion  to  dismiss  and  to  be
submitted  to  the  jury,  the  trial  court  must
determine whether there is substantial evidence
(1)  of  each  essential  element  of  the  offense
charged,   or   of   a   lesser   offense   included
therein,  and                                                                  (2)  of  defendant’s  being  the
perpetrator   of   such   offense.                                             Substantial
evidence   is   such   relevant   evidence   as   is
necessary  to  persuade  a  rational  juror  to
accept  a  conclusion.     The  trial  court  must
review the evidence in the light most favorable
to  the  State,  giving  the  State  the  benefit  of
every   reasonable   inference   to   be   drawn
therefrom.
Squires,                                                                       357  N.C.  at                      535,   591  S.E.2d  at   841   (citations  and
quotation marks omitted).
“Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human
being  with  malice,  but  without  premeditation  and  deliberation.”




-21-
State  v.  Foust,                                                              258  N.C.                                                  453,   458,                                             128  S.E.2d   889,   892   (1963)
(citations omitted).   Our Supreme Court has held that the “‘[i]ntent
to  kill  is  not  a  necessary  element  of  second-degree  murder,  but
there must be an intentional act sufficient to show malice.’”   State
v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 395, 527 S.E.2d 299, 304 (2000)(quoting State
v. Brewer, 328 N.C. 515, 522, 402 S.E.2d 380, 385 (1991)).   In this
State, malice is implied when the perpetrator uses a deadly weapon
to  commit  the  murder.    State  v.  Reynolds,  307  N.C.  184,  190,  297
S.E.2d  532,  535-36  (1982); State v. West,  180 N.C. App.  664,  668,
638  S.E.2d                                                                    508,                                                       511    (2006),  appeal  dismissed  and  disc.  review
denied,  361 N.C.  368,  644 S.E.2d  562  (2007).
“The effect of the presumption is to impose upon the defendant
the  burden  of  going  forward  with  or  producing  some  evidence  of  a
lawful reason for the killing or an absence  of  malice; i.e., that
the killing was done in self-defense or in the heat of passion upon
sudden provocation.”    Reynolds,  307 N.C. at  190,  297 S.E.2d at  536
(quoting State  v. Simpson,  303 N.C.  439,  451,  279 S.E.2d  542,  550
(1981)).                                                                       “Even though such an inference is permissible, the State
continues  to  bear  the  burden  of  showing  defendant  committed  an
unlawful  killing.”    State  v.  Banks,                                       191  N.C.  App.  743,  751,  664
S.E.2d  355,  361  (2008).
Evidence  raising  an  issue  on  the  existence  of
malice and unlawfulness causes the presumption
to   disappear,                                                                “leaving   only   a   permissible




-22-
inference which the jury may accept or reject.”
Furthermore,  if  there  is  any  evidence  of  heat
of passion on sudden provocation, either in the
State’s  evidence  or  offered  by  the  defendant,
the   trial   court   must   submit   the   possible
verdict of voluntary manslaughter to the jury.
State  v.  Weeks,  322  N.C.  152,  173,  367  S.E.2d  895,  907-08  (1988)
(quoting Reynolds,  307 N.C. at  190,  297 S.E.2d at  536).
Here,  defendant  argues  that  Tam’s  testimony  established  that
heat  of  passion  existed  in  lieu  of  malice.    Tam  testified  that
defendant and Bologna were arguing, the disagreement escalated, and
the  two  struck  each  other.    Katsigiannis  then  attempted  to  shoot
defendant, but he escaped into the woods.   Katsigiannis put the gun
down, and returned to the house.    Defendant remained in the  woods
for an unspecified amount of time, and then retrieved Katsigiannis’
gun,  went  back  into  the  house,  and  shot  Katsigiannis  and  then
Bologna at close range.    Though defendant claims that the evidence
established  that  he  killed  in  the  heat  of  passion,  there  was
sufficient  evidence  presented  that  defendant  unlawfully  murdered
Katsigiannis with malice.
The  trial  court  chose  to  instruct  the  jury  on  second  degree
murder  and  voluntary  manslaughter  of  Katsigiannis,  which  implies
that  the  trial  court  found  that  there  was  sufficient  evidence  to
convict  defendant  of  either  crime.    Just  because  there  was  some
evidence of heat of passion does not mean that the State failed to




-23-
present  sufficient  evidence  to  establish  the  elements  of  second
degree murder.    Because there was evidence of heat of passion, the
presumption of malice became a “permissible inference” and the trial
court was thus required to instruct the jury on both crimes, which
it did in this case.    Id.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State,  there  was  sufficient  evidence  to  establish  all  elements of
second  degree  murder.     Therefore,  this  assignment  of  error  is
without merit.
V. Sufficient Evidence to Establish Murder of Bologna
[8]  Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of first degree murder of
Bologna  on  the  grounds  that  the  evidence  was  insufficient  to
establish  every  element  of  the  crime.     Defendant  specifically
asserts   that   the   State   failed   to   establish   that   defendant
intentionally  killed  Bologna  with  premeditation  and  deliberation.
The  trial  court  instructed  the  jury  on  first  degree  murder  and
second degree murder.
“First-degree murder is the unlawful killing of another human
being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation.”    State
v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 591, 599 S.E.2d 515, 542 (2004); N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  14-17  (2007).




-24-
A  killing  is  premeditated  if                                              “the  defendant
formed  the  specific  intent  to  kill  the  victim
some period of time, however short, before the
actual  killing.”    A  killing  is  deliberate  if
the defendant acted  “in a cool state of blood,
in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or
to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under
the  influence  of  a  violent  passion,  suddenly
aroused  by  lawful  or  just  cause  or  legal
provocation.”
State v. Rios,  169 N.C.  App.  270,  280,  610 S.E.2d  764,  771  (2005)
(quoting  State  v.  Bonney,                                                  329  N.C.                    61,                                                            77,   405  S.E.2d   145,   154
(1991)).                                                                                                   “Premeditation  and  deliberation  ‘are  usually  proven  by
circumstantial evidence because they are mental processes that are
not  readily  susceptible  to  proof  by  direct  evidence.’”    State  v.
Mack,  161 N.C. App.  595,  605,  589 S.E.2d  168,  175  (2003)  (quoting
State  v.  Sierra,  335  N.C.  753,  758,  440  S.E.2d  791,  794  (1994)).
According  to  Tam’s  testimony,  defendant  killed  Bologna  after
advancing from his hide-out  in  a wooded area, going back into the
home, and shooting Katsigiannis.    Thus, the evidence showed a time
lapse for reflection during which defendant decided to go back into
the  home  armed  with  Katsigiannis’  gun.     Additionally,  forensic
evidence showed that Bologna  was  shot twice at close range, which
required multiple pulls of the trigger.    Id.  (the defendant’s  act
of  shooting  the  victim  twice  at  close  range  was  circumstantial
evidence of premeditation and deliberation); State v. LaPlanche, 349
N.C.  279,  283,  507  S.E.2d  34,  36  (1998)                                (the  defendant’s  act  of




-25-
shooting  the  victim  four  times  in  the  head  at  close  range  was
circumstantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation).
Based on the evidence presented at trial, we find no error in
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge
of first  degree murder with regard to Jenna Bologna, as there was
sufficient  evidence,  viewed  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the
State, to establish each element of the charge.
VI. Failure to Submit the Charge of Voluntary Manslaughter of
Bologna to the Jury
[9] Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct  the  jury  on  the  charge  of  voluntary  manslaughter  with
regard to Bologna.                                                           “The necessity for instructing the jury as to
an included crime of lesser degree than that charged arises when and
only when there is evidence from which the jury could find that such
included crime of lesser degree was committed.   The presence of such
evidence  is  the  determinative  factor.”    State  v.  Hicks,  241  N.C.
156,  159,  84 S.E.2d  545,  548  (1954).
“Voluntary  manslaughter  is  the  unlawful  killing  of  a  human
being without malice, express or implied, and without premeditation
or  deliberation.     One  who  kills  a  human  being  while  under  the
influence of passion or in the heat of blood produced by adequate
provocation  is  guilty  of  manslaughter.”    State  v.  Wynn,  278  N.C.
513,  518,  180 S.E.2d  135,  139  (1971)  (citations omitted).




-26-
Defendant  relies  on  State  v.  Mathis,  105  N.C.  App.  402,  413
S.E.2d                                                                           301,  disc.  review  denied,   331  N.C.   289,   417  S.E.2d   259
(1992).    In Mathis, the evidence tended to show that the defendant
retreated to his truck from his home after he  and his wife had an
argument.    Id.  at  403,  413  S.E.2d  at  302.    The  defendant’s  wife
attempted to stop him from leaving by opening the car door, trying
to take the keys out of the ignition, and ordering him to get out.
Id.   The defendant then tried to drive away, and in so doing, he ran
over  his  wife,  killing  her.    Id.  at  404,  413  S.E.2d  at  302.    The
defendant  was  convicted  of  voluntary  manslaughter  and  argued  on
appeal  that  there  was  insufficient  evidence  to  support  a  jury
instruction on voluntary manslaughter.    Id.  at  406,  413 S.E.2d at
304.    The Court held that in that situation,  “the victim’s yelling
and threatening behavior would have a natural tendency to arouse the
passions  of  an  ordinary  person.    From  these  facts  the  jury  could
find the victim’s provoking conduct and defendant’s action were of
such close proximity in time that defendant’s mind and disposition
did not cool.”    Id.    Accordingly,  “[i]nsofar as there was evidence
before the court to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter,
it was proper to submit that issue to the jury.”    Id.
Mathis is readily distinguishable.   In the present case, there
was  a  time  lapse  between  the  argument  that  took  place  between
defendant and Bologna and the actual shootings.   Defendant here was




-27-
shot  at,  re-entered  the  home,  shot  Katsigiannis,  then  turned  to
Bologna  and  shot  her  as  well.    Furthermore,  Tam  testified  that
defendant  shot  Bologna  because  she  was  screaming  after  defendant
shot  Katsigiannis,  not  because  of  the  prior  altercation.    Because
there was no evidence that defendant killed Bologna in the heat of
passion,  we  hold  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  refusing  to
instruct the jury on this lesser included offense.
VII. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish Robbery with a
Dangerous Weapon
[10]  Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous
weapon  due  to  insufficiency  of  the  evidence.                             Specifically,
defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that
the  theft  and  the  use  of  force  were  part   of  a  continuous
transaction.
[A]rmed  robbery  is  defined  as  the
taking  of  the  personal  property  of
another  in  his  presence  or  from  his
person   without   his   consent   by
endangering  or  threatening  his  life
with a firearm or other deadly weapon
with the taker knowing that he is not
entitled  to  the  property  and  the
taker    intending    to    permanently
deprive the owner of the property.
State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 102, 261 S.E.2d 114, 119 (1980); N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  14-87  (2007).




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To be found guilty of robbery with a dangerous
weapon,  the  defendant’s  threatened  use  or  use
of  a  dangerous  weapon  must  precede  or  be
concomitant with the taking, or be so joined by
time and circumstances with the taking as to be
part  of  one  continuous  transaction.    Where  a
continuous  transaction  occurs,  the  temporal
order  of  the  threat  or  use  of  a  dangerous
weapon and the taking is immaterial.
State  v.  Olson,                                                             330  N.C.                                  557,   566,   411  S.E.2d   592,   597   (1992)
(citations omitted).
Defendant  asserts  a  strong  similarity  between  his  case  and
Powell.    The evidence in Powell tended to show that the defendant
raped and murdered the victim, then took the deceased’s automobile
and television.    Id. at  100,  261 S.E.2d at  116.    Our Supreme Court
found:
[T]here                                                                       [was]  no  substantial  evidence  giving
rise  to  the  reasonable  inference  that  the
defendant  took  the  objects  from  the  victim’s
presence  by  use  of  a  dangerous  weapon,  an
essential  element  of  robbery  with  a  dangerous
weapon.    The  arrangement  of  the  victim’s  body
and  the  physical  evidence  indicate  she  was
murdered  during  an  act  of  rape.    We  believe
that  even  construing  the  evidence  in  a  light
most favorable to the State, it indicates only
that   defendant   took   the   objects   as   an
afterthought once the victim had died.
Id. at 102, 261 S.E.2d at 119.   Here, there is substantial evidence
that  defendant  used  a  deadly  weapon  to  kill  the  victims  and  then
took their property, not as a mere afterthought, but with the intent
of utilizing the vehicle and cellular telephones, and selling other




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personal property.   Furthermore, in Powell, the killing occurred in
the same transaction as the rape, not the  theft.    That is not the
case here.
The  fact  that  the  victims  were  deceased  at  the  time  of  the
taking is irrelevant.
To accept defendant’s argument would be to say
that  the  use  of  force  that  leaves  its  victim
alive to be dispossessed falls under [N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §]  14-87,  whereas  the  use  of force  that
leaves  him  dead  puts  the  robber  beyond  the
statute’s  reach.    That  the  victim  is  already
dead  when  his  possessions  are  taken  has  not
previously   been   an   impediment   in   this
jurisdiction to the defendant’s conviction for
armed  robbery.    All  that  is  required  is  that
the  elements  of  armed  robbery  occur  under
circumstances  and  in  a  timeframe  that  can  be
perceived as a single transaction.
State  v.  Fields,                                                      315  N.C.   191,   201-02,   337  S.E.2d   518,   524-25
(1985)  (citation and footnote omitted).    Accordingly, we hold that
the  killings  and  the  robbery  occurred  during  one  continuous
transaction.
[11]  Defendant  also  claims  a  lack  of  intent  to  permanently
deprive  either  victim  of  their  property;  however,  there  was
sufficient evidence to show that defendant took the automobile and
other personal property out of the state with no intent of returning
them.
Where   the   evidence   does   not   permit   the
inference   that   defendant   ever   intended   to
return the property forcibly taken but requires




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the   conclusion   that   defendant   was   totally
indifferent   as   to   whether   the   owner   ever
recovered    the    property,    there    is    no
justification  for  indulging  the  fiction  that
the taking was for a temporary purpose, without
any animus furandi or lucri causa.
State v. Smith,  268 N.C.  167,  172,  150 S.E.2d  194,  200  (1966).
In  sum,  we  find  that  all  the  elements  of  robbery  with  a  firearm
were met, and the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the
charge.
VIII. Jury Instruction Regarding Flight
[12]  Lastly,  defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
instructing  the  jury  on  flight  because  there  was  no  evidence  to
support such an instruction.                                                  “So long as there is some evidence in
the  record  reasonably  supporting  the  theory  that  defendant  fled
after commission of the crime charged, the instruction is properly
given.”    State  v.  Irick,  291  N.C.  480,  494,  231  S.E.2d  833,  842
(1977).    Defendant  claims  that  his  traveling  to  New  York  was  a
standard practice and was not evidence of flight.
Tam’s   testimony   provided   that   defendant,   Bologna,   and
Katsigiannis would visit her in New York approximately every other
weekend.    Contrary  to  his  normal  behavior,  defendant  went  to  New
York  alone  on  the  trip  in  question,  telling  police  that  George
allowed him to borrow his car and cellular telephone.   Additionally,
defendant arrived in New York on  a  Saturday, was still within the




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state on Tuesday, and never mentioned a date of departure. This too
was an unusual pattern of behavior for defendant according to Tam’s
testimony.
As  provided  in  Irick,                                                    “[t]he  fact  that  there  may  be  other
reasonable explanations for defendant’s conduct does not render the
instruction improper.”    Id.    Furthermore,  “evidence of flight does
not create a presumption of guilt but is only some evidence of guilt
which may be considered with the other facts  and circumstances in
the case in determining guilt.”    Id.
Based on the evidence provided at trial, there was evidence of
flight.    Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss
the  short  form  indictment;  denying  defendant’s  motion  to  suppress
the  cellular  telephone  records;  admitting  the  four  crime  scene
photographs;  denying  defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  charge  of
second degree murder of Katsigiannis; denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss  the  charge  of  first  degree  murder  of  Bologna;  denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous
weapon; refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter with
regard to Bologna’s death; and instructing the jury on flight.
No Error.




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Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.

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